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Index. LETTER 
TO 
THE RIGHT REVEREND 
EDWARD,  LORD  BISHOP  OF  WORCESTER, 
CONCERNING  SOXE PASSAGES  RELATING  TO 
MR.  LOCKE'S ESSAY  OF  HUMAN  UNDERSTANDING, 
LATE  DISCOURSE  OF  HIS LORDSHIP'S,  IN VINDICATION 
OF THE  TRINITY. LETTER 
TO 
THE  RIGHT REVEREND 
EDWARD,  LORD  BISHOP  OF  WORCESTER. 
MY  LORD, 
I CANNOT but look  upon  it as a  great honour,  that 
your  lordship, who are so thoroughly acquainted with 
the incomparable writings  of  antiquity,  and know so 
well how to entertain yourself with the great men  in 
the commonwealth of  letters,  should at any time take 
into your hand  my mean  papers;  and so far bestow 
any of your valuable  minutes on my Essay of  Human 
Understanding,  as  to  let  the world  see  you  have 
thought my notions worth your  lordship's  considera- 
tion.  My  aim  in that,  as well  as  every  thing else 
written by me, being purely to follow truth as far as I 
could discover it, I think  myself  beholden to whoever 
shows me my mistakes,  as to one who,  concurring in 
my design, helps me forward in my way. 
Your  lordship has  been  pleased to favour me with 
some +houghts  of yours in this kind, in your late learned 
"Discourse,  in Vindication  of  the  Doctrine  of  the 
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Trinity ;"  and I hope I may say, have gone a little out 
of your way to do me that kindness ;  for the obligation 
is thereby the greater.  And if your lordship has brought 
in the  mention  of  my  book  in  a  chapter,  entitled, 
"Objections  against the Trinity, in  Point of Reason, 
answered ;" when, in my whole  Essay, I think there is 
not to be found any thing like an objection against the 
Trinity :  I have the more to acknowledge to your lord- 
ship, who would not let the foreignness of  the subject 
hinder your lordship from endeavouring to set me right, 
as to some errors your lordship apprehends in my book; 
when other writers using some notions like mine, gave 
you that which was occasion enough for you to do me 
the favour to take notice  of what you  dislike in  my 
Essay. 
Your lordship's  name is of so great authority in the 
learned world,  that I,  who profess myself  more ready, 
upon conviction, to recant, than I was at first to pub- 
lish, my mistakes, cannot pay that respect is due to it, 
without telling the reasons why I still retain any of my 
notions,after your lordship's having appeared dissatisfied 
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with them.  This must be my apology, and I hope such 
a  one  as your  lordship will  allow, for  my examining 
what you have printed against several  passages in my 
hook,  and my showing the reasons why it has not pre- 
vailed with me to quit them. 
That your lordship's reasonings may lose none of their 
force by my misapprehending or misrepresenting them, 
(a way too familiarly used  in writings  that have  any 
appearance of controversy) I shall crave  leave to give 
the reader your lordship's arguments in the full strength 
of your own expressions ;  that so in them he may have 
the advantage to see the deficimcf  of  my answers, in 
any point where I shall be  so  un ortunate as  not  to 
pereeive,  or  not  to follow,  the  light  your  lordship 
affords me. 
Your lordship having in the two or three preceding 
pages, justly, as I think, found fault with the account of 
reason, given by the Unitarians and alate  writer, in those 
passages you quote out of them; and then coming to the 
nature of substance, and relating what that author has 
said concerning the mind's getting of simple ideas, and 
those simple ideas being the sole matter and foundation 
of all our reasonings ;  your lordship thus concludes : 
dC Then it follows, that we can have no foundation of 
reasoning,  where  there call  be  no  such  ideas  from 
sensation or reflection." 
ccNow  this is the case of  substance ; it is not intro- 
mitted by the senses, nor  depends upon the operation 
of  the mind ;  and so it cannot be within the compass 
of  our reason.  And  therefore I do not wonder,  that 
the  gentlemen  of  this  new  way  of  reasoning have 
almost  discarded substance out of the reasonable part 
of the world.  For they not only tell us,"  &c. 
This,  as I remember,  is the first  place where  your 
lordship is pleased to quote any thing out of my cc Essay 
of  Human  Understanding,"  which  your lordship does 
in these words following : 
"  That we can have no idea of it by sensation or re- 
flection:  but that nothing  is signified  by it,  only an 
uncertain  supposition of  we  know  not  what."  And 
therefore  it is  paralleled,  more  than  once,  with the 
Indian philosopher's "  He-knew-not-what ;  which  SLIP- 
ported the tortoise,  that supported the elephant, that 
supported the earth: so substance was found out only 
to  support  accidents.  And  that  when  we  talk  of 
substances,  we  talk  like  children;  who,  being  asked 
a  question  about  somewhat  which  they  knew  not, 
readily gave  this  satisfactory answer,  that it is some- 
thing." 
These words of  mine your lordship brings to prove, 
.that I am one ofu  the gentlemen  of  this  new way of 
reasoning, that have almost discarded substance out of 
the  reasonable  part  of  the world."  An  accusation 
which your lordship will pardon me, if I do not readily 
know what to  plead to, because I do not understand what 
is "almost  to discard substance out of the reasonable 
part of  the world."  If  your  lordship  means  by  it, 
that I deny or doubt that there is in the world any such 
thing as substance, that your lordship will acquit me of, 
when  your  lordship  looks  again into that chapter, Bishop of  Worcester.  7  6  Mr. Locke's Letter to the 
which  you  have  cited  more  than once,  where your 
lordship will find these words : 
""When  we  talk or think  of  any  particular  sort 
of corporeal substances, as horse, stone, &c. though the 
idea we have of either of them be but the complication 
or collection of  those  seyeral  simple  ideas of  sensible 
qualities  which  we  use  to find  united  in the  thing 
called horse or stone ;  yet because we cannot conceive 
how they should subsist alone, nor one in another, we 
suppose them  existing  in,  and  supported  by  some 
common  subject,  which  support  we  denote  by  the 
name  substance;  though  it be  certain  we  have  no 
clear  and  distinct  idea  of  that thing we  suppose a 
support."  And  again, 
"  t The same happens concerning the operations of 
the mind, viz. thinking,  reasoning, fearing,  &c. which 
we considering not  to subsist  of  themselves,  nor ap- 
prehending how they can  belong to body, or be pro- 
duced by it, we are apt to think these  the  actions  of 
some other  substance, which we  call  spirit: whereby 
yet it is evident, that having no other idea or notion of 
matter,  but  something wherein  those  many  sensible 
qualities, which affect our senses,  do subsist ;  by sup- 
posing a substance, wherein thinking, knowing, doubt- 
ing, and a power of moving, &c. do subsist, we have as 
clear a notion of  the nature or substance of  spirit,  as 
we  have  of  body;  the  one  being  supposed  to  be 
(without  knowing what it is) the substratum to those 
simple ideas we  have  from  without;  and  the other 
supposed  (with a like  ignorance of  what it is)  to be 
the substratum to those operations, which we experi- 
ment in ourselves within."  And again, 
"2 Whatever  therefore  be  the  secret  nature  of 
substance in general, all the ideas we have of  particu- 
lar distinct substances are nothing  but several  com- 
binations  of  simple  ideas,  co-existing in such, though 
unknown,  cause  of  their  union,  as makes the whole 
subsist of itself." 
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And I further say in the same section,  "That  we 
 upp pose  these  combinations to rest in,  and to be ad- 
herent  to,  that unknown  common  subject, which  in- 
heres  not  in  any thing else.  And  that  our complex 
ideas of substances, besides all those simple ideas they 
are  made  up  of,  have  always the  confused  idea  of 
something  to which they  belong,  and in which  they 
subsist: and therefore when  we  speak  of  any sort of 
substance, we  say it is a thing having such  and  such 
qualities; a body is a thing that is extended, figured, 
and capable of  motion;  a  spirit,  a thing capable  of 
thinking." 
These,  and the like fashions  of speaking, intimate 
that the substance is supposed always  something, be- 
sides the extension, figure,  solidity,  motion,  thinking, 
or other  observable idea,  though  we know not  what 
it is. 
"*Our  idea  of  body,  I say,  is  an  extended,  solid 
substance ;  and our idea of our souls is of a substance 
that thinks."  So that as  long  as there  is  any  such 
thing  as  body  or  spirit in  the world,  I have  done 
nothing towards the discarding  substance  out of  the 
reasonable  part of  the world.  Nay, as long as there 
is any simple idea or sensible quality left, according to 
my way  of  arguing, substance  cannot  be  discarded; 
because  all simple  ideas,  all sensible  qualities, carry 
with  them a supposition  of  a substratum to exist  in, 
and of  a substance wherein  they inhere:  and of  this 
that whole chapter is so full, that I challenge any one 
who reads it to think I have almost, or one jot discarded 
substance out of the reasonable part of the world.  And 
of  this,  man,  horse,  sun,  water,  iron,  diamond,  &c. 
which I have mentioned of distinct sorts of substances, 
will be my witnesses as long as any such thing remains 
in being ;  of which I say, "  .t that the ideas of substances 
are such  combinations  of  simple  ideas as  are  taken 
to represent distinct,  particular  things,  subsisting by 
themselves, in which the supposed or confused idea of 
substance is always the first and chief." 
If by almost discarding substance ou t of the reasonable 
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part of the world your lordship means, that I have de- 
stroyed, and almost discarded the true idea we have of 
it, by calling it '(* a substratum, a supposition of  we 
know  not  what  support of  such  qualities as are ca- 
pable of producing simple ideas in us ;  an obscure and 
relative  idea: that withput  knowing what  it is,  it is 
that which supports accidents ;  so that of substance we 
have  no idea  of  what  it is,  but only a confused  and 
obscure one, of what it does ;" I must confess this, and 
the like I  have  said  of  our  idea  of  substance;  and 
should be very glad to be convinced by your lordship, 
or any-body else, that I have  spoken too meanly of it. 
He that would show me a more clear and distinct idea 
of  substance, would do me a kindness I should  thank 
him  for.  But this  is  the  best  I can  hitherto find, 
either in  my own  thoughts,  or  in  the books  of  logi- 
cians :  for their account or idea of it is, that it is "Ens," 
or "res  per se  subsistens  et substans accidentibus;" 
which  in  effect is  no  more,  but that substance  is a 
being or thing ;  or, in short, something they know not 
what, or of which they have no clearer idea, than that 
it  is  something  which  supports  accidents,  or  other 
simple ideas or modes, and is not supported itself as a 
mode or an accident.  So that I do not  see but Bur- 
gersdicius, Sanderson, and the whole tribe of logicians, 
must  be  reckoned  with "the  gentlemen of  this  new 
way of reasoning, who have almost discarded substance 
out of the reasonable part of the world." 
Rut supposing, my lord, that I or  these gentlemen, 
logicians  of  note  in  the schools, should own, that we 
have a very imperfect, obscure, inadequate idea of sub- 
stance ;  would it not be a little too hard to charge us 
with discarding substance out of the world ?  For what 
almost  discarding,  and reasonable  part of  the world, 
signify, I must confess I do not clearly comprehend :  but 
let almost, and reasonable part, signify here what they 
will, for I dare say your lordship meant something by 
them, would not your  lordship think you were a little 
too hardly dealt with, if for acknowledging yourself to 
have a very imperfect  and inadequate ~dea  of God, or 
of several other things which, in this very treatise, you 
confess  our  understandings  come short in and cannot 
comprehend, you should be accused to be one of these 
gentlemen  that have  almost discarded  God, or those 
other mysterious things, whereof you contend we have 
very imperfect ahd inadequate ideas, out of the rewon- 
able world?  For I suppose  your  lordship  means  by 
almost discarding out of the reasonable world something 
that is blamable, for it smms not to be inserted for a 
commendation ;  and yet I think he deserves no blame, 
who  owns  the having  imperfect, inadequate, obscure 
ideas, where he has no better :  however, if it be inferred 
from thence, that either he almost excludes those things 
out of  being,  or  out of  rational discourse, if that be 
meant  by the reagonable world ;  for  the first  of  these 
will not hold, because the being of things in the world 
depends not on our ideas :  the latter indeed is true, in 
some degree, but is no fault ;  for it is certain, that where 
we have imperfect, inadequate, confused, obscure ideas, 
we  cannot  discourse and reason about those things so 
well, fully, and clearly, as if we had perfect, adequate, 
clear, and distinct ideas. 
Your lordship, I must own, with great reason, takes 
notice that I paralleled,  more  than once,  our  idea of 
substance with the  Indian philosopher's  he-knew-not- 
what, which supported the tortoise, &c. 
This repetition is, I confess, a fault in exact writing J 
but I have acknowledged and excused it  in these words 
in my preface :  "I am not ignorant how little I herein 
consult  my own reputation, when I knowingly let my 
Essay go with a fault so apt to disgust the most judi- 
cious, who are always the nicest readers."  And there 
further add, "that I did not publish my Essay for such 
great masters  of  knowledge  as  your  lordship;  but 
fitted  it to men  of  my own size, to whom repetitions 
might be  sometimes useful."  It would not therefore 
have been besides your lordship's generosity (who were 
not intended to be provoked by the repetition) to have 
passed by such a fault as this, in ohe who pretends not 
beyond the lower rank of writers.  But I see your lord- 
ship would have me exact and without any faults ;  and I Bishop of  Worcester.  11  10  Mr. Locke's  Letter to the 
wish I could be so, the better to deserve your lordship's 
approbation. 
My saying,  "that  when  we  talk  of  substance, we 
talk  like children ;  who being  asked a question about 
something,  which  they know  not,  readily  give  this 
satisfactory answer,  that it is something;"  your  lord- 
ship seems mightily to I:dy to heart, in these words that 
follow : 
"If this be the truth of the case, we  must  still talk 
like children, and I know not how it can be remedied. 
For if we cannot come at a rational idea of  substance.  .  . 
we can have  no principle  of  eertainty to go upon  in 
this debate." 
If your lordship has any better and distincter idea 
of substance than mine is,  which I have  given an ac- 
count of, your lordship is not at all concerned in  what 
I have there said.  But those whose idea of substance, 
whether a rational cr not  rational idea, is like mine, 
something he knows not what,  must in that, with me, 
talk like children, when they speak of  something they 
know  not  what.  For  a  philosopher' that  says,  that 
which  supports accidents is something he knows  not 
what ; and a countryman that says, the foundation of 
the church  at Harlem is  supported by something he- 
knows-not-what ; and a child that stands in  the dark 
upon  his  mother's  muff,  and  says he stands  upon 
something he-knows-not-what ; in this respect talk all 
three  alike.  But if the countryman knows  that the 
foundation of the church at Harlem is supported by a 
rock, as the houses about Bristol are ;  or by gravel, as 
the houses about London are ;  or by wooden  piles,  as 
the houses  in Amsterdam  are; it is  plain, that then, 
having  a  clear  and  distinct  idea  of  the thing that 
supports the church, he does not talk of this matter as 
a child ; nor will he of the support of  accidents, when 
he has a clearer and more distinct idea of it, than that 
it is barely something.  But as long as we  think like 
children, in cases *where  our  ideas  are no  clearer nor 
distincter than theirs, I agree with your lordship, that 
I know not how it can be remedied, but that we must 
talk like them. 
Your lordship's  next paragraph begins thus :  "I do 
not  say,  that we  can have a clear  idea  of  substance, 
either  by  sensation  or  reflection;  but from hence I 
argue,  that this  is  a  very  insufficient  distribution  of 
the ideas necessary to reason." 
Your lordship here argues against a proposition that 
1 know nobody that holds :  I am sure the author of the 
Essay of  Human Understanding never thought, nor in 
that Essay hath any where said, that the ideas that come 
into the mind by sensation and reflection are all the  ideas 
that are necessary to reason, or that reason is exercised 
about; for then he must have laid by  all the ideas of 
simple and mixed modes and relations, and the complex 
ideas of the species  of  substances, about which he has 
spent so many chapters ;  and must have denied that  these 
complex ideas are the objects of men's thoughts or rea- 
sonings, which he is far enough from.  All that he has 
said about sensation and reflection is, that all our simple 
ideas are received by them, and that these simple ideas 
are the foundation of  a11  our knowledge, forasmuch as 
all our complex, relative, and general ideas are made by 
the  mind,  abstracting,  enlarging,  comparing,  com- 
pounding,  and referring,  &c.  these simple  ideas,  and 
their  several  combinations,  one  to another; whereby 
complex  and general ideas are formed of modes, rela- 
tions, and the several species of substances, all which are 
made use of by reason, as well as the other faculties of 
the mind. 
I therefore agree with your lordship, that the ideas of 
sensation or reflection is a very insufficient  distribution 
of the ideas necessary to reason.  Only my agreement 
with  your lordship had been more entire to the whole 
sentence, if your lordship had rather said, ideas made use 
of by reason ;  because I do not well know what is meant 
by ideas necessary to  reason.  For reason being a faculty 
of the mind, nothing, in my poor opinion, can properly 
be said to be necessary to that faculty,  but what is re- 
quired to its being.  As nothing is necessary to sight in 
a man, but such a constitution of  the body and organ, 
that a man may have the power of seeing; so I submit 
it to your lordship, whether any thing can properly be 12  Mr. Locke's Letter  to the  Bishop  of Worcester.  IS 
said to  be necessary to reason in a man, but such a con- 
stitution of  body or  mind,  or  both,  as may give hirn 
the power of reasoning.  Indeed, such a particular sort 
of objects or instruments may be sometimes said to be 
necessary to the eye, but it is never said in reference to 
the faculty of seeing, but in reference to  some particular 
end of  seeing ; and thdn a microscope and a mite may 
be necessary to the eye, if the end proposed be to know 
the shape.  and parts of that animal.  And so if a man 
would reason about substance, then the idea of substance 
is necessary to his reason :  but yet I doubt not but that 
many a rational creature has been,  who,  in all his life, 
never bethought himself of any necessity his reason had 
of an idea of substance. 
Your lordship's  next words are ;  "  for besides these, 
there must be some general ideas which the mind doth 
form,  not  by mere  comparing those ideas  it has  got 
from  sense  or  reflection,  but  by  forming  distinct 
general notions of things from particular ideas." 
Here, again, I perfectly agree with your lordship, that 
besides the particular ideas received frbm sensation and 
reflection, the mind cc forms general ideas, not by mere 
comparing those  ideas it has got by sensation and re- 
flection;"  for  this  I  do  not  remember  I  ever  said. 
But this I say, "  * ideas become general, by separating 
from them the circumstances  of  time  and place,  and 
any other ideas that may determine  them  to this  or 
that particular existence.  By this way of abstraction 
they are made,"  &c.  And to the same purpose I ex- 
plain myself in another place t. 
Your lordship says,  'c  the mind forms general ideas, 
by forming  general notions  of things from  particular 
ideas."  And  I  say,  "the  mind  forms  general ideas, 
abstracting from  particular  ones."  So that there is 
no difference that I perceive between us in this matter, 
but only a little in expression. 
It follows, "and  amongst  these  general notions, or 
rational ideas,  substance is one  of the first; because 
we find, that we can  have  no  true conceptions of any 
modes  or  accidents  (no  matter which)  but  we must 
collceive  a  substratum,  or  subject wherein  they  are. 
Since it  is  a  repugnancy  to our  first conceptions of 
things, that modes or accidents should subsist by them- 
selves;  and  therefore  the rational  idea  of  substance 
is one of the first and most natural ideas in our minds." 
Whether the general idea of  substance be one of the 
first or most natural ideas in our minds, I will not dis- 
pute with your lordship,  as  not  being,  I  think,  very 
material to the matter in hand.  But as to the idea of 
substance, what  it is, and how  we  come by  it,.  your 
lordship says, "  it is a repugnancy to our conceptions of 
things,  that  modes  and  accidents  should  subsist  by 
themselves ; and therefore we must conceive a substra- 
tum wherein they are." 
And,  I  say,  "  * because  we  cannot  conceive  how 
simple ideas of  sensible  qualities should subsist alone, 
or  one  in  another, we  suppose them existing in, and 
supported by, some common subject."  Which I, with 
your lordship, call also substratumt. 
What can be more consonant to itself, than what your 
lordship and I have said in these two passages is conso- 
nant to one  another ?  Whereupon, my lord, give me 
leave, I beseech you, to boast to the world, that what I 
have said concerning our general idea of substance, and 
the way how we come by it, has the honour to be con- 
firmed  by  your lordship's  authority.  And  that from 
hence I may be sure the saying, [that the general idea we 
have of substance is, that it  is a substratum or support to 
modes or accidents, wherein they do subsist:  and that 
the mind forms it, because it cannot conceive how they 
should  subsist of  themselves,]  has no  objection in  it 
against the Trinity ;  for then your lordship will not, I 
know, be of  that opinion, nor own it in a chapter where 
you are answering objections against the Trinity; how- 
ever my words, which amount to no more, have been (I 
know not how) brought into that chapter: though what 
they have to do there, I must confess to your lordship, I 
do not yet see. 
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In the next words your lordship says, "  but we are 
still told,  that our understanding  can  have no other 
ideas, but either from sensation or reflection." 
The words of  that section your lordship quotes, are 
these :  cc "  the understanding seems to me, not to have 
the least  glimmering sf any ideas,  which  it doth not 
receive from one of  these two.  External objects fur- 
nish the mind with the ideas of sensible qualities, which 
are all those different perceptions they produce in us : 
and the mind furnishes the understanding with ideas of 
its own operations.  These, when we have taken a full 
survey  of  them,  and  their  several  modes,  and  the 
compositions  made out of  them, we  shall find to con- 
tain all our own stock of  ideas ;  and that we have no- 
thing in our minds which did not come in one of  those 
two ways.  Let any one  examine his  own  thoughts, 
and thoroughly  search  into his  own  understanding, 
and  then  let him  tell  me,  whether  a11  the original 
ideas  he has  there, are any other than of  the objects 
of  his  senses,  or of  the operations  of his  mind,  con- 
sidered  as objects of  his  reflection:  and how great a 
mass  of  knowledge soever  he imagines to be lodged 
there,  he will,  upon taking a strict view, see, that he 
has  not  any idea in his  mind but what  one of  these 
two  have  imprinted,  though,  perhaps,  with  infinite 
variety compounded  and  enlarged by the understand- 
ing, as we shall see hereafter." 
These words seem to me to signify something differ- 
ent from what your lordship has cited out  of them ;  and 
if  they do  not, were  intended, I  am  sure,  by  me,  to 
signify all those complex ideas of  modes, relations, and 
specific substances, which how the mind itself forms out 
of  simple ideas, I have showed in the following part of 
my book ;  and intended to refer to it by these words, 
"as  we  shall see  hereafter,"  with which  I  close  that 
paragraph. But  if by ideas your lordship signifies simple 
ideas, in the words you have set down, I grant then they 
contain my  sense,  viz.  "that  our understandings  can 
have (that is,  in the natural exercise of  our faculties) 
* B. ii.  c. I.  $ 5. 
no  other  simple  ideas,  but  either  from  sensation  or 
Your lordship goes on : "and [we are still told] that 
herein  chiefly  lies  the excellency of  mankind  above 
brutes,  that these  cannot abstract and enlarge ideas, 
as men do." 
Had your lordship done me the favour to have quoted 
the place in my book, from whence you had taken these 
words, I should not  have been at a loss  to find them. 
Those in  my book, which I can  remember  any where 
come nearest to them, run thus : 
This,  I  think,  I  may  be -positive  in,  that  the 
power of  abstracting is not at all in brutes ;  and that 
the having of general ideas is that which puts a perfect 
distinction betwixt  man and brutes ; and  is  an excel- 
lency which the faculties of brutes do by no means at- 
tain to*." 
Though, speaking of the faculties of  the human un- 
derstanding, I took occasion, by the by, to conjecture 
how far brutes partook with men  in  any of  the intel- 
lectual faculties ;  yet it never entered into my thoughts, 
on that occasion, to compare the utmost perfections of 
human nature with that of brutes, and therefore was far 
from  saying,  "herein  chiefly  lies  the  excellency  of 
mankind  above  brutes,  that  these  cannot  abstract 
and enlarge their ideas,  as men  do."  For  it  seems 
to me an absurdity I  would not willingly be guilty of, 
to  say, that "  the excellency of  mankind lies chiefly, or 
any  ways in this,  that brutes cannot abstract."  For 
brutes  not being able to do any thing, cannot be any 
excellency of  mankind.  The ability of  mankind does 
not lie  in  the impotency or disabilities of  brutes.  If 
your lordship had charged me to have said, that herein 
lies one excellency of  mankind above brutes, viz.  that 
men can, and brutes cannot abstract, I must have owned 
it to be my sense; but what I ought to say to what your 
lordship approved or disapproved of in it, I shall better 
understand, when I know to  what purpose your lordship 
was pleased to cite it. 
The immediately  following  paragraph  runs  thus : 
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6c but how comw the pnersl idea of  substance to be 
framed in our minds ?'  Is this by  "abstracting  and 
enlarging sirnple ideas ?"  No,  "  * but it is by  a compli- 
cation of many simple ideas together :  because not ima- 
gining how these simple ideas can subsist by themselves, 
we  accustom  ourselvgs  to suppose  some substratum 
wherein  they  do  subsist,  and  from  whence  they  do 
result,  which  therefore  we  call  substance:'  And  is 
this  all  indeed,  that is  to be  said  for  the being  of 
substance, "  that we accustom  ourselves  to suppose a 
substratum?"  Is  that custom  grounded upon  true 
reason, or not?  If not, then accidents or modes must 
"  subsist of  themselves, and these simple ideas need no 
tortoise to support  them: for figures and colours, &c. 
would  do  well  enough  of  themselves,  but  for  some 
fancies men have accustomed themselves to." 
Herein your  lordship  seems to charge me with two 
faults :  one, that I make "  the general idea of substance 
to be framed, not by abstracting and enlarging simple 
ideas,  but by  a  complication  of  many  simple  ideab 
together :"  the other,  as  if  I  had said,  the being of 
substance had no other foundation but the fancies of 
men. 
As to the first of  these, I beg leave to remind your 
lordship, that I say in more places than one, and parti- 
cularly those above quoted, where ex profess0 I treat of 
abstraction and general ideas, that  they are all made by 
abstracting;  and therefore could not be understood to 
mean, that that of  substance was made any other way; 
however my pen might have slipped, or the negligence 
of expression, where I might have something else than 
the general idea of substance in view, make me seem to 
say so. 
That 1 was not speaking of  the general idea of  snb- 
stance in the passage your lordship quotes, is manifest 
from the title of  that chapter, which is, "  of  the com- 
plex ideas  of  substance."  And the first section of  it, 
which your lordship cites for those words you have set 
down, stands thus : 
'' t The  mind being, as I have declared, furnished with 
* B. ii.  c. 23. j  4,  t Ibid.  $ 1. 
El  great number of  the simple ideas corlveyed in by the 
senses, as they are found  in exterior things, or by  rc- 
flections  on  its  own  o  erations;  takes  notice  also, 
that a certain number  o  F these  simple ideas  go con- 
stantly together; which being  presumed to belong to 
one thing, and words being suited to common apprehen- 
sion, and made use of for quick despatch, are called, so 
united  in one  subject, by one  name; which, by  inad-. 
vertency, we are apt qfterward to talk of,  and consider 
as  one simple idea,  which indeed is a  complication of 
many ideas together :  because, as I have said, not ima- 
gining how these simple ideas can subsist by themselves, 
we  accustom  ourselves  to suppose some  substratum, 
wherein they  do subsist, and from which they do re- 
sult; which therefore we call substance." 
In which words, I do not observe any that deny the 
general idea of substance to be made by abstraction ;  nor 
any that say,  "it is made by  a complication of  many 
simple  ideas  together."  But speaking in  that place 
of the ideas of distinct substances, such as man, horse, 
gold, &c.  I say they are made up of  certain combina- 
tions  of  simple ideas ;  which combinations are looked 
upon, each of  them, as one simple idea, though they are 
many;  and we call it by one name of substance, though 
made up of  modes,  from  the custom  of  supposing a 
substratum, wherein that combination does subsist.  So 
that in this paragraph I only give an account of the idea 
of  distinct substances, such as oak, elephant, iron, &c. 
how, though they are made up of distinct complications 
of  modes, yet they are looked on as one idea, called by 
one name, as making distinct sorts of  substances. 
But that my notion of  substance in general is quite 
different from these,  and has no such  combination of 
simple  ideas  in  it,  is  evident  from  the immediately 
following words, where I say ;  the idea of pure sub- 
stance in general is only a supposition of  we know not 
what support of  such qualities as are capable of  pro- 
ducing simple ideas in us."  And  these two I plainly 
distinguish all along, particularly where I say, "  t what- 
ever  therefore be  the secret  and  abstract  nature  of 
* B.  ii. c. 23.  5 2.  + Ibid.  $ 6. 
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substance in  general,  all the  ideas we  have  of  par- 
ticular  distinct  substances  are  nothing  but  several 
combinations  of  simple  ideas,  co-existing  in  such, 
though unknown,  cause of  their  union,  as makes the 
whole subsist of  itself." 
The other thing laid. to my charge, is as if  I took the 
being of substance to be doubtful, or rendered it so by 
the imperfect and ill-grounded idea I have given of  it. 
To  which I beg leave to say, that I ground not the being, 
but the idea of substance, on our accustoming ourselves 
to  suppose some substratum; for it is of the idea alone I 
speak there,  and not of  the being of  substance.  And 
having every-where  affirmed  and built upon it,  that a 
man is a substance; I cannot be supposed to question or 
doubt of  the being of substance, till I can question or 
doubt of my own being.  Further I say, "  * that sensa- 
tion  cor~vinces  us  that there are solid  extended  sub- 
stances ;  and reflection,  that there are thinking ones." 
So  that I think the being of  substance is not shaken by 
what I have said:  and if  the idea of  it should be,  yet 
(the being of  things depending not on our ideas) the 
being of  substance would  not be at all shaken by my 
saying, we had but an obscure imperfect idea of  it, and 
that that idea came from our accustoming ourselves to 
suppose  some substratum;  or indeed, if  I should say, 
we had no idea of  substance at  all.  For a great many 
things may be and are granted to have a being, and be 
in nature, of  which we have no ideas.  For example;  it 
cannot be doubted but there are distinct species of sepa- 
rate spirits, of which we have no distinct ideas at  all :  it 
cannot be questioned but spirits have ways of communi- 
cating their thoughts, and yet we have no idea of it  at  all. 
The being then of  substance being safe and secure, 
notwithstanding any thing I have said, let us see whe- 
ther the idea of  it be not so too.  Your lordship asks, 
with concern, "  and is this all indeed that is to be said 
for the being" (if  your lordship  please,  let it be the 
idea) "of  substance,  that we  accustom  ourselves  to 
suppose  a  substratum?  Is  that  custom  grounded 
upon  true  reason,  or  no?"  I  have  said,  that  it  is 
gou~ded  upon this, '(  *  that we cannot conceive how 
simple ideas of  sensible qualities should subsist alone, 
and therefore we suppose  them  to exist in, and to be 
supported by, some common subject, which support we 
denote by the name substance."  Which I think is a true 
reason, because it is the same your lordship grounds the 
supposition of  a substratum on, in this very page; even 
on  "repugnancy  to our  conceptions,  that modes and 
accidents should subsist by themselves."  So that I have 
the good luck here again to agrea with your lordship: 
and consequently conclude, I have your approbation in 
this, that the substratum to modes or accidents, which 
is our idea of  substance in general, is founded in this, 
"that we cannot conceive how modes or accidents can 
subsist by themselves." 
The words next following, are :  "if  it be grounded 
upop plain and evident reason, then we must allow an 
ides of  substance, which  comes not in by  sensation or 
reflection;  and  so  we  may  be  certain  of  something 
which we have not by those ideas." 
These words of your lordship's  contain nothing, that 
I see in them,  against me:  for  1 never  said that the 
general idea of  substance comes in by sensation and re- 
flection;  or, that it is  a  simple  idea  of  sensation  or 
reflection, though it be ultimately founded ill them: for 
it is a complex idea,  made up of  the general idea of 
something, or being, with the  relation of  a support to 
accidents.  For general ideas come not  into the mind 
by sensation or  reflection,  but are the creatures or in- 
ventions of the understanding,as, I think, I have sliownt : 
and also, how the mind makes them from ideas, which 
it has got by sensation  and reflection:  and as to the 
ideas of  relation, how the mind  forms  thcm, and how 
they  are derived  from,  and  ultimately terminate  in, 
ideas of sensation and reflection, I have likewise shown*. 
But that I may not be mistaken what I mean, when 
T  speak of  ideas of  sensation and reflection,  as the ma- 
terials of all our knowledge; give me leave, my lord, to 
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set down  a  place  or two out of  my book, to explain 
myself;  as  I  thus  speak  of  ideas  of  sensation  and 
reflection : 
"  * That these, when  we have taken a full survey of 
them,  and their several  modes,  and the compositions 
made  out of  them,  we  shall  find to contain  all our 
whole  stock  of  ideas;-and  we  have  nothing  in  our 
minds, which did not come in one of  those two ways." 
This thought, in another place, I express thus : 
"  t These  simple  ideas,  the  materials  of  all  our 
knowledge, are suggested and furnished to the mind 
only  by  these  two ways above-mentioned,  viz. sensa- 
tion and reflection."  And again, 
"  $ These are the most considerable  of  those simple 
ideas which the mind has, and out of which is made all 
its other knowledge;  all which  it receives  by the two 
fore-mentioned ways of sensation and reflection."  And, 
"  § Thus I have, in  a short draught, given a view of 
our original ideas, from whence all the rest are derived, 
and of which they are made up." 
This, and the like said in other places, is what I have 
thought concerning ideas of  sensation and reflection, as 
the foundation and materials of all our ideas, and con- 
sequently of all our knowledge.  I have set down these 
particulars out of  my book, that the reader, having a 
full view of my opinion herein, may the better see what 
in it is liable to your lordship's  reprehension.  For that 
your lordship is not very well satisfied with it, appears 
not only by the words under consideration, but by these 
also:  "But we  are still told,  that our understanding 
can have no other ideas,  but either  from  sensation or 
reflection.  And,  let us  suppose this  principle to be 
true, that the simple  ideas, by sensation or reflection, 
are the sole matter and  foundation of  all our reason- 
ing." 
Your lordship's argument,in the passage we are upon, 
stands  thus : "  If  the  general  idea  of  substance  be 
grounded  upon  plain  and  evident  reason,  then  we 
must  allow an idea of  substance, which  comes not in 
by  sensation  or  reflection."  This  is  a  consequence 
which, with submission, I think will  not hold, because 
it is founded on a  supposition which, I think, will  not 
hold,  viz. that reason and ideas are inconsistent;  for if 
that supposition be not true, then the general idea of 
substance may be grounded on plain and evident reason : 
and yet it will  not  follow from thence,  that it is  not 
ultimately grounded on, and derived from, ideas which 
come in by sensation or reflection, and so cannot be said 
to come in by sensation or reflection. 
To explain myself,  and  clear  my  meaning  in this 
matter:  all the ideas of  a11  the sensible qualities of  a 
cherry come into my mind  by sensation ;  the ideas of 
perceiving,  thinking,  reasoning,  knowing,  &c. come 
into my mind by reflection :  the ideas of  these qualities 
and actions, or powers, are perceived by the mind to be 
by themselves inconsistent with existence ; or,  as your 
lordship well expresses it,  cc we find that we can have 
no true conception of  any modes  or accidents, but we 
must conceive a  substratum or  subject, wherein  they 
are;"  i.  e. that they cannot exist or  subsist of  them- 
selves.  Hence the mind perceives their necessary con- 
nexion with inherence or being supported;  which being 
a relative idea superadded to the red colour in a cherry, 
or to thinking in a man, the mind frames the correlative 
idea of  a support.  For I never denied,  that the mind 
could frame to itself ideas of relation, but have showed 
the quite contrary in my chapters about relation.  But 
because a relation cannot be founded in nothing, or be 
the relation of  nothing, and the thing here related as a 
supporter or support is not represented to the mind by 
any clear and distinct idea; therefore the obscure, in- 
distinct, vague idea of  thing or something, is all that is 
left to be the positive idea, which has the relation of a 
support  or  substratum  to modes  or  accidents;  and 
that general indetermined idea of something, is, by  the 
abstraction of the mind, derived  also from the simple 
ideas of  sensation and reflection:  and thus  the mind, 
from  the  positive, simple ideas got by sensation or reflec- 
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which, without the positive simple ideas, it would never 
have. 
This your  lordship (without giving by retail all the 
particular steps of  the mind  in  this business) has well 
expressed in this more familiar way : 
"  We find  we  can have no true conception of  any 
modes  or  accidents, bixt  we  must conceive a substta- 
tum or  subject wherein they are ; since it is  a repug- 
nancy  to  our  conceptions  of  things,  that  modes  or 
accidents should subsist by themselves." 
Hence your lordship calls it the rational idea of sub. 
stance:  and says, '' I  grant that by sensation  and re- 
flection  we  come  to know the powers  and properties 
of  things ; but our reason is satisfied that there must 
be  something beyond  these,  because  it. is  impossible 
that  they  should  subsist  by themselves."  So that if 
this be that which your lordship means by the rational 
idea of  substance, I  see nothing there is in it against 
what I have said, that it is founded on simple ideas  of 
sensation  or  reflection,  and  that it is a very  obscure 
idea. 
Your  lordship's  conclusion  from  your  foregoing 
words  is,  "and  so  we may be  certain of  some things 
which  we have not by  those ideas :"  which is  a  pro- 
position, whose precise meaning your lordship will for- 
give me if I profess, as it stands there, I do not under- 
stand.  For it is uncertain to me, whether your lordship 
means, we inay certainly know the existence of  some- 
thing which  we have  not by those ideas ; or certainly 
know the distinct properties of something which we have 
not by those ideas ; or certainly know the truth of some 
proposition which we have not by those ideas:  for to be 
certain of something, may signify either of  these.  But 
in which soever of  these it be meant, I do not see how 
T am concerned in it. 
Your lordship's next paragraph is as followeth : 
"  The idea  of  substance,  we  are told  again, is  no- 
thing  but  the  supposed,  but  unknown  support  of 
those  qualities  we  find  existing,  which  wc  imagifie 
cannot  subsist,  sine re substante ;  which, according  to 
the  true  import  of  the  word,  is  in  plain  English 
standing under or upholding.  But very little weight 
is to be laid upon a bare grammatical etymology, when 
the word is used in another  sense by the best authors, 
such  as  Cicero  and  Quintilian ; who  take substance 
for  the same  as  essence,  as  Valla  hath proved ; and 
so  the Greek  word  imports:  but Boethius  in  trans- 
lating Aristotle's  Predicaments,  rather chose the word 
substance,  as  more  proper  to  express  a  compound 
being,  and reserved  essence  for what was simple and 
immaterial.  And in  this sense  substance was not ap- 
plied  to God,  but only essence,  as St. Augustine ob- 
serves." 
Your lordship here seems to dislike my taking notice, 
that the derivation of  the word  substance favours the 
idea we have of  it; and your lordship tells me, "  that 
very little weight is to be laid  on  a bare grammatical 
etymology."  Though little weight were to be laid on 
it, if there were nothing else to be said for it; yet when 
it was brought to confirm an idea which your lordship 
allows of, nay, calls a rational idea, and says is founded 
in evident reason, I do not see what your lordship had 
to blame in it.  For though Cicero and Quintilian take 
substantia for the same with essence,  as your lordship 
says ;  or for riches and estate, as I think they also do ; 
yet I suppose it will be true, that substantia is derived 
d substando,  and that that shows the original import 
of the word.  For, my lord, I have been long of opinion, 
as may be seen in my book,  that  if  we  knew the ori- 
ginal of all the words we meet with, we should thereby 
be very much helped to know the ideas they were first 
applied to and made to stand for ;  and therefore I must 
-beg  your lordship to excuse  this conceit  of  mine,  this 
etymological observation especially,  since  it hath no- 
thing in it against the truth, nor against your lordship's 
idea of substance. 
But your lordship opposes to this etymology the use 
of  the word  substance  by the best authors in another 
sense ;  and thereupon give the world a learned account 
of the use of the word substance, in a sense wherein it is 
not taken for the substratum of  accidents : however, I 
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ship, that I use it in the same sense your lordship does, 
and that your lordship thinks not fit to govern yourself 
by those authorities; for then your lordship could not 
apply the word substa,nce to God, as Boethius did not, 
and as your lordship has proved out of  St. Augustine, 
that it was not applied,  Though I guess it is the con- 
sideration of  substance,  as  it is  applied  to God,  that 
brings it into your lordship's  present discourse.  But if 
your lordship and I (if without presumption I may join 
myself with you) have, in the use of the word substance, 
quitted the example of  the best  authors,  I think the 
authority of  the schools,  which  has  a  long time been 
allowed in philosophical terms, will bear us out in this 
matter. 
In the remaining  part of  this paragraph it follows : 
"  but afterwards the names of  substance  and essence 
were promiscuously used,  with respect to God and his 
creatures; and  do imply  that  which  makes  the real 
being,  as  distinguished  from  modes  and  properties. 
And  so  the substance  and essence  of  a man  are the 
same;  not being  taken  for  the individual  substance, 
which cannot be understood without particular modes  , 
and properties;  but  the general substance  or  nature 
of  man,  abstractedly  from  all  the circumstances  of 
person." 
Here your lordship makes these terms general sub- 
stance, nature, and essence, to signify the same thing ; 
how properly I shall not here inquire.  Your lardship 
goes on- 
"  And I desire to know,  whether,  according to true 
reason,  that be not a clear idea of  man ; not of Peter, 
James, or John, but of  a man as such." 
This,  I  think,  nobody  denies:  nor  can  any  body 
deny it, who will not say, that the general abstract idea 
which he has in his mind of a sort or species of animals 
that he calls man, ought not to have that general name 
man applied to it :  for that is all (as I humbly conceive) 
which these words of your lordship here amount to. 
"  This,  your lordship says,  is  not a  mere universal 
name,  or  mark,  or  sign."  Your  lordship  says it is 
an idea, and every body must grant  it to be an idea ;  and 
therefore it is,  in my opinion,  safe enough from being 
thought a mere name,  or mark,  or sign of  that idea. 
For he must think very oddly,  who  takes the general 
name of  any idea, to be the general idea itself:  it is a 
mere  mark or  sign of  it without  doubt,  and nothing 
else.  Your lordship adds : 
(6  But there is  as clear and distinct a conception of 
this  in  our minds,  as we  can  have  from  any  such 
simple ideas as are conveyed by our senses." 
If your lordship means by this, (as the words seem to 
me to import) that we can have as clear and distinct an 
idea of the general substance, or nature, or essence of the 
species man,  as  we  have of  the particular colour and 
figure of a man when we look  on him,  or of  his voice 
when we hear him speak, I must crave leave to dissent 
from your lordship.  Because the idea we have of  the 
substance, wherein the properties of a man do inhere, is 
a very obscure idea ;  so in that part our general idea of 
man is  obscure  and confused :  as also, how that sub- 
stance is differently modified in the different species of 
creatures, so as to have different properties and powers 
whereby they are distinguished, that also we have very 
obscure, or rather no distinct ideas of at all.  But there 
is no obscurity or confusion at all in the idea of a figure 
that I clearly see, or of a sound that I distinctly hear; 
and such are, or may be,  the ideas that are conveyed 
in by sensation or reflection.  It follows : 
" I do not deny that the distinction  of  particular 
substances,  is  by the several modes and properties of 
them,  (which  they may call a complication of  simple 
ideas if  they please) ;  but I do assert, that the general 
idea which relates to the essence, without these,  is so 
just and true an idea,  that without it the complication 
of  simple ideas will  never  give  us  a  right notion  of 
:4.  9) 
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Here, I think,  tha,t your lordship asserts, "  that the 
general idea of  the real  essence  (for  so I understand 
general idea which relates to the essence) without the 
modes and properties,  is  a just  and true idea."  For 
example ;  the real essence of a thing is that internal con- 
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Now your lordship seems to me to acknowledge,  that 
that internal constitution or essence we  cannot know ; 
for your lordship says, '' that from the powers and pro- 
perties  of  things which  are knowable  by  us,  we may 
know  as  much  of  the internal essence  of  things  as 
these powers  and properties  discover."  That is un- 
questionably  so;  but if  those  powers  and  properties 
discover no more  of  those  internaI  essences,  but that 
there are internal essences, we shall know only that there 
are internal essences, but shall have no idea or concep- 
tion at all of what they are ;  as your lordship seems to 
confess  in  the next  words  of  the same  page,  where 
you add :  " I do not say, that we can know all essences 
of things alike, nor that we can attain to a perfect un- 
derstanding of  all that belong to them ; but if we can 
know so much,  as that there are certain beings in the 
world,  endowed  with  such  distinct powers  and pro- 
perties,  what  is  it  we  complain  of  the want  of?" 
Wherein your lordship seems  to terminate  our know- 
ledge of  those interhal essences in this, "  that there 
are certain beings indued with distinct powers and pro- 
perties."  But what  these  beings,  these  internal es- 
sences are, that we have no distinct conceptions of; as 
your lordship confesses yet plainer a little after, in these 
words :  for "  although we  cannot  comprehend  the in- 
ternal frame and constitution of  things."  So that we 
having, as is confessed, no idea of what this essence, this 
internal constitution of things on which their properties 
depend, is ;  how can we say it  is any way a just and true 
idea? But your lordship says, "  it is so  just and true 
an idea,  that without  it the  contemplation  of  simple 
ideas will never give us a right notion of  it."  All the 
idea we have of it, which is only that there is an internal, 
though unknown constitution of  things on which their 
properties depend,  sirnple ideas of  sensation and reflec- 
tion,  and the contemplation of them, have alone helped 
us to ;  and because they can help us no further, that is 
the reason we have no perfecter notion of  it. 
That  which your lordship seems to me principally to 
drive at, in this  and the foregoing paragraph,  is,  to 
assert, that the general substance of man, and so of any 
other species, is that which makes the real being of that 
abstractly from the individuals of  that species. 
BV  general  substance  here, I  suppose,  your  lordship 
rnians the general idea of  substance:  and that which 
induces me to take the liberty to suppose so is,  that I 
think your  lordship is here discoursing of  the idea of 
substance, and how we come by it.  And if your lord- 
ship should mean otherwise, I must take the liberty to 
deny there is any such thing in rerum natura as a ge- 
neral substance that exists itself, or makes any thing. 
Taking it then for granted that your lordship says, 
that this is the general idea of substance, viz. '(  that it 
is that which makes the real being of any thing;"  your 
lordship says, "  that it is  as  clear  and distinct a con- 
ception in  our minds,  as we  can have from any such 
simple ideas as are conveyed by our senses."  Here I 
must crave leave to dissent from your lordship.  Your 
lordship says,  in the former part of  this page, '(  that 
substance and essence  do imply that which makes the 
real being."  Now what,  I beseech  your  lordship,  do 
these words, that which,  here signify more than some- 
thing? And the idea expressed by something, I am apt 
to think, your lordship will not say is  as  clear and di- 
stinct a conception or idea in the mind,  as the idea of 
the red colour of a cherry, or the bitter taste of worm- 
wood,  or the figure of  a  circle brought into the mind 
by your senses. 
Your lordship farther says, "  it makes"  (whereby,  I 
suppose,  your lordship means,  constitutes or is) 6c the 
real  being,  as  distinguished  from  modes  and  pro- 
perties ." 
For example, my lord, strip  this supposed general idea 
of a man or gold of  all its modes  and properties,  and 
then tell me whether your lordship has as clear and di- 
stinct an idea of what remains, as you have of the figure 
of the one,  or  the yellow colour of  the other.  I must 
confess the remaining something to me affords so vague, 
confused, and obscure an idea, that I cannot say I have 
any distinct conception of it ;  for barely by being some- 
thing,  it is not  in my mind clearly distinguished from 
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cherry, for they are  something too.  If your lordship 
has a clear and distinct idea of  that "something which 
makes the real being as distinguished from all its modes 
and  properties,"  your  lordship  must  enjoy  the pri- 
vilege of  the sight and clear ideas you have : nor can 
you be denied them,  because I have not the like ;  the. 
dimness of my conceptions must not pretend to hinder 
the clearness of your lordship's,  any more than the want 
of them in a blind man can debar your lordship of  the 
clear and distinct ideas of colours.  The obscurity I find 
in my own mind, when I examine what positive, general, 
simple idea of  substance I have,  is  such  as I profess, 
and further than that I cannot go; but what, and how 
clear it is in the understanding of  a seraphim, or of an 
elevated mind, that I cannot determine.  Your lordship 
goes on- 
" I must do that right to the ingenious author of the 
Essay of  Human Understanding  (from  whence  these 
notions are borrowed to serve other purposes  than he 
intended them) that he makes the case of spiritual and 
corporeal substances to be alike, as to their ideas.  And 
that we have as clear a notion  of  a  spirit  as we have 
of a body ;  the one being supposed to be the substratum 
to those simple ideas we have from without,  and the 
other  of  those  operations  we  find  within  ourselves. 
And that it is  as rational to affirm,  there is no body, 
because we cannot know its essence,  as it is called, or 
have no idea of  the substance of matter ;  as to say there 
is no spirit, because we know not its essence,  or have 
no idea of a spiritual substance. 
('  From hence it follows, that we may be certain that 
there are both spiritual and bodily substances, although 
we can have no clear and distinct ideas of them.  But 
if our reason depend upon our clear and distinct ideas, 
how is this possible ?  We cannot reason without clear 
ideas,  and yet we  may be certain without them : can 
we  be  certain  without  reason? Or,  doth  our  reason 
give us true notions of  things, without these ideas? If 
it be so, this new hypothesis about reason must appear 
to be very unreasonable." 
That which  your lordship  seems  to argue here,  is, 
that we may be certain without clear and distinct ideas. 
Who your lordship here argues against, under the title 
of this new hypothesis about reason, I confess I do not 
know.  For I do not remember that I have any where 
placed certainty only in clear and distinct ideas, but in 
the clear and visible connexion of  any of  our ideas, be 
those ideas what they will ; as will  appear  to any one 
who will look into B. iv. c. 4.  5 18, and B. iv. c.  6.  § 3, 
of  my Essay,  in  the latter of  which he will find these 
words:  Certainty of  knowledge  is  to perceive  the 
agreement  or  disagreement of  ideas,  as  expressed  in 
any  As  in  the  proposition  your  lord- 
ship mentions, u. o..  that we  may be  certain there are 
P  spiritual  and bodily  substances ; or,  that bodily sub- 
stances do exist, is a proposition of whose truth we may 
be certain ;  and so of  spiritual substances.  Let us now 
examine  wherein  the certainty  of  these  propositions 
consists. 
First, as to the existence of bodily substances, I know 
by  my senses that something extended, and solid, and 
figured,does exist; for my senses are the utmost evidence 
and certainty I have of the existence of extended, solid, 
figured things.  These modes being then k~own  to exist 
by our senses,  the existence of  them  (which I cannot 
conceive can subsist without something to support them) 
makes me see the connexion of those ideas with a sup- 
port,  or,  as  it is  called,  a subject of  inhesion,  and so 
consequently the connexion of that support (which can- 
not be nothing)  with existence.  And  thus I come by 
a certainty of the existence of that something which is a 
support  of those sensible modes, though I have but avery 
confused, loose, and undetermined idea of  it,  signified 
by the same  substance.  After  the same  manner  ex- 
perimenting  thinking in myself,  by  the existence of 
thought in me,  to which  something that thinks is evi- 
dently and necessarily connected  in my mind ; I come 
to be  certain  that there  exists in  me  something  tnat 
thinks, though of  that something, which I call substance 
also, I have but a very obscure, imperfect idea. 
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ledgments to your lordship,  for the good opinion  you 
are pleased here to express of the <'  author of the Essay 
of Human Understanding,"  and  that you  do not im- 
pute to him  the ill  use  some  may have  made  of  his 
notions.  But he craves leave to say, that he should have 
been  better  preserved.  from  the  hard  and  sinister 
thoughts, which some men are always ready for,  if,  in 
what you have here published, your lordship had been 
pleased to have shown where you directed your discourse 
against him, and where against others, from p.  834,  to 
p. 569, of  your Vindication of  the Trinity.  For  no- 
thing but my book  and  my words  being  quoted,  the 
world will  be apt to think that I am the person who 
argue against the Trinity, and deny mysteries, against 
whom your lordship directs those pages.  And indeed, 
my lord,  though I have read them over with great at- 
tention,  yet, in many places,  1 cannot discern whether 
it be against me or any body else, that your lordship is 
arguing.  That which often makes the difficulty is, that 
I do not see how what I say does at all concern the con- 
troversy your lordship is engaged in, and yet I alone am 
quoted.  Your lordship goes on : 
Let us suppose this principle to be true,"  that the 
simple  ideas  by  sensation  or  reflection  are the sole 
matter and foundation  3f  all our  reasoning : " I ask 
then how we come to be certain, that there are spiritual 
substances in the world,  since we  can have  no  clear 
and distinct  ideas  concerning them? Can we be  cer- 
tain, without any foundation of reason ?  This is a new 
sort of certainty,  for which we do not envy those pre- 
tenders to reason.  But methinks,  they should not at 
the same time  assert  the absolute necessity of  these 
ideas to  our  knowledge,  and  declare  that we  may 
have  certain  knowledge  without  them.  If  there be 
any other  method,  they  overthrow  their  own  prin- 
ciple; if  there be none,  how  come  they  to any  cer- 
tainty  that there are both bodily  and spiritual sub- 
stanEes F 
This paragraph,  which  continues to prove that we 
may have certainty without clear  and distinct ideas,  I 
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would flatter myself is not meant against me, because it 
opposes nothing that I have said;  and so shall not say 
any thing to it, but only set it down to do your lordship 
right,  that the reader' may judge.  Though I do not 
find how he will easily overlook me, and think I am not 
at  all concerned in it, since my words alone are quoted 
in several pages immediately preceding and following: 
and in the very next paragraph it is said, "  how  they 
come to know ;" which word, they, must signify some- 
body besides the author of Christianity not mysterious ; 
and then I think, by the whole tenour of your lordship's 
discourse,  nobody will  be  left but me, possible  to be 
taken to be the other : for in the same paragraph your 
lordship says, <'  the same persons say, that notwithstand- 
ing their ideas, it is possible for matter to think." 
I know not what other person says so but I ;  but if 
any one does, I am sure no person  but I say so in my 
book,  which  your  lordship  has  quoted  for  them, vie. 
Human Understanding, B.  iv.  c. 3.  This, which  is  a 
riddle to me, the more amazes me, because I find it in 
a treatise  of  your lordship's,  who  so  perfectly under- 
stands the rules  and methods of  writing, whether in 
controversy or  any other way.  But this, which seems 
wholly new to me, I shall better understand when your 
lordship pleases  to explain it.  In the mean  time I 
mention  it as  an apology  for  myself,  if  sometimes I 
mistake  your  lordship's  aim,  and  so  misapply  my 
answer.  What follows  in your  lordship's  next  para- 
graph is this : 
cc As  to these latter (which  is my business) I must 
inquire  farther,  how  they  come  to  know  there  are 
such ?  The  answer  is,  by  self-reflection  on  those 
powers we find  in  ourselves, which cannot come from 
a  mere  bodily  substance.  I allow  the reason  to be 
very  good;  but  the question  I ask  is,  whether  this 
argument be from the clear  and  distinct idea or not? 
We have ideas  in  ourselves  of  the several  operations 
of  our  minds,  of  knowing,  willing,  considering,  &c. 
which  cannot  come  from  a  bodily  substance.  Very 
true ; but is  all this  contained in  the  simple  idea of 
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persons say, that notwithstanding their ideas, it is pos- 
sible for matter to think ?  For it is said-"  that we have 
the ideas of  matter  and thinking,  but possibly  shall 
never  be  able  to know  whether  my material  being 
thinks or  not ;  it being impossible for us, by the con- 
templation of our own ideas, without revelation, to dis- 
cover  whether Omnip&ency  hath not given to some 
systems of  matter, fitly disposed, a  power  to perceive 
or think.-If  this  be  true,  then  for  all that  we  can 
know by our ideas of matter and thinking, matter may 
have a power  of  thinking : and if  this hold, then it is 
impossible to prove  a  spiritual substance  in  us, from 
the idea of thinking :  for how  can we be assured by our 
ideas, that God hath not given such a power of  thinking 
to matter  so  disposed as our  bodies are  ?  Especially 
since it is said,-that  in respect of  our notions, it is not 
much more remote from our comprehension to conceive 
that God  can, if  he pleases,  superadd to our idea of 
matter a faculty of thinking, than that he should super- 
add to it another substance, with a faculty of thinking. 
-Whoever  asserts  this  can never  prove  a  spiritual 
substance in us from a faculty of thinking ;  because he 
cannot  know  from  the idea  of matter  and thinking, 
that matter so disposed cannot think.  And he cannot 
be  certain, that God  hath not  framed the matter  of 
our bodies so as to be capable of it." 
These words, my lord, I am forced to take to myself; 
for though your lordship has put it the same persolls 
say, in the plural number, yet there is nobody quoted 
for the following words, but my Essay ;  nor do I think 
anybody but I has said so.  But so it is in this present 
chapter, I have the good luck to be joined  with others 
for what I do not say, and others with  me for  what I 
imagine they do not say ;  which, how  it came  about, 
your lordship can best resolve.  But to the words them- 
selves:  in them your  lordship  argues, that  upon  my 
principles it "  cannot be proved that there is a spiritual 
substance in us."  To which give me leave, with sub- 
mission,  to say,  that I  think  it may be  proved  from 
my principles, and I think I have done it; and the proof 
* Human Understanding, B. ii. c. 3. 5,  6. 
in my book stands thus : First, we experiment in our- 
selves thinking.  The idea  of  this  action or  illode of 
thinking is inconsistent with the idea of self-subsistence, 
and therefore has a necessary connexion wit11 a support 
or sub#ject  of inhesion : the idea of that support is what 
we call substance ; and so from thinking experimented 
in us,  we  have a proof  of  a thinking substance  in us, 
which in my sense is a spirit.  Against this your lord- 
ship will  argue, that by what I have said of  the possi- 
bility that God may, if he pleases,  superadd to matter 
a faculty of thinking, it can never be proved that there 
is a spiritual substance in us, because upon that suppo- 
sition it is possible it may be a material substance that 
thinks in us.  I grant it ;  but add, that  the general idea 
of substance being the same every where, the modifica- 
tion of  thinking, or the power of thinking joined to it, 
makes it  a spirit, without considering what other ino- 
difications it has, as whether it has the modification  of 
solidity or no.  As  on  the  other  side, substance, that 
has the modification  or  solidity, is  matter, whether it 
has the modification of thinking or no.  And therefore, 
if your lordship means by a spiritual an immaterial sub- 
stance, I grant I have not proved, nor upon my princi- 
ples  can  it be  proved, (your  lordship  meaning,  as  I 
think you do, demonstratively proved) that there is an 
immaterial substance in us that thinks.  Though I pre- 
sume, from what I have said about the supposition of 
a  system  of  niatter  thinking *  (which  there  demon- 
strates  that  God  is  immaterial)  will  prove  it in  the 
highest degree probable,  that the thinking substance 
in us is immaterial.  But your lordship thinks not pro- 
bability enough ; and by charging the want of  demon- 
stration upon my principles, that the thinking thing in 
us  is  immaterial, your  lordship  seems  to conclude it 
demonstrable from principles of philosopliy.  That dc- 
monstration I should with joy  receive  from your lord- 
ship, or  any one.  For  though  all the great ends  of 
morality and religion are well enough secured without 
it, as I have shown t ; yet it would be a great advance 
af our knowledge in nature and philosophy. 
* B. iv. c.  lo. Q 16.  t B. iv. c. 3. Q 6. 
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To  whst I have said in my book, to show that all the 
great ends of religion and morality are secured barely 
by the imlnortality of  the soul, without a necessary sup- 
position that the soul is imrnatel-ial, 1  crave leave to add, 
that inlmortality may  and  shall be  annexed  to that, 
which in its own nature is neither  immaterial nor ini- 
mortal, as the apostle eipressly declares in these words ; 
" * for this corruptible must put on incorruption, and 
this mortal must put on immortality." 
Perhaps my using the word spirit for a thinkingsub- 
stance, withnnt excluding materiality out of it, will be 
thought too great a liberty,and suchas deserves censure, 
because I leave immateriality out of the idea I make it 
a sign of.  I readily own, that words should be sparingly 
ventured on in  a sense wholly  new ; and nothing by$ 
absolute necessity can excuse the boldness of using any 
term, in  a sense whereof we can  produce no example. 
But  in the present case, I think, I have great authorities 
to justify  me.  The soul is agreed, on  all hands, to be 
that in us which  thinks.  And  he that will look into 
the first book of  Cicero's Tusculan Questions, and into 
the sixth book  of Virgil's Bneids, will find that these 
two great men, who of all the Romans best understood 
philosophy, thought, or at least did not deny, the soul 
to be a  subtile matter, which  might come  under the 
name of aura, or ignis, or aether ;  and this soul they both 
of them called spiritus :  in the notion ofwhich it is plain 
they included only thought and active motion, without 
the total exclusion of  matter.  Whether they thought 
right in this, I do not say ;  that is not the 'question; but 
whether they spoke properly, when they called an active, 
thinking, subtile substance, out of which they excluded 
only gross and palpable matter, spiritus, spirit.  I think 
that nobody will  deny, that, if any among the Romans 
can be allowed to speak properly, Tully and Virgil are 
the two who may most securely be depended on for it : 
and one  of  them,  speaking  of  the soul, says, "  durn 
spiritus hos regit artus ;" and the other, "  vita contine- 
tur corpore et spiritu."  Where it is  plain, by corpus 
he means (as generally every where) only gross matter 
that may  be  felt  and  I~andled;  as  appears by these 
* l  Cor. xv. 53. 
words :  Si cor, aut sanguis, aut cerebrum est animus, 
certe, quoniam  est corpus, interibit  cum  reliquo  cor- 
pore ;  si anima  est, forte dissipabitur ; si  ignis, extin- 
petur."  Tusc.  Quest. 1.  i. c. 11.  Here Cicero op- 
poses corpus to ignis and anima, i. e. aura or  breath : 
and the foundatiorr  of  that his  distinction of the soul, 
from  that which  he calls  corpus or  body, he gives  a 
little lower  in  these words ; "  tanta  ejus  tenuitas,  ut 
fugiat aciem."  ib. c.  22. 
Nor was it the heathen world alone that had this no- 
tion of spirit ;  the most enlightened of  all the ancient 
people of God, Solomon himself, speaks after the same 
manner : "  *That which befalleth the sons of men be- 
falleth beasts, even  one  thing befalleth them; as the 
one dieth  so  dieth  the  other,  yea  they have  all  one 
spirit ."  So I translate the Hebrew  word nn here, 
for so I find it translated the very next verse but one ; 
" t  Who  knoweth the spirit of a man that gocth upward, 
and the spirit of a beast that goeth down to  the earth?" 
In  which  places  it is  plain that Solomon  applies  the 
word mm,  and our translators of  him, the word spirit, 
to a  substance,  out of  which  immateriality  was  not 
wholly  excluded, "  unless  the spirit of  a  beast  that 
goeth downwards to the earth"  be immaterial.  Nor 
did  the way  of  speaking in  our  Saviour's  time vary 
from this :  S St. Luke tells us, that when  our Saviour, 
after his  resurrection,  stood  in  the  midst  of  them, 
"  they  were  affrighted,  and  supposed  that they  had 
seen  arve;p.a,"  the  Greek word  which  always  answers 
spirit in English ;  and so  the translators of  the Bible 
render it here,  "  they supposed  that they  had seen s 
spirit."  But our Saviour says to them,  *'  $Behold my 
hands  anit my feet, that it is I myself, handle me and 
see; for a spirit hath not  flesh  and bones, as you see 
me have."  Which words of our Saviour put the same 
distinction between body and spirit, that Cicero did in 
the place  above  cited, viz.  that the one was a  gross 
compages  that  could  be  felt  and  handled;  and  the 
other  such  as Virgil describes  the  ghost  or  soul  of 
Anchises, 
+ Eccles. iii.  19.  t Ver. 21,  $  Chap.xxiv. 37.  § Vcr. 39. 
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('  Ter conatus ibi collo dare brachia circum; 
Ter frustra comprensa manus cKugit imago, 
Par levibus ventis, volucrique sirnillima somno." 
BN.  lib. vi.  jOO. 
1 would not be thought here to say, that spirit never 
does  signify  a purely immaterial  substance.  In tliat 
sense  the  scripture, I take  it, speaks,  when  it says, 
"  God is  a spirit ;" and  in  that sense 1 have  used it; 
and in that sense T  have proved  from  my  principles, 
that there is a spiritual substance ; and am certain that 
there is a  spiritual  immaterial substance : which  is, I 
humbly  conceive, a  direct  answer  to your  lordship's 
question in the beginning of this argument, viz.  'c  How 
come  we  to be  certain  that there  are spiritual  sub- 
stances. supposing  this principle  to be  true, that the 
simple ideas  by sensation  and reflection  are the sole 
matter  and  foundation  of  all  our  reasonins?"  Rut 
this hinders not, but that if  God, that infinite, oinni~ 
potent, and perfectly immaterial spirit,  should please 
to  give a  system of  very  subtile  matter  sense  and 
motion, it  might, with  propriety of  speech, be  called 
spirit ;  though materiality were not excluded out of its 
complex idea.  Your lordship proceeds : 
"  It is said indeed elsewhere, that it is repugnant ta 
the idea  of  senseless  matter, that it should put into 
itself sense, perception, and knowledge *.  But this doth 
not reach the present case ; which  is not what matter 
can do of  itself,  but what matter prepared  by an om- 
tlipotent  hand  can do.  And  what  certainty  can  we 
have that he hath not done it?  We can  have  none 
from  the ideas, for  those  are given up in this  case ; 
and consequently we can have no certainty upon these 
principles,  whether  we  have  any spiritual  substance 
within us or not." 
Your lordship in  this paragraph proves, that from 
what I say, "  we  can  have  no  certainty whether  we 
have  any  spiritual  substance  in  us  or  not t."  If 
by  spiritual  substance  your  lordship  means  an im- 
material  substance  in  us,  as  you  speak  a  little far- 
ther  on, I grant what your lordship says  is true, that 
cannot,  upon  these  principles,  be  demonstrated. 
]~ut  I must crave leave  to say at the same time, that 
upon  these  principles it can be proved, to the highest 
degree of probability.  If by spiritual substance  your 
lordship  means  a  thinking substance, I  must  dissent 
from  your  lordship,  and  say,  that  we  can  have  a 
certainty,  upon  my  principles,  that  there is  a  spi- 
ritual  substance in us.  In short,  my  lord, upon my 
principles, i.e.  from the idea of thinking, we  can have 
a  certainty  that  there  is  a  thinking  substance  in 
us; from  hence  we  have  a  certainty  that  there  is 
an eternal thinking  substance.  This  thinking sub- 
stance,  which  has  been  from  eternity, I have  proved 
to be immaterial ".  This eternal, immaterial, thinking 
substance, has put into us a thinking substance, which, 
whether  it  be  s  material  or  immaterial  substance, 
cannot  be  infallibly  demonstrated  from  our  ideas; 
though from  them  it may  be  proved,  illat  it is  to 
the  highest  degree  probable  that it  is  immaterial. 
This,  in short, my lord,  is what I have  to say on this 
point ;  which  may, in  good  measure, serve for an an- 
swer to your lordship's  next leaf or two ; which I shall 
set down, and then take notice of some few particulars 
which I wonder to find your lordship accuse me of.  Your 
lordship says : 
"  But we  are told,  that from the operations of our 
minds, we are able to frame a complex idea of a spirit t. 
How can that be,  when we cannot from those ideas be 
assured,  but that those  operations may come from  a 
material  substance?  If  we  frame  an idea  on  such 
grounds, it is at most  but a  possible  idea ;  for  it may 
be otherwise, and we  can have  no  assurance from our 
ideas, that it is not : so  that the most men may come 
to in this way of  ideas is,  that it is possible  it may be 
so, and it is  possible  it  may  not:  but that it is  im- 
possible  for  us,  from  our  ideas,  to determine  either 
way.  And is  not  this  an  admirable way to bring us 
to a certainty of reason ?" 
I am very glad to find the idea of  a spiritual sub- 
* B.  iv.  t B.  ij. c. 23. 5  15, 
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stance made as consistent and intelligible, as that of a 
corporeal :-for  as  the  one  consists  of  a  cohesion  of 
solid parts, and the power of communicating motion by 
impulse, so the otherconsists in a power of thinking, and 
willing, and moving the body ":  and that the cohesion of 
solid parts is as hard to be conceived as thinking: and 
we are as much in the dark about the power of commu- 
nicating motion by impulse, as in the power of exciting 
motion  by  thought.  We have  by  daily  experience 
clear evidence of motion produced, both by impulse and 
by thought :  but the manner how,  hardly comes within 
our comprehension; we are equally at a loss in both. 
"From  whence  it follows, that we  may be  certain 
of a being of a spiritual substance, although we have no 
clear and  distinct idea of  it, nor are able to compre- 
hend the manner of its operations t ;  and therefore it  is a 
vain thing in any to pretend that all our reason and cer- 
tainty is founded on clear and distinct ideas;  and that 
they have  reason  to reject  any doctrine which relates 
to  spiritual substances, because they cannot comprehend 
the manner of it.  For the same thing is confessed by 
the most inquisitive  men,  about the manner of opera- 
tion, both in material and immaterial substances.  It  is 
affirmed,-that  the very notion  of  body implies  some- 
thing very hard, if  not impossible,  to be  explained or 
understood by us f ;.  and that the natural consequence of 
it, viz. divisibility, involves us in difficulties impossible 
to be explicated, or made consistent ;  that we have but 
some few superficial idens of things ;  that we are desti- 
tute of faculties to attain to the true nature of them 9; 
and that when we do that, we fall presently into dark- 
ness and obscurity,  and can  discover  nothing further 
but our own blindness and ignorance." 
"  These are very fair and ingenuous confessions of the 
shortness of human understanding, with respect to the 
nature and manner of  such things which we  are most 
certain of the being of, by constant and undoubted ex- 
perience.  I  appeal now  to the  reason  of  mankind, 
whether  it can be  any reasonable  foundation  for  re- 
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jectiog a doctrine proposed to us as of divine revelation, 
because we cannot compl.ehend the manner of it ;  espe- 
cially when it relates to the divine essence.  For as the 
same author  observes*,-our  idea of God is framed from 
#he complex ideas of  those  perfections we find in our- 
selves, bllt enlarging them so, as  to make them suitable 
to an infinite Being; as knowledge, power, duration, &c. 
And the degrees  or  extent of  these which we  ascribe 
to the sovereign Being, are all boundless and  infinite t. 
For it is infinity, which joined  to our  ideas of  exist- 
ence, power, knowledge, &c. makes that complex idea, 
wherdby we represent to ourselves, the best we can, the 
Supreme Being." 
"  Now, when  our knowledge of  gross material sub- 
stances is so dark; when  the notion  of  spiritual sub- 
stances is above all ideas of sensation; when the higher 
any substance is, the more remote from our knowledge ; 
but especially when the very idea of a Supreme Being 
irrlplies its being infinite and incomprehensible; I know 
not whether it argues more  stupidity or arrogance to 
expose a doctrine relating to the divine essence, because 
they cannot comprehend the manner of it :  but of this 
more afterwards. I am yet upon the certainty of our rea- 
son, from clear and distinct ideas : and if we can attain 
to certainty without them, and where it is confessed we 
cannot have them, as about substance ;  then these can- 
not be the sole mattes and foundation of our reasoning, 
which is peremptorily asserted by this late author." 
Here, after having argued, that notwithstandingwhak 
I say about aur idea of  a spirit, it is impossible,  from 
our ideas, to determine whether that spirit in  us be a 
material substance or no,  your lordship concludes the 
paragraph thus : "  and is not this an admirable way to 
bring us to a certainty of  reason ?" 
I answer ; I think it is  a way to bring us  to a cer- 
tainty in these things which I have off'ered as certain, 
but I never thought it a  way to certainty, where we 
never can reach certainty;  nor shall I think the worse 
of  it, if  your lordship  should instance  in an hundred 
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other things, as well as the immateriality of the spirit in 
us, wherein this way does not bring us to a certainty; 
unless, at the same time,  your lordship  shall show us 
another way that will bring us to a certainty in those 
points, wherein this way of ideas failed.  If your lord- 
ship, or anybody else, will  show me a better way to s 
certainty in them, I nm ready to learn, and will lay by 
that of ideas.  The way of  ideas will not,  from philo- 
sophy, afford us a demonstration, that the thinking sub- 
stance in us is immaterial.  Whereupon your lordship 
asks, "  and is not this an admirable way to bring us to 
acertainty  of reason ?"  The  way of argument  which your 
lordship opposes  to the way of ideas,  will,  I humbly 
conceive, from philosophy,  as little afford us a demon- 
stration, that the thinking substance in us is immaterial. 
Whereupon, may not any one likewise ask, ('  and is not 
this an admirable way to bring  us  to  a  certainty  of 
reason?"  Is any way, I beseech  your lordship,  to be 
condemned as an ill way to bring us  to certainty,  de- 
monstrative certainty, because it brings us not to it in 
a point where reason cannot  attain to such certainty? 
Algebra is  a way to bring us  to certainty in mathe- 
matics ;  but must it  be presently condemned as an ill 
way, because there are some questions in mathematics, 
-.  - 
which a man cannot come td certainty in by the way 
of Algebra ? 
~njage  247, after having set down several  confes- 
sions of mine, "  of the shortness of human understand- 
ing,"  your  lordship  adds  these  words : '(  I appeal 
now to the reason  of  mankind, whether it can be any 
reasonable  foundation  for  rejecting  n  doctrine pro- 
posed to us as a divine revelation,  because we cannot 
comprehend  the  manner  of  it;  especially  when  it 
relates  to the divine  essence."  And I beseech  you, 
my  lord, where did 1 ever say so, or any thing like it? 
And yet it is impossible for any reader but to imagine, 
that  that proposition which your lordship appeals to the 
reason of  mankind  against,  is  a  proposition  of mine, 
which your lordship is confuting out of confessions of 
my own, great numbers whereof stand cluotecl out of my 
Essay, in  several pages  of your lordship's  book,  both 
before and after this your lordship's appeal to  the  reason 
of mankind.  And now I must appeal to your lordship, 
whether you  find any such proposition  in  my book ? 
If your lordship does not, I too must then appeitl to the 
reason of  mankind, whether it be reasonable  for your 
lordship to bring so many confessions out of my book, 
to confute a proposition that is nowhere in it? There 
is, no doubt, reason  for it:  which  since your  lordship 
does not, that I see, declare, and I have not wit enough 
to discover,  T  shall therefore  leave  to the reason  of 
mankind to find out. 
Your  lordship has,  in  this part of  your  discourse, 
spoke very much of reason ; as,-"  is  not this  an ad- 
mirable way to bring  us  to a  certainty of  reason?- 
And therefore it is a vain thing in any to pretend, that 
all our reason  and certainty is  founded on clear  and 
distinct  ideas.-I  appeal  now  to the reason  of  man- 
kind.-I  am yet upon  the certainty of  our reason.- 
The certainty is  not placed in the idea,  but in good 
and sound reason.-Allowing  the argument to be good, 
yet it is not taken from the idea, but frompriilciples of 
true reason." 
What your lordship  says  at the beginning of  this 
chapter,  in these woids, ;' we must consider what we 
understand  by reason,"  made me hope I should  here 
find  what  your  lordship  understands  by  reason ex- 
plained, that so I  might  rectify my notion of  it,  and 
might  be  able to  avoid  the obscurity and confusion 
which  very  much  perplex  most  of  the  discourses, 
wherein it is appealed to or from  as judge.  But not- 
withstanding the explication I flattered myself with the 
hopes of, from what I thought your lordship had pro- 
mised, I find no other account of reason, but in yuota- 
tions out of others, which  your lordship justly blames. 
Had I been so happy as to have been enlightened in this 
point by your lordship's learned pen, so as to have seen 
distinctly what your lordship understands by reason, I 
should possibly have escused myself from giving your 
lordship the trouble of  these papers,  and been able to 
have perceived, without applying myself any farther to 
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chapter,  which  was  designed  to  answer ''  objections 
against the Trinity, in point of reason."  It  follows : 
"  But I go  yet farther :  and as I have already showed, 
we can have  no certainty of  an immaterial substance 
within  us,  from  these  simple  ideas ; so  I  shall  now 
show, that there can be  no sufficient evidence brought 
from them,  by  their  oGn  confession,  concerning  the 
existence of  the most  spiritual and infinite substance, 
even God himself."  And  then your  lordship goes on 
to give an account of my proof of  a God : which your 
lordship closes with these words : 
"  That which I design is to show, that the certainty 
of  it is  not placed  upon  any clear and  distinct ideas, 
but upon the force  of  reason  distinct from it; which 
was the thing I intended to prove." 
If  this be the thing your loidship designed, I am then 
at  a loss who your lordship designed it against :  for I do 
not remember that I have any where said, that we could 
not be convinced by reason of any truth, but where all 
the ideas concerned in that conviction were clear and 
distinct ;  for knowledge  and certainty, in my opinion, 
lies in the perception of the agreement or disagreement 
of ideas, such as they are, and not always in having per- 
fectly clear and distinct ideas.  Though those, I must 
own, the clearer and more distinct they are, contribute 
very much to our more clear and distinct reasoning and 
discoursing  about them.  But in some cases we  may 
have certainty about obscure ideas ;  u. g.  by the clear 
idea of thinking in me, I find the agreement of the  clear 
idea of existence, and the obscure idea of a substance in 
me, because I perceive  the necessary idea of thinking, 
and the relative  idea of  a  support;  which  support, 
without having any clear and distinct idea of what it  is, 
beyond this relative one of a support, I call substance. 
If your lordship intended  this against another, who 
has said, "  clear and distinct ideas are the sole matter 
and foundation  of all  our reasoning ;" it seems very 
strange  to  me,tl~at  yourlordship should intend it against 
one, and quote the words  of  another.  For above ten 
pages before, your lordship had q~ioted  nothing but my 
book ;  and in the immediate preceding paragraph bring 
larg  quotation out of tlrt;  tenth section of the tenth 
chapter of my fourth book; of which yonr lordship says, 
66 this is the substance of tlie argament used,  to prove 
an infinite spiritual being, which I am far from weaken- 
ing the force  of; but that which I design is to show, 
that the certainty of  it is not placed  upon  clear  and 
distinct ideas."  Whom now, I beseech your lordship, 
can this  be understood  to  be  intended  against,  but 
me?  For how  can  my  using  an  argument,  whose 
certainty is not placed  upon clear  and distinct ideas, 
prove any thing against another man, who says, "that 
and distinct ideas are the sole matter and founda- 
tion of  all our reasoning ?"  This proves only against 
him  that uses  the  argument;  and therefore  either I 
must be supposed here to hold  that clear and distinct 
ideas  are the sole matter  and  foundation  of  all our 
reasoning, (which I do not remember that I ever said) 
or else that your lordship here proves against nobody. 
But though I do not remember that I have anywhere 
said, that clear and distinct ideas are the sole matter and 
foundation  of  all our reasoning;  yet I do own,  that 
simple ideas are the foundations  of all our knowledge, 
if that be it which your lordship questions : and there- 
fore I must think myself concerned  in what your lord- 
ship says in this very place, in these words-"Ishall  now 
show, that there can be no sufficient evidence brought 
from these simple ideas, by their own confession, con- 
cerning the existence of  God himself." 
This being spoken in the plural number, cannot be 
understood to be meant of  the author of Christianity 
not mysterious,  and nobody else : and whom can any 
reader  reasonably apply it to,  but the author of  the 
Essay of Human Understanding ;  since, besides that it 
stands in the midst  of  a  great many quotations out of 
that book, without any other person  being  named, or 
any one's  words but mine quoted,  my proof alone of a 
Deity is brought out  of that book, to make good what 
your lordship here says ;  and nobody else is anywhere 
mentioned or quoted concerning it  ? 
The same way of  speaking  of  the persons  you  are 
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in other places ;  as, ''  which  they may call a complica- 
tion of simple ideas, if they please." 
"  We do not envy these pretenders to reason ; but 
methinks they should  not at the same time assert the 
absolute necessity of these ideas to onr knowledge, and 
declare that we  may have  certain  knowledge without 
them."  And all alongain that page,  ccthey."  And in 
the very next pa,ge my words being quoted, your lord- 
ship  asks,  "how can that be,  when the same persons 
say,  that notwithstanding their ideas,  it is impossible 
for  matter to think?"  So that I do  not see how  I 
can exempt myself  from  being  meant  to be  one  of 
those pretenders to reason, wherewith we  can be cer- 
tain  without any foundation  of  reason,  which  your 
lordship, in  the immediate foregoing page,  does  not 
envy for  this  new  sort of  certainty.  How can it be 
understood but that I am one of  those persons,  that 
'<  at  the same time assert the absolute necessity of these 
ideas to our knowledge, and declare that we may have 
certain knowledge without them ?"  Though your lord- 
ship very civilly says, "  that you  must do that right 
to the ingenious author of the Essay of Human Under- 
standing (from whence these notions are borrowed, to 
serve other purposes than he intended them) that,"  &c. 
yet,  methinks it is  the author himself,  and his use of 
these notions, that is blamed  and argued against ;  but 
still in the plural number, which  he  confesses himself 
not to  understand. 
My lord, if your lordship can show me where I pre- 
tend to reason or certainty, without any foundation of 
reason ; or where it  is I assert the absolute necessity of 
any ideas to our knowledge,  and declare that we may 
have  certain knowledge without them,  your lordship 
will do me a great favour:  for this,  I grant, is  a new 
sort of certainty which I long to be rid of,  and to dis- 
own to  the world.  But truly, my lord, as I pretended to 
no new sort of certainty, but just such as human under- 
standing was possessed of before I was born; and should 
he glad I could gct more out of the books and writings 
that come abroad in my days :  so, my lord, if I have any- 
where pretended to any new sort of certainty, I beseech 
your  lordship  show me the place,  that I may correct 
the vanity of it, and unsay it t~ the world. 
Again, your lordship says thus,-"  I know not  whetlies 
it  argues  more  stupidity  or arrogance  to expose  a 
doctrine  relating to the divine  essence, because they 
cannot comprehend the manner of it." 
Here, my lord, I find the same "they"  again, whicli, 
some pages back, evidently involved me :  and since that 
you  have  named  nobody besides  me, nor alleged any 
body's  writings but mine ; give me leave, therefore, to 
ask  your lordship, whether I an1 one of  these  6c they" 
here also, that I may know whether I am concerned to 
answer for myself?  I am ashamed to importune your 
lordship so often about the same  matter; but I meet 
with so many places  in your  lordship's  (I had  almost 
said new)  way of writing, that put me to a stand, not 
knowing whether I am meant or no,  that I am at  a loss 
whether I should clear myself from what possibly your 
lordship does not lay to  my charge ;  and yet the reader, 
thinking it meant of me, should conclude that to be in 
my book which is not there, and which I utterly disown. 
Though I cannot be joined with those who expose a 
doctrine relating to  the divine essence, because they can- 
not comprehend the manner of it ;  unless your lordship 
can show where I have so exposed it, which I deny that 
I have any where done ;  yet your lordship, before you 
come to the bottom of the same page, has these words : 
"I shall now show, that there can be no sufficient evi- 
dence  brought from them,  by  their  own  confession, 
concerning the existence of  the most  spiritual and in- 
finite substance, even God himself." 
If your lordship did mean me in that "they"  which 
is some lines backwards, I must complain to your lord- 
ship that you have done me an injury, in imputing that 
to me which I have not done.  And  if "their"  here 
were not meant by your lordship to relate to the same 
persons, I ask by what shall the  reader distinguish them? 
And  how  shall  any body know  who  your  lordship 
means?  For that I am comprehended here is apparent, 
by your quoting my Essay in the very next words, and 
arguing aga,inst it in the following pages. d  G  iir.  Locke's  Letler to the 
I enter not here into your lordship's argument ;  that 
which I am now considering is your lordship's peculiar 
way of writing in this part of your treatise, which makes 
me often in doubt, whether the reader will not condemn 
my book upon your lordship's authority,where he thinks 
me concerned, if I say nothing:  and yet your lordship 
may look upon my defe'ncc as superfluous, when I did 
not hold what your lordship argued against. 
But to go on with  your lordship's  argument, your 
lordship  says, (' I  shall now  show  that there can bc 
no  sufficient  evidence  brought  from  simple  ideas 
by  their  own  confession,  concerning  the existence  of 
the most  spiritual  and  infinite  substance,  even  God 
himself."  - 
Your lordship's way of proving it is this :  your lord- 
shir, savs, '' we are told, B. iv. c.  10.  § 1, '  That the evi- 
de&e  6f .it is equal to mathematical certainty ;' and 
very good arguments are brought to prove it, in a chq- 
ter on  purpose:  but that which  I take notice  of,  is, 
that the argument from the clear  and distinct idea of 
a God is passed  over.''  Supposing all  this  to be so, 
your  lordship,  methinks,  with  submission,  does  not 
prove the proposition you undertook, which was this ; 
ccthere can  be  no  sufficient  evidence  brought  from 
simple ideas, by their own confession concerning [i.  e. 
to prove]  the existence  of  a God."  For if  I did  in 
that chapter, as your lordship says, pass over the proof 
from the clear and distinct idea of  God,  that,  I pre- 
sume, is no confession that there can be no sufficient 
evidence  brought from clear and distinct ideas,  much 
less  from  simple  ideas, concerning the existence of a 
God ;  because the using of one argument brought from 
one foundation, is no confession that  therz is not anothcr 
principle  or  foundation.  But,  my  lord, 1 shall not 
insist upon this, whether it be a confession or no. 
Leaving confession out of the proposition, I humbly 
conceive  your  lordship's  argument  does  not prove. 
Four lordship's  proposition  to be  proved,  is,  cc there 
can be  sufficient evidence  brought from simple ideas 
to prove  the existence of a God ;"  and your lordship's 
reason  is,  because  the argument from  the clear  and 
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distinct  idea of  God is omitted in my proof of  rt God. 
I will suppose, for the  strengthening your lordshi2's rea- 
soning in the case, that I had said (which I am far enough 
from saying) that there was no other argument to prove 
the existence  of God, but what I  had used in that chapter; 
yet, my lord, with all this,  your lordship's argument, I 
humbly conceive, would  not  hold : for  I might bring 
evidence from simple ideas, though I brought none from 
the idea of God ;  for the idea we have of God is a com- 
plex,  and no  simple  idea.  So that the terms being 
changed from simple ideas to a clear and distinct com- 
plex idea of God, the proposition which was undertaken 
to be proved, seems to me unproved. 
Your lordship's  next words  are,  "how  can this be 
consistent with  deducing  our  certainty of  knowledge 
from clear and simple ideas ?" 
Here your lordship joins something that is mine with 
something  that is  not  mine.  I do  say,  that all  our 
knowledge is founded in simple ideas; but I do not say, 
it is all deduced from  clear  ideas ; much less that we 
cannot have any certain ltnowledge of the existence of 
any thing, whereof we  have not a clear, distinct, com- 
plex  idea;  or,  that the complex  idea must be  clear 
enough to  be in itself the evidence of the existence of that 
thing ;  which seems to be your lordship's  meaning here. 
Our knowledge is all founded on simple ideas, as I have 
before explained, though not always about simple ideas ; 
for we may know the truth  of propositions which include 
complex ideas, and those complex ideas may not always 
be perfectly clear ideas. 
In the remaining part of this page, it follows :  c6 I do 
not go about to justify  those who lay the whole stress 
upon  that foundation, which  I grant to be  too weak 
to support so  important a truth; and that those  are 
very much to blame, who go about to invalidate other 
arguments for  the sake  of  that: but I doubt all that 
talk  about clear  and  distinct  ideas  being  made the 
foundation  of  certainty,  came  originally from  these 
discourses  or  meditations, which  are aimed at.  The 
author of  them  was an ingenious thinking man,  and 
he endeavoured to lay the foundation of  certainty, as 
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tainty in,  was  his  own  existence;  which  he founded 
upon the perceptions  of  the acts  of  his  mind, which 
some call an internal infallible perception that we are. 
From hence  he proceeded  to inquire,  how  we  came 
by this certainty ?  And  he resolved it into this, that 
he had a clear and distinct perception of it; and from 
hence he formed this general rule, that what we had s 
clear  and distinct  perception of was true.  Which in 
reason ought to go no farther, than where there is the 
like degree of  evidence." 
This account which your lordship gives here, what it 
was wherein Descartes laid the foundation of certainty, 
containing nothing  in  it to show what  your lordship 
proposed  here,  viz.  "that  there can be  no  sufficient 
evidence  brought from ideas,  by  my  own  confession, 
concerning the existence of  God himself;"  I willingly 
excuse myself from troubling your lordship concerning 
it.  Only I crave leave to make my acknowledgment to 
your lordship, for what you are pleased, by the way, to 
drop in these words : "But I doubt all this talk about 
clear  and distinct ideas being made the foundation of 
certainty,  came  originally  from  these  discollrses  or 
meditations, which are aimed at." 
By the quotations in your lordship's immediately pre- 
ceding words taken out of my Essay *,  which relate to 
that ingenious thinking  author, as well as by what in 
your following words is said of  his founding  certainty 
in his own existence ; it is hard to avoid thinking that 
your  lordship  means,  that I  borrowed from  him  my 
notions concerning certainty.  And your lordship is so 
great a man, and every way so far above my meanness, 
that it cannot be supposed that your lordship intended 
this for  any thing  but a commendation  of  me  to the 
world, as the scholar of so great a master.  But though 
I must  always  acknowledge  to  that  justly-admired 
gentleman the great obligation of my first deliverance 
from the unintelligible way of talking of the philosophy 
in i~se  in the schools in his  time,  yet I am so fnr from 
entitling  his writings  to any of  the errors or  imper- 
fections which  are to be  found  in  my  Essay,  as  de- 
riving  their  original  from  him,  that I must  own  to 
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your lordship  they were  spun barely  out of  my  own 
thoughts, reflecting as well as I could on my own mind, 
and the ideas I had there ;  and were not, that I know, 
derived  from any other original.  But,  possibly, I all 
this while assume to  myself an honour which your lord- 
ship did not intend to me by this intimation ;  for though 
what goes before and after seems to appropriate those 
words to me, yet some part of  them brings me under 
my usual doubt, which I shall remain under till I know 
whom  thcse  words,  viz. " this  talk  about clear  and 
distinct ideas being made the foundation of  certainty," 
belong to. 
The remaining part of this paragraph contains a dis- 
course of  your lordship's upon Descartes's  general rule 
of  certainty, in these words: "  For the certainty here 
was not grounded  on  the clearness of  the perception, 
but  on  the plainness  of  the evidence,  which  is  that 
of  nature,  that  the very  doubting  of  it  proves  it; 
since  it is  impossible, that any thing should doubt or 
question its own being, that had it not.  So that here 
it is  not  the clearness  of  the idea, but  an immediate 
act of  perception, which is  the true ground  of  cer- 
tainty.  And  this  cannot  extend  to  things  without 
ourselves,  of  which we  can have no other perception 
than what is  caused  by  the  impressions of  outward 
objects.  But whether we are to judge  according  to 
these impressions,  doth not depend on our ideas them- 
selves,  but upon  the exercise  of  our judgment  and 
reason about them,  which  put the difference  between 
true and  false,  and  adequate  and  inadequate  ideas. 
So that our certainty is not from the ideas themselves, 
but from  the evidence of  reason, that those  ideas axe 
true  and just,  and  consequently  that we may  build 
our certainty upon them." 
Granting all this to be so, yet I must confess, my lord, 
I do not see how it any way tends to show either your 
lordship's  proof, or my confession "that my proof of an 
infinite  spiritual  Being  is  not  placed  upon  ideas; 
which  is what your lordship professes  to be  your de- 
sign here." 
VOL.  IV.  E Hut though we  are not  yet come to your lordship's 
proof, that the certainty in my proof  of  a Deity is not 
placed on ideas, yet I crave leave to consider what your 
lordship says here concerning certainty ; about which 
one cannot employ too many thoughts to find wherein it 
is placed.  Your lordshi  says, "  That Descartes's  cer- 
tainty was not grounde  5 on  the  clearness of  the per- 
ception, but on the plainness  of  the evidence."  And 
a  little lower ;  here (i. e.  in Descartes's  foundation of 
certainty) it is not the clearness of  the idea, but an im- 
mediate "act of perception, on which is the true ground 
of  certainty."  And  a  little  lower,  that  "in  hhings 
without  us,  our  certainty is  not  from  the ideas,  but 
from the evidence of  reason  that those  ideas are true 
and just." 
Your  lordship,  I  hope, will  pardon  my dulness,  if 
after your lordship has placed the grounds of certainty 
of  our own existence, sometinles in the plainness of the 
evidence, in opposition  to the clearness of  the percep- 
tion;  sometimes in the immediate act of  perception, in 
opposition to the clearness of the idea; and the certainty 
of  other things without  us, in the evidence of  reason 
that these ideas are true and just,  in opposition to the 
ideas themselves : I know not, by these rules, wherein 
to place certainty ; and therefore stick to my own plain 
way, by ideas, delivered in these words :  "Wherever we 
perceive the agreement or disagreement of  any of  our 
ideas, there is certain knowledge ;  and wherever we are 
sure those ideas agree with the reality of  things, there 
is certain real knowledge.  Of which agreement of  our 
ideas with the reality of  things, I think I have shown 
wherein it is that certainty, real certainty, consists "." 
?Vhereof  more  may be  seen  in  chap. vi.,  in which, if 
your lordship find any mistakes, I shall take it  as a great 
honour to be set right by you. 
Your lordship, as far as I can guess your meaning (far 
I must own I do not clearly comprehend it), seerns  to 
me, in the foregoing passage,  to oppose this assertion, 
that the certainty of  the being of  any thing might be 
made out from the idea of' that thing. Truly, my lord, I 
*B.iv.c.44.$  18. 
am so  far  from  saying (or  thinking) so, that I ncvcr 
knew any one of  tliat mind but Descartes, and some that 
followed him in his proof  of  a God, from the idea 
which we have of  God in us ; which I was so far from 
thinking a sufficient ground of certainty, that your lord- 
ship makes use of my denying or doubting of it against 
me, as we shall see in the following words: 
"  But the idea of  an infinite Being has this peculiar 
to it,  that necessary existence is  implied in it.  This 
is a  clear and  distinct  idea, and yet it is  denied  that 
this  doth  prove  the  existence  of  God.  How  then 
can the grounds  of  our certainty arise from the clear 
and distinct ideas,  when  in one of  the clearest ideas 
of  our minds, we can come to no certainty by it?" 
Your lordship's  proof here,  as far as I comprehend it, 
seems to be, that it is confessed,  '<  That certainty does 
not  arise  from  clear and distinct  ideas,  because it is 
denied that  the clear  and distinct  idea of  an infinite 
being,  that  implies  necessary  existence in  it,  does 
prove the existence of  a God." 
Here your  lordship  says,  it is denied ;  and in  five 
lines after you recall that saying, and use these words, 
"I do not say that it is denied, to prove it :" which of 
thcse two sayings of your lordship's must 1 now answer 
to? If your lordship says it is denied, I fear tliat will 
not  hold to be so in matter of  fact, which made your 
lordship unsay it ; though that being most to your lord- 
ship's  purpose, occasioned, I suppose, its dropping from 
your pen.  For if  it be not  denied, I think the whole 
force of your lordship's  argument fails.  But your lord- 
ship helps that out as well as the thing will bear, by the 
words  that follow  in  the sentence,  which  altogether 
stands thus:  '<  I do not say, that it is denied, to prore 
it; but this  is  said, that it is  a  doubtful thing:  from 
the different  make of  men's  tempers,  and application 
of  their  thoughts.  What can this mean, unless it be 
to let us know  that even  clear and distinct ideas may 
lose  their  effect,  by  the difference  of  men's  tempers 
and studies? So that besides ideas, in order to a right 
judgment,  a  due temper  and application of  the mind 
is required." 
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If  I meant in those  words of  mine, quoted here by 
your lordship,  just as your lordship concludes they mean, 
I know not n  liy I should be ashamed of  it ; for I never 
thought that ideas,  even the most  clear  and distinct, 
would make men certain of what might be demonstrated 
from them, unless they were  of  a  temper to consider. 
and would  apply their minds  to them.  There are no 
ideas more clear and distinct than those of numbers, and 
yet  there are a  thousand  demonstrations concerning 
numbers, which millions of  men  do not know, (and so 
have not the certainty about them that they might have) 
for want of  application. 
I could not avoid liere to take this to myself:  for this 
passage of  your lordship's is pinned down  upon me so 
close, by your lordship's citing thc 7th sect. of the loth 
chapt,er of my fourth book,that I am forced liere to an- 
swer for myself;  which I shall do, after having first set 
down my words, as they  stand in the place quoted by 
your lordship : "  * How far the idea of  a most perfeck 
being, which  a  man  rnay frame in his  mind,  does or 
does not prove the existence of  a God, I will not here 
examine.  For in the different make of  men's  tempers 
and  application of  their  thoughts,  some  arguments 
prevail more on one, and sonie on another, for the con- 
firmation  of  the same  truth.  But yet,  I think, this I 
may say, that it is an ill way of  establishing this truth, 
and silencing atheists, to lay the whole stress of  so im- 
,  portant n point as lhis upon  that sole foundation, and 
take  some  men's  having  that  idea  of  God  in  their 
minds  (for  it is  evident,  some  men  have  none,  and 
some a worse  than none, and the most  very  different) 
for the only  proof  of  a  Deity; and,  out of  an over- 
fondness of  that darling invention,  cashier, or at least 
endeavour to invalidate  all other arguments, and for- 
bid  us to hearken  to those  proofs,  as  being weak,  or 
fallacious, which  our own existence,  and the sensible 
parts of  the universe,  offer  so clearly and  cogently to 
our thoughts, that I  deem  it impossible  for  a consi- 
dering  riian  to witl~stand  thcrn.  For  1 judge  it  as 
certain and  clear  a truth, as  c211  any where  be  deli- 
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yered,  that  the  invisible  things  of  God  are  clearly 
seen from the creation of  the world, being understood 
by the things  that are made, even  his  eternal power 
and Godhead." 
The  meaning of which words of mine was not to deny 
that the idea of  a most perfect being doth prove a God, 
but to blame those who take it for the only proof, and 
endeavour to invalidate all others.  For the belief  of  a 
God being, as I say in the same section, the foundation 
of a11 religion and genuine morality, I thought no argu- 
ments that are made use of  to work the persuasion of a 
God into men's  minds, should be invalidated.  And the 
reason I give why they should  all be left  t.0  their full 
strength, and none of them rejected as unfit to be heark- 
ened  to,  is this : because  "in  the  different  make of 
men's  tempers  and  application  of  their  thoughts, 
some  arguments prevail  more  on one,  and some  on 
another, for the confirmation of the same truth."  So 
that my meaning  here was not, as  your  lordship sup- 
poses, to ground certainty on the different make of men's 
tempers,  and application of  their  thoughts, in opposi- 
tion to clear and distinct ideas, as is very evident from 
my words ; but to show of what ill consequence it is, to 
go  about to invalidate any argument, which hath a tend- 
ency to settle the belief  of  a God in any one's  mind ; 
because, in the difference of men's tempers and applica- 
tion,  some  arguments prevail more on one,  and some 
on another : so that I speaking of  belief, and your lord- 
ship, as I take it, speaking in  that place  of  oertainty, 
nothing can (I crave leave to say) be inferred from these 
words of  mine to your lordship's purpose.  And that I 
meant belief, and not certainty, is evident from hence, 
that I look upon the argument there spoken of, as not 
conclusive, and so not able to produce certainty in any 
one, though I did not know how far it might prevail on 
some men's  persuasions,  to confirm them in the truth. 
And since not all, nor the most of  those that believe a 
God, are at the pains, or have the skill, to examine and 
clearly comprehend the demonstrations of  his being, I 
was  unwilling to show the weakness  of  the argument 
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be confirmed  in the belief  of  a God, which is enough 
to preserve in them true sentiments of religion and mo- 
rality. 
Your lordship Elereupon asks,  "Wherein  is  this dif- 
fcrcilt from what all men of  understanding have said ?" 
I answer :  in ilothing that I  know;  nor did I ever, 
that I remember,  say tKat it was.  Your lordship goes 
on to demand, 
"Why then  should  these  clear and simple ideas be 
made the sole foundation of  reason ?" 
I answer:  that I  know not: they  must  give your 
lortiship a reason for it, who have made clear ideas the 
sole foundation of  reason.  Why I have  made simple 
ones the foundation  of  all knowledge, I have shown. 
Your lordship goes on : 
"  One would think by this"-- 
By what, I beseech your lordship ? 
That these  ideas  would  presently  satisfy  men's 
minds, if  they attended to them." 
What those ideas are from which your lordship would 
expect such present satisfaction, and upon what grounds 
your lordship expects it, I  do not know.  But this I 
will venture to say, that all the satisfaction men's minds 
can have in their inquiries after truth and certainty, is 
to be had only from considering, observing, and rightly 
laying together of  ideas, so as to find out their agree- 
ment or disagreement, and no other way. 
But I do not  think ideas have  truth and certainty 
always so ready to satisfy the mind in its inquiries, that 
there needs  no  more to be  satisfied, than to attend to 
then1 as one does to a man, whom one asks a question to 
be satisfied ; which your lordship's  way of  expression 
seems to me to intimate.  But they must be considered 
well, and their habitudes  examined ; and where their 
agreement or disagreement cannot be perceived by  an 
immediate comparison, other ideas must be found out to 
discover the agreement or disagreement of those under 
considerztion, and then all laid in  a due order, before 
the mind can be satisfied in the certainty of that truth, 
which it is seeking after.  This, my lord, requires often 
a little more time and pains,  than  attending to a  tale 
that is told  for  present  satisfaction.  And  I  believe 
some  of  the incomparable  Mr.  Newton's  wonderful 
denlonstrations  cost him so  much pains,  that though 
they were all  founded in nothing but several ideas of 
quantity, yet those ideas  did not presently satisfy his 
mind, though they were such that, with great applica- 
tion and labour of thought, they were  able  to satisfy 
him with certainty, i.  e. produce demonstration.  Your 
lordship adds, 
66 But even this will not do as to the idea of an infi- 
nite Being." 
Though the complex idea for which the sound God 
stands (whether containing in it the idea of  necessary 
existence or no,  for the case is the same) will not prove 
the real existence of a being answering that idea, any 
more than any other idea in any one's mind will prove 
the existence of any real being answering that idea; yet, 
I humbly conceive, it does  not hence follow,  but that 
there may be other ideas by which the being of a God 
may be proved.  For nobody that I know ever said, that 
every idea would prove every thing, or that an idea in 
men's  minds would prove  the existence of such a real 
being: and therefore  if this idea fail to prove,  what is 
proposed to  be proved by it, it is no more an exception 
against the way of ideas, than it would be an exception 
against the way of  medius terminus, in arguing that 
somebody used one that did not prove.  It  follows : 
c6 It is not enough to say they will not examine how 
far it will hold ;  for  they ought  either to say, that it 
doth hold, or give up this  ground  of  certainty from 
elear and distinct ideas." 
Here, my lord, I am got again into the plural num- 
ber:  but not knowing anybody but myself who has used 
these words which are set down out of my Essay, and 
which you 3re in this and the foregoing paragraph argu- 
ing against, I am forced to beg your lordship to let me 
know, who those persons are whom your lordship, join- 
ing with me, entitles with me to these words of my book ; 
or to whom  your lordship joining me,  entitles me by 
these words of mine to what they have published, that 
I may see how far I am answerable for them. Now as to the words themselves,  viz.  <'  I will not ex- 
amine  how  far  the  idea proposed  does  or  does  not 
prove the existence of  a God," because they are mine; 
and your lordship excepts against them, and tells me, 
'(  it was not enough to say, I will not examine, &c.  For I 
ought either  to have  said, that it  doth hold, or  give 
up this  ground of  ce&ainty  from  clear  and  distinct 
ideas."  I mill answer as well as I can. 
I could not  then,  my lord, well say,  that that doth 
bold,  which I thought did not hold ;  but I imagined I 
might, without entering into the examen, and showing 
the weakness of that argument, pass it  by with saying, I 
would not  examine,  and  so  left it with this thought, 
"  valeat quantum valere potest." 
But though I did this, and said not then, it will hold, 
nay think  now it will  not  hold, yet I do not see how 
from thence I was then, or am now under any necessity 
to give up the ground of certainty from ideas ;  because 
the  ground of certainty from ideas may be right, though 
ill the present instance  a  right use were not made  of 
them, or a right idea was not  made use of to produce 
the certainty sought.  Ideas in mathematics are a sure 
ground of certainty; and yet every one may not make 
so right  an use  of  them,  as  to attain to certainty by 
them: but yet any one's failing of certainty by them, is 
not the overturning of this truth, that certainty is to be 
had by them.  Clear and distinct I have omitted here to 
join with ideas, not because clear and distinct make any 
ideas unfit to produce certainty, which  have all other 
fitness to  do it ;  but because I do not limit certainty to 
clear and distinct ideas  only, since  there may be cer- 
tainty from ideas that are not in all their parts perfectly 
clear and distinct. 
Your  lordship,  in  the following paragraph, endea- 
vours to  show, that I have  not  proved  the being of a 
God by ideas ;  and from thence, with an argument  not 
unlike the preceding, you  conclude, that ideas cannot 
be the grounds of certainty, because I have notgrounded 
my proof of a  God on  ideas.  To which way of argu- 
mentation I must crave leave here again to reply, that 
your lordship's  supposing, as you do, that there is an- 
other way to certainty, which is not that of ideas, does 
not prove that certainty may not he had from ideas, be- 
cause I make use of  that other way.  This being pre- 
nlised, I shall  er~clcavour  to show, ihat my proof of a 
Deity is all grounded on ideas, however your lordship 
is  to call it by other names.  Your lordship's 
words are : 
c6 But instead of the proper argument from ideas, we 
are  told,  that-fiom  tlie  consideration  of  ourselves, 
and what we find in our own constitutions, our reason 
leads us to the knowledge  of this  certain arid evident 
truth,  that  there  is  an  eternal,  most  powerful,  and 
most knowing Being.  All which I readily yield;  but 
we see plainly,  the certainty is not placed in tlie idea, 
but in good  and  sound  reason,"  from  the considera- 
tion  of ourselves and our  constitutions.  "  What! in 
tlle idea ,of ourselves ?  No,  certainly." 
Give  me leave, my lord,  to ask where I ever  said, 
that certainty was placed in the idea, which your lord- 
ship urges my words  as  a contradiction of? I think I 
never said so.  1. Because I do not remember it.  2. Be- 
cause your lordship has not quoted any place where I 
have said so.  3. Because I a11 along in my book, which 
has the honour to be so often quoted here by your lord- 
ship,  say the quite  contrary.  For  I  place certainty 
where I  think  every body  will  find  it,  and  nowhere 
else,  viz.  in the perception  of  the agreement  or dis- 
agreement of ideas ;  so that, in my opinion, it is impossi- 
ble to be placed in any one single idea,  simple or com- 
plex.  I must own, that I think certainty grounded on 
ideas;  and therefore  to  take  your lordship's  words 
here, as I think they are meant, in  opposition to what 
I say,  I  shall take the  liberty to change  your  lord- 
ship's  words  here, "  What!  in the idea  of  ourselves? 
No, certainly," into words used by your lordship in the 
foregoing page, to the same purpose, " What! can the 
grounds of our  certainty  arise  from the idea of  our- 
selves ?  No, certainly." 
To which permit me,  my  lord, with due respect  to 
reply,  Yes, certainly.  The certainty of tlic being of a 
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as we are thinking beings.  But your lordship urges my 
own words, which are, that "from  the consideration of 
ourselves, and what  we  find in  our  constitutions, our 
reason leads us to the knowledge  of this certain and 
evident truth." 
My lord,  I must coqf'ess  I never  thought, that the 
consideration of ourselves, and what we find in our own 
constitutions, excluded  the consideration  of  the idea 
either  of being  or of thinking,  two  of the ideas that 
make a part of the complex idea a man has of himself. 
If consideration of ourselves excludes those ideas, I may 
be  charged with speaking improperly :  but it is plain, 
nevertheless, that I ground the proof of a God on those 
ideas, and I thought I spoke properly enough ; when 
meaning that the consideration of those ideasywhich  our 
own being offered us, and so finding their agreement or 
disagreement with others, we were thereby, i.  e. by thus 
reasoning, led into the knowledge  of the existence of 
the first infinite Being, i. e. of God ;  I expressed it as I 
did, in  the more  familiar way of  speaking.  For  my 
purpose, in that chapter, being to make out the know- 
ledge of the existence of a God, and not to prove that 
it was  by ideas, I thought  it most proper  to express 
myself in the most usual and familiar way, to let it the 
easier into men's  minds, by common words and known 
ways  of expression:  and  therefore,  as I think, I have 
scarce used the word  idea  in that whole chapter, but 
only in  that  one place,  where my  speaking against 
laying the whole proof  only upon  our idea of  a  most 
perfect Being obliged me to it. 
But your lordship says, that in this way of coming to 
a certain knowledge of the being of a God, "  from the 
consideration of ourselves, and what we find in our own 
co~stitutions,  the certainty is placed in good and sound 
reason."  I hope so.  "  But not in the idea." 
What your lordship here means by not placed in the 
idea, I confess, I do not well  understand ;  but if your 
lordship means that it is not grounded on the ideas of 
thinking and existence before-mentioned, and the com- 
paring  of  them, and finding their  agreement or disa- 
greement with other ideas, that I must take the liberty 
to dissent from; for in this  sense  it may be placed in 
ideas, and in good and sound reason too,  i.  e. in reason 
rightly managing those ideas so as to produce evidence 
by them.  So that, my lord, I must own I see not the 
force of  the argument which says, not in  ideas but in 
sound reason ; since I see no such opposition between 
them, but that ideas and sound reason may codsist to- 
@her.  For instance:  when a  man would  show  the 
certainty of this  truth, that the three angles of a tri- 
angle are equal to two right ones; the first thing pro- 
bably that he does, is to draw a diagram.  What is the 
use of that diagram?  but steadily to suggest to  his mind 
those several ideas he would make use of in that demond 
stration.  The considering and laying these together in 
such order, and with  such connexion,  as to make  the 
agreement of the ideas of the three angles of the tri- 
angle, with  the ideas  of  two right  ones,  to be per- 
ceived, is called  right reasoning,  and the business  of 
that faculty which we call reason ;  which when it ope- 
rates rightly by considering and comparing ideas so  as 
to produce  certainty,  this showing or  demonstration 
that the thing is so, is  called  good and  sound reason. 
The ground of this  certainty lies in  ideas themselves, 
and their agreement or disagreement, which reason nei- 
ther does or can alter, but only lays them so together 
as to make it perceivable ;  and without such a due con- 
sideration and ordering  of  the ideas,  certainty could 
not be had :  and thus certainty is placed both in ideas, 
and in good and sound reason. 
This affords an easy answer to your lordship's  next: 
words, brought to prove,  that the certainty of a God 
is not placed on  the idea  of ourselves.  They stand 
thus : 
cc For let our ideas  be taken which way we please, 
by sensation  or reflection,  yet it is not the idea that 
makes us certain, but the argument from that which 
we perceive in and about ourselves." 
Nothing truer than that it is not the idea that  makes 
us certain without reason,  or without the understand- 
ing :  but it is as true, that it is not reason, it is not the 
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is not the sun makes me certain it is day, without my 
eyes; nor it is not my sight makes me certain it is day, 
without the sun; but tlie one employed about the other. 
Nor  is it one  idea by itself, that in  this,  or any case, 
makes us certain; but certainty consists in the perceived 
agreement or disagreement of all the ideas that serve to 
show the agreement of  disagreement of distinct ideas, 
as they stand in  the proposition, whose truth or false- 
hood we would be  certain of.  The using of interme- 
diate ideas to show this is called argumentation, and the 
ideas  so  used  in train, an  argument; so that,  in  my 
poor opinion, to say, that the argument makes us cer- 
tain,  is  no more than saying, the ideas  made use  of 
make us  certain. 
The idea of thinking in ourselves, which we receive 
by reflection, we may, by intermediate ideas, perceive 
to have a necessary agreement and connexion with the 
idea  of  the existence of  an eternal,  thinking Being. 
This, whether your  lordship will  call placing  of  cer- 
tainty in the idea, or placing the certainty in reason,- 
whether your lordship will say, it is not the idea  that 
gives us the certainty,but the argument,-is  indifferent 
to me; I shall not be so unmannerly as to prescribe to 
your  lordship what way you  should  speak, in this or 
any other matter.  But this your lordship will give me 
leave to say, that let it be  called  how your  lordship 
pleases,  there  is no  contradiction in  it to what I have 
said concerning certainty, or the way how we came by 
it, or the ground on which I place  it.  Your lordship 
further urges my words out of the fifth section of the 
same chapter. 
But "we  find in  ourselves  perception  and  know- 
lege.  It is very true.  But how doth this prove there 
is  a God ?  Is it from the clear  and distinct idea of it? 
No  but from  this  argument,  that either there must 
have been  a  knowing  being  from  eternity, or an un- 
knowing, for something must have been from eternity: 
but if  an unknowing  being,  then  it was  impossible 
tlicre ever should  have  been  any knowledge, it being 
as impossible that  a  thing without  knolr.1eclg.e should 
produce it, as that  a triangle shoulcl make itself three 
angles bigger than  two right ones."  Allowing  the 
argument  to be  good,  "yet  it  is  not  taken from 
the idea,  hut from the principles of  true reason;  as, 
that no  man  can  doubt  his  own  perception;  that 
every  thing must  have a  cause ;  that this cause must 
have  either a knowledge or not; if  it have, the point 
is gained:  if  it hath  not,  nothing  can produce  no- 
thing;  and  consequently  a  not  knowing being  can- 
not produce a knowing." 
Your lordship here  contends,  that my  argument is 
not taken  from  the idea, but from  true principles  of 
reason.  I do not say it is taken from any one idea, but 
from all the ideas concerned in it.  But your lordship, 
if you  herein  oppose  any thing I have  said, must, I 
humbly conceive, say,  not from ideas,  but from  true 
principles of reason ;  several whereof your lordship has 
here set down.  And whence, I beseech your lordship, 
comes the certainty of any of those propositions, which 
your lordship calls true principles of reason, but from 
the perceivable agreement or disagreement of the ideas 
contained in them? Just as it is expressed in those pro- 
positions, u. g.  '<  a man  cannot  doubt of his own per- 
ception,"  is a  true principle  of reason, or a  true pro- 
position,  or a certain proposition :  but to the certainty 
of it we arrive, only by perceiving the necessary agree- 
ment  of  the  two  ideas  of  perception  and  self-con- 
sciousness. 
Again,  cc every thing must have a cause :"  though I 
find it so  set  down  for  one  by your  lordship, yet,  I 
humbly conceive, is not a true principle of reason, nor 
a true proposition ; but the  contrary.  The certainty 
whereof we attain by the contemplation of our ideas, 
and by perceiving that the idea of eternity, and the idea 
of the existence of something, do agree ;  and the idea 
of existence  from eternity, and of  having a  cause, do 
not agree,  or are inconsistent within  the same thing. 
But '' every thing that  has  a  beginning  must  have 
a  cause,"  is a true principle  of  reason,  or  a  propo- 
sition certainly true ;  which we  come  to know by the 
same way,  i. e. by  contemplating our ideas,  and per- 
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connccted with  the idea  of  some operation;  and the 
idea of operation, with the idea of something operating, 
which  we call a cause ;  and so the beginning to be, is 
perceived to agree with  the idea  of a cause, as is ex- 
pressed in the proposition:  and thus it comes to be a 
certain proposition ;  and so may be  called a principle 
of reason, as every true  is to him that per- 
ceives the certainty of it. 
This,  my lord,  is  my way of  ideas,  and  of coming 
to a certainty by them ;  which, when your lordship has 
again considered, I am apt to think your lordship will 
no more condemn, than I do except against your lord- 
ship's way of arguments or principles  of reason.  Nor 
will  it,  I  suppose,  any longer  offend  your lordship, 
under the notion  of a new way of  reasoning ; since I 
flatter myself,  both  these  ways will  be  found to be 
equally old, one as the other, though perhaps formerly 
they have  not been so distinctly taken  notice of, and 
the name  of  ideas  is  of  later  date in  our  English 
language. 
If your lordship says, as I think you mean, viz. that 
my argument to prove a God is not taken from ideas, 
your  lordship  will  pardon  me,  if  I  think  otherwise. 
For I beseech your lordship, are not ideas, whose agree- 
ment or disagreement, as they are expressed in proposi- 
tions,  is  perceived,  immediately  or  by  intuition,  the 
principles of true reason ?  And does not the certainty 
we have of  the truth of  these propositions  consist in 
the perception  of  such agreement  or disagreement? 
And does not the agreement or disagreement  depend 
upon  the ideas  themselves ?  nay,  so  entirely depend 
upon the ideas themselves,  that it is impossible for the 
mind,  or  reason,  or argument,  or any thing to alter 
it ?  All that reason or  the mind does, in reasoning or 
arguing, is to find  out and observe that agreement or 
disagreement: and all  that argument does  is,  by an 
intervening  idea,  to show it,  where  an  immediate 
putting the ideas together will not do it. 
As  for  example,  in the present case:  the proposi- 
tion,  of whose truth I would  be  certain,  is  this :  a 
knowing being has eternally existed."  Here the ideas 
joined,  are eternal existence,  with  a  knowing being. 
~ut  does my mind perceive  any immediate connexion 
or repugnancy in these  ideas ?  No.  The proposition 
then at first view affords me no  certainty;  or,  as our 
English idiom phrases it,  it is not certain, or I am not 
certain of it.  But though 1 am not,  yet I would be 
certain whether it be true or no.  What then must I 
do ?  Find arguments to prove  that it is  true, or the 
contrary.  And  what is that,  but to cast about  and 
find out intermediate ideas,  which  may show me the 
necessary connexion or inconsistency of the ideas in the 
Either of  which,  when  by  these inter- 
vening ideas I am brought to perceive,  I am then cer- 
tain that the proposition is true, or I am certain that it 
is false.  As,  in the present case, I perceive in myself 
thought and perception ;  the idea of  actual perception 
has  an evident  connexion  with  an  actual being  that 
doth perceive and think :  the idea of an actual thinking 
being hath a  perceivable  connexion  with  the eternal 
existence of  some knowing being,  by the intervention 
of  the negation  of all being,  or  the idea of  nothing, 
which  has a  necessary connexion  with  no  power,  no 
operation,  no causality,  no  effect,  i.  e.  with  nothing. 
So  that  the  idea  of  once  actually  nothing,  has  a 
visible  connexion  with  nothing  to eternity,  for  the 
future ;  and hence the idea of  an actual being is per- 
ceived to have a necessary connexion with some actual 
being  from  eternity.  And  by  the like way of  ideas, 
may be perceived  the actual existence  of  a  knowing 
being,  to have  a  connexion  with the existence of  an 
actual knowing being from eternity ;  and the idea of an 
eternal, actual, knowing being, with the idea of imma- 
teriality, by the intervention of the idea of matter, and 
of  its actual division, divisibility,  and want of percep 
tian, &c.  which  are the ideas,  or,  as your lordship is 
pleased to call them, arguments, I make use of in this 
proof, which I need not here go over again ;  and which 
is  partly  contained in these following words,  which 
Your  lordship thus quotes out of the 10th section of the 
same chapter. 
"Again,  if we  suppose nothing to be first,  matter 64  JWT.  Loeke's Letter to flit3  Bishop  of  PYorcester.  65 
can  never  begin  to be; if  bare  matter  without  ma- 
tion to be eternal,  motion  can  never begin  to be; if 
matter and motion be supposed eternal,  thought can 
never begin to be :  for if matter could produce thought, 
then  thought must  be  in  the power  of  matter;  and 
if  it be in matter as such, it must be the inseparable 
property of  all matter;'which  is contrary to the sense 
and experience of  mankind.  If  only  some parts of 
matter have a power of  thinking, how comes so great 
a  difference  in  the  properties  of  the  same  matter ? 
What  disposition  of  matter  is required  to thinking? 
And from whence comes it? Of  which no account can 
be given in reason."  To which your lordship subjoins : 
'<  This is  the substance  of  the argument used,  to 
prove  an infinite  spiritual Being, which I am far from 
weakening the force of: but that which  I design,  is 
to show,  that the certainty of  it is  not  placed  upon 
any clear  and  distinct  ideas,  but  upon  the force  of 
reason distinct from it ;  which was the thing I intended 
to prove." 
Your lordship says, that the certainty of it (I suppose 
your  lordship  means  the  certainty  produced  by  my 
proof of  a Deity) is not placed upon clear and distinct 
ideas.  It is placed,  among others,  upon the ideas of 
thinking,  existence,  and matter,  which I think are all 
clear arld distinct ideas;  so that there are some clear 
and distinct ideas in it : and one  can hardly say there 
are not  any  clear  and  distinct  ideas  in  it,  because 
there is one  obscure and confused one in it,  viz.  that 
of substance ;  which yet hinders not the certainty of the 
proof. 
The  words  which  your  lordship  subjoins  to the 
former,  viz.  'c But upon  the force  of  reason  distinct 
from it,"  seem to me to say, as far as I can understand 
them, that the certainty of my argument for a Deity is 
placed  not  on  clear and distinct  ideas,  but upon the 
force of reason. 
This, among other places before set down,makes me 
wish your lordship had  told  us,  what  you understand 
by reason ; for, in my acceptation of  the word reason, 
I  do not see but the same proof  may be  placed  up011 
clear  and disthct ideas,  and upon  reason  too.  As I 
said before,  E can perceive  no inconsistency or opposi- 
tion between them, no more than  there is any opposi& 
tion between a clear object and my faculty of  seeing, 
in the certainty of any thing I receive by my eyes ;  for 
this  certainty  may  be  placed very  well on  both  the 
clearness of the object, and the exercise of that faculty 
in me. 
Your lordship's  next words, I think, should be read 
thus; c6  distinct from them :" for if they were intended 
as they are printed,  cc  distinct fronl it,"  I confess I dd 
not understand them.  Certainty not placed on clear 
and distinct ideas, but upon the force of reason distinct 
from them,"  my capacity will reach the sense of.  But 
then I cannot but wonder what a  distinct from them" 
do there ;  far I know nobody that does not think that 
reason, or the faculty d  reasoning, is distinct from the 
ideas it makes  use  of  or  is employed  about,  whether 
those ideas be clear and distinct,  6r obscure and con.. 
fused.  But if that sentence be to be read as it  is printed, 
viz.  The certainty of it is not placed upon an 
and distinct ideas, but upon the force of reason if  ~stinct 
from it;"  I acknowledge  your  lo~dship's  meaning  is 
above  my comprehension.  Upon  the whaIe  matter, 
my lord,  I must confess, that I do not see that what 
your lordship says you intended here to prove, is proved, 
viz. that oertainty in my proof of a God is not placed on 
ideas.  And next, if  it were proved, I do not see how 
it answers  any objection  against the Trinity,  in point 
of reason. 
Before I go on to what follows, I must beg leave ta 
confess, I am troubled to find these words of your lord- 
ship,  among those I have  above set dom  out of  the 
foregoing page, vie.  allowing the argument to  be good ; 
and cannot hrbear to wish,  that when your lordship 
was writing this passage,  you  had  had  in  your mind 
what you are pleased here to say, viz, that you are far 
from weakening the force of m  argument which I used 
to prove an infinite spiritual deing. 
My lord, your lordship is a great man,  not only by 
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the dignity your merits are invested with, but more by 
the merits of your parts and learning.  Your lordship's 
words carry great weight and authority with them ;  and 
he that shall quote but  a  saying  or  a  doubt of  your 
lordship's,  that questions the force of my argument for 
the proof  of  a God,  will  think  himself  well  founded 
and  to be  hearkened,  to as  gone  a great way in the 
cause.  These words,  <'  allowing the argument to be 
good,"  in  the  received way of  speaking,  are usually 
taker1 to signify,  that he  that  speaks them  does not 
judge the argument to be good ;  but that for discourse- 
sake he at present  admits it.  Truly,  my lord,  till I 
read these words in your lordship, I always took it for 
a good  argument; and was  so  fully persuaded of  its 
goodness, that I spoke higher of  it than of any reason- 
ing of mine anywhere,  because I thought it equal to a 
demonstration.  If it be  not so,  it is fit  I recall  my 
words, and that I do not betray so important and fun- 
damental a  cruth,  by a  weak,  but over-valued  argu- 
ment:  and therefore I cannot,  upon this occasion, but 
importune your lordship, that if your lordship (as your 
words seem to intimate) sees any weakness in it,  your 
lordship would  be pleased  to show it me;  that either 
I may amend that fault, and make it conclusive, or else 
retract my confidence, and leave that cause to those who 
have strength suitable to its weight.  But to return to 
what follows in your lordship's  next paragraph. 
2.  The next thing necessary to be  cleared in  this 
dispute  is,  the  distinction  " between  nature  and 
person;  and of  this  we can have no clear and distinct 
idea  from  sensation  or  reflection.  And  yet  a11  our 
notions of the doctrine of the Trinity depend upon the 
right understanding of  it.  For we must talk unintel- 
ligibly about this point,unless we have clear and distinct 
apprehensions concerning nature and person,  and the 
grounds  of  identity  and distinction.  But that these 
come not into our minds by these simple ideas of  sensa- 
tion and reflection,  I shall now make it appear." 
By  this it is plain, that the business of the following 
pages  is  to make it appear,  that " we have  no clear 
and distinct idea of the distinction of nature and person, 
from sensation or reflection :" or, as your lordship ex- 
presses it a little lower, ''  the apprehensions concerning 
nature and person,  and the grounds of  identity and 
distinction, come not into our minds by the simple ideas 
of sensation and reflection." 
And what, pray, my lord, can be inferred from hence, 
if it should be so ?  Your lordship tells us, 
All our notions of  the doctrine of  the Trinity de- 
pend upon the right understanding of  the distinction 
between nature and person;  and we  must talk unin- 
telligibly about this  point,  unless  we  have  clear  and 
distinct  apprehensions concerning  nature and person, 
and the grounds of identity and distinction." 
If it be so,  the inference I should draw from thence 
(if  it were fit for me to draw any) would be this,  that 
it concerns  those who  write on  that subject to have 
themselves,  and to lay down to others,  clear  and di- 
stinct  apprehensions,  or notions,  or  ideas,  (call them 
what  you  please)  of  what  they mean  by  nature and 
person,  and of the grounds of identity and distinction. 
This seems,  to me,  the natural conclusion flowing 
from your lordship's words ; which  seem  here to sup- 
pose clear  and distinct apprehensions (something  like 
clear and distinct ideas) necessary for the avoiding un- 
intelligible talk in the doctrine of  the Trinity.  But I 
do not see your lordship can, from the necessity of clear 
and distinct apprehensions of nature and person, &c. in 
the dispute of  the Trinity, bring in one,  who has per- 
haps  mistaken  the way to clear  and distinct ~iotions 
concerning nature and person, &c. as fit to be answered 
among those who  bring objections against the Trinity 
in point of reason.  I do not see why an Unitarian may 
not as well bring him in,  and argue against his Essay, 
in a chapter that he should write, to answer objections 
against the unity of God,  in point of reason or revela- 
tion : for  upon  what ground soever any one writes in 
this dispute,  or  any other,  it is  not  tolerable to talk 
unintelligibly on either side. 
If by the way of  ideas,  which is that of  the author 
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of the Essay of Human Understanding,  a  man cannot 
come to clear  and  distinct  apprehensions  concerning 
nature and person ;  if,  as he proposes from the simple 
ideas  of  sensation and reflection,  such  apprehensions 
cannot be got; it will follow from thence, that he is a 
mistaken  philosopher:  but  it will  not  follow  from 
thence  that he is  not  in  orthodox Christian;  for  he 
might (as  he did)  write  his Essay of  Human Under- 
standing,  without any thought of  the controversy be- 
tween  the  Trinitarians and Unitarians:  nay,  a  man 
might have writ all that is in his book, that never heard 
one word of any such dispute. 
There is in the world a great and fierce contest about 
nature and grace :  it would  be very hard for me, if  I 
must be brought in as a party on either side,  because 
a disputant, in that controversy, should think the clear 
and distinct apprehensions  of  nature and grace come 
riot into our minds by the simple ideas of sensation and 
reflection.  If this  be so,  I may be reckoned  among 
the objectors against all sorts and points of orthodoxy, 
whenever any one pleases: I may be called to account 
as one heterodox, in the points of  free-grace, free-will, 
predestination, original sin, justification  by faith, tran- 
substantiation, the pope's  supremacy,  and what not? 
as well as in the  doctrine of  the Trinity ;  and all be- 
cause they cannot be furnished with clear and distinct 
notions  of  grace,  free-will,  transubstantiation, &c.  by 
sensation or reflection.  For in all these, or any other 
points, I do not see but there may be complaint made, 
that they have not always right understanding and clear 
notions of those things, on which the doctrine they dis- 
pute of  depends.  ,4nd it  is not altogether unusual for 
men to talk unintelligibly to themselves and others,  in 
these and other points of controversy, for want of clear 
and distinct apprehensions,  or (as I would  call them, 
did not your lordship dislike it) ideas:  for all which 
unintelligible talking I do nat think myself  account- 
able, though it should so fall out that my way, by ideas, 
would not help them to what it seems is wanting, clear 
and distinct notions.  If  my way be ineffectual to that 
purpose, they may, for  all me,  make  use of any other 
more successful, and leave me  out of the controversy, 
as  one  useless  to  either  party,  for  deciding of  the 
question. 
Supposing, as your  lordship  says, and as  you have 
to make  appear,  that  the clear  and 
distinct apprehensions concerning  nature and person, 
and the grounds  of  identity  and  distinction,  should 
not come  into  the mind by the  simple ideas of  sensa- 
tion  and  reflection;"  what, I beseech your  lordship, 
is thls to the dispute concerning the Trinity, on either 
side ?  And if  after  your lordship  has endeavoured to 
give clear and distirict apprehensions of nature and per- 
son, the disputants in this controversy should still talk 
unintelligibly about this point, for  want  of  clear  and 
distinct apprehensions  concerning nature and person, 
ought your lordship to be brought in among the parti- 
sans on the other side, by any one who writ a Vindica- 
tion of the Doctrine of the Trinity ?  In good earnest, 
my lord, I do not see how the clear and distinct notions 
of nature and person, not coming into the mind by the 
simple ideas of sensation and reflection,  any more con- 
tains any objection against the doctrine of  the Trinity, 
than the clear  and distinct  apprehensions of  original 
sin, justification,  or transubstantiation, not coming to 
the mind by the simple ideas of sensation and reflection, 
contains any objection against the doctrine of original 
sin, justification, or transubstantiation, and so of all the 
rest of  the terms used in any controversy in religion ; 
however your lordship, in a Treatise of the Vindication 
of  the  Doctrine of  the  Trinity,  and in  the chapter 
where you make it your business to answer objections 
in point of reason, set yourself seriously to prove, that 
66  clear and distinct apprehensions  concerning nature 
and person,  and the grounds  of  identity and  distinc- 
tion, come not into our minds  by  these simple ideas 
of sensation and reflection."  In order to the making 
this appear, we read as followeth: 
'' As  to nature,  that is  sometimes  taken  for  the 
essential  property of  a  thing:  as, when  we say, that 
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we mean  no more, than it is differenced  by such pro- 
perties as come to our knowledge.  Sometimes nature 
is taken for  the thing itself in which  these  properties 
are ; and so Aristotle took nature for  a corporeal sub- 
stance, which  had  the principles  of  motion in  itself; 
but nature and substance are of an equal extent; and 
so that which is the subject of  powers and properties 
is the nature, whether it be meant of bodily or spiritual 
substances." 
Your lordship, in this paragraph, gives us two signi- 
fications of the word nature : 1.  That it is sometimes 
taken for  essential  properties,  which  I easily  admit. 
8. That sometimes  it is  taken  for  the thing itself in 
which these  properties are, and  consequently for sub- 
stance itself.  And  this  your  lordship  proves  out of 
Aristotle. 
Whether Aristotle  called. the thing itself,  wherein 
the essential properties are, nature, I will not dispute : 
but that your lordship thinks fit to  call substance nature, 
is evident.  And  from  thence  I think your  lordship 
endeavours  to prove, in the following  words, that we 
can have from ideas no clear and distinct apprehensions 
concerning nature.  Your lordship's  words are : 
"  I grant, that by sensation and reflection we come 
to know  the powers  and  properties  of  things;  but 
our reason is  satisfied  that there must be  something 
beyond these, because it is impossible that they should 
subsist by themselves.  So that the nature of  things 
properly  belongs  to  our  reason,  and  not  to  mere 
ideas." 
How we  come  by the idea of  substance,  from  the 
simple ones of  sensation and reflection, I have endea- 
voured  to show in another  place, and therefore shall 
not trouble your lordship with it here again.  But what 
your lordship infers, in these words, "  So that the na- 
ture  of  things properly  belongs  to our reason,  and 
not to mere ideas ;" I do not well understand.  Your 
lordship indeed here again seems to oppose reason and 
ideas ; and to that I say, mere ideas are the objects of 
the understanding, and reason is one of the faculties of 
the understanding employed about them ;  and that the 
understanding,  or  reason,  whichever  your  lordship 
pleases to call  it, makes  or  forms, out of  the simple 
ones that come  in by sensation and reflection, all the 
other ideas, whether general,  relative, or complex,  by 
abstracting, comparing, and compounding its positive 
simple ideas, whereof it cannot make or frame any one, 
but what it receives by sensation or  reflection.  And 
therefore I never denied that reason was employed about 
our particular simple ideas, to make out of them ideas 
general, relative, and complex ;  nor about all our ideas, 
whether simple or complex, positive or relative, general 
or particular : it being  the proper business  of reason, 
in the search after truth and knowledge, to find out the 
relations between all these sorts of ideas, in the percep- 
tion whereof knowledge and certainty of truth consists. 
These, my lord, are, in short, my notions about ideas, 
their original and formation, and of  the use the mind, 
or reason,  makes  of  them  in knowledge.  Whether 
your lordship thinks fit to call this a new way of rea- 
soning, must be left to your lordship ; whether it be a 
right  way,  is that alone  which  I  am  concerned  for. 
But your lordship seems  all along (I crave leave here 
once for all to take notice of it) to have some particular 
exception against ideas, and particularly  clear and di- 
stinct ideas, as if they were not to be used, or were of 
no use in reason and knowledge ;  or, as if reason were 
opposed to them,  or  leads us into the knowledge and 
certainty of  things without  them; or, the knowledge 
of  things did not at all depend on them.  I beg your 
lordship's pardon for expressing myself so variously and 
doubtfully in  this  matter;  the reason whereof  is, be- 
cause I must  own,  that I  do not everywhere clearly 
understand what your lordship means, when you speak, 
as you  do,  of  ideas;  as if  I ascribed  more  to them 
than  belonged  to them;  or  expected  more  of  them 
than they could do ;  u. g.  where your lordship says, 
"  But is all this contained in the simple idea of these 
operations ?"  And again, "  so that here it is not the 
clearness  of  the idea,  but an immediate act of  per- 
ception, which is the true ground of  certainty."  And 
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themselves,  but  from the evidence of  reason,"  And 
in another place,  c6 it is not the idea that makes us 
certain, but the  argument  from  that  which we  per- 
ceive in and about ourselves.  Is  it from the dear and 
distinct  idea  of  it?  No ! but  from  this  argument." 
And here,  cc the nature of things belongs to our reason, 
and not to mere  idea^.'^ 
These, and several the like passages,  your lordship 
has against what your lordship calls  th~s  new way of 
ideas, and an admirable way to bring us to the cer- 
tainty of reason." 
I never said nor thought ideas, nor any thing else, 
could bring us to the certainty of  reason, without the 
exercise of season.  And then, my lord, if we will em- 
ploy  our minds, and exercise  our reason, to bring us 
to certainty ;  what, I beseech  you,  shall they be em- 
ployed about but ideas? For ideas, in my sense of  the 
word,  are,  a  whatsoever  is  the  object  of  the under- 
standing, when a  man thinks;  or, whatever  it is  the 
mind  can  be  employed  about  in  thinking*."  And 
again, I have these words,  whatsoever  is  the imme- 
diate object of  perception, thought, or understanding, 
that I call idea t."  So that my way of  ideas, and of 
coming to certainty by thern, is to  employ our minds iq 
thinking upon  something;  and I do not  see but your 
lordship yourself,  and every body else, must make use 
of my way of ideas, unless they can find out a way that 
will bring them to oertainty by thinking on nothing, 
So that let certainty be  placed  as much  as it will on 
reason, let the nature of things belong as properly as it 
will to our reason, it will nevertheless be true, that cer- 
tainty consists in the perception of  the agreement or 
disagreement of ideas ;  and that the complex idea the 
word nature stands far is  ultimately  made up of  the 
simple ideas of sensation and reflection.  Your lordship 
proceeds : 
a  But we must yet proceed farther :  for nafure may 
be considered two ways, 
cc 1. As it is in distinct individuals, as  the nature of 
a man is equally iu  Peter, James, and John ; and this 
* B. i.  c.  1. p 8.  t B, ii. c. 0.  p 8. 
;,  the common  nature, with  a  particular  subsistence 
proper to each of  them.  For the nature of man, as in 
peter, is distinct from the same nature, as it is in James 
and John;  otherwise, they would  be  but one person, 
as well  as have the same nature.  And this distinction 
of persons in them is  discerned both by our senses, as 
to their  different  accidents;  and  by  our  reason,  be- 
cause they have a separate existence ;  not coming into 
it at once, and in the same manner." 
cc  g.  Nature may be  considered  abstractly,  without 
respect to  individual persons;  and  then it makes an 
entire notion of  itself.  For however  the same nature 
may be  in different individuals,  yet  the nature itself 
remains one  and  the same; which  appears from this 
evident reason,  that otherwise  every  individual must 
make a different kind." 
I am so little confident of my own quickness, and of 
having got,  from what your lordship has said here, a 
clear and distinct apprehension concerning nature, that 
I must beg your lordship's  pardon, if I should happen 
to dissatisfy your lordship, by talking unintelligibly, or 
besides the purpose  about it.  I must then confess to 
your lordship, 1. that I do not clearly understand whe- 
ther your lordship, in these two paragraphs, speaks of 
nature, as standing for  essential properties ; or of na- 
ture, as standing for substance : and yet it is of great 
moment in the case, because your lordship allows, that 
the notion of nature, in the former of these senses, may 
be had from sensation and reflection ;  but of nature, in 
the latter sense, your  lordship  says, "  it properly be- 
longs to reason, and not mere ideas."  2, Your  lord- 
ship's  saying, in  the first of  these paragraphs,  ~ that 
the nature of  a man, as in Peter,  is  distinct from the 
same nature as it is  in James and John ;" and in the 
second of  them, "  that however  the same nature may 
be  in  different  individuals,  yet  the  nature itself  re- 
mains one  and the same ;" does not give  me so clear 
and distinct an apprehension concerning nature, that I 
know  which,  in your  lordship's  opinion,  I  ought  to 
think, either that one and the same nature is in Peter and 
John ; or that a nature distinct from that in John is in Bishop of Worcester.  75  744  Mr. Locr'ce's Letter to the 
Peter :  and the reason is, because I cannot, in my way 
by ideas, well put together one and the same and di- 
stinct.  My apprehension concerning the nature of man, 
or the common nature of  man, if  your  lordship will, 
upon this occasion, give me leave to trouble your lord- 
ship with it, is, in short, this ;  that it is a collection of 
several  ideas,  combin6d  into  one  complex,  abstract 
idea, which when  they are found united in any indi- 
vidual existing, though joined  in  that existence with 
several other ideas, that individual or particular being 
is truly said to have the nature of a man, or the nature 
of a man to be in him ; fo-rasmuch as all .these  simple 
ideas are found united in him, which answer the com- 
plex, abstract idea, to which the specific name man is 
given  by  any one;  which  abstract,  specific  idea,  he 
keeps  the  same,  when  he  applies  the specific name 
standing for  it,  to distinct  individuals;  i.  e. nobody 
changes his idea of a man, when he says Peter is a man, 
from that idea which he makes the name man to stand 
for, when he calls John a man.  This short way by ideas 
has  not,  I confess, those  different  and  more learned 
and  scholastic considerations  set down by your lord- 
ship.  But how  they are necessary, or  at all tend to 
prove what your  lordship has proposed  to prove, viz. 
that we have no clear and distinct idea of nature, from 
the simple ideas got  from sensation and reflection, I con- 
fess I do not yet see.  But your lordship goes on to it. 
a Let us now  see how. far these  things can  come 
from  our  simple  ideas,  by  reflection  and sensation. 
And I shall lay down the hypothesis of those, who  re- 
solve our certainty into ideas, as plainly and intelligibly 
as I can." 
Here I am got again into the plural  number;  for 
though it be said  the hypothesis  of  those,"  yet my 
words alone are quoted for that hypothesis, and not a 
word of any body else in this whole business concerning 
nature.  What they are, I shall give the reader, as your 
lordship has set them down. 
1.  We  are told, "  * that all simple ideas are true and 
adequate.  Not, that they are the true representations 
* Human Understanding, B.  ii. c. 30,31. 
of things without us ;  but that they are the true effects 
of  such  powers  in  them,  as  produce  such  sensation 
rvitllin us.  So that really we can understand nothing 
certainly by them, but the effects they have upon us." 
For thcse words of mine, I find Human Understand- 
ing,  B.  ii. c. 30, 31,  quoted ;  but I crave leave to ob- 
serve to your lordship, that in neither of these chapters 
do I find the words,  as they stand here  in your  lord- 
ship's  book.  In B.  ii.  c. 31,  § 2,  of  my Essay, I find 
these words-"  that all our simple ideas are adequate, 
because being nothing hut the effects  of certain powers 
in  things fitted  or  ordained by God  to produce such 
sensations in us,  they cannot but be correspondent and 
adequate to those powers."  And  in  chap. SO, sect. 2, 
I say, that "  our simple ideas are all real,  all agree to 
the reality of things.  Not  that they are all of  them 
the images or representations of  what does exist ;  the 
contrary whereof,  in all but the primary  qualities  of 
bodies,  hath been already showed." 
These are the words in my book,  from whence those 
in your lordship's seem to be gathered,  but with some 
difference: for  I  do  not  remember  that I have  any 
where said, of  all our simple ideas, that they are none 
of  them true representations of  things without us ;  as 
the words I find in your lordship's  book seem to make 
me say.  The contrary whereof appears from the words 
which I have set down out of  chap. SO,  where I deny 
only the simple ideas of  secondary qualities  to be re- 
presentations;  but  do  everywhere  affirm,  that  the 
simple ideas of primary qualities are the images or re- 
presentations of  what does exist without us.  So that 
my words,  in the chapters quoted  by your  lordship, 
not saying that all our simple ideas are only effects, and 
none of them representations,  your lordship, I humbly 
conceive,  cannot,  upon  that account,  infer  from  my 
words,  as  you  do here,  viz. '' so  that really we  can 
understand nothing certainly by them." 
The remaining words of  this  sentence, I must beg 
your  lordship's  pardon,  if  I profess  I do not  under- 
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upon  us."  They  here,  and  them  in  the  preceding 
words to which  they are joined,  signify simple ideas ; 
for it is of  those your lordship infers, "  so that really 
we can understand nothing certainly by them, but the 
effects they have upon us."  And  then your lordship's 
words import thus much, "  so that really we can un- 
derstand  nothing  cert'zinly by  simple  ideas,  but the 
effects  simple  ideas  have  upon us :"  which I cannot 
understand to be what your lordship intended to infer 
from the preceding words  taken  to  be  mine.  For I 
suppose your  lordship argues,  from  my  opinion  con- 
cerning the simple ideas of secondary qualities, the little 
real knowledge we  should  receive from them,  if  it be 
true, that they are not representations or images of any- 
thing in bodies,  but only effects  of  certain powers in 
bodies to produce them in us; and in that sense I take 
the liberty to read your lordship's  words thus :  so that 
we can really understand  nothing certainly but [these 
ideas]  by the effects [those  powers]  have upon us.  To 
which I answer, 
1. That we as certainly know and distinguish things 
by ideas, supposing them nothing but effects produced 
in us by these powers, as if  they were representations. 
I can as  certainly,  when  I have  occasion  for  either, 
distinguish gold from silver by the colour, or wine from 
water by the taste,-if  the colour of  the one,  or  the 
taste of the other, be only an effect of  their powers on 
me,-as  if that  colour and that taste were representations 
and resemblances of something in those bodies. 
2. I answer ;  that we  have certainly as much plea- 
sure and delight by those ideas one way as the other. 
The smell of  i  violet  or  taste of  a  peach gives me as 
real and certain delight,  if  it be only an effect, as if it 
were the true resemblance of  something in that flower 
and fruit.  And I a little the more wonder to hear your 
lordship complain so much of want of  certainty in this 
case,  when  I read  these  words  of  your  lordship  in 
another place : 
" That from  the powers  and properties  of  things 
which  are  knowable  by us,  we may know as much of 
the  internal essence  of  things,  as those  powers  and 
discover.  I do not say, that we  can know 
all essences of  things alike ; nor that we can attain to 
a  understanding  of  all that belong  to them: 
but if we can know so much, as that there are certain 
beings in the world, endued with such distinct  powers 
and  properties;  what  is  it we  complain  of,  in  order 
to our  certainty of  things?  But we  do  not  see  the 
bare  essence  of  things.  What is  that bare  essence, 
without  the powers  and  properties  belonging  to it? 
It  is that internal constitution of  things, from whence 
those  powers  and  properties  flow.  Suppose we  be 
ignorant of  this  (as we  are like to be, for any disco- 
veries  that have  been  yet made) that is a good argu- 
ment,  to prove  the uncertainty of  philosophical  spe- 
culations,  about the real  essence  of  things; but it is 
no  prejudice  to us, who inquire after the certainty of 
such  essences.  For  although we cannot  comprehend 
the internal frame or  constitution of  things,  nor  in 
what manner they do flow from the substance ;  yet by 
them we certainly know, that there are such  essences, 
and  that they  are distinguished from  each other  by 
their powers and properties." 
Give me leave, if your lordship please, to argue after 
the same  manner in the present case:  that from these 
simple  ideas  which  are knowable  by us,  we  know as 
much of the powers and internal constitutions of  things 
as these powers discover ;  and, if we can know so much, 
as that there are such powers, and that there are certain 
beings in the world, endued with such powers and pro- 
perties, that,  by these simple  ideas that are but the 
effects of these powers, we can as certainly distinguish 
the beings wherein those powers are, and receive as cer- 
tain advantage from them, as if those simple ideas were 
resemblances: what is  it we complain  of the want of, 
in order to our certainty of things ?  But we do not see 
that internal constitution from whence  those  powers 
flow.  Suppose we be ignorant of  this (as we  are like 
to  be for any discoveries that have been yet made) that 
is a good argument, to show how short our philosophi- 
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tions of things ;  but is no prejudice to us, who by those 
simple ideas search out, find, and distinguish things for 
our  uses.  For though, by those  ideas which are not 
resemblances, we cannot comprehend the internal frame 
or constitution of things, nor in what manner these ideas 
are produced in us, by those powers ; yet by them we 
certainly know, that th&e are  such essences or constitu- 
tions of these substances, that have those powers, where- 
by they regularly produce those ideas in us ;  and that 
they are distinguished from each other by those powers. 
The next words  your  lordship  sets down, as out of 
my book, are : 
rce.  All  our ideas  of  substances are imperfect and  .  -  -  - -  -  - 
inadequate,  because they refer to the realessences of 
things of which we  are ignorant, and no  man knows 
what substance is  in  itself:  and  they  are  all false, 
when looked on as the representations of the unknown 
essences of things." 
In these too,  my lord,  you  must give  me leave to 
take notice,  that there is  a  little variation trom my 
words: for I do not  say, "that  aU  our ideas  of  sub- 
stances  are imperfect  and  inadequate,  because  they 
refer to the real essences of things ;" for some people 
may not refer  them  to real essences.  But I do say, 
(c that all ideas of substances, which are referred to real 
essences,  are in  that  respect  inadequate * :"  as may 
be seen inore at large in that chapter. 
Your  lordship's  next  quotation has in it something 
of  a  like  slip.  The words which  your lordship sets 
down are, 
((3.  Abstract ideas are only general names, made by 
separating circumstances  of  time and place, &c. from 
them, which are only the inventions  and creatures of 
the understanding."  - 
For theae your lordship quotes chap. iii. 5 6, of my 
third book ;  where my words are,  The next thing to 
be  considered,  is,  how  general  words  come  to  be 
made.  For since  all things that exist  are only parti- 
culars, how  come  we  by  general  terms? or  where 
find  we  those  general  &tires  they are  supposed to 
* B. 2. c.  21. 
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for?  Words  become  general, by  being made 
signs of  general ideas  3  and ide~r  become general, by 
separating from  them  the  circumstances  of  time  or 
place,  and  any other ideas that may determine them 
to this  or that particular  existence.  By this way of 
they  are  made  capable  of  representing 
more individuals  than one; each  of which, having in 
it a conformity to that abstract idea,  is (as we call it) 
of  that sort."  By which words  it appears that I am 
far enough from saying, "that  abstract ideas are only 
general  names."  Your lordship's  next quotation out 
of my book, is, 
cC4. Essence may be taken  two ways:  1. For the 
real,  internal  unknown  constitutions of  things:  and 
in this sense it is  understood  as to particular  things. 
2. For the abstract  idea;  and one  is  said to be the 
nominal, the other the real essence.  And the nominal 
essences only are immutable, and are helps to enable 
them to consider things, and to discourse of them." 
Here too,  I think,  there are some words  left out, 
which are necessary to make my meaning clearly under- 
stood; which your  lordship will  find, if you  think fit 
to give yourself  the trouble to cast your eye apin  on 
that chapter, which you here quote.  But not discern- 
ing cleiyly what use your lordship makes of them, as 
they are either in your lordship's  quotation, or in my 
book,  I shall not  trouble your lordship about them. 
Your lordship goes on : 
"But  two things are granted, which  tend to clear 
this matter. 
"  1. That there is a real essence, which is the founda- 
tion of powers and properties. 
"2. That we  may know these powers  and proper- 
ties, although we are ignorant of the real essence." 
If by that indefinite expression, cc we may know these 
powers and properties:'  your  lordship  means,  cc that 
we may know some of the powers and properties  that 
depend on the real essences of  ~ubstances,'~  I grant it 
to be my meaning.  If  your lordship,  in these words, 
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beyontl  my meaning.  From  these two things, which 
I grant your lordship says, you infer, 
6c I. That from those true and adequate ideas, which 
we  have  of  the  modes  and  properties  of  things, 
we  have  sufficient  certainty  of  the  real  essence  of 
them:  for  these  ideas  are allowed  to  be  true;  and 
either by thein we  may'jrtdge of  the truth of  things, 
or we can make no judgment at all of  any thing with- 
out ourselves. 
c6 If our ideas be only the effects we see of the powers 
of  things without  us; yet  our  reason  must  be satis- 
fied, that there could be no such powers, unless there 
were  some  real  beings  which  had  them.  So  that 
either we may be certain, by these effects, of  the real 
being of things ;  or it is not possible, as we are framed, 
to have any certainty at all of  any thing without our- 
selves." 
All this,  if  I mistake  not  your  lordship,  is  only to 
prove, that by the ideas of properties and powers which 
we observe in things, our reason must be satisfied that 
there are without  us  real beings, with  real essences; 
which being that which I readily own and have said in 
my book, I cannot but ackriowledge myself  obliged to 
your lordship, for being at the pains  to collect  places 
out of  my book  to prove what I hold  in  it ;  and the 
mcre, because your lordship does it by ways and steps 
which I should never  possibly have thought of.  Your 
lordship's  next inference is : 
'c2. That from the powers and properties of things, 
which  are knowable  by  us,  we  may  know  as much 
of the internal essence of  things, as those  powers and 
properties  discover.  I do not say, that we  can know 
all essences of things  alike ;  nor that we can attain to 
a perfect  understanding  of  all that belong  to them: 
but if  we can know so  much,  as that there are cer- 
tain beings  in  the world,  endued  with  such distinct 
powers  and properties ;  what is it we complain of  the 
want of, in order to our certainty of  things ?  But we 
do not see the bare  essence  of  things.  What is that 
bare  essence  without  the powers  and properties be- 
longing to it? It is that internal constitution of things, 
from whence those powers  and properties flow.  Sup- 
pose we be ignorant of this, as we are like to be, for any 
discoveries  that have  been  yet  made)  that is  a good 
mgument to prove the uncertainty of philosophical spe- 
culations, about the real  essences  of  things ;  but it is 
no prejudice to us, who  inquire  after the certainty of 
such essences.  For although we  cannot  comprehend 
the internal frame or constitution of things, nor in what 
manner they do flow from the substance ;  yet, by them, 
we certainly know that there are such essences, and that 
they are distinguished from each other by their powers 
and properties." 
This second inference seems to be nothing but a re- 
proof to those who complain, "  that they do not see the 
bare  essences  of  things."  Complaining that God did 
not  make us  otherwise  than he has,  and with larger 
capacities than he has thought fit  to give us,  is, I con- 
fess, a fault worthy of your lordship's reproof.  But to 
say, that if we knew the real  essences or internal con- 
stitutions of those beings, some of whose properties we 
know, we should have much  more certain  knowledge 
concerning those things and their properties, I am sure 
is true, and I think no faulty complaining ;  and if it be, 
I must own myself to your lordship to be one of those 
complainers. 
But your lordship asks,  what is it we complain of 
the want of, in order to our certainty of things  ?" 
If your lordship  means,  as your words  seem to im- 
port, <'what is it we complain of,  in order to our cer- 
tainty,"  that  those  properties  are  the properties  of 
some beings, or that something does exist when  those 
properties exist ?  I answer, we complain of the want of 
nothing in order to that certainty, or such a certainty as 
that is.  But there are other very desirable certainties, 
or other  parts of knowledge concerning the same things, 
which we  may want,  when we have  those certainties. 
Knowing the colour, figure, and smell of hyssop, I can, 
when 1 see hyssop,  know so  much,  as that there is s 
certain being in the world, endued with such distinct 
Powers  and  properties;  and  yet  I  may justly  com- 
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plain,  that  I  want  something in  order  to certainty, 
that hyssop will cure a  bruise or a  cough,  or  that it 
will  kill  moths;  or,  used  in  a  certain way,  harden 
iron ; or an hundred other useful properties that may 
be  in  it,  which  I shall  never  know;  and yet might 
be  certain  of,  if I knew, the real essences, or internal 
constitutions  of  things,  on which  their properties  de- 
pend. 
Your lordship agreeing with me, that the real essence 
is that internal constitution of things, from whence their 
powers  and properties flow ; adds  farther, "  suppose 
we  be  ignorant  of  this  Cessence]  as  we  are like  to 
be for any discoveries that have been yet made, that is 
a good argument to prove  the uncertainty of  philoso- 
phical speculations about the real essences of things; 
but it is no prejudice  to us, who inquire after the cer- 
tainty of such essences." 
I know nobody that ever denied the certainty of such 
real essences or internal constitutions, in things that do 
exist,  if  it be  that that your lordship means by cer- 
tainty of such essences.  If it be any other certainty that 
your lordship inquires  after,  relating to such essences, 
I confess  I know not what it  is,  since  your  lordship 
acknowledges, "  we are ignorant of those real essences, 
those internal constitutions, and are like to be so ;"  and 
seem to think it the incurable cause of  uncertainty in 
philosophical speculations. 
Your lordship adds, "  for although we cannot com- 
prehend the internal frame and constitution of things, 
nor in what manner they do flow from the substance." 
Here I must acknowledge to your lordship, that my 
notion of these essences differs a little from your lord- 
ship's ;  for I do not take them to flow from  the sub- 
stance in any created being,  but to be in every thing 
that internal constitution, or frame,  or modification of 
the substance, which God in his wisdom and good plea- 
sure thinks fit to  give to every particular creature, when 
he gives a being : and such essences I grant there are 
in all things that exist.  Your lordship's  third inference 
begins thus : 
"  3.  The  essences of things,  as they are knowable by 
us, have a reality in them: for they are founded on the 
natural constitution of things." 
I think the real essences of  things arc not so much 
founded on, as that they are the very real constitution 
of  things,  and therefore I easily grant there  is reality 
in them ;  and it was from that reality that I called them 
real essences.  But yet  from hence I cannot agree to 
what follows : 
And however the abstracted ideas are the work of 
the mind,  yet  they  are  not  mere  creatures  of  the 
mind;  as  appears  by  an  instance  produced  of  the 
essence of  the sun being  in  one  single individual;  in 
which case it is granted, that the idea may be so abs- 
tracted,  that  more  suns  might agree in  it,  and it is 
as much a sort, as if there were as many suns as there 
are stars.  So that here we  have  a real  essence sub- 
sisting in  one  individual,  but capable of  being  mul- 
tiplied into more, and the same essence remaining.  But 
in this one sun there is a real essence, and not a mere 
nominal or abstracted essence : but suppose there were 
more suns ;  would not each of them have the real essence 
of the sun ?  For what is it makes the second sun to be a 
true sun, but having the same real essence with the first ? 
If it were but a nominal essence, then the second would 
have nothing but the name." 
This, my lord, as I understand it,  is  to prove, that 
the abstract, general essence  of  any sort of things, or 
things of the same denomination, c. g.  of man or mari- 
gold, hath a real being out of the understanding; which 
I confess, my lord, I am not  able to conceive.  Your 
lordship's  proof  here  brought  out of  my Essay,  con- 
cerning the sun, I humbly conceive will  not reach it; 
because what is said there does not at all concern the 
real,  but nominal  essence;  as  is evident from hence, 
that the idea I speak  of  there is a complex idea ; but 
we have no complex  idea  of  the internal constitution, 
or real essence,  of the sun.  Besides,  I say expressly, 
that our distinguishing substances into species by names 
is not at all founded on their real essences.  So that the 
sun being one of these substances, I cannot, in the place 
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quoted by your lordship,be supposed to mean by esqence 
of the sun, the real essence of the sun, unless I had so 
expressed it.  But all this argument will be at an end, 
when your lordship shall have explained what you mean 
by these words, "  true sun."  In my sense of them, any 
thing will be a  true sun,  to which  the name sun may 
be truly and properly applied; and to that substance or 
thing,  the name  sun  may be  truly  and properly ap- 
plied, which has united  in  it that combination of sen- 
sible  qualities,  by which  any thing else that is called 
sun is distinguished from other substances,  i. e. by the 
nominal essence : and thus our sun is denominated and 
distinguished from  a fixed  star; not by a real essence 
that we  do  not  know (for  if  we  did, it is possible we 
should  find  the real  essence  or constitution of  one of 
the fixed stars to be the same with that of our sun) but 
by  a  complex  idea  of  sensible  qualities  co-existing; 
which, wherever they are found, make a true sun.  And 
thus I crave  leave to answer your lordship's  question, 
for what is it makes the second sun to be a true sun, 
but having the same real  essence with the first?  If it 
were but a nominal essence, then the second would have 
nothing but the name." 
I humbly conceive, if it had  the nominal essence, it 
would have something besides the name, roix. that nomi- 
nal essence, which is sufficient to denominate it truly a 
sun,  or  to make  it be  a  true sun,  though  we  know 
nothing of that real essence whereon that nominal one 
depends.  Your lordship will then argue, that that real 
essence is in the second sun, and makes the second sun. 
I grant it, when the second sun comes to exist, so as to 
be perceived by us to have  all the  ideas contained in 
our complex idea, i. e. in our nominal essence of a sun. 
For should  it be  true  (as  is  now  believed  by  astro- 
nomers) that the real essence of the sun were in any of 
the fixed stars, yet such a star could not for that be by 
us called a sun, whilst it answers not our complex idea 
or nominal  essence  of  a  sun.  But how far that will 
prove, that the essences  of  things,  as  they are know- 
able by us, have a reality in them, distinct from that of 
ideas in the mind, which  are merely creatures 
of the mind, I do not see ; and we shall farther inquire, 
in considering your lordship's following words : 
6c Therefore there must  be a  real  essence in every 
individual of the same kind."  Yes, and I beg leave of 
your lordship to say, of a different kind too.  For that 
alone is it which makes it to be what it is. 
That every individual substance which has a real, in- 
ternal, individual constitution, i. e. a real essence, that 
makes it to be what it is, I readily grant.  Upon this 
your lordship says, 
cC Peter, James, and John are all true and real men." 
Answer.  Without doubt, supposing them to be men, 
they are true and  real men, i. e. supposing the name 
of that species  belongs to them.  And  so  three  bo- 
baques are all true and real bobaques,  supposing the 
name of that species of animals belongs to them. 
For I beseech your lordship to consider, whether in 
your  way  of  arguing, by naming them Peter, James, 
and John, names familiar  to us,  as appropriated to in- 
dividuals of the species man, your lordship does not at 
first  suppose  them  men;  and  then  very  safely  ask, 
whether they be not all true and real men?  But if I 
shouldask your lordship,whether Weweena, Chuckerey, 
and  Cousheda,  were true and real men  or  no? Your 
lordship would  not  be  able to tell me,  until I having 
pointed out to your lordship the individuals called by 
those names, your lordship, by examining whether they 
had in them those sensible  qualities, which your lord- 
ship has  combined  into that complex  idea, to which 
you give the specific name man, determined  them all, 
or some of them, to be the species which you call man, 
and  so to be  true  and real  men:  which when  your 
lordship has determined, it is  plain you did it by that 
which is only the nominal essence, as not knowing the 
real one.  But your lordship farther asks- 
"  What is  it makes  Peter, James,  and John,  real 
men?  Is it the attributing the general name to them ? 
No certainly ;  but that the true and real essence of  a 
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If when your lordship asks, what makes them men? 
your  lordship used  the word,  making, in the proper 
sense for the efficient  cause, and in that sense it were 
true, that the essence of a man, i. e. the specific essence 
of  that species,  made  a  man ;  it would  undoubtedly 
follow, that this specific essence had a reality beyond 
that of being only a gendral abstract idea in the mind. 
But when  it is  said,  '<  that it is the true and real 
essence  of  a  man  in  every  one of  them  that makes 
Peter, James, and John, true and real men ;" the true 
and real meaning of  these words is no more, but that 
the essence of  that species, i. e.  the properties answer- 
ing the complex  abstract idea, to which  the specific 
name is given, being found  in them, that makes them 
be properly and truly called men, or is the reason why 
they are called men.  Your lordship adds, 
And we must  be  as certain of this, as we are that 
they are men." 
How, I beseech  your  lordship, are we  certain, that 
they are men,  but only  by  our senses, finding  those 
properties in them which answer the abstract complex 
idea,  which  is  in our minds of  the  specific  idea,  to 
which we have annexed the specific name man? This 
I take to be the true meaning of  what your lordship 
says in the next words,  viz. "  they take their denomi- 
nation  of  being  men,  from  that  common  nature  or 
essence  which  is  in  them;"  and  I  am  apt to  think 
these words will not hold true in any other sense. 
Your lordship's fourth inference begins thus : 
"  That the general idea is not made from the simple 
ideas,  by  the mere act of  the mind abstracting from 
circumstances,  but from reason  and consideration  af 
the nature of things." 
I thought, my  lord,  that reason  and consideration 
had  been  acts of  the mind,  mere  acts of  the mind, 
when  any  thing was  done  by  them.  Your lordship 
gives a reason for it, viz. 
"  For when we see several individuals that have the 
same  powers  and  properties,  we  thence  infer,  that 
there must be something common to all, which  makes 
them of one kind." 
I grant the inference to be true ;  but mast beg leave 
to deny that this proves, that the general idea the name 
is annexed to is not made by the mind.  I have  said, 
it  agrees  with  what your  lordship  here  says, 
that  the mind,  "  in  making  its  complex  ideas  of 
substances,  only follows  nature,  and puts  no  ideas 
together,  which  are  not  supposed  to have  an union 
in  nature:  nobody  joins  the voice  of  a  sheep  with 
the shape of an horse; nor the c~lour  of  lead,  with 
the  weight  and fixedness  of  gold,  to  be  t  -?m- 
plex ideas  of  any  real  substances ;  unless  he has  a 
mind  to  fill  his  head  with  chimeras,  and  his  dis- 
course with unintelligible words.  Men observing cer- 
tain  qualities  always joined  and  existing  together, 
therein  copied  nature, and of  ideas so  united,  made 
their complex ones of substances *,"  &c.  Which is very 
little different from what your lordship here says, that 
it is from our observation of individuals, that we come 
to infer,  "that there  is something  common  to them 
all."  But I do not see how it will thence follow, that 
the general or  specific idea is  not made by the mere 
act of the mind.  No, says your lordship ; 
"  There is  something  common to them  all, which 
makes them of one kind ;  and if the difference of kinds 
be real, that which  makes them  all of one kind must 
not be a nominal, but real essence." 
This may be some objection to the name of nominal 
essence; but is, as I humbly conceive, none to the thing 
designed  by it.  There is  an internal  constitution of 
things, on which their  properties depend.  This your 
lordship and I are agreed of,  and this we call the real 
essence.  There are also certain complex ideas, or com- 
binations of these properties in men's  minds, to which 
they  commonly  annex  specific  names,  or  names  of 
sorts or  kinds  of things.  This, I believe, your  lord- 
ship does not deny.  These complex ideas, for want of 
a better name, I  have  called  nominal  essences ;  how 
properly, I will not dispute.  But if  any one will help 
me to a better name for them, I am ready to  receive 
it ;  till then I must, to express myself, use this.  Now, 
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my lord, body, life, and the power of reasoning, being 
not the real essence  of a  man, as I believe  your lord- 
ship will agree : will your  lordship say, that they are 
not enough to make the thing wherein they are found 
of  the kind  called  man, and  not  of  the kind  called 
baboon, because  the  difference of these kinds is real ? 
If this be not  real enough  to make  the  thing of  one 
kind  and  not  of  another, I  do  not see  how  animal 
rntionule can be enough  to distinguish a man from  a 
horse :  for that is  but the nominal, not real essence of 
that kind, designed by the name man.  And yet, I sup- 
pose, every one thinks it real enough, to make a  real 
difference between  that and  other kinds.  And if no- 
thing will serve the turn, to make things of one  kind 
and not of another (which,  as I have showed, signifies 
no more but ranking of  them  under  different specific 
names) but  their  real,  unknown  constitutions, which 
are the real essences we are speaking of, I fear it would 
be a long while before we should have really different 
kinds of substances, or distinct names for them ;  unless 
we could distinguish them by these differences, of which 
we have no distinct conceptions.  For I think it would 
not be readilyanswered me, if I should demand,wherein 
lies the real difference in the internal constitution of a 
stag from that of  a buck, which are each of them very 
well known  to be  of one kind,  and not  of the other; 
and nobody questions but that the kinds whereof each 
of them is, are really different.  Your lordship farther 
says, 
"  And this difference doth not depend upon the com- 
plex ideas of substances, whereby men arbitrarily join 
modes together in their minds." 
T confess, my lord, I know not  what to say to this, 
because  I  do not  know what  these  complex  ideas of 
substances  are,  whereby  men  arbitrarily join  modes 
together in their minds.  But I am apt to think there 
is a mistake in the  matter,  by the words  that follow, 
which are these : 
"  For let them  mistake  in  their  complication  of 
ideas, either  in  leaving  out or  putting in what  doth 
not  belong to them ; and let their ideas be what they 
please, the real essence  of a  man,  and a horse, and a 
tree, are just what they were." 
The mistake I spoke  of,  I humbly suppose  is this, 
that things are here taken to be distinguished by their 
real  essences ;  when  by  the very way of speaking  of 
them, it is clear, that they are already distinguished by 
their nominal  essences, and  are so  taken to be.  For 
what,  I beseech  your  lordship,  does  your  lordship 
mean, when you say, "  the red essence of a man, and 
a horse, and a  tree ;" but that  there are  such kinds 
already set out by the signification of these names, man, 
horse, tree? And what, I beseech your lordship, is the 
signification of each of  these  specific  names,  but the 
complex idea it stands for ?  And that complex idea is 
the nominal essence, and nothing else.  So that taking 
man, as your lordship does here,  to stand for a kind or 
sort of  individuals ;  all which  agree in  that common, 
complex idea, which that specific  name stands for ;  it 
is certain that the real  essence  of all  the individuals, 
comprehended under  the specific  name man,  in  your 
use of it, would  be just  the same,  let others leave out 
or put into thei'r complex idea of man what they please; 
because the real essence on which that unaltered com- 
plex idea, i. e. those properties depend, must necessarily 
be concluded to be the same. 
For I take it for granted, that in  using the name 
man, in this place, your lordship uses it for that com- 
plex idea which is in your lordship's  mind of that spe- 
cies.  So that your lordship, by putting it for, or sub- 
stituting it in, the place  of that  complex idea, where 
you say, the real essence  of it is just as it was, or the 
very same it was; does suppose the idea it stands for to 
be steadily the same.  For if I  change the signification 
of the word man, whereby it may not comprehend just 
the same individuals which  in your lordship's  sense  it 
does, but shut out some of  those that to your lordship 
are men in your signification of the word man, or take 
in  others  to which  your  lordship does  not  allow the 
name man :  I do not think your lordship will say, that 
the real essence  of  man,  in both these  senses, is the 
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say, "  let men  mistake  in  the complication  of  their 
ideas, either  in  leaving out  or  putting  in what  doth 
not belong to them ; and let their ideas be what they 
please ;  the  real  essence  of  the individuals conlpre- 
hended under the names annexed to these ideas, will be 
the same :"  for so, I humbly conceive, it must be put, 
to make out what your lordship aims at.  For as your 
lordship  puts it by  the name  of  man,  or  any  other 
specific name, your  lordship seems  to me to suppose, 
that that name stands for,  and not for,  the same idea, 
at the same time. 
For example,  my lord,  let your  lordship's  idea, to 
which you annex the sign man, be a rational animal ; 
let another man's  idea be  a  rational animal of such  a 
shape ;  let a third man's  idea be of an animal of such 
a size and shape, leaving out rationality; let a fourth's 
be an animal with a body of such a shape, and an im- 
material  substance, with a  power of reasoning ;  let a 
fifth leave out of his idea an immaterial substance :  it is 
plain every one of these will call his a man,  as well as 
your lordship; and yet it is as plain that man, as stand- 
ing for  all these  distinct,  complex  ideas,  cannot  be 
supposed to have the same internal  constitution, i. e. 
the same real essence.  The truth is,  every  distinct, 
abstract idea, with a name to it, makes a real, distinct 
kind, whatever  the real  essence  (which we know not 
of any of them) be. 
And therefore I grant it  true, what your lordship says 
in the next words, "  and let the nominal essences differ 
never so much, the real, common essence or nature of 
the several kinds,  is not  at all altered by them;" i. e. 
that our thoughts or  ideas  cannot alter the real con- 
stitutions that are in things that exist ;  there is nothing 
more certain.  But yet it is true, that the change of 
ideas to which we annex them, can and does alter the 
signification of their names, and  thereby alter the kinds, 
which  by  these  names  we rank  and sort them into. 
Your lordship farther adds, 
"  And these real essences are unchangeable, i. e.  the 
internal constitutions are unchangeable."  Of  what, I 
beseech your lordship,  are  the  internal  constitutions 
unchangeable? Not of  any thing that exists,  but of 
~~d  alone ; for they may be  changed all  as easily by 
that hand that made them, as the internal frame of a 
watch.  What then is it that is unchangeable? The in- 
tern$l constitution or real essence of a species :  which, 
in plain English, is no more but this,  whilst the same 
specific name, a. g.  of man, horse, or tree, is annexed 
to, or made  the sign  of  the same  abstract, complex 
idea, under which I rank  several  individuals, it is im- 
possible but the real constitution on which that unal- 
tered complex idea, or nominal essence, depends, must 
be the same :  i.  e.  in other words, where we find all the 
same properties, we have  reason to conclude  there is 
the same real,  internal constitution, from which those 
properties flow. 
But your lordship proves the real essences to be un- 
changeable, because God makes them, in these follow- 
ing words : 
"  For  however  there may happen  some  variety in 
individuals by particular accidents, yet the essences of 
men  and horses, and trees,  remain  always the same ; 
because they do not depend on the ideas of  men, but 
on  the will  of  the Creator,  who  hath  made  several 
sorts of beings." 
It is true, the real constitutions or essences of parti- 
cular things existing, do not depend on  the ideas of 
men, but on the will  of the Creator ;  but their being 
ranked into sorts, under such and such names, does de- 
pend, and wholly depend, upon the ideas of men. 
Your lordship here ending your four inferences,  and 
all your discourse about nature ;  you come, in the next 
place, to treat of person, concerning which your  lord- 
ship discourseth thus : 
"  2. Let us now come to the idea of a person.  For 
although the common nature in mankind be the same, 
yet we see a difference in the several individuals from 
one another :  so that Peter, and James, and John, are 
all of  the same kind;  yet Peter  is  not  James,  and 
James  is  not  John.  But  what  is  this  distinction 
founded upon ?  They may be  distinguished from each 
other by  our  senses  as  to difference  of  features, di- 9  2  Mr. Locke's Letter to the 
stance of place, &c. but that is not all ; for  supposing 
there were  no such  external difference,  yet  there  is 
a  difference  between  them, as  several  individuals  of 
the  same  nature.  And  here  lies  the  true  common 
idea  of  a  person, which  arises  from that manner  of 
substance which  is in  one individual,  and is not com- 
municable to another. '  An individual, intelligent sub- 
stance, is rather supposed to the making of  a person, 
than the proper definition  of  it : for a  person relates 
to something, which  doth distinguish it from another 
intelligent substance in the same nature;  and there- 
fore  the foundation  of  it  lies  in  the peculiar  man- 
ner  of  subsistence, which  agrees to one,  and to none 
else of  the  kind : and this  is  it which  is  called  per- 
sonality.)' 
But then your lordship asks, "  but how do our simple 
ideas  help ue  out in this matter ?  Can we learn from 
them the difference of nature and person ?" 
If nature and person  are taken for two real beings, 
that do or can exist any where, without any relation to 
these two names, I must confess I do not see how simple 
ideas, or any thing else, can help us out in this matter; 
nor can we from simple ideas, or any thing else that I 
know,  learn  the difference  between  them,  nor what 
they are. 
The reason why I speak thus, is because your lord- 
ship,  in  your  fore-cited  words,  says, "  here  lies the 
true idea of a person ;" and in the foregoing discourse 
speaks  of  nature,  as if  it were  some  steady,  esta- 
blished being, to which one certain precise idea neces- 
sarily belongs to make it a true idea :  whereas, my lord, 
in  the way of ideas, I begin at the other end, and think 
that the word person in itself signifies nothing ;  and so 
no idea belonging to it, nothing can be said to be the 
true idea  of  it.  But as soon  as the common  use of 
any language has appropriated it to any idea, then that 
is the true idea of a person, and so of nature :  but be- 
cause the propriety of language, i. e. the precise idea 
that  every word stands for, is not always exactly known, 
but is  often  disputed, there  is  no  other way for  him 
that uses a word that is in dispute, but to define what 
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he signifies by it ;  and then the  dispute can be no longer 
verbal, but must  necessarily be  about the idea which 
he tells us he puts it for. 
Taking therefore nature and person for the signs of 
two ideas they are put to stand for, there is nothing, I 
think, that helps us  so  soon,  nor  so well  to find  the 
difference of  nature and  person,  as simple  ideas; for 
by enumerating all the simple ideas, that are contained 
in the complex idea that each of them is made to stand 
for, we shall immediately see the whole difference that 
is between them. 
Far be it from me to say  there is  no other way but 
this :  your lordship proposing to clear the distinction 
between nature and person, and having declared, "  we 
can haw no clear  and  distinct  idea of it by sensation 
or  reflection,  and that  the grounds  of  identity  and 
distinction  come  not  into  our minds  by  the simple 
ideas of sensation and reflection ;"  gave me some hopes 
of  getting  farther  insight  into these  matters,  so  as 
to have more clear and distinct apprehensions concern- 
ing nature and person, than was  to be  had  by ideas. 
But after having, with attention, more than once read 
over  what  your  lordship, with  so  much  application, 
has writ thereupon ; I must, with regret, confess, that 
the way is too delicate, and the matter too abstruse, for 
my capacity;  and that 1 learned  nothing  out of your 
lordship's  elaborate  discourse but  this,  that I  must 
content myself with the condemned way of ideas, and 
despair of ever attaining any knowledge by any other 
than that, or farther than that will lead me to it. 
The remaining part of the chapter containing no re- 
marks of your  lordship upon  any part  of my book,  I 
am glad I have no  occasion to give your lordship any 
farther trouble, but only to beg your lordship's  pardon 
for this, and to assure your lordship that I am, 
My lord, 
Your lordship's  most humble 
And most obedient servant, 
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POSTSCRIPT. 
My Lord, 
UPON  a  review of  these papers,  I can  hardly for- 
bear wondering  at  myself what I have  been  doing in 
them ; since I can scarce find  upon what ground  this 
controversy with me stands, or whence it rose, or whi- 
ther it tends.  And I should certainly repent my pains 
in it, but that I conclude that your lordship, who does 
not throw away your  time upon  slight matters,  and 
things of small  moment,  having a  quicker  sight  and 
larger views  than I have,  would  not  have  troubled 
yourself  so  much with my book,  as to bestow on it 
seven-and-twenty  pages  together  of  a  very  learned 
treatise,  and that on  a very weighty subject;  and in 
those  twenty-seven  pages  bring  seven-and-twenty 
quotations  out of  my book;  unless  there were some- 
thing in it wherein  it is very material that the world 
should be set right ; which  is what I earnestly desire 
sllould be done ;  and to that purpose alone have taken 
the liberty to trouble your lordship with this letter. 
If I have any where  omitted  any thing of moment 
in your lordship's  discourse concerning my notions, or 
any where mistaken your lordship's sense in what I have 
taken notice  of,  I beg your  lordship's  pardon; with 
this assurance,  that it was  not wilfully done.  And if 
any where, in the warm pursuit of an argument, over- 
attention to the matter should have  made me let slip 
any form of expression, in the least circumstance  not 
carrying with it the utmost marks of that respect that 
I acknowledge due, and shall always pay to your lord- 
ship's  person and known great learning, I disown it ; 
and desire your  lordship to look  on it as not coming 
from my intention, but inadvertency. 
 body's notions, I think,  are the better or truer, 
for ill manners joined  with them ;  and I concluclc your 
lordship, who so well lrnows the different cast of men's 
heads, and of  the opinions  that possess them, will not 
think it ill manners in any one, if his  notions  differ 
from your lordship's,  that he owns that difference, and 
explains the grounds of  it as well  as he can.  I have 
thought, that truth and knowledge, by the ill 
and  over-eager  management  of controversies,  lose  a 
great deal of the advantages they might receive, from 
the variety of conceptions there is in men's  understand- 
ings.  Could the heats, and passion,  and ill language 
be left out of them, they would  afford  great improve- 
ments  to those  who  could  separate  them  from  by- 
interests and personal prejudices.  These I look up011 
your lordship to be altogether above. 
Jt is not for me,  who  have  so  mean  a talent  in it 
myself, to prescribe  to any one  how he should write ; 
for when I have said all I can, he, it is like, will follow 
his own method,  and perhaps  cannot help  it.  Much 
less would it be good manners in me, to offer any thing 
that way to a person of your lordship's  high rank, above 
me, in parts and learning, as well as place and dignity. 
But yet your lordship will excuse it to  my short-sighted- 
ness,  if  I wish  sometimes  that  your  lordship  would 
have been pleased,  in this debate, to have kept every 
one's part separate to himself; that what I am concerned 
in  might not have been  so mingled with the opinions 
of others, which are no tenets of  mine, nor,  as I think, 
does what I have written any way relate to ;  but that I 
and every one might have  seen whom your lordship's 
arguments bore upon, and what interest he had in the 
controversy,  and how far.  At last, my lord, give me 
leave to wish, that your lordship had shown what con- 
nexion any thing I have said about ideas, and particu- 
larly about the idea of substance, about the possibility 
that God, if he pleased, might endue some systems of 
matter with a power of thinking ;  or what I have said 
to prove  a God, &c. has with  any objections, that are 
made by others, against the doctrine of the Trinity, or 
against mysteries :  for many passages concerning ideas, 96  Mr.  Locke's  Letter to  the 
substances, the possibility of God's  bestowing thoughts 
on some systems of matter, and the proof of a God, &c. 
your lordship has quoted out of my book, in a chapter 
wherein your lordship professes to answer ''  objections 
against the Trinity,  in point of  reason."  Had I been 
able to discover in these passages  of my book,  quoted 
by your  lordship,  whai tendency  your  lordship  had 
observed in them to any such objections, I should per- 
haps have troubled your lordship with less impertinent 
answers.  But the uncertainty I was very often in, to 
what purpose  your lordship brought them,  may have 
made my explications of myself less apposite, than what 
your lordship might have expected.  If  your lordship 
had showed me any thing in my book, that contained 
or implied  any opposition in it to any thing revealed 
in holy writ concerning the Trinity, or any other doc- 
trine contained in the Bible, I should have been thereby 
obliged to your lordship for freeing me from that mis- 
take, and for affording me  an opportunity to own to 
the world that obligation,  by  publicly retracting my 
error.  For I know not any thing more disingenuous, 
than not publicly to own a conviction one has received 
concerning  any  thing  erroneous  in  what  one  has 
printed;  nor  can there,  I think,  be a greater offence 
against mankind, than to propagate a falsehood whereof 
one is convinced, especially in a matter wherein men are 
highly concerned not to be misled. 
The holy scripture is to me, and always will be, the 
constant guide of my assent ;  and I shall always hearken 
to it,  as containing infallible truth,  relating to things 
of the highest concernment.  And I wish I could  say, 
there were no mysteries in it: I acknowledge there are 
to me,  and J  fear  always will be.  But where I want 
the evidence of things, there yet is ground enough for 
me to believe, because God has said it : and I shall pre- 
sently condemn and  quit any opinion of mine, as soon 
as I am shown that it is contrary to any revelation in 
the holy scripture.  But I must  confess  to your lord- 
ship, that I do not perceive any such contrariety in any 
thing in my Essay of Human Understanding. 
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MY  LORD, 
YOUR lordship  having  done  my  letter  the  honour 
to think  it worth  your  reply,  I think  myself  bound 
in good  manners  publicly to acknowledge the favour, 
and to give your lordship an account of the effect it  has 
had upon me,  and the grounds upon which I yet differ 
from you in those points, wherein I am still under  the 
mortification of  not being able to bring my sentiments 
wholly to agree with your lordship's.  And this I the 
more readily do,  because  it seems to me,  that  that 
wherein  the great difference now  lies between  us,  is 
founded only on your fears ;  which I conclude, upon a 
sedate review, your  lordship  will  either part with,  or 
else give me other reasons, besides your apprehensions, 
to convince  me  of  mistakes  in my  book,  which  your 
lordship thinks may be of  consequence even in matters 
of  religion. 
Your lordship makes my letter to consist of two parts ; 
my  complaint to your  lordship, and  my vindication of 
myself.  You  begin  with  my  complaint;  one  part 
whereof  was,  that I was  brought into a  controversy, 
wherein I had never  meddled, nor  knew how I came 
to be concerned in.  To this  your lordship is  pleased 
to promise me satisfaction. 
Since your lordship has condescended so far, as to be 
at the pains to give  me and others satisfaction in this 
matter, I crave leave to second your design herein, and 
to premise a remark or two for the clearer understand- 
ing the nature of my complaint, which is the only way 
to satisfaction in it. 
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1. Then it is  to be  observed, that the proposition 
which you dispute against, as opposite to the doctrine 
of the Trinity, is this, that clear and distinct ideas are 
necessary to certainty.  This is  evident not only from 
what your lordship subjoins to the account of  reason, 
given  by  the author  of  Christianity  not  mysterious; 
but also by what your lordship says here again, in your 
answer to me, in these words: "  to lay all foundation 
of  certainty,  as  to matters  of  faith,  upon  clear  and 
distinct ideas, was the opinion I opposed." 
2. It  is to be observed, that this you call a new way 
of  reasoning ;  and those that build upon it, gentlemen 
of  this new way of  reasoning. 
3.  It  is to be observed, that a great part of my com- 
plaint was, that I was  made one of  the gentlemen of 
this new way of  reasoning, without any reason at all. 
To this  complaint of  mine, your  lordship has had 
the goodness to make this answer : 
"  Now to give you, and others, satisfaction as to this 
matter,  I shall first give an account of  the occasion of 
it; and then  show  what care I took  to prevent mis- 
understanding about it." 
The first part of  the satisfaction your  lordship  is 
pleased to offer, is contained in these words : 
6c The occasion  was this:  being to  answer  the ob- 
jections in point  of  reason, (which  had  not been  an- 
swered  before)  the  first  I  mentioned  was:  That it 
was  above  reason,  and therefore  not  to be believed. 
In  answer to this,  I proposed two things to be  consic 
dered : 1. What we understand by reason :  2.  What 
ground in reason there is to reject any doctrine above 
it, when it is proposed as a matter of  faith." 
6c As to the former, I observed, that the Unitarians, 
in their late pamphlets, talked very much about clear 
and distinct  ideas and perceptions, and that the  my- 
steries  of  faith  were repugnant to them ;  but never 
went  about to state the nature and bounds of  reason, 
in  such  a manner  as  they ought to have  done,  who 
make it the rule and standard of  what they are to be- 
lieve.  But  I  added,  that a  late  author,  in  a  book 
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called  Christianity  not  mysterious,  had  taken  upon 
him to clear this  matter,  whom for that cause 1 was 
bound to consider : the design of  this discourse related 
wholly to matters  of  faith,  and  not  to pl~iloso~hical 
speculations;  so  that there  can  be no dispute  about 
his  application  of  these  he  calls  principles of  reason 
and certainty. 
66 When  the mind makes use of  intermediate  ideas, 
to discover  the  agreement  or  disagreement  of  the 
ideas  received  into them ; this method of  knowledge, 
he saith, is properly called reason or demonstration. 
'6  The mind,  as he goes on, receives ideas two ways : 
1.  By intromission of  the senses. 
a  2. By considering its own operations. 
('And  these simple  and distinct  ideas  are the sole 
matter and foundation of  all our reasoning." 
And so all our certainty is resolved into two things, 
either "  immediate  perception, which is self-evidence ; 
or the use  of  intermediate ideas,  which  discover  the 
certainty  of  any  thing  dubious;  which  is  what  he 
calls reason. 
a Now this, I said, did  suppose,  that we  must have 
clear and distinct ideas of whatever we pretend to any 
certainty  of  in our  minds  (by reason)  and that the 
only  way  to attain  this  certainty,  is  by  comparing 
these ideas together;  which excludes  all  certainty of 
faith  or reason, where  we cannot have such clear  and 
distinct ideas. 
"  From hence I proceeded to show, that we could not 
have such clear and distinct ideas as were necessary in 
the present  debate,  either by sensation  or reflection, 
and consequently we could not attain to any certainty 
about it; for which  I instanced in the  nature of  sub- 
stance and person, and the distinction between them. 
"And  by virtue of these principles, I said, that I did 
not  wonder  that the gentlemen  of  this  new  way  of 
reasoning  had  almost discarded substance out of  the 
reasonable part of  the world." 
This is all your lordship says here, to give me,  and 
others, satisfaction, as to the matters of  my complaint. 
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lordship's  arguing against what I have said concerning 
substance. 
In these words therefore, above quoted, I am to find 
the satisfaction your  lordship  has promised, as to the 
occasion why your lordship made me one of  the gentle- 
men of the new way of reasoning, and in that joined me 
with the Unitarians, an&  the author of Christianity not 
mysterious.  But I crave leave  to represent  to your 
lordship, wherein the words  above-quoted  come short 
of  giving me satisfaction. 
In the first place, it is plain they were intended for a 
short narrative of what was contained in the tenth chap- 
ter of  your Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity, 
relating to this matter.  But how could your lordship 
think, that the repeating  the same  things over again 
could give me  or  any body else  satisfaction, as to my 
being  made  one of  the gentlemen of  this new way of 
reasoning ? 
Indeed, I cannot say it is an exact repetition of what 
is to be found in the beginning of  that tenth chapter; 
because your  lordship said, in that tenth chapter, that 
"  the author  of  Christianity not  mysterious gives  an 
account of  reason, which  supposes that we  must have 
clear  and  distinct ideas of  whatever  we pretend  to a 
certainty of  in our minds."  But here, in  the passage 
above set, down, out of your answer to my letter, I find 
it is  not  to his  account  of  reason, but to something 
taken out of  that, and something borrowed by him out 
of  my book, to which  your lordship annexes  this  sup- 
position.  For  your lordship says,  "now  this,  I said, 
did suppose that we must have clear and distinct ideas 
of  whatever  we  pretend  to any  certainty  of  in  our 
minds (by reason.)" 
If your lordship did say so in your Vindication of the 
doctrine of  the Trinity, your printer did your lordship 
two  manifest  injuries.  The one is,  that  he  omitted 
these words [by reason] :  and the other, that he annexed 
your lordship's  words to the account of  reason,  there 
given by the author of Christianity not mysterious;  and 
not to those words your lordship here says you annexed 
them to.  For this here refers to other words,  and not 
barely to that author's account of  reason ;  as any one 
may satisfy himself,  who will but compare  these  two 
places together. 
One thing more  seems  to me very  remarkable  in 
this  matter,  and  that is,  that  6c the  laying  all foun- 
dation  of  certainty,  as  to  matters  of  faith,  upon 
dear and  distinct ideas,  should be the opinion which 
you  oppose,"  as  your  lordship  declares ; and  that 
this should be it for which  the Unitarian, the author 
of Christnnity not mysterious, and I, are jointly brought 
on the stage, under the title of  the gentlemen of this 
new  way  of  reasoning:  and yet no one  quotation be 
brought out of  the Unitarians, to show  it to be  their 
opinion ;  nor  any thing alleged  out of  the author of 
Christianity not mysterious, to show it to be his ;  but 
only some things quoted out of  him, which are said to 
suppose all foundation of certainty to be laid upon clear 
and distinct ideas :  which that they do suppose it, is not, 
I think,  self-evident,  nor  yet proved.  But this I am 
sure, as to myself, I do no where  lay all foundation of 
certainty in clear and distinct ideas ;  and therefore am 
still at a loss, why I was made one of  the gentlemen of 
this new way of  reasoning. 
Another thing wherein your lordship's  narrative, in- 
tended for my satisfaction, comes short of giving it  me, 
is this ;  that at most it gives but an account of  the oc- 
casion why the  Unitarians, and the author of Christianity 
not mysterious, were made by your lordship the gentle- 
men of this new way of reasoning.  But it  pretends not 
to  say a word why I was made one of  them ;  which was 
the thing wherein I needed satisfaction.  For your lord- 
ship breaks off  your report of  the matter of  fact, just 
when  you  were come to the matter of  my complaint; 
which  you  pass  over  in silence,  and  turn your  dis- 
course to what  I  have  said  in  my  letter: for  your 
lordship  ends  the account  of  the occasion, in  these 
words:  'c  the gentlemen  of  this  new  way  of  reason- 
ing had  almost  discarded  substance out of  the rea- 
sonable part of  the world."  And there your lordship 
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follow, that I am brought in as one of those gentlemen, 
of which I would have been glad to have known the oc- 
casion ; and it is in this that I needed satisfaction.  For 
that which  concerns the others, I meddle  not with ;  I 
only desire to know upon what occasion, or why, I was 
brought into this dispute of  the Trinity.  But of that, 
in this account  of  the occasion, I do not see that your 
lordship says any thing. 
I have  been  forced  therefore  to look again a little 
closer into this whole  matter : and,  upon a fresh exa- 
mination of  what your lordship has said, in your Vindi- 
cation of the Doctrine of the Trinity, and in your answer 
to  my letter, I come now to see a little clearer, that the 
matter, in short, stands thus: The  author of Chlistianity 
not mysterious was one  of  the gentlemen of  this new 
way of  reasoning, because he had laid down a doctrine 
concerning reason, which  supposed  clear  and distinct 
ideas necessary to certainty.  But that doctrine of his 
tied me not at all to him, as may be seen by comparing 
his account of reason with what I have said of reason in 
my Essay, which your lordship accuses of no such sup- 
position; and so I stood clear from his account of reason, 
or any thing it supposes.  But he having given an ac- 
count of the original of our ideas, and having said some- 
thing about them conformable to what is in my Essay, 
that has tied him and me so close together, that by this 
sort of connexion I came to be one of the gentlemen of 
this new way of  reasoning, which consists. in making 
clear and distinct ideas necessary to  certainty; though I 
nowhere  say, or  suppose,  clear and distinct ideas rie- 
cessary to certainty. 
How your lordship came to  join me with the author 
of Christianity not mysterious, I think is now  evident. 
And he being the link whereby yc;ur lordship joins me 
to the Unitarians, in Objections against the Trinity in 
Point af Reason answered;  give me leave, my lord, a 
little to examine the connexiorl of this link on that side 
also, i. e. what has  made  your lordship join  him  and 
the Unitarians in this point, viz. making clear and di- 
stinctideas nercessaq to  certainty; that  great battery, it 
*ems, which they make use of  against the doctrine of 
the  Trinity in pint  of reason. 
NOW  as to this,  your lordship says, "  that the Uni- 
tarians having  not  explained  the nature  and bounds 
of  reason, as they  ought ; the author of  Christianity 
not mysterious hath endeavoured  to make amends for 
this, and takes upon  him to make this matter clear." 
And then your lordship sets down his account of reason 
at large. 
I will  not exarnine  how it appears, that the author 
of Christianity not mysterious gave this account of rea- 
son, to supply the defect of the Unitarians herein, or to 
make amends for their not having done it.  Your lord- 
ship does not quote any thing out of him, to show that 
it was  to make amends for  what  the Unitarians had 
neglected.  I only look to see how the Unitarians and 
he come to be united, in this dangerous principle of the 
necessity of clear and distinct ideas to certainty :  which 
is that which makes him a gentleman of  this new and 
dangerous way of reasoning ;  and consequently me too, 
because he agrees in some particulars with my Essay. 
Now,  my  lord,  having  looked  over his  account of 
reason, as set down by your lordship ;  give me leave to 
say, that he that shall compare that account of  reason 
with your  lordship's  animadversion  annexed  to it,  in 
these  words,  "this  is offered  to the world  as  an ac- 
count  of  reason;  but  to  show  how  very  loose  and 
unsatisfactory  it is,  I  desire  it may  be  considered, 
that this  doctrine supposes  that we  must  have  clear 
and  distinct  ideas  of  whatever  we  pretend  to any 
certainty of  in our minds; and that the only way  to 
attain this  certainty, is by  comparing these  ideas to- 
gether; which  excludes  all certainty  of  faith or rea- 
son,  where  we cannot  have  such  clear  and  distinct 
ideas :"  will, I fear,  hardly defend  himself from won- 
dering a,t the way your lordship has taken to show, how 
loose and unsatisfactory an account of reason his is; but 
by imagining that your lordship had a great mind to say 
S~ething  against clear and distinct ideas, as necessary 
to  certainty;  or that your lordship had some reason for 
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of reason ;  since in it, from one end to the other, there 
is not the least mention of clear and distinct ideas.  Nor 
does he (that I see) say any thing that supposes that we 
must have clear and distinct ideas of  whatever we pre- 
tend to any certainty of in our minds. 
But whether he and the Unitarians do, or do not, lay 
all foundation of certainty, as to matters of  faith, upon 
clear and distinct  ideas, I concern  not myself:  all my 
inquiry is, how he and I and the Unitarians come to  be 
joined  together, as gentlemen of  this new way of rea- 
soning? Which, in short, as far as I can  trace and ob- 
serve the connexion, is only thus : 
The  Unitarians are the men of this new way of rea- 
soning, because they speak of  clear  and distinct per- 
ceptions,  in their answer  to your  lordship's  sermon, 
as your lordship says.  The author of  Christianity not 
mysterious  is joined  to the Unitarians,  as  a  gentle- 
man  of  this  new way  of  reasoning,  because  his  doc- 
trine, concerning reason,  supposes we  must have clear 
and distinct ideas of whatever we pretend to any cer- 
tainty of in our minds :  and I am joined to that author, 
because he says,  <'that the using of intermediate ideas 
to  discover the agreement or disagreement of the ideas 
received into our minds, is reason ;  and that the mind 
receives ideas by the intromission of the senses, and by 
considering its own operations.  And these simple and 
distinct ideas are the sole matter and foundation of all 
our reasoning."  This, because it  seems to be borrowed 
out of my book, is that which unites me to him, and by 
him consequently to the Unitarians. 
And thus I am come to the end of the thread of your 
lordship's  discourse,  whereby I am  brought  into the 
company of the gentlemen of this new way of reasoning, 
and thereby bound up  in the bundle  and cause of the 
Unitarians arguing against the doctrine of the Trinity, 
by objections in point of reason. 
I have been longer upon this, than I thought I should 
be ;  but the thread that ties me to the Unitarians being 
spun very fine and subtile, is,  as it naturally falls out, 
the longer for it, and the harder to be followed, so as to 
discover the connexion every where.  As for example ; 
the thread that ties me to the author of Christianity not 
is  so fine and delicate, that without laying 
my  eyes close to it,  and  poring  a  good while, I can 
hardly perceive how it hangs together ;  that because he 
says what your lordship  charges him  to say, in your 
vindication, &c.  and because  I say what your lordship 
quotes  out  of my Essay,  that therefore  I am one  of 
the gentlemen  of  this  new  way  of  reasoning,  which 
your lordship opposes in the Unitarians, as dangerous 
to the doctrine of the Trinity.  This connexion of  me 
with the author of Christianity not mysterious,  and by 
him with the Unitarians,  (being in a point wherein I 
agree with your lordship, and not with them, if they do 
lay all the foundation of knowledge in clear and distinct 
ideas) is, I say, pretty hard for me  clearly to perceive 
now, though your lordship has given me, in your letter, 
that end of the clue which was to lead me to it, for my 
satisfaction;  but was impossible for me, or (as I think) 
any body else to discover, while  it stood as it does in 
your lordship's  Vindication, &c. 
And now,  my lord, it is time I  ask your  lordship's 
pardon, for saying in my first letter,  that I hoped I 
might  say,.  you had gone a little out of  your way  to 
do me  a kindness;"  which your  lordship, by so  often 
repeating of it, seems to be displeased with.  For, be- 
sides that there is nothing out of the way to a willing 
mind, I have  now the satisfaction to be joined to the 
author of Christianity not mysterious,  for his agreeing 
with me  in the original of our ideas and the materials 
of our knowledge (though I agree not with him, or any 
body else, in laying all foundation of certainty,in mat- 
ters of faith, in clear and distinct ideas ;)  and his being 
joined  with  the Unitarians,  by giving  an  account  of 
reason, which  supposes  clear and distinct ideas, as ne- 
cessary to all knowledge and certainty : I have now, I 
say, the satisfaction to see how I lay directly in your 
lordship's  way, in  opposing these  gentlemen, who lay 
all foundation of certainty, as to matters of faith, upon 
clear  and distinct ideas; i. e. the Unitarians, the gen-  . 
tlemen of this new way of reasoning;  so dangerous to 
the doctrine of the Trinity.  For the author of  Chris- 10s  Mr. Locke's Reply  to the  Bishop oJ  FVorcester's Answer.  109 
stianity  not mysterious agreeing  with  them in  some 
things, and with me in others ;  he being joined to them 
on one side by an account of reason, that supposes clear 
and distinct ideas necessary to certainty; and to me on 
the other side, by ~aying,  "  the mind has its ideas from 
sensation and reflection,  and that those are the mate- 
rials  and foundations 6f  all our knowledge,"  &c.  who 
can deny, but so ranged in a row, your lordship may 
place  yourself  so,  that we  may seem but one  object, 
and so one shot be aimed  at us altogether ?  Though, 
if your lordship would be at the pains to change your 
station  a  little,  and view  us  on the other  side,  we 
should visibly appear  to be very far  asunder; pnd  I, 
in  particular,  be  found,  in  the  matter controverted, 
to be nearer to your lordship, than to either of them, 
or any body else,  who lay all foundation  of certainty, 
as to  matters of faith, upon  clear  and distinct ideas. 
For I perfectly  assent  to  what  your  lordship  saith, 
c6 that  there  are many things  of  which  we  may  be 
certain, and yet can have no clear and distinct ideas of 
them." 
Besides  this  account of the occasion of bringing me 
into your lordship's  chapter, wherein objections against 
the Trinity in point of  reason are answered, which we 
have  considered;  your  lordship promises  "  to show 
what care you  took  to  prevent being  misunderstood 
about it,  to  give  me  and  others  satisfaction,  as  to 
this matter :"  which I find  about the end  of  the first 
quarter of your lordship's answer to me.  All the pages 
between,  being  taken up  in a  dispute  against  what 
I have said about substance, and our idea of it, that I 
think has now  no more to do with the question, whe- 
ther I ought to have been made one  of the gentlemen 
of  this new  way  of  reasoning,  or with my complaint 
about it; though there be  many  things in it that I 
ought to consider  apart, to show the reason why I am 
not yet brought to your lordship's  sentiments, by what 
you have there said.  To return therefore to the busi- 
ness in hand. 
Your lordship  says, "  I come therefore now to show 
the  carc  I  took  to  prevent  being  misunderstood ; 
which will best appear by my own words,  viz. I must 
do that right  to the ingenious author of the Essay of 
Human Ur~derstanding  (from whence these notions are 
borrowed,  to serve  other  purposes  than he  intended 
them) that he makes the cases of spiritual and corporeal 
substances to be alike." 
These words,  my lord,  which you  have quoted out 
of  your  Vindication,  kc.  I,  with  acknowledgment, 
own,  will  keep  your  lordship  from  being  misunder- 
stood, if any one should be in danger to be so foolishly 
mistaken, as to think your lordship could not treat me 
with great civility when  you pleased ;  or that you did 
not here make me a great compliment,  in the epithet 
which you here bestow upon me.  These words also of 
your  lordship  will  certainly  prevent  your  lordship's 
being misunderstood, in allowing me to have made the 
case of  spiritual and corporeal  substances to be alike. 
But this was not what I complained of:  my complaint 
was,  that I was  brought  into a controversy,  wherein 
what I had  written had nothing more to do,  than in 
any other controversy whatsoever ;  and that I was made 
a party on one side of  a  question,  though what I said 
in my book made me not more on the one side of  that 
question than the other.  And that your lordship had 
so mixed  me,  in many places,  with those  gentlemen, 
whose objections against the Trinity in point of reason 
your lordship was answering, that the reader could not 
but take me to be one of  them that  had objected against 
the Trinity in point of reason.  As for example; where 
your lordship first  introduces  me,  your lordsllip says, 
"  That the gentlemen  of  this  new  way of  reasoning 
have almost discarded substance out of  the reasonable 
Part of the world  For they not only tell us,  that we 
can have GO idea of it by sensation and reflection ;  but 
that nothing is  signified by it,  only an uncertain sup- 
position of  we know not what."  And for these words, 
B.  i. c.  4. $  18.  of my  Essay is quoted. 
Now, my lord,  what care is there taken ?  what pro- 
vision  is  there made,  in the  words  above  alleged  by 
Your lordship,  to prevent your being misunderstood, if $IT.  Locke's Hgl?/  to  the 
you meant not that I was one of  the gentlemen of this 
new way of  reasoning?  And  if  you  did mean  that I 
was,  your  lordship did  me  a  manifest  injury.  For I 
nowhere make clear and distinct ideas necessary to cer- 
tainty ;  which is the new way of reasoning which your 
lordship opposes in tlrq Unitarians,  as contrary to the 
doctrine of the Trinity.  Your lordship says, you took 
care not to be misunderstood.  And the words wherein 
you took that care,  are these : <'  I must do that right 
to the ingenious  author of  the Essay of  Human Un- 
derstanding, (from whence these notions are borrowed, 
to serve other putposes  than he intended them) that 
he makes the case of spiritual and corporeal substances 
to be alike."  But which of  these words  are they, my 
lord, I beseech  you,  which are to hinder people from 
taking me to  be one of the  gentlemen of that new way of 
reasoning, wherewith they overturn the doctrine of the 
Trinity? I confess, my lord,  I cannot see any of them 
that do : and that I did not see any of them that could 
hinder men from that mistake, I showed your lordship, 
in my first letter to your lordship, where I take notice 
of  that passage in your  lordship's  book.  My words 
are : "  I return my acknowledgment  to your lordship 
for the good opinion  you are here pleased to express 
of the author of  the Essay of Human Understanding; 
and that you  do not impute to him the ill  use some 
may have made of his notions.  But he craves leave to 
say,  that he should have  been  better preserved from 
the hard and sinister  thoughts which some men are al- 
ways ready for ; if,  in what you  have here published, 
your lordship had been pleased  to have shown where 
you directed  your  discourse  against him,  and where 
against others.  Nothing but my words and my book 
being quoted,  the world will  be  apt to think that I 
am  the  person  who  argue  against  the  Trinity  and 
deny mysteries,  against  whom  your  lordship  directs 
those pages.  And indeed, my lord, though I have read 
them over with great attention,  yet in many places I 
cannot discern whether it be against me,  or any body 
else, that your lordship is arguing.  That which often 
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makes the difficulty  is, that 1 do not see how what I 
say does at all concern  the controversy your lordship 
is  in, and yet T alone an1 quoted."  TO  which 
of  mine  your lordship returns no other an- 
swer, but refers me to the same passage again for satis- 
faction ;  and tells me, that therein you took care not to 
be misunderstood.  Your lordship might see that those 
words did not satisfy me in that point, when I did my- 
self  the honour  to write  to your lordship;  and how 
your lordship should think the repetition of  them in 
your answer should satisfy me better,  I confess I can- 
not tell. 
I make the like  complaint,  in these words : "  This 
paragraph,  which  continues  to prove,  that we  may 
have certainty without clear and distinct ideas, I would 
flatter myself  is not meant against me,  because it op- 
poses nothing that I have said, and so sha3  not say any 
thing to it ;  but only set it down to do your lordship 
right, that the reader  may judge.  Though I do not 
find how  he will easily overlook  me,  and think I am 
not at all concerned  in it,  since  my words alone are 
uoted  in  several  pages  immediately  preceding and  ?allowing:  and in the very next paragraph it is said, 
how they come to know;  which word,  they, must sig- 
nify somebody besides  the author of  Christianity not 
mysterious ; and then, I think, by the whole tenor of 
your lordship's discourse,  nobody will  be  left but me, 
possible to be taken to be the other; for in the same 
paragraph  your  lordship says,  the same persons  say, 
that, notwithstanding their ideas, it is possible for mat- 
ter to think. 
"  1 know not what  other person says so but I ; but 
if  any one does,  I am sure no person  but I say so in 
my book,  which  your  lordship  has  quoted  for  them, 
viz.  Human Understanding, B. iv.  c.  3.  This,  which 
is a riddle to me, the more amazes me,  because I find 
it in a treatise of your lordship's,  who so perfectly nn- 
derstands the rules and methods of  writing,  whether 
in controversy or any other way :  but this, which seems 
wholly new to me,  I  shall  better  understand,  when 
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time, I mention  it as an apology for myself,  if  some- 
times I mistake your lordship's  aim,  and so misapply 
my answer." 
To  this also your lordship answers nothing,  but for 
satisfaction refirs me to the  care you took to prevent 
being misunderstood;  which, you say, appears by those 
words  of  yours  above-kecited.  But what there is  in 
those words that can prevent the mistake I complained 
I was  exposed to ; what  there  is  in  them  that can 
hinder any one  from  thinking  that I am one of  the 
they and them that oppose the doctrine of the Trinity, 
with arguments in point of reasen ;  that I must confess, 
my lord,  I cannot see,  though I have read them over 
and. over again to find it out. 
The like might be said in respect of  all those other 
passages, where I make the like complaint, which your 
lordship  takes  notice I was  frequent in ; nor could I 
avoid it,  being  almost  every leaf perplexed to know 
whether I was concerned,  and how far,  in what your 
lordship said, since my words were quoted,  and others 
argued against.  And for satisfaction herein, I am sent 
to a compliment of your lordship's.  I say not this, my 
lord,  that I do not highly value the civility and good 
opinion your lordship has expressed of me therein ;  but 
to let your lordship see,  that I was not so rude as to 
complain of  want of  civility in your lordship :  but my 
complaint was of something else ;  and therefore it  was 
something else wherein I wanted satisfaction. 
Indeed, your lordship says,  in that passage, "  from 
the  author  of  the  Essay  of  Human Understanding 
these  notions  are borrowed,  to serve  other purposes 
than he intended them."  But, my lord, how this helps 
in the case to prevent my being  mistaken  to be one 
of  those whom  your  lordship had  to do with  in this 
chapter,  in answering  objections  in point  of  reason 
against the Trinity, I must own, I do not yet perceive : 
for these notions, which your lordship is there arguing 
against, are all taken out of my book, and made use of 
by nobody that I know, but your lordship, or myself: 
and which of us two it is,  that hath borrowed them to 
serve other purposes than I intended them, I must leave 
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to your lordship to determine.  I,  and I think every 
body else with me,  will be at a loss to know who they 
are,  till  their  words,  and  not mine,  are produced  to 
prove,  that they do use  those notions of  mine,  which 
your lordship there calls these notions,  to purposes to 
which I intended them not. 
But to those words in your lordship's Vindication of 
the Doctrine of the Trinity, you, in your answer to my 
letter,  for farther  satisfaction,  add  as followeth :  it 
was too plain that the bold writer against the mysteries 
of our faith took his notions and expressions from thence: 
and what could be said more for your vindication, than 
that he turned them into other purposes than the author 
intended them ?" 
With submission,  my lord, it is as plain as print can 
make it,  that  whatever  notions  and expressions that 
writer took  from  my book;  those  in  question,  which 
your lordship there calls these notions, my book is only 
quoted for ;  nor does it appear, that your lordship knew 
that that writer had anywhere made use of  them : or, 
if  your  lordship knew  them  to  be  anywhere  in  his 
writings,  the matter of  astonishmrrt and complaint is 
still the greater, that your iordship should know where 
they were in his writings used to serve other purposes 
than I intended them; and yet  your  lordship should 
quote only my book,  where  they were  used  to serve 
only those purposes I intended them. 
How much this is  for my vindication  we  shall pre- 
sently see: but what  it can do to give satisfaction to 
me or  others,  as to the matters of  my complaint,  for 
which it is  brought by your lordship, that I confess I 
do not see.  For my complaint  was  not against those 
gentlemen, that they had cast any aspersions upon my 
book, against which I desired your lordship to vindicate 
me; but my complaint was of  your lordship,  that you 
had brought me into a  controversy,  and so joined me 
with those against whom you were disputing in defence 
the Trinity,  that those  who  read  your  lordship's 
book would be apt to mistake me for one of them. 
<<  But your lordship asks,  LL  What could be said more 
for my vindication ?"  My lord, I shall always take it 
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for a very great honour to be vindicated by your lord- 
ship against others.  But in the present case, I wanted 
no vindication against others: if  my book  or  notions 
had need of  any vindication,  it was only against your 
lordship ; for it was your lordship, and not others, who 
had in your book dispujed against passages quoted out 
of mine, for several pages together. 
Nevertheless,  my lord, I gratefully acknowledge the 
favour you  have done for me,  for being guarantee for 
my intentions,  which  you have no reason to repent of. 
For as it was not in my intention  to write  any thing 
against  truth,  much  less  against  any  of  the  sacred 
truths contained in the scriptures ;  so I will be answer- 
able for it, that there is nothing in my book, which can 
be made use  of  to other purposes,  but what may be 
turned upon them, who so use it, to  show their mistake 
and error.  Nobody can hinder but that syllogism, which 
was intended for the service of truth, will sometimes be 
made use of against it.  But it is nevertheless of truth's 
side, and always turns upon the adversaries of it. 
Your lordship adds, "  and the true reason why the 
plural  number  was  so  often  used  by  me,  was,  be- 
cause  he  [i.  e.  the  author  of  Christianity not myste- 
rious]  built upon those,  which  he imagined  had been 
your grounds." 
Whether it was  your lordship or he,  that imagined 
those to be my grounds, which were not my grounds, 
I will not pretend to say.  Be that as it will, it is plain 
from what your lordship here says, that all the founda- 
tion of  your  lordship's  so positively,  and in so many 
places,  making  me one  of  the gentlemen of  the new 
way of  reasoning,  was but an imagination of  an ima- 
gination.  Your  lordship  says, "  he built upon  those, 
which  he imagined had been  my grounds ;" but it is 
but an imagination  in  your  lordship,  that he did so 
imagine ; and, with  all due respect,  give me leave to 
say,  a  very ill-grounded  imagination too.  For it ap- 
pears to me no foundation to think, that because he or 
anybody agrees with me in things that are in my book, 
and so appears to be of my opinion ;  therefore he ima- 
gines he agrees with me in other things which are not 
in my book, and are not my opinion.  As in the matter 
before us ;  what reason is there to imagine, that the au- 
thor of Christianity not  mysterious imagined,  that he 
built on my grounds,  in laying all  foundation of  cer- 
tainty in clear and distinct ideas, (if he does so) which 
is nowhere: laid down in  my book ; because he builds 
on my grounds, concerning the original of our ideas, or 
else he finds in my book,  or quotes out of it  ? 
For this is  all that the author of Christianity not my- 
sterious has done in this case, or can be brought to sup- 
port such an imagination. 
But  supposing it true,  that he imagined  he built 
upon  my grounds ; what reason, I beseech your lord- 
ship,  is  that for using the plural number,  in quoting 
words which I alone spoke, and he nowhere makes use 
of? To  this your lordship says, "  that he imagined he 
built upon my grounds;  and your  lordship's  business 
was to show those expressions of  mine,  which seemed 
most to countenance his method of  proceeding,  could 
not  give  any  reasonable  satisfaction :"  which,  as  I 
humbly conceive,  amounts to thus much :  the author 
of  Christianity not mysterious writes something which 
your lordship disapproves : your  lordship imagines he 
builds upon my grounds ;  and then your lordship picks 
out some expressions of  mine,  which  you imagine do 
most countenance his method of proceeding, and quote 
them,  as belonging in common to us both;  though it 
be certain he nowhere used them.  And this your lord- 
ship tells me  (to  give me satisfaction,  what care you 
took not to be misunderstood) was the true reason why 
you so often used the plural number :  which, with sub- 
mission, my lord,  seems to me  to be no reason at all ; 
unless it can be a reason to ascribe my words to another 
man  and me together,  which  he never  said; because 
Your  lordship  imagines he might,  if  he  would,  Rave 
said them.  And ought not this, my lord, to satisfy me 
of the care you took not to be misunderstood ? 
Your lordship goes on to show your care to prevent 
Your  being misunderstood : your words are, "  but you 
[i.  e.  the author  of  the letter to your  lordship]  say, 
YOU do not place  certainty only in  clear  and  distinct 
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ideas,  but in the clear and visible connexion of  any of 
our ideas.  And  certainty of knowledge,  you  tell  us, 
is to perceive the agreement or disagreement of  ideas, 
as  expressed  in any  proposition.  Whether this be a 
true account of the certainty of knowledge or not, will 
be  ~resently  considered.  But it is  very  possible  he 
might mistake, or misapply your notions ; but there is 
too much reason to believe he thought them the same: 
and we have no reason  to be sorry that he hath given 
you this occasion for explaining your meaning, and for 
the vindication of yourself in the matters you apprehend 
I had charged you with." 
Your  lordship herein  says,  it  is  very  possible  the 
author of Christianity not mysterious might mistake, or 
misapply my uotions.  I find  it indeed very possible, 
that niy notions  may be  mistaken  and misapplied;  if 
by misapplied, be meant drawing inferences from thence 
which belong not to  them. But  ifthat  possibility be reason 
enough to  join me in the plural number with the author 
of Christianity not mysterious, or with the Unitarians, 
it is as much a reason to join me in the plural number 
with the Papists,  when  your  lordship has an occasion 
to write against them next;  or with the Lutherans or 
Quakers,  &c. ; for it is possible that any of  these may 
mistake, or in that sense misapply my notions.  But if 
mistaking or misapplying my notions actually join  me 
to any body, I know nobody that I am so strictly joined 
to as your lordship ;  for, as I humbly conceive, nobody 
has so  much  mistaken  and misapplied my notions as 
your lordship.  I  should  not  take the liberty  to say 
this, were not my thinking so the very reason and ex- 
cuse for my troubling  your  lordship with  this second 
letter.  For, my lord, I do not so well love controversy, 
especially with so great and so learned a man as your 
lordship,  as to say a word  more,  had  I  not  hopes to 
show,  for my excuse,  that it is my misfortune to have 
my  notions  to  be  mistaken  or  misapplied  by  your 
lordship. 
Your lordship adds, "  but there is too much reason 
to believe  that he  thought them  the same ;" i.  e. that 
the author of Christianity not mysterious thought that 
I had laid  all fouhdation of  certainty in clear and di- 
stinct ideas, as well as he did ;  for that is it upon whicll 
all this dispute is raised.  Whether he himself laid all 
foundation of  certainty in  clear  and distinct  ideas,  is 
more than I know.  But what that "  too much reason 
to believe,  that he thought"  that I did, is,  I am sure, 
is hard for me to guess, till your lordship is pleased to 
name it.  For that there is not any such thing in my 
book to give him, or any body else, reason to think so, 
I suppose your lordship is now satisfied ; and I would 
not willingly suppose the reason to be,  that unless he, 
or somebody else thought so,  my book  could  not  be 
brought into the dispute, though it be not easy to find 
any other.  It follows in your lordship's letter : 
rc And we have no reason  to be sorry that he hat11 
given  you  this occasion for the explaining your mean- 
ing, and for  the vindication of  yourself  in the matter 
you apprehended I had charged you with." 
My lord, I know not  any occasioil he has given me 
of vindicating myself: your lordship was pleased to  join 
me with the gentlemen of  the new way of  reasoning, 
who laid all foundation of certainty in clear and distinct 
ideas.  All the vindication I make, or need to make, in 
the case is,  that I lay not  all foundation  of  certainty 
hi clear and distinct ideas ;  and so there was no reason 
to join  me with  those that do.  And  for  this vindica- 
tion of  myself,  your lordship alone gives me occasion : 
but whether your lordship has reason to be sorry or not 
sorry, your lordship best knows. 
Your lordship goes on,  in what is designed  for my 
satisfaction, as followeth : 
"  And if  your answer doth not come fully up in all 
things  to what I could  wish,  yet I  am glad to find 
that in general you own the mysteries of  the christian 
faith,  and the scriptures to be the rule and foundation 
of it." 
Which words,  my lord,  seem to me rather to show, 
that your lordship is not willing to be satisfied with my 
book, than to show any care your lordship took to pre- 
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mistake,  that I was one of  the gentlemen of that new 
way of  reasoning,  who argued against the doctrine of 
the Trinity. 
The gentlemen of  the new way of reasoning, whom 
your  lordship  sets  yourself  to  answer  in  that  10th 
chapter of  your  Vindication  of  the Doctrine of  the 
Trinity, are those whd lay all foundation of  certainty 
in clear and distinct ideas ; and from  that foundation 
raise objections against the Trinity, in point of reason. 
Your lordship joins  me with these gentlemen in that 
chapter,  and calls  me one  of  them.  Of  this I com- 
plain ;  and tell your lordship,  in the place and words 
you  have  quoted  out of  my letter,  '<  that  I do not 
place certainty only in clear and distinct ideas."  I ex- 
pected upon this, that your lordship would have assoiled 
me, and said, that then I was none of them ;  nor should 
have been joined  with them.  But instead of that your 
lordship tells  me, '' my  answer  doth  not  come  fully 
up in  a11  things  to what  your  lordship  could  wish." 
The question  is,  whether  I  ought  to  be  listed  with 
these,  and ranked  on  their  side,  who place certainty 
only in clear and distinct ideas ?  What more direct and 
categorical answer could your lordship wish for, to  de- 
cide this question,  than that which I give ?  To which 
nothing can  be  replied,  but that it is  not  true: but 
that your lordship does not object to it ;  but says,  a  it 
does not come fully up in a11  things to what your lord- 
ship  could  wish."  What other  things  there can be 
wished for in an answer, which,  if it be true,  decides 
the matter, and which is not doubted to be true, comes 
not within  my guess.  But though my  answer be an 
unexceptionable  answer,  as to the point  in 
yet, it seems, my book is not an unexceptionab  yes  e book,  tion, 
because,  I  own,  that in  it I  say,  cc  that certainty of 
knowledge  is to perceive  the agreement or disagree- 
ment of  any ideas,  as  expressed  in  any propositlon." 
Whether it be true, that certainty of knowledge lies in 
such a perception, is nothing to the question here ;  that, 
perhaps,  we may have an occasion to examine in an- 
other place.  The question here is, whether I ought to 
have been ranked with those, who lay a11 foundation of 
certainty in clear and distinct  ideas ?  And to that, I 
think,  my answer  is  a full  and decisive  answer;  and 
there is  nothing  wanting in  it,  which  your  lordship 
could wish for, to make it fuller. 
But it is natural the book should be found fault with, 
when the author, it seems, has had  the ill  l~lck  to be 
under  your  lordship's  ill  opinion.  This I  could  not 
but be  surprised to find  in  a paragraph, which  your 
lordship declares was designed to give me satisfaction. 
Your  lordship  says,  "though  my  answer  doth  not 
come  up in  all things  to what  you  could wish;  yet 
you  are glad to find,  that in  general I own the my- 
steries  of  the christian faith,  and the scriptures to be 
the foundation and rule of it." 
My lord, I do not remember that ever I declared to 
your lordship, or any body else, that I did not own all 
the doctrines of  the christian faith, and the scriptures 
to be  the sole  rule and foundation of it.  And there- 
fore I know no more reason  your lordship had to say, 
that you  are glad to find, that in general I own, &c. 
than I have reason to say, "that I am glad to find, that 
in  general your  lordship  owns  the mysteries  of  the 
christian  faith,  and the  scriptures to be  the founda- 
tion and rule  of  it."  Unless it be taken for  granted, 
that those who do  not write and appear in  print,  in 
controversies of religion, do not own the christian faith, 
and the scriptures as the rule of it. 
I know,  my lord,  of what weight  a  commendation 
from your  lordship's  pen  is  in the world:  and I per- 
ceive your  lordship knows  the value of  it, which  has 
made  your  lordship temper yours of me with so large 
an alloy, for fear possibly lest it should work too strongly 
on my vanity.  For  whether  I  consider  where  these 
words stand, or how they are brought in, or what inti- 
mation they carry with them ;  which way soever I turn 
them, I do not find they were intended to puff  me up, 
though  they are in a paragraph purposely written to 
give me satisfaction ;  and grounded on words of mine, 
which seem to be approved by your lordship before any 
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place, (whither your  lordship has been at the pains to 
fetch them from  my postscript,)  unless  it be  to give 
vent to so extraordinary a sort of  compliment; for they 
are, I think, in  their  subject,  as well as place, the re- 
motest  of  any in  my letter from the argument your 
lordship was then upon; which was to show what care 
you had taken not to beYmisunderstood  to my prejudice. 
For what, I beseech  you, my  lord, would you think of 
him,  who  from  some  words  of  your  lordship's,  that 
seemed to express much of a christian spirit and temper 
(for so your lordship is pleased to say of these of mine) 
should  seek  occasion  to tell  your  lordship,  and  the 
world, that he was glad to find that your lordship was 
a christian, and that you believed the Bible ?  For this, 
common humanity, as well as christian charity, obliges 
us  to believe  of  every one, who  calls  himself  a  chri- 
stian, till he manifests the contrary.  Whereas the say- 
ing, I am glad to find  such  an one believes the scrip- 
ture,  is  understood  to intimate, that I knew the time 
when he did not; or, at least, when I suspected he did 
not.  But perhaps your lordship had some other mean- 
ing in it, which I do  not see.  The largeness  of  your 
lordship's  mind,  and  the  charity  of  a  father  of  our 
church, makes me hope that I passed not in your lord- 
ship's opinion for a heathen, till your lordship read that 
passage in the postscript of my  late letter to you. 
But to return  to the satisfaction  your  lordsbip  is 
giving  me.  To those words  quoted  out of  my post- 
script, your  lordship  subjoins : "  which words seem to 
express  so  much of  a christian spirit and temper, that 
I cannot  believe  you  intended  to give any advantage 
to the enemies  of  the  christian  faith;  but whether 
there hath  not  been  too  just  occasion  for  them  to 
apply  them  in  that  manner,  is  a  thing very  fit  for 
you to consider." 
Your lordship here again expresses a favourable opi- 
nion of my intentions, which I gratefully acknowledge : 
but you  add,  "that  it is fit for  me  to consider, whe- 
ther  there hath not  been  too just  occasion for them 
to  apply them  in  that  manner."  My lord,  I shall 
do what your lordship 'thinks is fit for me to do, when 
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lordship does me the favour to tell me, who those 
enemies of the faith are, who have applied those words 
of  my postscript,  (for  to those  alone,  by any kind of 
construction, can I make your lordship's word, 6r them," 
refer) and  the manner which  they have  applied them 
in, and the too just occasion they have had so to apply 
them.  For I confess,  my lord, 1 am at a loss as to all 
these ;  and thereby unable to obey your lordship's  com- 
mands, till  your  lordship  does me the favour to make 
me understand all these particulars better. 
But if by any new way of construction, unintelligible 
to me, the word,  them,  here  shall  be  applied  to any 
passages of my Essay of Human Understanding ;  I must 
humbly crave  leave  to observe  this  one  thing, in the 
whole course of  what  your  lordship  has  designed for 
my satisfaction, that though  my complaint be of  your 
lordship's  manner of applying what I had published in 
my Essay, so as to interest me in a controversy wherein 
I meddled  not;  your  lordship  all  along tells  me  of 
others,  that have  misapplied  I  know not what words 
in  my book, after I know not what  manner.  Now as 
to this matter, I beseech your lordship to believe, that 
when  any  one,  in  such  a  manner,  applies  my words 
contrary to what I intended them, so as to make them 
opposite to the doctrine of the Trinity, and me a party 
in that controversy against  the Trinity, as  your lord- 
ship knows I complain  your lordship has done, I shall 
complain  of  them too;  and consider as well  as I can, 
what satisfaction they give me and others in it. 
Your  lordship's  next  words  are: "for  in  an  age, 
wherein the mysteries  of  faith  are so  much exposed, 
by the promoters  of  scepticism  and infidelity,  it is a 
thing  of  dangerous  consequence  to start  such  new 
methods  of  certainty,  as  are  apt  to  leave  men's 
minds  more  doubtful than  before;  as will  soon  ap- 
pear from your concessions." 
These words contain a further accusation of my book, 
which shall be considered in its due place.  What I am 
now upon is the satisfaction your lordship is giving me, 
in  reference  to my complaint.  And  as to that, what 
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reason to say,  'r  that my notions were  carried  beyond 
my intentions :"  for  in  these  words  your  lordship 
winds  up all  the following  eight  or  nine  pages,  uix. 
"thus far I have endeavoured, with all possible brevity 
and  clearness,  to  lay  down  your  sense  about  this 
matter ;  by which  it is  sufficiently proved, that I had 
reason to say,  that yofir  notions were carried beyond 
your intentions." 
I beg leave to remind  your  lordship,  that my com- 
plaint was  not  that your  lordship  said, "  that my no- 
tions  were  carried  beyond  my  intentions."  I  was 
not so absurd, as to turn what was matter of  acknow- 
ledgment  into  matter  of  complaint.  And  therefore, 
in showing the care you had taken of me for my satis- 
faction,  your  lordship  needed  not  to have  been at so 
much  pains,  in  so  long a,  deduction, to prove  to me, 
that you had reason for saying what was so manifestly 
in my favour, whether you  had reason for saying it or 
no.  But my complaint was, that the new way of  ren- 
soning,  accused  by  your  lordship,  as  opposite to the 
doctrine  of  the Trinity, being in laying all foundation 
of certainty in clear  and  distinct  ideas, .your lordship 
ranked me amongst the gentlemen of thls new way of 
reasoning, though I laid not all foundation of certainty 
in clear  and distinct ideas.  And this being my com- 
plaint, it is for this  that there needs a reason.  Your 
lordship subjoins, 
<'But you  still  seem  concerned  that I quote your 
words;  although I declare  they  were  used  to other 
purposes  than  you  intended  them.  I  do  confess  to 
you,  that  the  reason  of  it was,  that I  found  your 
notions, as to certainty by ideas, was the main founda- 
tion  which  the  author  of  Christianity  not  myste- 
rious  went  upon;  and that  he  had  nothing  which 
looked  like  reason,  if  that principle  were  removed; 
which  made  me  so  much  endeavour  to show that it 
would  not  hold.  And  so,  I  suppose,  the reason  of 
my mentioning  your  words  so  often,  is  no  longer  a 
riddle to you." 
My lord, he that will give himself the trouble to look 
into that part of  my former letter, where I speak  of 
pollr lordship's way of proceeding as a riddle to me; or 
to that, which your lordship here quoted, for my seem- 
ing concerned  at it ;  will  find  my complaint, in both 
places,  as well  as  several  others, was,  that I was  so 
everywhere joined  with  others under  the comprehen- 
sive  words  of  they  and  them,  &c.  though my  book 
alone was everywhere quoted,  "that  the world would 
be apt to think I was  the  person who argued against 
the Trinity and denied mysteries ;"  against whom your 
lordship directed these very pages.  For so I express 
myself in that part, which your  lordship here  quotes. 
And  as to this,  your  lordship's  way of writing  (which 
is the subject of  my complaint) is  (for any thing your 
lordship has in  your answer  said  to give  me satisfac- 
tion) as much  still a riddle to me as ever. 
For that which your  lordship  here says, and is  tlle 
only thing I can find your lordship has said to clear it, 
seems to me to do nothing towards it.  Your lordship 
says, "  the reason  of  it was,  that you  found my no- 
tions, as  to  certainty by ideas, was  the main  founda- 
tion which the author  of Christianity  not  mystcrious 
went upon,"  &c. 
Wit11 submission, I thought your lordship had found, 
that the foundation, which  the author  of Christianity 
not mysterious went upon, and for which he was made 
one  of  the  gentlemen of the new  way  of  reasoning, 
opposite  to the doctrine  of  the Trinity, was, that he 
made, or supposed, clear and distinct ideas necessary to 
certainty; but that is not my notion, as to certainty by 
ideas.  My notion  of certainty  by ideas  is,  that  cer- 
tainty consists in the  perception  of  the agreement or 
disagreement of  ideas, such as we  have, whether they 
be in all their parts perfectly clear and distinct or no; 
nor have I any notions of certainty more than this one. 
And if your  lordship had  for  this  called me a gentle- 
man  of a new way of  reasoning,  or  made  me one  of 
the opposers of  the  doctrine of  the Trinity, I should 
perhaps  have wondered;  but should  not  at all have 
complained of  your  lordship,  for  directly questioning 
this  or  any of  my opinions : I should  only have  exa- 
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desired you to make out, that charge against me; which 
is what I shall do by and by, when I come to examine 
what your lordship now charges this opinion with :  but 
I shall not add any complaints to my defence. 
That which I complained  of  was,  that I was  made 
one  of  the gentlemen  of the new  way  of  reasoning, 
without being guilty of  what made them so ;  and so was 
brought into a  chapter, wherein I thought myself not 
concerned: which was managed  so:  that my book was 
all along quoted,  and others  argued  against;  others 
were entitled to what I had said, and I to what others 
said, without knowing why,  or how.  Nor am I yet, I 
must own, much enlightened in the reason of it :  that 
was  the cause why I  then thought  it a  new  way of 
writing ;  and that must be my apology for thinking so 
still, till I light upon,  or am  directed to,  some author 
who has ever writ thus before. 
And thus I come to the end  of what your  lordship 
has said, to that part of my letter which your lordship. 
calls my complaint;  wherein, I think, I have  omitted 
nothing which your lordship  has  alleged for %he  satis- 
faction of others, or myself, under those  two heads, of 
the occasion  of your  lordship's way of writing  as you 
did, and the care you took  not  to  be  misunderstood. 
And if,  my lord, as to me, it has  not possibly had  all 
the success your lordship proposed, I beg your lordship 
to attribute it to my dulness, or any thing rather than 
an unwillingness to be satisfied. 
My lord, I so  little love controversy,  that I  never 
began a dispute with anybody; nor shall ever continue 
it, where  others begin with me, any longer  than  the 
appearance of truth, which first made me write, obliges 
me not to quit it.  But least  of all, would I have any 
controversy with your lordship,  if I had any design in 
writing, but the defence  of truth.  I do not know my 
own weakness, or your lordship's  strength so little, as 
to enter the lists with your lordship only for a trial of 
skill, or the vain  and ridiculous hopes of victory.  No- 
thing, I know,  but truth on my side,  can support me 
against so great  a man ;  whose  very name  in writing 
and authority, in the  learned world, is of weight enough 
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to  and sink whatever  opinion  has not that solid 
basis to bear it Up. 
There are men that enter into disputes to get a name 
in controversy,  or  for  some little by-ends  of a party : 
your lordship has been so long in the first rank of the 
men of letters,  and by common  consent settled at the 
top of this learned age, that it must pass for the utmost 
folly, not to think, that if your lordship condescended 
so far, as to meddle with any of the opinions  of so In- 
considerable a man as I am, it  was with a design to con- 
vince me of my errors, and not to gain reputation on 
one  so  infinitely below your  match.  It is upon  this 
pund  that I still continue to offer my doubts to your 
lordship,in those parts wherein I am not yet so happy as 
to be convinced; and it is with this satisfaction I return 
this answer to your lordship, that if I am in a mistake, 
your lordship will certainly detect it, and lead me into 
the truth; which I  shall embrace, with the acknow- 
ledgment ofthe benefit I have received from your lord- 
ship's  instructions.  And  that your  lordship,  in  the 
mean tirne, will have  the goodness to allow me, as be- 
comes a scholar, willing to profit by the favour you do 
me, to show your lordship where I stick,  and in what 
points your lordship's  arguments have  failed  to work 
upon me.  For, as on the one side it  would not become 
one that would learn of your lordship to acknowledge 
himself convinced, before he is convinced ;  and I know 
your lordship would blame me for it, if I should do so; 
su, on the other side,  to continue to dissent from your 
lordship,  where you have done  me the honour to take 
pains  with me, without giving you  my reasons  for it, 
would, I think, be an ungrateful and unmannerly sul- 
lenness. 
Your lordship has had the goodness to write several 
leaves, to give me satisfaction  as to the matter of my 
complaints.  I return your lordship  my most  humble 
thanks for this great condescension ;  which I take as a 
pledge, that you will  bear with  the representation of 
my doubts,  in other points, wherein I am  so  unlucky 
&mot  to be yet thoroughly enlightened by your lord- 
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letter,  which,  I think,  may  be  comprehended  under 
these two,  viz. those things  in  my  Essay, which  your 
lordship now charges, as concerned in the controversy 
of  the Trinity;  and  others,  as  faulty  in themselves, 
whether we consider them with respect to any doctrines 
of religion or no. 
In the close ofyour lordship's letter, after some other 
expressions of  civility to me,  for which I return your 
lordship my thanks, I find these words : "  I do assure 
you, that it is out of no disrespect, or the least ill-will 
to  you, that I have again  considered this matter ;  but 
because  I  am  further  convinced,  that  as you  have 
stated your  notion  of  ideas,  it may  be  of  dangerous 
consequence  to  that  article  of  the  christian  faith, 
which I endeavour to defend." 
This now is a direct charge against my book ;  and I 
must own it a great satisfaction to me, that I shall now 
be no  longer at a loss, who  it is your lordship means; 
that I shall stand by myself, and myself answer for my 
own faults, and not be so placed in such an association 
with others, that will hinder me from knowing what is 
my particular guilt and share in the accusation.  Had 
your lordship done me the favour to  have treated me so 
before, you had heard nothing of all those  complaints 
which have been so troublesome to your lordship. 
To take now a  right view of this matter, it is fit to 
consider the beginning and progress of it: your lordship 
had a  controversy with the Unitarians ;  they, in their 
answer to your lordship's sermons, and elsewhere, talk 
of ideas; the author of Christianity not mysterious, whe- 
ther an Unitarian or no, your lordship says not, neither 
do I inquire, gives an account of reason, which, as your 
lordship says, supposes certainty to consist only in clear 
and distinct idens ;  and because he expresses himself in 
some other things  conformable  to what I had  said  in 
my  book,  my  book  is  brought  into the controversy, 
though there be no such opinion in it, as your lordship 
opposed.  For what that was, is plain both from what 
has been  observed  out of  the beginning of the tenth 
chapter of your Vindication of the Trinity, and also in 
your letter, viz. this proposition, "  that certainty, as to 
of faith,  is  founded upon  clear  and  distinct 
ideas :" but my book not having that proposition in it, 
which  your  lordship  then  opposed,  as  overthrowing 
mysteries  of  faith, at that time,  fell,  by I know  not 
what ~hance  and misfortune,  into the Unitarian contro- 
versy. 
Upon examination, my book being not found guilty 
of that proposition, which your  lordship, in  your Vin- 
dication of the Doctrine of the Trinity, opposed, because 
it overthrows the mysteries of faith ; I thought  it ac- 
pitted, and clear from that controversy.  No, it must 
not escape so :  your lordship  having  again considered 
this matter, has found new matter of accusation, and a 
new charge is brought against my book ;  and what now 
is it?  even this, "  That as I have  stated the notion  of 
ideas, it may be  of dangerous  consequence to that ar- 
ticle of the christian faith, which your lordship has en- 
deavoured to defend." 
The accusation then,  as  it now stands, is,  that my 
notion of ideas may be of dangerous consequence, &c. 
Such an accusation  as this brought  in any court in 
England, would, no doubt, be thought to show a great 
inclination to have the accused be suspected, rather than 
any evidence of being guilty of any thing; and so would 
immediately be dismissed, without hearing any plea to 
it.  But in controversies in print, wherein an appeal is 
made to the judgment  of mankind, the strict rules  of 
proceeding in justice are not always thought necessary 
to be observed ;  and the sentence of those who are ap- 
pealed  to,  being  never  formally pronounced,  a  cause 
can  never  be  dismissed  as  long  as the prosecutor is 
pleased to continue or renew his charge. 
As to the matter in hand, though what your lordship 
says here against my book  be nothing but your appre- 
hension  of  what  may  be,  yet  nobody  will  think  it 
Strange, or unsuitable to your lordship's  character and 
atation, to be watchful over any article of the christian 
faith, especially one that you have endeavoured  to de- 
fend; and to warn the world  of any thing your lordship 
may suspect to be of dangerous consequence to  it, as far 
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to attribute the trouble your lordship has been  at, to 
write again in this matter. 
Another  thing I  must take notice of,  in  tliis  your 
lordship's new charge against my book, that it is against 
my notion of ideas, as I have  stated it.  This contain- 
ing all that I have said in  my Essay concerning ideas, 
which, as your  lordship takes  notice,  is  not a  little; 
your lordship, I know, would not be thought to leave 
so general an accusation  upon my book, us  you  could 
receive no answer to: and therefore though your lord- 
ship has not been pleased plainly to specify here the par- 
ticulars of my notion  of  ideas, which your lordship ap- 
prehends to be  of  dangerous  consequence  to  that ar- 
ticle which your lordship has defended ;  I shall endea- 
vour to find them, in other parts of your letter. 
Your lordship's words, in the immediately preceding 
page,  run thus :  '<  I can easily bear the putting of phi- 
losophical  notions  into  a  modern  and  fashionable 
dress." 
'<  Let men  express  their  minds  by  ideas,  if  they 
please;  and take pleasure  in sorting, and comparing, 
and  connecting of  them,  I  am not  forward  to con- 
demn them : for every age must  have its new modes ; 
and it is very well, if truth and reason be received  in 
any garb.  I was therefore far enough from condemn- 
ing your way of  ideas,  till I found  it made  the only 
ground of  certainty, and  made  use  of  to overthrow 
the mysteries of our  faith,  as I told you  iu the begin- 
ning.". 
These words, leading to your  lordship's  accusation 
1 thought the likeliest  to show me what it was in my 
book, that your lordship now declared against, as what 
might be of dangerous consequence to that article you 
have defended ; and that seemed to me to lie in those 
two particulars,  via. the making  so  much  use  of the 
word ideas; and my placing, as I do, certainty in ideas, 
i. e. in the things  signified by them.  And these  two 
seem here to be the particulars which your lordship com- 
prehends under my way by ideas.  But that I might not 
be led  into mistake  by this  passage, which  seemed  a 
little  more  obscure and  doubtful  to me, than I could 
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have wished;  I consulted those other places, wherein 
your lordship seemed to express, what it was that your 
lordship now accused in my book,  in reference  to the 
Unitarian controversy ;  and which your lordship appre- 
hends may be of dangerous consequence to that article. 
Your lordship, in the close of the words above-quoted, 
out of your answer, tells  me :  "you  were  far  enoueh 
from condemning my way  of ideas,  till  your lordship 
found it made the only ground of certainty, and made 
use of to overthrow the mysteries of our faith, as you 
told me in the beginning." 
My lord,  the way  of ideas which your lordship op- 
psed  at first, was the way of certainty only by clear and 
distinct ideas ;  as appears by your words above-quoted : 
but that, your lordship now knows, was not my way of 
certainty by ideas, and therefore that, and  all  the use 
can  be  made of  it to overthrow the mysteries of our 
faith, be that as it will, cannot any more be charged 011 
my book, but is quite out of doors: and therefore what 
you said in the beginning, gave me no light into what 
was your lordship's  present accusation. 
But a little farther on I found these words :  '<when 
new  terms  are made use  of,  by  ill men,  to promote 
scepticism  and  infidelity,  and  to overthrow  the my- 
steries ~f our faith, we have then reason to inquire into 
them, and to examine the foundation  and tendency of 
them.  And  this was the true and only  reason  of  my 
looking into this way of certainty, by  ideas, because I 
found it applied to such purposes." 
Here, my lord, your lordship seems to  lay your  ac- 
cusation wholly against new terms and their tendency. 
And in another place your lordship has these words : 
"  The world hath been strangely amused with ideas 
of  late;  and we  have  been told,  that strange things 
might  be  done  by  the help  of  ideas;  and yet these 
ideas,  at last,  come  to  be  only  common  notions  of 
things,  which  we must make use of  in our reasoning. 
You [  i.  e. the author of the Essay concerning Human 
Understanding]  say in  that chapter,  about  the enist- 
ence  of God, you  thought it most proper  to express 
Yourself, in the most usual and familiar way, by com- 
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mon words  and  expressions.  I would  you had  done 
so quite through  your book : for then you  had  never 
given  that occasion  to  the  enemies  of  our  faith  to 
take up your new way of ideas, as an effectual battery 
(as they  imagined) against the mysteries  of the chri- 
stian faith.  But you might have enjoyed the satisfac- 
tion of  your  ideas long enough,  before  I  had  taken 
notice  of  them,  unless  I  had  found  them  employed 
about doing mischief." 
By which places it is plain that that which your lord- 
ship  apprehends in my  book,  "  may  be  of  dangerous 
consequence  to  the  article  which  your  lordship  has 
endeavoured to defend,"  is my introducing new terms; 
and  that which your  lordship  instances  in,  is that of 
ideas.  And  the  reason your  lordship  gives, in every 
of these places, why  your lordship has such an appre- 
liension  of  ideas,  as  a  that they may be of  dangerous 
consequence  to that article  of faith, which your lord- 
ship has endeavoured to defend, is, because  they have 
been  applied  to  such  purposes.  And  I might (your 
lordship  says)  have  enjoyed  the  satisfaction  of  my 
ideas  long  enough,  before  you  had  taken  notice  of 
them, unless  your lordship had found them employed 
in doing mischief."  Which, at last, as I humbly con- 
ceive,  amounts to thus much,  and no  more, viz. that 
your lordship fears ideas, i. e.  the term ideas, may, some 
time  or  other,  prove  of  very  dangerous  consequence 
to  what  your  lordship  has  endeavoured  to  defend, 
because they have beer1 made use of in arguing against 
it.  For I am sure your lordship does  not mean, that 
you apprehend the things, signified by ideas,  "may be 
of dangerous  consequence  to the article of faith your 
lordship  endeavours  to  defend,"  because  they  have 
been made use of  against it :  for (besides that your lord- 
ship mentions terms) that would be to expect that those 
who oppose that article,  should  oppose it without any 
thoughts ; for  the thing signified by  ideas,  is nothing 
but the immediate objects of our minds in thinking: so 
that unless any one can oppose the article your lordship 
defends, without thinking on  something, he must use 
the things signified by ideas : for he that thinks, must 
have  some immediate object of  his  mind  in  thinking, 
j.  e, must have ideas. 
~~t whether it be  the name  or the thing, ideas in 
sound, or ideas in  signification, that your lordship  ap- 
rehen&  may be of dangerous consequence to that ar-  Zcle of faith, which your lordship endeavours to defend, 
it seems to me, I will  not say a new way of  reasoning 
(for that belongs to me) but were it not your lordship's, 
I should think it a very extraordinary way ofreasoning, 
to write against a book, wherein your lordship acknow- 
ledges they are not used to bad purposes, nor employed 
to do mischief:  only because  that you  firld that ideas 
are,  by those who oppose your  lordship,  employed to 
do mischief;  and  so  apprehend  they may be  of  dan- 
gerous corisequence to the article your lordship has en- 
gaged in the defence of.  For whether ideas as terms, or 
ideas as the immediate objects of the mind signified by 
those terms,  may be,  in  your lordship's  apprehension, 
of  dangerous  consequence  to that article;  1 do not 
see how your lordship's  writing  cgainst the notion  of 
ideas,  as  stated  in my book,  will  at all hinder  your 
opposers from  employing them in  doing mischief,  as 
before 
However,  be that as it will,  so it is, that your lord- 
ship apprehends these "  new  terms,  these  ideas, with 
which the world hath, of late, been so strangely amused 
(though  at last they come to be only common notions 
of things,  as your lordship owns) may be of dangerous 
consequence to that article." 
My lord, if  any,  in their answer to your  lordship's 
sermons,  and in their other pamphlets, wherein your 
lordship complains they have talked so much of  ideas, 
have been troublesome to your lordship with that term ; 
it is not strange that your lordship should be tired with 
that sound:  but how natural soever it be to our weak 
constitutions to be offended with any sound, wherewith 
an importunate din hath been made about our ears; yet, 
my lord,  I know  your lordship has a better opinion of 
the articles of our faith, than to think any of  them can 
be overturned,  or  so  much  as shaken  with  a breath, 
formed into any sound or term whatsoever. 
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Names are but the arbitrary marks of  conceptions; 
and so they be sufficiently appropriated to them in their 
use, I know  no  other  difference  any of  them have in 
particular, but as they arc of  easy or difficult pronun- 
ciation, and of a more or less pleasant sound :  and what 
particular antipathies there may be in men, to some of 
them upon  that account,  is  not  easy to be  foreseen. 
This I am sure, no term whatsoever in itself bears, one 
more than another, any opposition to truth  of any kind; 
they are only propositions that do,  or  can oppose the 
truth of  any article or doctrine:  and thus no term is 
privileged from being set in opposition to truth. 
There is  no  word  to be  found,  which may not be 
brought  into a proposition, wherein the most sacred and 
most erident truths may be opposed ;  but that is not a 
fault in the term, but him that uses it.  And therefore 
I cannot easily persuade myself (whatever your lordship 
hat11 said in the heat of your concern) that you have be- 
stowed so much pains upon my book, because the word 
idea is so much used there.  For though upon my saying, 
in my chapter  about  the existence of  God, " that I 
scarce used the word idea in that whole chapter ;  your 
lordship wishes that I had  done so quite through my 
book ;" yet I must rather look upon that as a compli- 
ment to me,  wherein  your  lordship  wished,  that my 
book had been all through suited to  vulgar readers, not 
used to that and the like terms, than that your lordship 
has such an apprehension of the word idea; or that there 
is any such harm in the use of  it, instead of  the word 
notion (with which  your  lordship seems to take it to 
agree in signification) that your lordship would think it; 
worth your while to  spend any  part of your valuable time 
and thoughts about my book,  for having the word idea 
so often in it :  for this would be to make your lordship to 
write only against an impropriety of speech.  I own to 
your lordship, it is a great condescension in your lord- 
ship to have done it, if that word have such a share in 
what your lordship has writ against my book, as some 
expressions would persuade one ; and I would, for the 
satisfaction of your lordship, change the term of idea for 
a better, if your lordship  or any one, could help me to 
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it.  For that notion  will not so well  stand  for  every 
immediate object of the mind in thinking; as idea does, 
I have (as I guess)  somewhere  given  a  reason  in my 
book ; by showing  that the term notion is more pecu- 
liarly appropriated  to a  certain  sort of  those objects, 
which I call mixed  modes:  and, I think,  it would not 
sound altogether so well, to say the notion of  red, and 
the notion of  a horse,  as the idea of  red,  and the idea 
of  a horse.  But if any one thinks it  will, I contend not ; 
for I have no fondness for,  nor antipathy to,  any par- 
ticular  articulate sounds ; nor do I think there is any 
spell or fascination in any of them. 
But be the word idea proper  or improper, I do not 
see how it is the better or worse,  because ill men have 
made use of it, or because it  has been made use of to bad 
purposes ;  for if that be a reason to condemn, or lay it 
by, we must lay by the terms of scripture, reason, per- 
ception, distinct,  clear,  &c, nay, the name of God him- 
self will not escape :  for I do not think any one of these, 
or any  other term,  can be produced,  which  has  not 
been made use of  by such men,  and to such purposes. 
And therefore, "  if the Unitarians,  in  their late pam- 
phlets, have talked very much of, and strangely amused 
the world with ideas ;" I cannot believe  your lordship 
will  think  that word one jot  the worse,  or  the more 
dangerous,  because  they  use  it; any more  than,  for 
their use of them,  you will  think reason or scripture 
terms ill or dangerous.  And therefore what your lord- 
ship says, that " I might have enjoyed the satisfactio~l 
of my ideas long enough, before your lordship had taken 
notice of  them,  unless  you  had found them employed 
in doing  mischief:'  will,  I presume,  when  your lord- 
ship has considered  again of  this matter,  prevail with 
Your  lordship  to let me  enjoy still the satisfaction I 
take in  my ideas,  i. e.  as  much satisfaction  as I  can 
take in so small a matter, as is the usine of  a  DroDer 
I  ~L---  term,  notwithstanding it should be employed by others 
in doing mischief. 
For,my lord,  if  I should leave it wholly out of  my 
book, and substitute the word notion everywhere in the 
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lordship does not,  I suppose,  silspect  that I have the 
vanity  to  think  they  would  follow  my example)  my 
book would,  it seems,  be the more to your lordship's 
liking:  but I do not see how this would one jot  abate 
the mischief your lordship complains of.  For the Uni- 
tarians might as much employ notions,  as they do now 
ideas, to do mischief;  unless they are such fools, as to 
think  they can  conjure  with  this  notable  word  idea; 
and that the force of  what they say lies in the sound, 
and not in the signification of  their terms. 
This I am sure of,  that the truths  of  the christian 
religion can be no more battered by one word than an- 
other; nor can they be beaten down or endangered by 
any sound whatsoever.  And I am apt to flatter myself, 
that your lordship is satisfied there is no harm in the 
word ideas, because you say you should not have taken 
any notice of  my ideas, "  if  the enemies of  our  faith 
had not taken up my new way of ideas, as an effectual 
battery against  the mysteries  of  the  christian  faith." 
In which place, by new way of ideas, nothing, I think, 
can be construed to be meant, but my expressing myself 
by that of ideas ;  and not by other more common words* 
and of  ancienter standing in the English language. 
My new way by ideas,  or  my  way by  ideas,  which 
often occurs in your lordship's  letter,  is,  I confess, a 
very large and doubtful expression ;  and may, in the full 
latitude, comprehend my whole Essay :  because treating 
in it of  the understanding,  which  is  nothing  but the 
faculty of thinking, I could not well treat of that faculty 
of  the mind,  which  consists in  thinking, without can- 
sidering the immediate objects of the mind in thinking, 
which I call ideas :  and therefore in treating of the un- 
derstanding, I guess it will not be thought strange, that 
the greatest part of  my book  has  been  taken  up,  in 
considering what these objects of  the mind, in thinking, 
are ; whence they come ;  what  use the mind makes of 
them, in its several ways of thinking ;  and what are  the 
outward marks whereby it signifies them to others,  or 
records them  for  its own use.  And this,  in short,  is 
my way by  ideas,  that which  your  lordship calls  my 
new way by ideas : which, my lord,  if it be new, it is 
but 8 new history of  an old thing.  For I think it will 
not be doubted, that men always performed the actions 
of  thinking,  reasoning,  believing,  and  knowing,  just 
after  the  same  manner  that  they  do now;  though 
whether the same account has heretofore been given of 
the way how they performed these actions, or wherein 
they consisted, I do not know.  Were I as well read as 
your lordship, I should have been safe from that gentle 
reprimand of your lordship's,  for "  thinking my way of 
ideas new, for want of looking into other men's thoughts, 
which appear in their books." 
Your  lordship's  words,  as  an  acknowledgment  of 
your instructions  in  the case,  and  as  a  warning  to 
others, who will be so bold adventurers as to spin any 
thing barely  out  of  their  own  thoughts,  I  shall set 
down  at large:  and they  run thus: " whether  you 
took  this way of  ideas  from  the modern  philosopher 
mentioned by you, is not at all material ;  but I intended 
no reflection upon you in it (for that you mean by my 
commending you as a scholar of so great a master) ; I 
never meant to take from you the honour of your own 
inventions ; and I do believe you,  when  you say,  that 
you wrote from your own thoughts, and the ideas you 
had  there.  But many things  may  seem  new to one, 
who  converses  only  with  his  own  thoughts,  which 
really are not so ; as he may find,  when he looks into 
the  thoughts  of  other  men,  which  appear  in  their 
books.  And therefore,  although I have a  just esteem 
for  the  invention  of  such,  who  can  spin  volumes 
barely out of  their  own  thoughts;  yet I  am apt to 
think they would oblige the world more,  if, after they 
have thought so much of themselves, they would  exa- 
mine  what  thoughts  others  have  had  before  them, 
concerning  the same  things : that so  those  may not 
be thought their  own  inventions,  which  are common 
to themselves  and  others.  If  a  man should  try all 
the rnagnetieal experiments himself,  and publish them 
as  his  own  thoughts, he might take himself  to be the 
inventor  of  them: but he  that  examines  and  com- 
pares  with  them  what Gilbert and  others have done 
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gence,  but may wish  he had  compared  his  thoughts 
with  other men's;  by  which  the world would  receive 
greater advantage, although  he lost the honour of being 
I  an original." 
To alleviate my fault herein, I agree with your lord- 
ship, "  that Inany things  may  seem new  to one that 
converses only with his own thoughts, which really are 
not so:"  but  I  must  crdve  leave  to suggest to your 
lordship,  that if,  in  the spinning them out of  his own 
thoughts,  they seem  new  to him,  he is  certainly the 
inventor of  them ; and  they may as justly be thought 
his own invention as any one's ;  arid he is as certainly 
the inventor of them, as any one who thought on them 
before him : the distinction of  invention, or not inven- 
tion, lying not in thinking first  or not first, but in bor- 
rowing or not borrowing your thoughts from another: 
and he to whom spinning them out of his own thoughts, 
they seem new,  could  not certainly borrow them from 
another.  So he truly invented printing in Europe, who, 
without any cominunication  with the Chinese,  spun it 
out of  his own thoughts ; though it were ever so true, 
that the Chinese had the use of printing, nay. of print- 
ing in the very same way, among them, many ages be- 
fore him.  So that he that spins any thing out of his own 
thoughts, that seems new to him, cannot cease to think 
it his own invention, should he examine ever so far what 
thoughts others have  had  before him,  concerning the 
same thing ; and should find, by examining,  that they 
had the same thoughts too. 
But  what great obligation this would be to the world, 
or weighty cause of turning over and looking into books, 
I confess I do not see.  The great end to me,  in con- 
versing with my own or  other men's  thoughts in mat- 
ters of speculation, is to find truth, without being much 
concerned whether my own spinning of  it out of mine, 
or their spinning of it out of their own thoughts, helps 
me to it.  And how little I affect the honour of  an ori- 
ginal, may be seen in that place of my book, where,  if 
anywhere, that itch of  vain-glory  was likeliest to have 
shown itself, had I been so over-run with it as to need 
a cure.  It is where I speak of certainty,  in these fol- 
lowing words,  taken  notice  of  by  your  lordship  in 
another  place : "  I think I have shown wherein it is that 
certainty,  real  certainty,  consists ;  which, whatever it 
was to others, was, I confess,  to  me heretofore one of 
those desiderata, which I found great want of." 
Here, my lord, however new this seemed to me, and 
the more so because possibly I had in vain hunted for it 
in the books of others;  yet I spoke of it as new, only 
to myself; leaving others in the undisturbed possession 
of what  either by invention  or reading was theirs  be- 
fore; without  assuming to myself  any other honour, 
but that of my own ignorance  till that time, if others 
before had shown wherein certainty lay.  And yet, my 
lord, if I had upon this occasion been forward to assume 
to myself the honour of an original, I think I had been 
pretty safe in it ; since I should have had your lordship 
for my guarantee and vindicator in that point, who are 
pleased to call it new; and, as such, to write against it. 
And truly, my lord, in  this respect my book has had 
very unlucky  stars,  since  it hath had  the misfortune 
to displease  your  lordship,  with  many  things in  it, 
for their  novelty;  as "  new  way  of  reasoning;  new 
hypothesis  about reason;  new sort of certainty ;  new 
terms ;  new  way of  ideas ;  new method  of certainty," 
&c.  and  yet  in  other places  your  lordship  seems  to 
think it worthy in me  of  your lordship's  reflection, for 
saying but what others have  said before.  As where I 
say,  cc in  the  different  make  of  men's  tempers  and 
application  of  their  thoughts,  some  arguments pre- 
vail more  on one,  and some  on another, for  the con- 
firmation  of  the  same  truth:"  your  lordship  asks, 
"  what is this different  from  what  all  men  of  under- 
standing have  said ?'  Again, I take it your lordship 
meant  not  these  words  for  a  commendation  of  my 
book,  where  you  say; '' but if no more  be meant by 
the simple ideas  that come  in by sensation or reflec- 
tion,  and  their  being  the  foundation  of  our  know- 
ledge;"  but  that  our  notions  of  things  come  in, 
either from our  senses,  or the exercise  of our minds : 
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your lordship is far enough from opposing that, wherein 
you think all mankind are agreed. 
And again, "  but what need all this great noise about 
ideas and certainty, true and real certainty by  ideas ; 
if, after all,  it comes only to this,  that our ideas only 
represent  to us  such  things,  from  whence  we  bring 
arguments to prove the truth of things ?" 
And "the world hath been  strangely  amused with 
ideas of  late;  and we  have  been  told,  that strange 
things might be done  by the help of ideas ; yet these 
ideas,  at last,  come  to be  only  common  notions  of 
thigs,  which  we must make use of in our reasoning." 
And to the like purpose in other places. 
Whether therefore at last your lordship will resolve, 
that it is  new or no,  or more  faulty by its being new, 
must be left to your lordship.  This I find  by it,  that 
my book  cannot avoid  being  condemned  on  the one 
side or the other; nor do I see  a possibility to help it. 
If there be readers that like only new thoughts ;  or, on 
the other side, others that can  bear nothing but what 
can be justified by received authorities in print; I must 
desire them to make themselves  amends in that part 
which they like, for the displeasure they receive in the 
other:  but if many should be so exact as to find fault 
with both, truly I know not well what to say to them. 
The  case is a plain  case,  the book is all over naught, 
and there is not a sentence in it that is not, either for 
its antiquity or novelty, to be condemned; and so there 
is a short end of  it.  From your lordship indeed in par- 
ticular, 1 can hope for something better ;  for your lord- 
ship thinks the general design of it so good, that that, 
I flatter myself, would prevail on your lordship to pre- 
serve it from the fire. 
But as to the way your lordship thinks I should have 
taken to prevent the having it thought my invention, 
when it was comman to me with  others ;  it unluckily 
so fell out,  in the subjeet of  my Essay of  Human Un- 
derstanding, that I could not look into the thoughts of 
other men to inform myself.  For my design being, as 
well as I could, to copy nature, and to give an account 
of  the  of the mind in thinking, I could look 
into  understanding but my own, to see how it 
wrought; nor have a prospect into other men's minds to 
view their thoughts there, and observe what steps and 
lnotions they took,  and  by what  gradations they pro- 
ceeded in their acquainting themselves with truth, and 
their advance  to knowledge.  What we  find of  their 
thoughts in books, is but the result of this, and not the 
progress and working of their minds, in coming to the 
opinions or conclusions they set down and published. 
All therefore that I can say of my book is, that it is 
a copy of  my own mind, in its several ways of  opera- 
tion.  And all that I can say for the publishing  of  it 
is, that I think the intellectual faculties are made,  and 
operate alike in most men; and that some, that I showed 
it to before I published  it,  liked it so well that I was 
confirmed  in  that opinion.  And  therefore if it should 
happen, that it should  not be  so,  but that some men 
should have ways of thinking, reasoning, or arriving at 
certainty, different from others, and above those that 1 
find my mind to use  and acquiesce  in, I do not see of 
what use my book  can  be  to them.  I can only make 
it my  humble  request,  in  my own  name,  and in the 
name of those that are of my size, who find their minds 
work,  reason,  and  know,  in  the same low  way that 
mine  does,  that those  men  of  a  more  happy  genius 
would show  us  the  way of  their  nobler flights; and 
particularly would discover to us their shorter br surer 
way to certainty, than by ideas, and the observing their 
agreement or disagreement. 
In the mean time, I must acknowledge, that, if I had 
been  guilty of  affecting  to be thoaght an original, a 
correction could not have  come from anybody so disin- 
terested in the cast: as your lordship ; since your lord- 
ship so much  declines  being thought  an original, for 
writing in a way wherein it is hard to avoid thinking 
that you are the first, till some other can be produced 
that writ so before you. 
But to  return  to your  lordship's  present  charge 
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words :  "  in an age, wherein the mysteries of faith are so 
much exposed, by the promoters  of  scepticism and in- 
fidelity;  it is a thing of dangerous consequence, to start 
such new  methods  of  certainty,  as  are  apt to leave 
men's minds more doubtful than before." 
By which passage, and some expressions that seem to 
look that way,  in the places  above-quoted ; I take it 
for granted, that another particular in my book, which 
your  lordship  suspects  may  be  of  dangerous  conse- 
quence to that article of  faith which your lordship has 
endeavoured to defend, is my placing of certainty as I 
do, in the perception of  the agreement or disagreement 
of  our ideas. 
Though T cannot conceive how any term. new or old, 
idea or not idea, can have  any opposition or danger in 
it, to any article of faith, or any truth whatsoever;  yet 
I easily grant, that propositions  are capable of  being 
opposite to propositions, and may be such as, if granted, 
may  overthrow  articles  of  faith,  or  any  other  truth 
they are opposite to.  But your lordship not having, 
as I remember,  shown,  or  gone  about  to show,  how 
this proposition, viz.  that certainty consists in the per- 
ception of the agreement or disagreement of two ideas, 
is opposite  or  inconsistent  with  that article of  faith 
which your lordship has endeavoured  to defend : it is 
plain,  it is  but your  lordship's  fear  that  it  may  be 
of  dangerous  consequence  to it; which,  as I humbly 
conceive,  is  no  proof  that it is  any way inconsistent 
with that article. 
Nobody,  I think:  can blame  your  lordship,  or any 
one  else,  for  being  concerned  for  any  article of  the 
Christian faith:  but if  that concern  (as it may, and as 
we know it  has done)  makes any one apprehend danger 
where  no danger is,  are we  therefore  to give  up and 
condemn any proposition,because any one, though of the 
first  rank and magnitude, fears it  may be of dangerous 
consequence  to any truth of  religion, without saying 
that it is so ?  If  such fears be the measures whereby to 
judge of truth and falsehood, the affirming that there 
are antipodes would be still a heresy; and the doctrine 
ofthe motion  of  the earth must  be  rejected,  as over- 
throwing  the truth of  the scripture : for of that dan- 
gerous consequence it has  been apprehended to be,  by. 
many leariled and pious divines, out of their great con- 
cern for religion.  And yet, notwithstanding those great 
of what dangerous consequence it might 
be, it is now universally received by learned men, as an 
undoubted truth; and  writ  for by some, whose  belief 
of the scriptures is not at all questioned ; and particu- 
larly, very lately,  by a  divine  of  the church  of  Eng- 
land, with great strength and reason, in his wonderfully 
ingenious New Theory of the Earth. 
The reason your lordship gives of  your fears, that it 
may be of such dangerous consequence to that article 
of  faith  which  your  lordship  endeavours  to defend, 
though it occurs in many more places than one, is only 
this,  viz.  that it is  made use  of  by ill  men to do mis- 
chief,  i.  e. to oppose that article of  faith,  which your 
lordship has endeavoured to defend.  But,  my lord,  if 
it be a reason to lay by any thing as bad, because it is, 
or may be used  to an ill  purpose;  I know  not what 
will  be  innocent  enough  to be  kept.  Arms,  which 
were made for our defence,  are sometimes made use of 
to do mischief ; and yet they are not  thought of dan- 
gerous consequence  for  all that.  Nobody lays by his 
sword  and  pistols,  or thinks them  of  such dangerous 
consequence as to be  neglected,  or thrown  away,  be- 
cause robbers and the worst  of  men  sometimes make 
use of them to take away honest  men's  lives or goods. 
And the reason is, because they were designed, and will 
serve to preserve them.  And who knows but this may 
be the present case? If your lordship thinks that placing 
of certainty in the perception  of  the agreement or dis- 
agreement  of  ideas  be  to be  rejected  as  false,  be- 
cause  you  apprehend  it  may  be  of  dangerous  cq- 
sequence to that article of faith ;  on the other side, per- 
haps others, with  me,  may think it a  defence against 
error, and so (as being of good use) to be received and 
adhered to. 
I would  not,  my lord,  be  hereby thought to set up 
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but I have said this only to show, while the argument 
lies for or against the truth of  any proposition, barely 
in an imagination, that it may be  of  conseqllence to 
the supporting or  overthrowing  of  any remote truth ; 
it will  be  impossible,  that way,  to determine of  the 
truth or falsehood of  that proposition.  For imagina- 
tion will be set up against imagination, and the stronger 
probably will be  against your lordship ;  the strongest 
imaginations being usually in the weakest heads.  The 
only way,  in this case, to put it past doubt, is to show 
the inconsistency of  the two propositions ;  and then it 
will be seen, that one  overthrows the other; the true 
the false one. 
Your lordship says indeed,  this  is s new method of 
certainty.  I will  not  say  so myself,  for  fear  of  de- 
serving a second reproof from your lordship, for being 
too forward to assume to myself  the honour of being 
an original.  But this, I think,  gives me occasion, and 
will  excuse me from  being  thought impertinent,  if I 
ask your lordship,  whether there be any other or older 
method of certainty? and what it is ?  For if there be 
no other,  nor older than this,  either this  was  always 
the method of  certainty,  and so mine is no new one ; 
or else the world is obliged to  me for this new one, after 
having been so long in the want of so necessary a thing, 
as a method of  certainty.  If  there be  an older, I am 
sure your  lordship  cannot  but  know  it;  your  con- 
demning mine as new, as well as your thorough insight 
into antiquity, cannot but  satisfy every body that you 
do.  And therefore to set the world right in a thing of 
that great concernment,  and to overthrow  mine, and 
thereby prevent the dangerous conseguenee there is in 
my having unseasonably started it, wlll  not, I humbly 
conceive, misbecome your lordship's care of that article 
you have endeavoured'to defend, nor the good-will you 
bear to truth in general.  For I will be answerable for 
myself, that I shall ;  and I think I may be for all others, 
that they all will give off  the placing of certainty in the 
perception of  the agreement or disagreement of  ideas, 
if your lordship will  be pleased to show that it lies in 
any thing else. 
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~~t  truly, and not to ascribe to myself an invention 
of what has been as old  as knowledge is in the world, 
I must own, I am  not guilty of  what  your lordship is 
pleased  to  call  starting  new  methods  of  certainty. 
 ledge, ever since there has been any in the world, 
has consisted in one particular action of  the mind ;  and 
so,  I conceive, will  continue  to  do  to the  end of  it : 
and to start new methods of knowledge and certainty, 
(for  they are to me  the same thing) i.  e.  to find out 
and propose  new  methods  of  attaining  knowledge, 
either with  more ease  and quickness,  or in things yet 
is  what I think  nobody  could  blame:  but 
this is not that which your lordship here means by new 
methods of  certainty.  Your lordship, I think,  means 
by  it the placing  of  certainty  in  something  wherein 
either it does  not  consist,  or else  wherein  it was  not 
placed  before now; if this be to be called a new method 
of certainty.  As to the latter of these,  I  shall know 
whether I am guilty or no,  when your lordship will do 
me the favour to tell me, wherein it was placed before ; 
which your lordship knows I professed myself ignorant 
of,  when  I  writ  my  book,  and  so  am  still.  But if 
starting of new methods of certainty, be the placing of 
certainty  in  something  wherein  it does  not  consist; 
whether I have done that or no, I must appeal to the 
experience of mankind. 
There are several  actions  of  men's  minds that they 
are conscious to themselves  of performing,  as willing, 
believing, knowing, &c. which  they have  so particular 
a sense  of,  that they can  distinguish  them  one  from 
another;  or else they could not say when they willed, 
when  they believed,  and when  they knew any thing. 
But though these  actions were different  enough from 
One  another, not to be confounded by those who spoke 
of them ;  yet nobody, that I had met with, had, in their 
writings,  particularly  set  down  wherein  the act  of 
knowing precisely  consisted. 
TO  this reflection upon the actions of my own mind, 
the  subject  of  my  Essay concerning  Human  Under- 
standing naturally led me ;  wherein, if I have done any 
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titularly than had  been  done before, what  it is their 
minds  do, when  they perform  that action which  they 
call knowing:  and if,  upon  examination, they observe 
I have  given  a  true  account  of  that  action  of  their 
minds in all the parts of it ;  I suppose it will be in vain 
to  dispute against what they find and feel in themselves. 
And  if I have  not told  ihem right, and exactly what 
they find and feel in themselves, when their minds per- 
form the act of  knowing, what I have said will  be all 
in vain;  men will not be persuaded against their senses. 
Knowledge is  an internal perception of  their minds ; 
and if,  when they reflect on it, they find it is not what 
I have  said  it is,  my  groundless  conceit  will  not  be 
hearkened to,  but exploded  by everybody,  and die of 
itself;  and nobody need  to be at any pains to drive it 
out of the world.  So impossible  is  it to find  out,  or 
start new methods  of  certainty,  or  to have  them  re- 
ceived,  if  any one  places  it in  any thing but in that 
wherein it really consists : much less can any one be in 
danger to be misled  into error,  by any such new, and 
to every one visibly senseless  project.  Can it be sup- 
posed, that any one could start a new method of seeing, 
and persuade men thereby,  that they do not see what 
they do see ?  Is it to be feared, that any one can cast 
such a mist over their eyes, that they should not know 
when they see, and so be led out of their way by it? 
Knowledge, I find,  in myself;  and,  I  conceive,  in 
others ; consists in the perception of the agreement or 
disagreement of the immediate  objects of the mind in 
thinking, which I call ideas :  but whether it does so in 
others  or  no,  must  be  determined by  their  own  ex- 
perience,  reflecting  upon  the action  of  their mind in 
knowing;  for  that I  cannot  alter,  nor  I think they 
themselves.  But whether they will call those immediate 
objects  of  their mind  in  thinking  ideas  or no,  is per- 
fectly in their own choice.  If  they dislike that name, 
they may call them notions or conceptions, or how they 
please ; it matters not, if they use them so as to avoid 
obscurity and confusion.  If they are constantly used in 
the same and a known sense, every one has the liberty 
to please himself in his terms;  there lies neither truth, 
llor error, nor science, in that ; though those that take 
them for things,  and not for what they are,  bare arbi- 
trary signs of our ideas, make a great deal of ado often 
about them,  as if some  great matter lay in the use of 
this or that sound.  All that I know or can irnagine of 
difference about them is,  that those words are always 
best, whose significations are best known in the sense 
they are used ;  and so are least apt to breed confusion. 
My lord, your lordship has been pleased to find fault 
with my use of the new term, ideas, without telling me 
a better name for the immediate objects of the mind in 
thinking.  Your lordship has also been pleased to find 
fault with my definition  of  knowledge,  without doing 
me the favour to give me a better.  For it is only about 
my definition of knowledge, that all this stir, concern- 
ing certainty, is made.  For with me,  to know and be 
certain,  is  the same  thing;  what I know,  that I am 
certain  of; and  what I am certain  of,  that I know. 
What reaches  to knowledge,  I think  may  be  called 
certainty ;  and what comes short of  certainty, 1 think 
cannot be  called knowledge;  as your  lordship  could 
not  but observe  in $ 18. of  c. iv.  of  my fourth book, 
which you have quoted. 
My definition of knowledge, in the beginning of the 
fourth  book  of  my  Essay,  stands thus:  cc knowledge 
seems to me to be  nothing but the perception of  the 
connexion  and  agreement  or  disagreement  and  re- 
pugnancy of  any of  our ideas."  This definition  your 
lordship dislikes,  and apprehends "  it may be of  dan- 
gerous consequence as to that article of christian faith 
which  your  lordship  has  erideavoured  to  defend:' 
For  this  there is  a  very  easy  remedy:  it is  but for 
Your  lordship  to  set  aside  this  definition  of  know- 
ledge by giving us  a  better,  and  this  danger is  over. 
But your  lordship  chooses  rather  to have  a  contro- 
versy with my book,  for having it in it, and to put me 
the defence of it ;  for which I must acknowledge 
myself  obliged  to  your  lordship,  for  affording me so 
much of your time, and for allowing me the honour of 
Conversing so much with  one  so  far  above  me  in  all 
respects. 
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Your lordship says, "  it may be of dangerous conse- 
quence to  that article of christian faith, which you have 
endeavoured to defend."  Though the laws of disputing 
allow  bare  denial as  a  sufficient  answer  to sayings, 
without  any offer  of  a  proof;  yet,  my lord,  to show 
how willing I am to give your lordship all satisfaction, 
in what you  apprehend may  be  of  dangerous  conse- 
quence in my book, as to that article, I shall not stand 
still sullenly, and put your lordship upon the difficulty 
of showing wherein that danger lies;  but shall, on the 
other side, endeavour to show your  lordship that that 
definition of mine, whether true  or false, right or wrong, 
can be of  no dangerous consequence to that article of 
faith.  The reason which I shall offer for it is this ;  be- 
cause it can be of no consequence to it at all. 
That which  your  lordship is afraid it may be dan- 
gerous to, is an article of  faith :  that which your lord- 
ship labours and is  concerned  for,  is  the certainty of 
faith.  Now, my lord, I humbly conceive the certainty 
of  faith,  if  your  lordship  thinks fit  to call it so, has 
nothing to do with the certainty of  knowledge.  And 
to talk of the certainty of  faith,  seems all one to me, 
as to talk of  the knowledge  of  believing;  a  way of 
speaking not easy to me to understand. 
Place knowledge in what you will, "  start what new 
methods of certainty you please,  that are apt to leave 
men's  minds  more  doubtful than before ;" place  cer- 
tainty on such grounds as will leave little or no know- 
ledge in the world ;  (for these are the arguments your 
lordship uses against my definition of  knowledge)  this 
shakes not at  all, nor in the least concerns the assurance 
of faith; that is  quite distinct from it,  neither stands 
nor falls with knowledge. 
Faith stands by itself, and upon grounds of its own ; 
nor can be removed from them, and placed on those of 
knowledge.  Their grounds are so far from being the 
same,  or having  any thing common,  that when  it is 
brought  to certainty,  faith  is  destroyed ;  it is know- 
ledge then, and faith 110  longer. 
With what assurance soever of believing, I assent to 
any article of faith, so that I stedfastly venture my all 
upon it, it is still but believing.  Bring it to certainty, 
it ceases to be faith.  I believe,  that Jesus Christ 
was crucified, dead and buried, rose again the third day 
from the dead, and ascended into heaven ;  let now such 
lnethods of knowledge or certainty be started, as leave 
men's minds more doubtful than before :  let the grounds 
of knowledge be resolved into what any one pleases, it 
touches not my faith : the foundation of that stands as 
sure as before,  and cannot be at all shaken by it : and 
one may as well say,  that any thing that weakens the 
sight, or casts  a  mist  before  the eyes,  endangers the 
hearing ; as that any thing which alters the nature of 
knowledge  (if  that could  be done)  should  be of dan- 
gerous consequence to an article of faith. 
Whether then I am  or  am  not  mistaken,  in  the 
placing  certainty in  the perception of  the agreement 
or  disagreement  of  ideas;  whether  this  account  of 
knowledge be  true or false,  enlarges or straitens the 
bounds of it more than it should ;  faith still stands upon 
its own basis,  which  is not  at all altered by it; and 
every article of that has  just the same unmoved founda- 
tion,  and the very same credibility that it had before. 
So that, my lord, whatever I have said about certainty, 
and how  much  soever  I may be out in  it;  if  I  am 
mistaken,  your  lordship has no  reason  to apprehend 
any danger to any article of  faith from thence ;  every 
one of them stands upon the same bottom it did before, 
out of  the reach of  what  belongs  to knowledge  alid 
certainty.  And thus much out of my way of certainty 
by ideas ;  which, I hope, will satisfy your lordship, how 
far it is from being dangerous to any article  of  the 
Christian faith whatsoever. 
I find one thing more  your lordship charges on me, 
in  reference  to the Unitarian  controversy;  and  that 
is, where  your lordship says,  that "  if these [i.  e. my 
notions of nature and person]  hold, your lordship does 
not see how it is possible to defend the doctrine of the 
Trinity." 
My  lord, since I have a great opinion that your lord- 
ship sees as far as any one, and I shall be justified to the 
World,  in  relying upon your lordship's  foresight more 
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than on any one's ;  these  discomforting words of your 
lordship's  would  dishearten  me  so,  that I  should  be 
ready to give up what  your  lordship confesses  so un- 
tenable ;  with  this  acknowledgment however  to vour 
lordship, as its great defender : 
(6  --  St pergama dextrli 
gr Defendi possint, etiam hic defensa fuissent." 
This, I say, after such a declaration of your lordship's, 
I should think,  out of  a due value for  your lordship's 
great penetration and judgment,  I had  reason to do, 
were it in any other cause but that of an article of the 
christian faith.  For these,  1 am sure,  shall all be de- 
fended and stand firm to the world's  end ; though we 
are not always sure what hand shall defend them.  I 
know as much may be expected from your lordship's in 
the case, as any body's ;  and therefore I conclude, when 
you have taken a view of this matter again, out of  the 
heat of  dispute,  you will have a better opinion of  the 
articles of  the christian faith, and of your own ability 
to defend them, than to pronounce, that "if  my notions 
of nature and persop hold,  your lordship cannot see 
how it is possible to defend that article of the christian 
faith, which your lordship has endeavoured to defend." 
For it is,  methinks,  to put that article. upon  a  very 
ticklish issue,  and to render  it  as suspected  and  as 
doubtful as is possible to men's minds,  that your lord- 
ship should declare it not possible to be defended, if my 
notions of nature and person hold; when all that I can 
find that your lordship excepts against, in my notions of 
nature and person,  is nothing but this,  viz.  that these 
are two sounds, which in themselves signify nothing. 
But before  I come  to examine how  by nature and 
person your lordship,  at present  in your answer,  en- 
gages me in the Unitarian controversy;  it will  not be 
beside the matter to consider, how by them your lord- 
ship at first brought my book into it. 
In  your Vindication of  the Doctrine of  the Trinity, 
your lordship says,"  the next thing to be cleared in this 
dispute,  is the distinction between  nature and person. 
And of  this  we  have  no  clear  and distinct idea from 
or reflection : and yet all our notions of the 
doctrine of the Trinity depend  upon  the right under- 
standing of it.  For we must talk unintelligibly about 
this point, unless we have clear and distinct apprehen- 
sions conceri~ing  nature and person,  and  the grounds 
of identity and  distinction : but these  come  not  into 
our minds by these  simple ideas of  sensation and re- 
flection." 
To this I replied,  <'  if it be so, the inference, I should 
draw from thence, (if  it were fit  for me to draw any) 
would be this ;  that it concerns those, who write on that 
subject, to have themselves, and to lay down to others, 
clear and distinct apprehensions,  or  notions,  or ideas 
(call  them what  you  please)  of  what  they mean by 
nature and person, and of  the grounds of identity and 
distinction. 
;' This appears to me the natural conclusion flowing 
from your lordship's words;  which seem here to suy- 
pose ckar and distinct apprehensions  (something like 
clear and distinct ideas) necessary for the avoiding un- 
intelligible talk in the doctrine of  the Trinity.  But I 
do not see how your lordship can, from the necessity  of 
clear and distinct apprehensions of  nature and person, 
kc. in the dispute of the Trinity, bring in one who has 
perhaps mistaken the way to clear and distinct notions 
concerning nature and person, &c. as fit to be answered 
among those who bring objections against the Trinity 
in point of reason.  I do not see why an Unitarian may 
not as well bring him in,  and argue against his Essay, 
in a chapter that he should write, to answer objections 
ageinst the unity of  God, in point of reason or revela-  a on: for  upon what ground soever any one writes, in 
this dispute or ally other, it is not tolerable to talk un- 
intelligibly on either side. 
"  If, by the way of ideas, which is that of the author 
of the Essay of  Human Understanding,  a man cannot 
come to clear  and  distinct  apprehensions concerning 
nature and person;  if,  as he proposes, from the simple 
ideas of  sensation  and reflection,  such  apprehensions 
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a mistaken  philosopher : but it will  not  follow  from 
thence,  that he is not  an orthodox christian;  for he 
might (as  he did) write  his  Essay of  Human Under- 
standing, without  any thoughtlof  the controversy be- 
tween  the Trinitarians  and  the Unitarians.  Nay,  a 
man might have writ all that is in his book, that never 
heard one word of any such dispute. 
"  There is  in the world a great and fierce contest 
about  nature and  grace:  it would  be  very hard for 
me,  if I must be brought in as a party on either side, 
because  a  disputant  in  that controversy should think 
the clear  and  distinct  apprehensions  of  nature  and 
grace come not into our minds by these  simple ideas 
of sensation and reflection.  If  this be  so,  I may be 
reckoned  among the  objectors  against all  sorts  and 
points of  orthodoxy whenever any one pleases :  I may 
be called to account as  one  heterodox,  in  the points 
of  free-grace,  free-will,  predestination,  original  sin, 
justification by faith, transubstantiation,  the pope's su- 
premacy,  and what not ?  as well as in the doctrine of 
the Trinity ;  and all because they cannot be furnished 
with  clear  and  distinct  notions  of  grace,  free-will, 
transubstantiation,  &c. by sensation or reflection.  For 
in all these,  as in other points,  I do not see but there 
may be a complaint  made, that they have  not  always 
a right understanding and clear notions of those things 
on which the doctrine they dispute of depends.  And it 
is not  altogether  unusual  for  men to talk  unintel- 
ligibly to themselves,  and others,  in these  and  other 
points of  controversy,  for  want  of  clear  and distinct 
apprehensions,  or  (as  I  would  call  them,  did  not 
your  lordship dislike it) ideas :  for  all which unintel- 
ligible  talking  I  do not  think  myself  accountable, 
though it should so fall out, that my way by ideas would 
not help them to what it  seems is wanting, clear and 
distinct  notions.  If my  way  be  ineffectual  to that 
purpose,  they  may,  for  all  me,  make  use  of  any 
other more successful;  and leave me out  of  the con- 
troversy,  as one useless to either party for deciding of 
the question. 
"  Supposing, as your lordship says, and as you have 
undertaken to make appear, that the clear and distinct 
apprehensions concerning nature and person, and the 
grounds of  identity and distinction, should  not  come 
into  the mind  by  simple ideas  of  sensation  and  re.. 
flection; what, I beseech  your  lordship, is  this  to the 
dispute concerning the Trinity,  on  either  side? And 
if, after your  lordship  has endeavoured  to give  clear 
and  distinct  apprehensions of nature  and person,  the 
disputants in  this  controversy  should  still  talk  un- 
intelligibly  about this  point,  for  want  of  claar  and 
distinct apprehensions concerning nature and person ; 
ought your lordship to be  brought in among the par- 
tisans  on  the other  side, by any one who writ  a Vin- 
dication  of  the Doctrine  of  the  Trinity? In  good 
earnest,  my lord, I do not see how the clear  and di- 
stinct notions  of nature  and person,  not  coming into 
the mind by the simple ideas of sensation  and reflec- 
tion, any more contains any objection against the doc. 
trine of the Trinity, than the clear and distinct appre- 
hensions  of  original  sin,  justification,  or  transub- 
stantiation,  not coming  into the mind by the simple 
ideas  of sensation  and reflection, contains  any objec- 
tion against the doctrine of original sin, justification, or 
transubstantiation :  and so of all the rest of the terms 
used in any controversy in religion." 
All  that your lordship  answers to this is  in these 
words : "The  next  thing I undertook  to show  was, 
that we can have no clear and distinct idea of  nature 
and  person,  from  sensation  or reflection.  Here you 
spend many pages to show,  that this doth not concern 
you.  Let it be so.  But it concerns the matter I was 
upon ;  which was to show, that we must have ideas [I 
think, my lord, it should  be clear  and distinct ideas  J 
of these things, which we cannot come to by sensation 
and reflection." 
But be that as it will ;  I have troubled your lordship 
here with this large repetition out of my former letter, 
because I think  it  clearly shows,  that my book  is  no 
more concerned in the controversy about the Trinity, 
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posite to that ~ide  of the question that your  lordship 
has endeavoured to defend, thgn to the contrary: and 
also  because,  by your  lordship's  answer to it in these 
words,  "let  it be  so,"  I  thought  you  had  not  only 
agreed to  all that I have  said,  but that by  it I  had 
been dismissed out of that controversy. 
It is an  observation  r have  somewhere  met  with, 
"  That  whoever is once got into the Inquidtion,.guilty 
or not  guilty,  seldom  ever gets clear out aga~n."  I 
think your lordship is satisfied there is no heresy in my 
book.  The suspicion  it was  brought  into, upon  the 
account of placing certainty  only upon clear and distinet 
ideas, is found groundless, there being no such thing in 
my book ;  and yet it is not dismissed out of the contro- 
versy.  It  is alleged still, that cc my notion of ideas, as 
I have stated it,  may be  of dangerous consequence as 
to that article of the Christian  faith, which your lord- 
ship has endeavoured  to defend ;" and so I am bound 
over to another trial.  "  Clear and distinct apprehen- 
sions concerning nature  and person, and the grounds 
of identity and distinction,  so necessary in the dispute 
of the Trinity, cannot be  had from sensation  and re- 
flection ;" was  another accusation.  To this,  whether 
true or false, I pleaded, that it makes me  no parby in 
this dispute  of  the Trinity, more  than in any dispute 
that can arise; nor of one side of the question more than 
another.  My plea is allowed,  66 let it be so ;"  and yet 
nature and person  are made use of again, to hook  me 
into the heretical side of the dispute :  and what is now 
the charge against me, in reference to theunitarian con- 
troversy, upon the account of nature and person ? even 
this  new one,  viz. that "  if my notions  of nature and 
person  hold,  your  lordship  does  not  see  how  it  is 
possible to defend the doctrine of the Trinity.''  How 
is this new charge proved ?  even thus,  in these words 
annexed to it: '' For if these  terms really signify no- 
thing in themselves,  but are only abstract  and  com- 
plex  ideas, which  the common usc  of language hath 
appropriated to be  the signs of two ideas;  then it is 
plain,  that they are only notions  of  the mind,  as all 
and complex ideas are ; and so one nature 
and three persons can be no more." 
My lord, I am not so conceited  of my notions, as to 
think that they deserve that your lordship should dwell 
long upon the consideration of them.  But pardon me, 
my lord, if I say, that it seems to me that this repre- 
sentation which your lordship here makes to yourself, of 
my notions of nature and person, and the inference from 
it, were made a little in haste:  and that if  it had not 
been sa,  your lordship would not,  from  the preceding 
words, have drawn this conclusion ;  '' andl so one nature 
and three  persons can  be  no  more ;"  nor  charged it 
upon me. 
For as to that part of your lordship's representation 
of my notions of nature and person, wherein it is said, 
if these terms in themselves signify nothing ;"  though 
I grant that to be my  notion  of  the terms nature and 
person, that they are two sounds that naturally signify 
not one thing more than another, nor in themselves sig- 
nify any thing at all, but have the signification which 
they have, barely by imposition ;  yet, in this my notion 
of  them, give  me  leave to presume,  that upon  more 
leisurely thoughts I shall have your lordship, as well as 
the rest of mankind  that ever  thought of this matter, 
concurring with me.  So that if your lordship continues 
positive in it, "  that you  cannot see how it is  possible 
to defend  the doctrine of the Trinity,  if this  my no- 
tion of nature  and person  hold ;" I, as far  as my eye- 
sight will reach in the case (which possibly is but a little 
way) cannot see,  but it will  be plain to  all mankind, 
that your lordship gives up the doctrine of the Trinity : 
since thi~  notion of nature and person that they are two 
words  that signify by imposition, is what will  hold in 
the common sense of all mankind.  And then, my lord, 
all  those who think well of your lordship's ability to de- 
fend it, and believe that you see as far in that question 
as anybody (which I take to be  the common sentiment 
of all the learned world, especially of those of our coun- 
try and church) will be in great danger to have an ill 
opinion of the evidence of that art?cle: since, 1 imagine, 
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notion will hold, viz. that these  terms nature and per- 
son  signify what  they do  signify  by  imposition,  and 
not by nature. 
Though, if the  contrary were true,  that these  two 
words, nature and person, had this particular privilege, 
above other names of things, that they did naturally and 
in themselves signify what they do signify, and that they 
received not their significations from the arbitrary im- 
position  of men, I do not see how the defence of the 
doctrine of the Trinity should  depend hereon ;  unless 
your lordship concludes, that it is necessary to the de- 
fence of the doctrine of the Trinity, that these two ar- 
ticulate sounds should have natural significations ;  and 
that unless they are used in those significations, it were 
impossible to defend the doctrine of the Trinity.  'Which 
is in effect to say, that where these two words are not in 
use and in their natural signification, the doctrine of the 
Trinity cannot be defended.  And if this be so, I grant 
your lordship had reason to  say, that if it hold, that  the 
terms nature and person  signify by imposition,  your 
lordship does not see how it is possible to defend the 
doctrine of the Trinity.  But then, my lord, I beg your 
lordship to consider, whether  this  be not mightily to 
prejudice that doctrine, and to undermine the belief of 
that  article of faith, to make  so extraordinary a sup- 
position  necessary to the defence of  it ;  and of  more 
dangerous  consequence  to  it,  than  any  thing  your 
lordship can imagine deducible from my book ? 
As to the remaining part of what your lordship  has, 
in the foregoing passage, set down as some of my  notions 
of nature and person, viz. that these terms are only abs- 
tract  or complex ideas: I crave  leave to plead, that I 
never said any such thing; and I should be ashamed if I 
ever had said, that  these, or any other terms, were ideas: 
which is all one as to say, that the sign is the thing sig- 
nified.  Much less did I ever  say,  <'  That these terms 
are only abstract and complex ideas,  which the com- 
mon use of language hath appropriated to  be the signs 
of two ideas."  For to say, "  that the common  use of 
language has appropriated abstract and complex ideas 
to be the signs of ideas,"  seems to  me so extraordinary 
a way of talking, that I can scarce persuade myself it 
would be of credit  to your lordship, to think it worth 
your while to answer a man, whom you could suppose 
to vent such gross jargon. 
This therefore containing none of  my notions of na- 
ture and  person, nor  indeed  any thing that I under- 
stand; whether your  lordship  rightly deduces from it 
this consequence,  viz.  "and  so one nature  and three 
persons can be no more ;" is what I neither know nor 
am concerned to examine. 
Your lordship has been pleased to take my Essay of 
Human Understanding to task, in your Vindication of 
the Doctrine of the Trinity: because the doctrine of it 
#ill not furnish your lordship "  with clear and distinct 
apprehensions concerning nature and person,  and the 
of  identity and distinction.  For, says your 
lordship, we must  talk  unintelligibly about this point 
[of  the Trinity] unless  we have  clear and distinct ap- 
prehensions of nature and person,"  &c. 
Whether, by my way of ideas, one can have clear and 
distinct apprehensions of nature and person, I shall not 
now dispute,  how much soever I am of the mind  one 
may..  Nor shall I question the reasonableness of this 
principle  your  lordship goes upon, viz.  that my book 
is to be disputed against, as opposite to the doctrine of 
the Trinity, because  it fails  to furnish your  lordship 
"  with clear and distinct apprehensions of  nature  and 
person,  and the distinction  between  them;" though I 
promised no such clear and distinct apprehensions, nor 
have ,treated in my book  any where  of nature  at all. 
But upon this occasion I cannot but observe, that your 
lordship yourself,  in that place,  makes "  clear and di- 
stinct ideas necessary to that certainty of faith,"  which 
your lordship thinks requisite,  though it be that very 
thing for which you blame the men of the new way of 
reasoning,  and is  the very ground  of your  disputing 
against the Unitarians, the author of Christianity not 
mysterious,  and me, jointly under that title. 
Your lordship, to supply that defect in my book,  of 
elear and distinct apprehensions of nature and person, 
for the vindication  of the doctrine of the Trinity, with- 
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fended, undertook to clear the distinction between na- 
ture and person.  This, I told  your lordship, gave me 
hopes of gett,ing farther insight into these matters, and 
more clear and distinct apprehensions concerning nature 
and person, than was to be had by ideas ;  but that after 
all the attention and application I could use, in reading 
what your lordship  had writ  of  it, I  found  myself so 
little enlightened concerning nature and  person,  by 
what your  lordship had  said,  that I  found  no  other 
remedy, but that I must be content with the condemned 
way by ideas. 
This, which I thought  not  only an  innocent, but a 
respectful answer, to  what your lordship had said about 
nature and person, has drawn upon me a more severe re- 
flection  than I thought it deserved.  Scepticism  is  a 
pretty hard word, which I find  dropt in  more  places 
than one ;  but I shall refer the consideration of that to 
another  place.  All that I shall do now, shall be  to 
mark out (since  your  lordship forces me  to it) more 
particularly than I did before, what I think very hard 
to be understood, in that which your lordship has said 
to clear the distinction  between  nature and person; 
which I shall do, for these two ends: 
First, as an excuse for my saying, cc that I  had learnt 
nothing  out of  your  lordship's  elaborate discourse  of 
them,  but this;  that I must  content myself with  my 
condemned way by ideas." 
And next to show, why not only I, but several others, 
think that if my book  deserved to be brought in, and 
taken notice of among the anti-Trinitarian writers, for 
want of clear and distinct ideas of nature and person; 
what your lordship has said  upon these  subjects will 
more justly deserve, by him that writes next in defence 
of the doctrine of the Trinity, to be brought in among 
the opposers  of the doctrine of the Trinity, as of dan- 
gerous consequence to it ;  for want of giving clear and 
distinct apprehensions of nature and  person ;  unless the 
same thing ranks one man among the Unitarians, and 
another amongst the Trinitarians. 
What your lordship had said, for clearing of the di- 
stinction of nature and person, having surpassed my un- 
derstanding, as I told your lordship in my former letter; 
I was resolved not to  incur your lordship's displeasure a 
second time, by confessing I found not myself enlight- 
ened by it, till I had taken all the help I could imagine, 
to find out these clear and distilict apprehensions of na- 
ture and person, which your lordship had so much de- 
clared for.  To this purpose, I consulted others upon 
what you had said, and desired to find somebody, who, 
~nderstanding  it himself, would help me out, where my 
own  application and  endeavours had  been used to no 
purpose.  But my niisfortune  has  been,  my lord, that 
among severalwhom1  have desired to tell me their sense 
of what your lordship has said, for clearing the notions 
of nature and  person, there has not been one who owned, 
that he understood your lordship's  meaning;  but con- 
fessed,  the farther he looked  into what  your lordship 
had there said  about nature and person,  the more he 
was at a loss about them. 
One  said, your lordship began with giving two signi- 
fications of the word nature.  One of them, as it stood 
for properties,  he said he understood : but the other, 
wherein lC  nature was taken for the thing itself, wherein 
those  properties  were,"  he  said,  he  did  not  under- 
stand.  But that, he added, I was not to wonder at, in 
a man who was not very well acquainted with Greek; 
and  therefore  might  well  be  allowed  not  to have 
learning enough not to understand anEnglish word that 
Aristotle was brought to explain and settle the sense of. 
Besides, he added, that which puzzled  him the more in 
it, was the very explication which was brought of it out 
of Aristotle,  viz.  that  cc  nature  was  a  corporeal  sub- 
stance, which  had  the principles  of motion in itself;" 
because  he  could  not conceive a corporeal substance, 
having the principles of motion in itself.  And if nature 
were  a corporeal  substance,  having  the principles  of 
motion in itself; it must be good sense  to say, that a 
corporeal substance, or, which is the same thing, a body 
having  the principles  of  motion  in  itself,  is  nature; 
which he confessed,  if  anybody should  say to him,  he 
could not understand. 
Another thing, he said,  that perplexed him,  in this 
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poreal substance, which  had  the principles  of motion 
in  itself,"  he  thought  it  might  happen  that there 
inig!t  be no nature  at all.  For corporeal  s~tbstances 
having all equally principles,  or no  principles  of  mo- 
tion in themselves; and all men who do not make matter 
and motion eternal, being positive in it, that a body, at 
rest, has no principle  of motion in it ; must conclude, 
that corporeal substance has no principle of motion in 
itself: from hence it will follow, that to all those who 
admit not matter and motion  to be eternal, 110  nature, 
in that sense, will be left at all, since nature is said to 
be a corporeal substance, which  hath the principles of 
motion in itself ;  but such a sort of corporeal substance 
those men have no notion  of  at all, and conseque~ltly 
none of nature, which is such a corporeal substance. 
Now, said he, if this be that clear and distinct appre- 
hension of nature, which is so necessary to the doctrine 
of the Trinity; they who have found it out for that pur- 
pose, and find  it clear and  distinct,  have  reason to be 
satisfied with it upon that account:  but how they will 
reconcile it to the creation of  matter, 1 cannot tell.  I, 
for my part, said he, can  make  it consist neither with 
the creation of the world, nor with  any other notions ; 
and so plainly cannot understand it. 
He  farther said,  in  the following words,  which arc 
these, "but nature and substance are of an equal extent ; 
and so that which  is  the subject of  powers  and pro- 
perties  is  nature,  whether  it  be  meant  of  bodily  or 
spiritual  substances ;" he neither understood the con- 
nexion nor sense.  First, he understood  not,  he  said, 
that  nature and substance were  of the same extent." 
Nature, he said, in his notion  of it, extended to things 
that were not substances ;  as he thought it might pro- 
perly be said, the nature of  a rectangular triangle was, 
that the square of  the hypothenuse was equal to the 
square of the two other sides ;  or, it is the nature of ain 
to offend God : though it be certain,  that neither sin 
nor a rectangular triangle, to  which nature is attributed 
in these propositions,  are either of them substances. 
Farther, he said, that he did not see how the perticle 
"  but"  connects  this  to  the  preceding  words.  But 
least, of  all,  could  he comprehend the inference from 
hence :  a  and so that which is the subject of powers and 
is  nature, whether it be  meant of bodily or 
substances."  Which deduction, said he, stands 
thus :  Aristotle  takes  nature  for  a  corporeal  sub- 
stance,  which  has  the principle  of  motion  in itself; 
therefore nature and substance are of an equal extent, 
and so both corporeal and incorporeal  substances are 
nature."  This is the very connexion,  said  he,  of  the 
whole deduction in the foregoing words; which I under- 
stand not, if I understand  the words ;  and if I under- 
stand not the  words, I am yet farther from understand- 
ing ally thing of this explication of nature, whereby we 
are to come to clear and distinct apprehensions of it. 
Methinks,  said  he,  going on, I understand  how by 
making nature and substance one and the same thing, 
that  may serve to  bring substance into this dispute; but 
for all that, I cannot, for my life, understand nature to 
be substance, nor substance to be nature. 
There is another inference,  said he,  in  the close  of 
this paragraph, which both for  its connexion  and ex- 
pression,  seems to me very hard  to be understood,  it 
being set down in these words :  "so that the nature of 
things properly  belongs  to  our  reason,  and  not  to 
mere  ideas."  For when  a  man knows what  it is for 
the nature of  things properly to belong to reason, and 
not  to mere ideas,  there will, I guess,  some difficulty 
remain, in what sense  soever he shall understand that 
expression,  to deduce this proposition  as  an inference 
from the foregoing words, which  are these : cc I grant, 
that by  sensation  and  reflection,  we  come  to know 
the powers  and properties of  things;  but our reason 
is satisfied that there must be something beyond those, 
because  it is impossible  that they  should  subsist  by 
themselves :  so that the nature of  things properly be- 
longs to our reason, and not to mere ideas." 
It  is true, said I ; but his lordship,  upon my taking 
reason in that place for the power of reasoning, hath, in 
his answer, with a little kind  of warmth, corrected my 
mistake in these words:  cc still  you are at it, that you 
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ideas are objects of the understanding, and the under- 
standing is one of the faculties employ-ed about them." 
Gc No doubt  of  it.  But you  might easily see that by 
reason, I understood principles  of  reason,  allowed by 
mankind;  which,  I  think,  are  very  different  froni 
ideas.  But I perceive reason,  in this sense,  is a thing 
you have no idea of; or one as obscure as that of sub- 
stance." 
I imagine,  said  the gentleman,  tlist if his  lordship 
should be asked, how he perceives you have no idea of 
reason in that sense,  or one  as obscure as that of sub- 
stance ?  he would scarce have a reason ready to give for 
his  saying so:  and what we  say which  reason  cannot 
account for, must be ascribed to some other cause. 
Now truly, said I, my mistake was so innocent and 
so unaffected, that if I had had these very words said to 
me then, which his lordship sounds in my ears now, to 
awaken my understanding, viz. "  that the principles of 
reason  are very different  from  ideas;"  1  do not yet 
find how they would  have  helped  me  to see what,  it 
seems,  was  no  small fault,  that I did not see before. 
Because, let reason, taken for principles of reason, be as 
different as it  will from ideas ;  reason,taken as a faculty, 
is as different  from them, in my apprehension:  and in 
both senses of  the word  reason,  either as taken for n 
faculty, or for the principles of reason allowed by man- 
kind, reason and ideas may consist together. 
Certainly, said the gentleman, ideas have something 
in them, that you do not see; or else such a small mis- 
take, as you made in endeavouring to make them con- 
sistent with reason as a faculty, would not have moved 
so great a man as my lord bishop of Worcester so as to 
make him tell you, "that reason, taken for the common 
principles  of  reason,  is  a thing whereof  you  havle no 
ideas,  or one  as  obscure as that of  substance."  For, 
if I mistake not, you have in your book,  in more plaees 
than one, spoke, and that pretty largely, of sdf-evident 
propositions  and maxims : so that, if  his  lordship has 
ever read those parts of  your Essay, he cannot doubt, 
but that you have ideas of those common principles of 
reason. 
~t may be  so, I replied;  but such things  are to be 
borne from great men, who often use them as marks of 
distinction : though 1 should less expect them from my 
lord bishop of Worcester than from almost any one ;  be- 
cause he has the solid and interior greatness of learning, 
as well as that of outward title and dignity.  But since 
he expects it from me, I will do what I can to see what, 
he says, is  his  meaning here by reason.  I will repeat 
it just as his  lordship  says, " I might easily have seen 
what he  understood  by  it."  My lord's  words imme- 
diately  following  those  above  taken  l~otice  of  are : 
and so that which is the subject of powers and proper- 
ties  is  the  nature,  whether  it be  meant  of  bodily or 
spiritual  substances."  And  then  follow these, which, 
to be rightly understood, his lordship says must be read 
thus : "  I grant, that  by  sensation  and reflection we 
come  to know the properties of things ;  but our rea- 
son,  i.  e.  the  principles  of  reason  allowed  by  man- 
kind,  are satisfied  that there must  be  something be- 
yond these,  because  it is  impossible  they should sub- 
sist  by themselves : so  that the nature  of things pro- 
perly belongs  to our reason,  i.  e. to the principles of 
reason allowed by mankind ;  and not  to mere ideas." 
This  explication  of  it,  replied  the gentleman, which 
my lord bishop has given of this passage, makes it more 
unintelligible to me than it was before; and I know him 
to be so great a master of sense, that I doubt whether he 
himself will  be  better  satisfied with  this  sense  of  his 
words, than with that which you understood it in.  But 
let us go on to the two next paragraphs,  wherein his 
lordship is at farther pains to give us clear and distinct 
apprehensions of nature: and, that we may not mistake, 
let US first read his words, which run thus : 
"  But we must yet proceed farther;  for nature may 
be considered two ways :" 
1.  "As  it is in distinct individuals ;  as the nature of 
man is equally in Peter, James,  and John ; and this 
IS the common  nature,  with  a  particular  subsistence, 
Proper to each of  them.  For the nature of  a man, as 
ln  Peter, is distinct  from  that same nature, as it is in 
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depend; and without  which,  we  must talk  unintelli- 
gibly about that point? 
His lordship tells us here, nature may be considered 
two ways.  What is it the nearer to be told, nature may 
be considered two or twenty ways,  till we know what 
-  that is which is to be considered two ways ?  i. e. till he 
defines the term nature,  that we may know what pre- 
cisely is the thing meant by it. 
He  tells us.  6c nature may be considered, 
"  1. As it is in individuals. 
'(  2.  Abstractly." 
1. His lordship says, " nature may be considered  as 
in distinct individuals."  It  is true, by those that know 
what nature is.  But his  lordship having not yet told 
me  what nature is,  nor  what  he  here  means  by  it; 
it is  impossible  for me to consider nature in or out of 
individuals, unless I can consider I know not what : so 
that this consideration is,  to me,  as good as no consi- 
deration ;  neither does or can it help at all to any clear 
and distinct apprehensions of nature.  Indeed, he says, 
Aristotle by nature signified acarporeal substance ;  and 
from thence his lordship  takes occasion  to say, " that 
nature and substance are of an equal extent :" though 
Aristotle, taking nature for a corporeal substance, gave 
no ground for such a saying,because corporeal substance 
and substance are not of an equal extent.  But to pass 
by that: if his lordship would have us understand here, 
that by nature he  means  substance,  this is  but  sub- 
stituting one name in the place of another;  and, which 
is worse, a more doubtful and obscure term, in the place 
of one  that is  less  so; which will, I fear, not give us 
very clear and distinct apprehensions of nature.  His 
lordship goes on : 
"  As tlie nature of a man is equally in Peter, James 
and John ;  and this is the common nature, with a par- 
ticular subsistence proper to each of them." 
Here his lordship does not tell us what consideration 
of nature there may be, but actually affirms and teaches 
something.  I wish I had the capacity to learn by it the 
dear and distinct apprehensions of nature and person, 
which is the lesson  he is here upon.  He says, "  that 
the nature of  a man is  equally in  Peter, James,  and 
~~hn."  That is more than I know:  because I do not 
know what things Peter, James,  and John are.  They 
may be drills or horses,  for aught I know;  as well as 
Weweenay  Cuchipe, and Cousheda, may be drills, as his 
lordship says, for aught he knows.  For I know no law 
of speech that more necessarily makes these three sounds, 
Peter, James, and John, stand for three men ;  than We- 
weens, Cuchipe,  and Cousheda,  stand  for three men : 
for I knew a horse that was called Peter; and I do not 
know but the master of the same team might call other 
of his horses James and John.  Indeed, if Peter, James, 
and John, are supposed to be the names only of men, it 
cannot be questioned but the nature of man is equaily 
in thwn ;  unless one can suppose each of them to be a 
man, without having the nature of a man in him:  that 
is, suppose him to be a man, without being a man.  But 
then this to me, I confess, gives no manner of clear or 
distinct apprehensions concerning nature in general, or 
the nature of  man in particular ;  it seeming to me to 
say no more  but this, that a man is a man, and a drill 
is a drill, and a horse is  a  horse : or, which  is all one, 
what has the nature of a man, has the nature of a man, 
or is a man ; and what has the nature of a drill, has the 
nature of a drill, or is a drill ; and what has the nature 
of  a  horse,  has  the nature of  a  horse,  or is a horse; 
whether it be called Peter, or not called Peter.  But if 
any one should repeat this a thousand times to me, and 
go over all  the species of  creatures, with such an un- 
questionable assertion to every one of them ; I do not 
find that  thereby Ishouldget one  jot clearer or distincter 
apprehensions either  of  nature in  general,  or  of  the 
nature of a man, a horse, or a drill, &c. in particular. 
His lordship adds,  " and this is the common nature, 
with a particular subsistence proper to each of them." 
I do not doubt but his  lordship set down these words 
with a very good meaning; but such is my misfortune, 
that I, for my life, cannot find it out.  I have repeated 
4.6  and this"  twenty times to myself;  and my weak un- 
derstanding always rejolts, and what?  To which I am 
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and the nature of a man in James, and the nature of a 
man in John, is the common  nature ;  and there I stop, 
and can go no farther to make it coherent to myself, 
till I add of man; and then it must be read thus; "  the 
nature of man in  Peter is  the common  nature of man, 
with a particular subsistence proper to Peter."  That 
the nature of  man in  Peter is the nature of a man, if 
Peter be supposed  to be  a  man, I certainly know, let 
the nature of man be what it will, of which I yet know 
nothing : but if Peter be not supposed  to be the name 
of a man, but be the name of a horse, all that knowledge 
vanishes, and I know nothing.  But  let Peter be ever so 
much a man, and let it be impossible to give that name 
to a horse, yet I cannot understand these words, that the 
common nature of man is in Peter; for whatsoever is in 
Peter, exists in Peter; and whatever exists in  Peter, is 
particular : but the common  nature of man, is the ge- 
neral nature of  man,  or else I understand  not what is 
meant by common nature.  A.nd  it confounds my un- 
derstanding, to make a general a particular. 
But to help me to conceive this matter, I am told, 
"  it is the common nature with a particular subsistence 
proper to Peter."  But this helps not my understanding 
in  the case:  for,  first, I do not understand what sub- 
sistence is, if  it signify any thing different from exist- 
ence; and if it be the same with existence, then it is so 
far from loosening the knot,  that it leaves it just as it 
was,  only  covered  with the  obscure  and less  known 
term, subsistence.  For the difficulty to me is,  to con- 
ceive  an  universal  nature,  or  universal  any thing, to 
exist; which would  be, in  my mind,  to make  an uni- 
versal a particular:  which, to me, is impossible. 
No, said another who was by, it is but using the word 
subsistence instead of  existence,  and there is nothing 
easier;  if  one will  consider  this  common or universal 
nature, with a particular existence,  under the name of 
subsistence, the business is done. 
Just as easy, replied the former, I find it in myself, as 
to consider the nature of a circle with four angles ;  for to 
consider a circle with four angles, is no more impossible 
to me, than to consider an  universal with  a  particular 
existence;  which  is  to  consider  an  universal  really 
existing, and in  effect  a  particular.  But the words, 
66 proper to each of  them,"  follow to help me  out.  1 
hoped so, till I considered them ; and  then I found I 
thern as little as all the rest.  For I know 
not what is a subsistence proper to Peter, more than to 
James  or  John,  till I know Peter himself;  and then 
indeed my senses will discern him from James or John, 
or any man living. 
His lordship goes on : cc for the nature  of  man,  as 
in  Peter, is  distinct  from  that  same nature  as it is 
in James  and John ;  otherwise they would be but one 
person,  as well  as  have  the  same nature."  These 
words,  by  the  casual  particle  for,  which  introduces 
them, should be a proof of something that goes before; 
but what they are meant for a proof of, I confess I un- 
derstand riot.  For the propositiori preceding, as far as 
I can make any thing of it, is this, that the general na- 
ture of a man has a particular existence in each of the 
three,  Peter,  James,  and  John.  But  then  how  the 
saying, that "  the nature of man, as in Peter, is distinct 
from the same nature as it is in James and John,"  does 
prove that the general nature of man does or can exist 
in either of them, I cannot see. 
The words which follow,  "otherwise  they would be 
one person, as well as have the same nature,"  I see the 
connexion of; for it isvisible they were brought to prove, 
that the nature in Peter is distinct from the nature in 
James  and John.  But with  all that, I do  not  see  of 
what use or significancy they are here :  because, to me, 
they are more obscure and doubtful, than the proposi- 
tion they are brought to prove.  For I scarce think there 
can be a clearer proposition  than this,  viz.  that three 
natures, that have three distinct existences in three men, 
are, as his lordship says,  three distinct natures, and so 
needs no proof.  But to prove  it by this,  that 66 other- 
wise they could  not  be  three persons,"  is  to prove  it 
by a proposition unintelligible to me ; because his lord- 
ship has not yet told me, what the clear and distinct ap- 
Prehension  of  person  is,  which I ought to have.  For 
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which has in itself a certain signifi~atioa;  I, who have 
no such conception of it,  should in vain  look for it in 
the propriety of our language, which is established upon 
qrbikrary imposition; arid so can, by no means, imagine 
what person here signifies, till his lordship shall do me 
the favour to tell me. 
To this I replied,  that six  pages  farther  on,  your 
lordship explains the notion of person. 
To  which the gentleman answered, whether I can get 
clear and distinct apprehensions of person, by what his 
lordship says tliere of person, I shall see when I come to 
it.  Rut this, in the meantime, must be confessed, that 
person comes in here six pages too soon, for those who 
want his lordship's explication of it, to make them have 
clear  and  distinct  apprehensions  of  what  he means, 
when he uses it. 
For we must certainly talk  unintelligibly  about na- 
ture and  person,  as well  as about  the doctrine of the 
Trinity, unless we have clear and distinct apprehensions 
concerning nature and person ;  as his lordship says, in 
the foregoing page. 
It follows,  <'  and this distinction of  persons in them 
is  discerned  both  by  our  senses,  as to their  different 
accidents;  and  by  our  reason,  because  they  have  a 
separate existence;  not coming into it at once and in 
the same manner." 
These words, said he, which conclude this paragraph, 
tell us how persons are distinguished ;  but, as far as I 
an  see, serve not at all to give us any clear and distinct 
apprehensions of nature,  by considering  it in distinct 
individuals: which was the business of this paragraph. 
His lordship says, we may consider nature asin  distinct 
individuals : and so I do as much, when I consider it in 
three distinct physical  atoms  or particles of the air or 
~ther,  as when I consider it in Peter, James, and John. 
For three distinct  physical  atoms  are three distinct 
individuals,  and have three  distinct natures  in  them, 
as certainly as three distlnct men; though I cannot dis- 
cern the distinction  between them  by my senses, as to 
their different accidents ;  nor is their separate existence 
discernible to my reason, by their not coming into it at 
once arrd  in  the same manner:  for they did, for aught 
I know, or at least might,  come into existence at once 
and in  the same  manner,  which  was  by creation.  I 
think it will be allowed, that God did, or might, create 
more  than  one physical  atom  of  matter  at once:  so 
that  here  nature  may  be  considered  in  distinct  in- 
dividuals,  without  any  of  those  ways  of  distinction 
which his lordship here speaks of: and so I cannot see 
how these last words contribute aught, to give us clear 
and  distinct apprehensions  of  nature,  by  considering 
nature in distinct individuals. 
But to try what clear and distinct apprehensions con- 
cerning nature, his lordship's way of considering nature 
in this paragraph carries in it; let me repeat his lord- 
ship's  discourse to you here, only changing one common 
nature for another, viz.  putting the common nature of 
animal, for the common nature of man, which his lord- 
ship has chose to instance in ;  and then his  lordship's 
words  would  run thus : "  nature  may  be  considered 
two ways;  first, as it is in distinct individuals ; as the 
nature of  an  animal  is  equally in  Alexander,  Buce- 
phalus, and Podargus : and this is the common nature, 
with a particular subsistence,. proper to each of  them. 
For the nature of animal,  as in Bucephalus, is distinct 
from the same nature as  in Podargus and Alexander ; 
otherwise  they would  be but one  person,  as  well  as 
have the same nature.  And this distinction of persons 
in  them  is  discerned  both by  our senses,  as to thei'r 
different accidents;  and by our reason,  because  they 
have a separate existence, not  coming into it at once 
and in the same manner." 
To  this I said, I thought he did violence to your lord- 
ship's  sense, in  applying the word  person, which sig- 
nifies  an  intelligent  individual,  to  Bucephalus and 
Podargus,  which were two irrational animals. 
To  which the gentleman replied, that he fell into this 
mistake, by his thinking your lordship had somewhere 
spoken, as if an  individual intelligent substance  were not 
the proper definition  of  person.  But, continued he, I 
lay no stress on the word person, in the instance wherein 
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please, put individual for it; and then reading it so, let 
me ask you whether that way of considering it contri- 
butes any thing to the giving you clear and distinct ap- 
prehensions of nature? which it ought to do,if  his lord- 
ship's  way  of  considering  nature,  in  that paragraph, 
were of any use to that purpose:  since the common na- 
ture of animal is as much the same; or, as his lordship 
says in the next paragraph,  as much  an entire notion 
of itself, as the common nature of man.  And the com- 
mon nature of animal is as equally in Alexander, Buce- 
phalus,  and  Podargus,  with  a  particular  subsistence 
proper to each of them; as the common nature of man 
is equally in Peter, James, and John, with a particular 
subsistence to each of them,  &c.  But pray what does 
all this  do  towards  the giving you clear and distinct 
apprehensions of nature  ? 
I replied,  truly neither the consideration  of  nature, 
as in  his  lordship's  distinct  individuals,  viz.  in Peter, 
James, and John ;  nor the consideration of nature, as in 
your distinct individuals, viz. in Alexander, Bucephalus, 
and Podargus;  did  any thing towards  the giving me 
clear and distinct apprehensions of  nature.  Nay, they 
were  so far from it,  that after having gone  over both 
the one and the other several  times in my thoughts, I 
seem to have less  clear and distinct  apprehensions of 
nature, than Ihad before.  13ut whether it  will be so with 
other people, as I perceive it is with you, and me, and 
some  others, none of  the dullest, whom I have talked 
with upon this subject, that must be left to experience ; 
and  if there be others that do hereby get such clear and 
distinct  apprehensions  concerning  nature, which may 
help them in their notions of  the Trinity, that cannot 
be denied them. 
That is true, said he :  but if that be so,  I must ne- 
cessarily conclude,  that the notionists  and the ideists 
have their apprehensive facultiesvery differently turned ; 
since in their explaining themselves (which they on both 
sides  think  clear and intelligible) they cannot under- 
stand one another. 
But let us go on to nature, considered abstractly, in 
the next words. 
Secondly,  nature  may be considered,  says his  lord- 
ship, abstractly, without respect to individual persons. 
I do not  see,  said  he,  what persons do here,  more 
than  any  other  individuals.  For  nature,  considered 
abstractly, has no  more respect to persons, than any 
other sort of individuals. 
And then, says his lordship, it makes an entire notion 
of itself.  To  make an entire notion of itself, being an 
expression I never met with before, I shall not, I think, 
be  much blamed, if I be not confident, that I perfectly 
it.  To  guess,  therefore,  as well  as I can, 
what can be meant by it, I consider, that whatever the 
makes an object of its contemplation at any time, 
may be called one notion, or, as you perhaps will call it, 
one idea; which may be an entire notion or idea, though 
it be but the half of what  is  the object of the mind at 
another  time.  For  methinks  the  number  five  is  as 
much  an entire notion  of  itself, when  the mind  con- 
templates the number five by itself,  as the number ten 
is an entire notion by itself, when the mind contemplates 
that alone and its properties : and in this sense I can 
understand an entire notion by itself.  But if it mean 
any thing else, I confess I do not understand  it.  But 
thep the difficulty remains ;  for I cannot see how, in this 
sense,  nature  abstractly  considered  makes  an entire 
notion, more than the nature of Peter makes an entire 
notion.  For if  the nature in Peter be considered by 
itself,  or if  the abstract nature of  man be considered 
by itself, or if the nature of  animal (which  is yet more 
abstract)  be considered  by  itself;  every one of  these 
being  made  the whole  object,  that the mind  at any 
time contemplates,  seems,  to me,  as  much an entire 
notion as either of the other. 
But  farther, what the calling nature, abstractly consi- 
dered,  an  entire  notion  in  itself,  contributes  to our 
having or not having clear and distinct apprehensions 
of nature, is yet more remote from my comprehension. 
His  lordship's  next  words  are ; "  for  however  the 
Same nature may be  in  different  individuals,  yet the 
in itself remains  one and the same :  which ap- 172  Mr. Locke's Rep& to the 
pears  from  this evident  reason,  that otherwise every 
individual must make a different kind." 
The  coherence  of  which  discourse,  continued  he, 
tending, as it seems, to prove, that nature, considered 
abstractly, makes an entire notion  of itself; stands, as 
far as I can comprehend  it,  thus: "  because  every in- 
dividual must not make a different kind ;  therefore na . 
ture, however it be in different individuals,  yet in itself 
it remains  one  and the same.  And  because  nature, 
however  it be  in  different  individuals,  yet in itself 
remains one and the same; therefore,  considered abs- 
tractly,  it  makes  an  entire  notion  of  itself."  This 
is the argument of this paragraph ;  and the connexion 
of it,  if I understand the connecting words, "  for, and 
from this  evident reason."  But if  they are used for 
any thing else but to tie those propositions together, as 
the proofs one of another, in that way I have mentioned ; 
I confess, I understand them not, nor any thing that is 
meant by this whole  paragraph.  And in that sense I 
understand it in, what it does towards the giving usclear 
and distinct apprehensions of nature, I must confess, I 
do not see at all. 
Thus  far, said he, we have considered his lordship's  ex- 
plication of nature ;  and my understanding what his lord- 
ship has discoursed upon it, under several heads, for the 
giving us clear and distinct apprehensions concerning it. 
Let us now read what his lordship has said concern- 
ing person ; that I may,  since you  desire it of me, let 
you see how far I have got any clear and distinct appre- 
hension  of  person,  from his  lordship's  explication  of 
that.  His lordship's  words are:  let us now come to 
the idea of  a person.  For although the common na- 
ture of  mankind be the same,  yet we see a difference 
in the several  individuals  from  one  another:  so that 
Peter,  and  James,  arid  John,  are  all  of  the  same 
kind ;  yet Peter is  not James,  and James is not John. 
But what is this  distinction founded  upon ?  they may 
be  distinguished from each  other by our senses,  as to 
difference of  features,  distance  of  place,  &c.  but that 
is not all; for supposing  there were  no  external dif- 
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ference,  yet  tliere is  a  difference between  them,  as 
several individuals in the same common nature.  And 
here lies the true idea of  3 person,  which arises from 
the manner of  subsistence, which  is in one individual, 
arid  is  not  communicable  to another.  An  individual 
intelligent  substance is rather supposed to the making 
of  a  person,  than the proper  definition  of  it; for  a 
persol1 relates to something which  doth distinguish it 
from another intelligent substance in the same nature: 
and therefbre  the foundation of  it lies in the peculiar 
manner  of  subsistence, which  agrees  to one,  and to 
none else,  of  the  same  kind ; and this it is which  is 
called personality." 
In these words,  this I understand very well, that sup- 
posing Peter, James, and John, to be all three men; and 
man being a name for one kind of animals ;  they are all 
of  the same kind.  I understand too very well, that Peter 
is not James,  and James is not John,  but that there is 
a difference in these several individuals.  I understand 
also, that they may  be  distinguished  from  each other 
by our senses,  as to different features and distance of 
place, $c.  But what  follows,  I do confess,  I do not 
understand, where his  lordship says, '' but that is not 
all ; for  supposing tliere were no such external differ- 
ence, yet there is a difference between them, as several 
individuals in the same nature."  For,  first,  whatever 
willingness I have to gratify his lordship in whatever he 
would have me suppose,  yet I cannot, I find,  suppose. 
that there is no such external difference between Peter 
and James, as difference of place ;  for I cannot suppose 
a contradiction :  and it seems to me to imply a contra- 
diction  to say,  Peter  and  James are not  in  different 
places.  The next thing I do not understand,  is what 
his lordship says in these words : '(  for supposing there 
were no such external diaerence, yet there is a difference 
between  them,  as  several individuals in the same na- 
ture."  For  these words being here to show  what the 
distinction of Peter, James, and John is founded upon, 
I do not understand how they at all do it. 
His lordship says,  <'  Peter is not James,  and James 
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tion  founded  upon ?"  And  to resolve  that,  he  an- 
swers, "  not by  difference  of  features,  or  distance  of 
place,"  with an &c.  because,  " supposing there  were 
no such external  difference,  yet  there is  a difference 
between  them.''  In which  passage,  by  these  words, 
such external difference,  must be meant  all other dif- 
ference  but what  his  lordship,  in the next  words,  is 
going to name;  or else 1 do not see how his lordship 
shows what  this distinction is founded upon.  For ify 
supposing such external differences away, there may be 
other differences  on  which  to found their distinction, 
besides  that other  which  his  lordship  subjoins,  viz. 
6r the difference that is between  them,  as several indi- 
viduals  in the  same  nature,"  I  cannot  see  that  his 
lordship has said  any thing to show what the distinc- 
tion between those individuals is founded on ;  because 
if he has not, under the terms external difference, com- 
prized  all  the  differences  besides  that  his  chief  and 
fundamental one, viz. " the difference between them as 
several  individuals  in  the same common  nature;"  it 
may be founded  on what  his  lordship has  not  men- 
tioned.  I conclude then  it is  his  lordship's meaning, 
(or else I can see no meaning in his words  (that sup- 
posing  no  difference  between  them,  of  features or 
distance of place, &c.  i.  e.  no other difference between 
them, yet there would be still the true ground  of  di- 
stinction, in  the difference  between  them,  as  several 
individuals in the same common nature. 
Let us then understand, if we can, what is the differ- 
ence between things, barely as several individuals in the 
same common nature, a11  other differences laid aside. 
Truly, said I, that I cannot conceive. 
Nor I neither, replied the gentleman :  for considering 
them as several individuals, was what his lordship did, 
when he ssid, Peter was not James, and James was not 
John;  and if  that were  enough to show  on what the 
distinction between them was founded, his lordship need 
have gone no farther in his inquiry after that, for that 
he had found already :  and yet methinks thither are we 
at last come again, as to the foundation of  the distinc- 
tion between them,viz. that they are several individuals 
in tEle  same common nature.  Nor  can I here see any 
other ground of  the distinction between those,  that are 
several  individuals in the same  common  nature,  but 
this, that they are several individuals in the same corn- 
marl nature.  Either  this is  all the meaning that his 
lordship's words, when considered, carry in them, or else 
T do not understand what they mean : and either way, 
I must own, they do  not much,towards the giving me 
clear and distinct apprehensions of  nature and person. 
One thing more I must remark to you,  in  his  lord- 
shiI"~  way of  expressing himself  here ; and that is, in 
the former part of the words last read, he speaks, as he 
does all along,  of  the same  common  nature  being in 
*ankind,  or in the several individuals ;  and, in the latter 
part of them, he speaks of  several individuals being in 
the same common nature.  I do by no means find fault 
wit11  such figurative and common ways of speaking, in 
popular  and  ordinary  discourses,  where  inaccurate 
thoughts allow inaccurate ways of speaking; but I think 
I may say that metaphorical expressions (which seldom 
terminate in precise truth) should be as much as possible 
avoided, when men  undertake to deliver clear and di- 
stinct apprehensions,  and exact notions of things;  be- 
cause, being taken strictly and according to the letter, 
(as we find they are apt to be) they always puzzle and 
mislead, rather than enlighten and instruct. 
I do not say this (continued he) with an intention to 
accuse  his  lordship of  inaccurate notions ; but yet, I 
think, his sticking so close all along to that vulgar way 
of speaking of  the same common  nature,  being  in se- 
veral individuals,  has made him less easy to be under- 
stood.  For to speak truly and precisely of this matter, 
as in reality it is, there is no such thing as one and the 
Same  common  nature in  several  individuals;  for  all 
that in truth is in  them is particular,  and can be  no- 
thing but particular.  But the true meaning (when it 
has any)  of  that metaphorical and popular  phrase,  I 
take to be this, and no more,  that  every particular in- 
dividual  man  or horse,  kc. has  such a nature or con- 
stitution,  as  agrees  and  is  conformable  to that idea, 
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His lordship's  next words are; " and here  lies the 
true idea of  a person,  which  arises  from that manner 
of  subsistence which  is  in  one  individual,  and  is  not 
communicable to another."  The reading of these words, 
said he,  makes  me wish that we had  some other may, 
of  communicating  our  thoughts,  than by  words;  for, 
no doubt, it would  have  been  as  much  a  pleasure to 
have seen what his lordship's  thoughts  were when he 
writ this, as it is now an uneasiness to pudder in words 
and expressions whose meaning one  does not compre- 
hend.  But let us do the best we  can.  "  And  here," 
says his lordship, "  lies the true idea of person." 
Person being a dissyllable, that in itself signifies no- 
thing ;  what is meant by  the true idea of  it (it having 
no idea, one more than another, that belongs to it, but 
the idea of the articulate sound, that those two syllables 
make in pronouncing) I do not understand.  If by true 
idea, be meant true signification, then these words will 
run thus; here lies the true signification of  the word 
person :  and then, to make it more intelligible, we must 
change here into  herein,  and  then  the whole comma 
will stand thus ;  herein lies the true signification of the 
word person : which reading, herein, must refer to the 
preceding words.  And then the meaning of these words 
will be, the true signification of person lies in this, that 
"supposing there were no other diEerence in the several 
individuals of  the same kind,  yet there is a difference 
between them,  as several individuals in the same com- 
mon nature."  Now,  if  in  this  lies  the true significa- 
tion of  the word person, he must find it here that can. 
For if he does find it in these words, he must find it to 
be such  a  signification  as will  make tl~e  word person 
agree  as  well  to  Bucephalus  and  Podargus,  as  to 
Alexander : for let the difference  between Bucephalus 
and Podargus, as several individuals in the same corn- 
mon nature, be what it will ;  it is certain, it will always 
be as great,  as  the difference  between Alexander and 
Hector, as several individuals in the same common na- 
ture.  So that, if the true signification of person lies in 
that difference, it will belong to Bucephalus and Podar- 
gus, as well as to Alexander and Hector.  But let any 
one reason ever so subtilly or profoundly about the true 
idea,  or  the signification  of  the term  person, he will 
never be able to make me understand, that Bucephalus 
and Podargus are persons,  in  the true  signification of 
the  word  person, as  commonly  used  in  the English 
tongue. 
But that  which  more  certainly  and  for  ever  will 
hinder me from finding the true signification of person, 
lying in the foregoing words, is, that they require me 
to do what I find  is impossible  for me  to do, i. e.  find 
a difference between two individuals, as  several indivi- 
duals in the same common  nature, without  any other 
difference.  For if I never find any other difference, I 
should never find two individuals.  For first, we find some 
difference, and by that we find they are two or several 
individuals ;  but in this way we are bid  to find two in- 
dividuals, without  any difference : but that, I find,  is 
too subtile  and  sublime  for my weak  capacity.  But 
when by any difference of time, or place, or any thing 
else, I have once  found them  to be  two, or several, I 
cannot for ever after consider them but as several. They 
being once,  by some difference, found  to be  two, it is 
unavoidable for me, from thenceforth, to consider them 
as two.  But to find several where I find no difference ; 
or, as his lordship is pleased  to call it, external differ- 
ence at all ;  is, I confess, too hard for me. 
This  his  lordship  farther  tell  us,  in  these  words 
which follow ; ''  which arises  from the manner of sub- 
sistence,  which  is  in  one  individual,  which  is  not 
communicable to another :" which is, I own, a learned 
way  of  speaking,  and  is  supposed  to  contain  some 
refined philosophic  notion  of  it, which to me is either 
wholly incomprehensible,  or else  may be expressed  in 
these  plain  and  common words, viz.  that every thing 
that exists has, in the time or place, or  other perceiv- 
able  differences  of  its  existence,  something  incom- 
municable to all those of its own kind, whereby it will 
externally be kept several from all the rest.  This, I 
think, is that which the learned have  been pleased to 
term a peculiar manner of subsistence; but if this man- 
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ner of subsistence be any thing else, it will  need some 
farther explication to make me understand it. 
His lordship's  next words which  follow,  I must ac- 
knowledge,  are  also wholly incomprehensible  to me : 
they are, '(  an individual intelligent substance is rather 
supposed to the making of  a  person, than  the proper 
definition of it." 
Person is a word ;  and the idea that word stands for, 
or the proper signification of that word, is what I take 
his lordship is here giving us.  Now what is meant by 
saying, "  an individual  intelligent substance is rather 
supposed to the making the signification  of the word 
person, than the proper definition of it,"  is beyond my 
reach.  And the reason his lordship adjoins, puts it in 
that, or any other sense,  farther from my comprehen- 
sion.  "  For a person relates to something, which does 
distinguish it from another intelligent substance in the 
same nature;  and therefore  the foundation  of  it lie3 
in the peculiar manner of subsistence, which agrees to 
one, and none else, of the kind :  and this is that which 
is called personality." 
These words,  if  nothing  else,  convince  me,  that 
am  Davus,  and  not  (Edipus;  and so  I  must  leave 
them. 
His lordship,  at last, gives  us what, I think, he in- 
tends for a definition of person, in these words :  "  there- 
fore a person is a complete intelligent substance, with 
a  peculiar  manner  of  subsistence."  Where I cannot 
but observe, that what was, as I think, denied or half 
denied to be the proper  definition  of person, in say- 
ing "  it was rather  supposed to the making of  a per- 
son,  than the proper  definition  of  it,"  is yet here got 
into his  lordship's  definition  of person;  which  I can- 
not  suppose  but his  lordship  takes  to  be  a  proper 
definition.  There is  only  one  word  changed  in  it; 
and,  instead of  individual intelligent substance;  his 
lordship has put it,  66 complete intelligent substance :" 
which,  whether it makes  his  the  more  proper defini- 
tion, I leave to others ;  since possibly some will be apt 
to think, that a proper  definition of  person cannot be 
well  made,  without the term individual, or an equiva- 
lent.  But his  lordship has, as  appears  by the place, 
put in complete, to exclude the soul from being a per- 
son; which,  whether  it does  it or  no,  to  me  seems 
doubtful :  because  possibly many may think, that the 
soul is a complete intelligent substance by itself,  whe- 
ther  in  the body  or  out of  the body;  because  every 
substance,  that has a  being, is  a complete substance, 
whether joined  or  not joined  to another.  And as  to 
the soul's  being  intelligent, nobody,  I guess,  thinks, 
that the soul is completed in that, by its union with 
the body;  for then it would  follow, that it would  not 
be equally intelligent out of the body; which, I think, 
nobody will say. 
And thus I have, at your request, gone over all that 
his lordship has said, to give us clear and distinct appre- 
hensions of nature and person, which  are so  necessary 
to the understanding the doctrine of the Trinity, and 
talking intelligibly about it.  And  if I should judge of 
others by my own  dulness,  I should  fear  that by his 
lordship's  discourse  few would be  helped  to think or 
talk intelligibly about it.  But I measure not others by 
my narrow capacity: I wish  others  may profit  by his 
lordship's explication of  nature  and person more than 
I have done.  And so the conversation ended. 
My lord, I should not  have troubled  your  lordship 
with  a  dialogue of  this  kind,  had  not your  lordship 
forced me to it in my own defence.  Your lordship,  at 
the end of your above-mentioned explication of nature, 
has these words:  let us now see how far these things 
can  come  from  our  ideas,  by  sensation  and  reflec- 
tion:'  And to the like purpose, in the close  of your 
explication  of person,  your  lordship says ; "  but how 
do our  simple ideas help us  out in this matter ?  Can 
we learn from them  the difference  of nature and per- 
son ?"  Your  lordship concludes we  cannot.  But you 
say, what rnakes  a person  must be  understood  some 
other  way.  And  hereupon,  my  lord,  my  book  is 
thought worthy  by your  lordship to be  brought  into 
the controversy, and  argued against, in your Vindica- 
tion of the Doctrine of the Trinity;  because,  as your 
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lordship conceives, clear and  distinct apprehensions of 
nature and person cannot be had from it. 
I h~inibly  crave leave to  represent to your lordship, 
that if want  of affording  clear  and distinct apprehen- 
sions  concerning  nature  and person, make  any book 
anti-Trinitarian, and, as such, fit to be writ against by 
your lordship ; your lordship ought, in the opinion of 
a great many men, in the first place, to write a~ainst 
your own Vindication  of  the Doctrine of the Trinity: 
since,  among the many I  have  consulted  concerni& 
your lordship's notions  of nature and person, I do not 
find any one that understands  them better, or has got 
from them any clearer or more distinct  apprehensions 
concerning nature  and person,  than I myself,  which 
indeed is none at all. 
The owning of  this  to your lordship in my former 
letter, I find,  displeased  your lordship : I have there- 
fore here laid before your lorciship  some part of those 
difficulties  which  appear  to me,  and others,  in your 
lordship's  explication of nature and person, as my apo- 
logy for  saying,  I  had  not learned  any thing by  it. 
And to make  it evident,  that if  went  of  clear  and 
distinct apprehensions of nature and person involve any 
treatise in the Unitarian  controversy;  your lordship's, 
upon that account, is,  I humbly conceive,  as guilty as 
mine; and may be reckoned one of the first that ought 
to be charged with  that offence,  against the doctrine 
of the Trinity. 
This, my lord,  I cannot  help thinking, till I under- 
stand better.  Whether the not being able to get clear 
and distinct apprehensions concerning nature and per- 
son, from what your lordship has said of them, be the 
want of  capacity  in  my  understanding,  or want  of 
clearness in  that which I have  endeavoured  to under- 
stand, I shall not  presume  to say;  of that the world 
must judge.  If it be my dulness (as I cannot presume 
much upon my own quickness, having every day expe- 
rience how short-sighted I am) I have  this yet tc de- 
fend me from any very severe censure in the case, that 
I have as much endeavoured to understand your lord- 
ship, as  I  ever  did to understand  anybody.  And  if 
your  Iordship's  notions,  laid  down  about nature and 
~lerson,  are plain  and  intelligible,  there are a  great 
many others, whose  parts lie under no blemish in the 
world, who find thern neither plain nor intelligible. 
Pardon me therefore,  I  beseech  you,  my lord, if I 
return  your lordsliip's  question, '' how  do your lord- 
ship's  notioils help us out in this ~natter  ?  Can we learn 
from them clear and distinct apprehensions concerning 
nature  and person,  and the grounds of  identity and 
distinction ?"  To  which the answer will stand, no ; till 
your  lordship  has  explained  your notions  of  them  a 
little  clearer,  and  shown  what  ultimately  they  are 
founded on arid made up of,  if they are not ultimately 
founded on and made up of our simple ideas, received 
from sensation and reflection ;  which is that for which, 
in this point,  you  except  against my book:  and yet, 
though your lordship sets yourself to prove, that they 
cannot be had from our simple ideas by sensation and 
reflection;  though  your  lordsllip  lays  clown  several 
heads about them, yet you do not,  that I see, offer any 
thing  to instruct  us  from  what  other original  they 
come, or whence they are to be had. 
But perhaps this may be my want of  understanding 
what your lordship has said about them : and, possibly, 
from the same cause it is, that I do not see how the 
four passages your lordship subjoins, as out of my book 
(though  there be no  such passages in my book,  as,  I 
think, your lordsliip nekno~vledges,  since your lordship 
answers nothing to what  1  said thereupon);  the two 
things your lortiship says are granted, that tend to the 
clearing this matter, nild  the four inferences .your lord- 
ship makes;  are all,  or any of  them, applied by your 
lordsl~i~,  to show that clear and distinct apprehensions 
concerning nature and person cannot be had upon my 
principles ; at least  as clear as can be had  upon your 
lordship's,  when you please to let us know them. 
Hitherto, my lord,  I  have  considered  only what is 
cllarged  upon my book  by your lordship, in  reference 
to  the  Unitarian  controversy,  viz.  the inaiiiler  and 
grounds on which my book has been, by your lordship, 
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cerning the Trinity, with which it hath nothing to do : 
nor has your lordship, as I humbly conceive, yet showed 
that it has. 
There remain to be considered several things, which 
your lordship thinks faulty in my book; which, whether 
they have any thing to do or no with the doctrine of the 
Trinity, I think myself  obliged  to give your lordship 
satisfaction  in, either by acknowledging my errors, or 
giving  your  lordship  an account  wherein  your  lord- 
ship's  discourse comes short of convincing me of them. 
But these papers being already grown to a bulk that 
exceeds the ordi~iary  size of a letter, I shall respite your 
lordship's  farther trouble in this matter for the present, 
with this promise,  that I shall not fail to return my 
acknowledgments  to your  lordship,  for  those  other 
parts of the letter you have honoured me with. 
Before I conclude, it is fit, with due acknowledgment, 
I take notice of  these words, in the close of your lord- 
ship's letter : <'  I hope,  that, in the managing this de- 
bate, I have not either transgressed the rules of civility, 
or  mistaken  your  meaning;  both  which  I have  en- 
deavoured to avoid.  And I return you thanks for the 
civilities you have expressed to me, through your letter: 
and I do assure you, that it is out of  no disrespect, or 
the least ill-will  to you,  that I have again considered 
this matter,"  &c. 
Your  lordship  hopes  you  have  not  mistaken  my 
meaning:  and I, my  lord,  hope  that where you have 
(as I humblv conceive I shall make it appear you have) 
mistaken mi  meaning, I may,  without  offence, lay it 
before  your  lordship.  And  I  the  more  confidently 
ground  that hope  upon this expression  of  your lord- 
ship here,  which  I take  to be  intended  to that pur- 
pose;  since,  in  those  several  instances I  gave in my 
former  letter,  of  your  lordship's  mistaking not  only 
my meaning,  but the very  words  of  my  book  which 
you  quoted,  your  lordship  has  had  the goodness  to 
bear with me, without any manner of reply. 
Your lordship assures me, "that  it is out of  no dis- 
respect or the least ill-will to me,  that you have again 
cousidered this matter." 
MY  lord, my never  having,  by any act of  mine, de- 
served otherwise of your lordship, is a strong reason to 
keep me from questioning what your lordship says.  And, 
I hope, my part in the controversy has been such that I 
may be  excused from making any such  profession,  in 
reference to what I write to your lordship.  And I shall 
take care to continue to defend myself  so, in this con- 
troversy, which your lordship is pleased to have with me, 
that I shall not come within  the need of  any apology, 
that what I say is out of no disrespect or the least ill-will 
to your lordship.  But this must not hinder me any where 
from laying the argument in its due light, for the ad- 
vantage of truth. 
This, my lord, I say not to your lordship, who pro- 
posing to yourself, as you say in this very page, nothing 
but truth, will  not,  I know,  take it amiss, that I en- 
deavour to make every thing as plain  and as clear as I 
can : but this I say,  upon occasion of  some exceptions 
of  this  kind,  which  I have  heard  others  have  made 
against the former letter I did myself  the honour  to 
write to your lordship, as if I did therein bear too hard 
upon your lordship.  Though your lordship, who knows 
very well the end of arguing, as well as rules of civility, 
finds nothing  to blame in my way  of  writing;  and I 
should be very sorry it should  deserve any other cha- 
racter, than what your lordship has been pleased to give 
it in the beginning of your postscript.  It  is my misfor- 
tune to have any controversy with your lordship ; but 
since the concern of truth alone engages me in it, as I 
know your lordship will expect that I should omit no- 
thing that should make for truth, for that is the end we 
both profess to aim at; so I shall take care to avoid all 
foreign, passionate, and unmannerly mixtures, which do 
no way become a lover of truth in any debate, especially 
with one of  your lordship's character and dignity. 
My lord, the imputation of a tendency to scepticism, 
and to the overthrowing of  any article of  the christian 
faith, are no small charges ;  and all censures of that high 
nature, I humbly conceive, are with the more  caution 
to be passed, the greater the authority is of the person 
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of  the book, merely upon surmises, be to be taken for 
rt mark of good-will  to  the author, I must leave to your 
lordship.  This I am sure, I find the world thinks me 
obliged to vindicate myself.  I have taken leave to say, 
merely upon surmises,  because I cannot see any argu- 
ment your lordship has any where brought, to show its 
tendency to scepticism, beyond what your lordship has 
in these words in the same page, vie.  that it is your 
lordship's  great prejudice  against it that it leads to 
scepticism;  or,  that your lordship can find  no way to 
attain to certainty in it, upon my grounds. 
I confess, my lord, I think that there is a great part 
of  the visible,  and a great deal more of  the yet much 
larger intellectual world, wherein  our poor and weak 
understandings, in this state, are not capable of know- 
ledge ;  and this, I think, a great part of mankind agrees 
with me in.  But whether or no my way of certainty by 
ideas comes short of what it should, or your lordship's 
way, with or without ideas, will carry us to clearer and 
larger degrees of  certainty,  we shall see,  when  your 
lordship pleases  to let us  know  wherein  your way of 
certainty consists. Till then,I think, to avoid scepticism, 
it is better to have some way of certainty (though it will 
riot lead us to it in every thing) than no way at all. 
The necessity your lordship has put upon me of vin- 
dicating myself  must be  my  apology  for giving your 
lordship this  second  trouble;  which,  I assure myself, 
you  will  not  take amiss,  since  your  lordship  was  so 
much concerned for  my vindication, as to declare, you 
had no reason to be sorry, that the author of Christianity 
not mysterious had given me occasion to vindicate my- 
self.  I return your  lordship my humble  thanks,  for 
affording me this second opportunity to do it ;  and am, 
wit11 the utmost respect, 
My lord, 
Your lordship's most humble 
and most obedient servant, 
JOHN LOCKE. 
London, 
291h Junc, 1697. 
POSTSCRIPT. 
MY  LORD, 
TI-~~UGH  I have  so great  a precedent,  as  your  lord- 
ship has given me in the letter you  have honoured me 
with;  yet  I  doubt whether  even  your  lordship's  ex- 
ample will be enough to justify me to the world, if,  in 
a letter writ to one, I should put a postscript in answer 
to another man, to whom I do not speak in my letter: 
I shall therefore  only beg, that your  lordship will  be 
pleased to excuse it,  if you find a short answer to the 
paper of another man, not big enough to be published 
by itself, appear under the same cover with my answer 
to your lordship.  The paper itself came to my hands, 
at the same time  that your lordship's  letter did ;  and, 
containing  some  exceptions  to my Essay  concerning 
H~lman  Understanding,  is  not  wholly  foreign  in  the 
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AN 
ANSWER TO REMARKS 
UPON  AN 
ESSAY  CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, &c. 
BEFORE  ally thing came out against my Essay con- 
cerning  Human  Understanding  the  last year,  1 was 
told, that I must prepare myself for a  storm that was 
coming against it; it being resolved by some men, that 
it was  necessary  that  book  of  mine  should,  as it is 
phrased, be  run down.  I do not  say, that the author 
of these Remarks was one of those men : but I premise 
this  as the reason  of the answer T  am about  to give 
him.  And though I do not  say he was  one  of  them, 
get in this, I think, every indifferent reader will agree 
with me, that his  letter  does  not very well  suit with 
the character he takes upon himself, or the design he 
pretends in writing it 
He pretends, the  business  of his letter is to be  in- 
formed : but if  that were in earnest so, I  suppose he 
would have  done two things  quite otherwise  than he 
has.  The first is, that he would  not have thought  it 
necessary for his particular information, that his letter 
(that pretends inquiry in the body of it, though it car- 
ries remarks  in the  title)  should have been  published 
in print: whereby I am apt to think, that however in 
it he puts on the person of a learner, yet he would miss 
his aim, if he were  not  taken notice  of as a  teacher; 
and particularly, that his remarks  showed  the world 
grerlt faults in my book. 
The other  is,  that he has  not  set his  name to his 
letter  of inquiries ;  whereby I might,  by knowing  the 
that inquires, the better know how to suit my 
answer to him.  I cannot much blame him in another 
respect, for concealing his name : for, I think, any one 
who appears among christians, may be well ashamed of 
his name,  when  he raises  such  a  doubt as  this,  viz. 
whether an infinitely powerful and wise Being be vera- 
cious or no; unless falsehood be in such reputation with 
tllis gentleman, that he concludes lying to be no mark 
of weakness and folly.  Besides,  this author might, if 
he had pleased, have taken notice, that, in more places 
than  one, I  speak  of  the  goodness  of God;  another 
evidence, as I take it, of his veracity. 
He  seems concerned to know "  upon what ground I 
will build the divine law, when I pursue morality to a 
demonstration ?" 
If he  had  not been  very much  in  haste, he would 
have seen, that his questions, in that paragraph,  are a 
little too forward; unless he thinks it necessary I should 
write, when  and  upon  what  he  thinks  fit.  When I 
know him better, I may perhaps think I owe him great 
observance; but so  much  as  that very few men think 
due to themselves. 
I have said indeed in my book, that I thought mora- 
lity capable of demonstration, as well as the mathema- 
tics ; but I  do not remember  where I promised  this 
gentleman to demonstrate it to him. 
He says,  "if  he knew upon what  grounds I would 
build my demonstration of morality, he  could make  a 
better  judgment  of  it."  His  judgment  who  makes 
such demands as this, and is so much in haste to be  a 
judge, that he cannot stay till what he has such a mind 
to be  sitting  upon  be  born,  does  not  seem  of  that 
consequence, that any one should be in haste to gratify 
his impatience. 
And since  r6 he thinks the illiterate part of mankind 
(which is the greatest) must have a more compendious 
Way  to know their  duty,  than by long deductions;" 
he may do well to consider,  whether it were  for their 
sakes  he  published  this question, viz.  "  What is the 
and ground of the divine law ?" Whoever sincerely acknowledges any law to be the 
law of God, cannot  fail  to acknowledge also,  that it 
hath all that reason and ground that a just and wise law 
can or o~ght  to have ;  and will  easily persuade himself 
to forbear raising such questions and scruples about it. 
A man that insinuates, as he does, as if  I held, that 
the distinction of virtue  and vice was to be picked up 
by our eyes, or ears,  or our nostrils;"  shows so much 
ignorance, or so much malice, that he deserves no other 
answer but pity. 
"  The immortality of the soul is another thing,"  he 
says, "  he cannot clear to himself, upon my principles." 
It  may be so.  The right reverend the lord bishop of 
Worcester,  in  the letter he has  lately honoured  me 
with in print, has undertaken to prove,  upon my prin- 
ciples, the soul's  immateriality;  which, I suppose, this 
author will  not  question  to be  a proof  of  its  immor- 
tality.  And to his lordship's  letter I refer him  for it. 
But if  that will  not  serve his  turn,  I will  tell him a 
principle of mine that will clear it to him ;  and that is, 
the revelation of life  and immortality of Jesus Christ, 
through the Gospel. 
He mentions other doubts he has,  unresolved by my 
pinciples.  If  my principles  do not teach them,  the 
world,  I think  will, I am sure I shall, be  obliged  to 
him to direct me to such  as will  supply that defect in 
mine.  For I never  had  the vanity to hope  to outdo 
all other men.  Nor  did I propose  to myself, in pub- 
lishing my  Essay, to be an answerer of  questions;  or 
expect that all doubts should  go out of  the world,  as 
soon as my book came into it. 
The world  has  now my book, such  as it is: if any 
one finds, that there be  many questions  that my prin- 
ciples will not resolve, he will do the world more service 
to lay down such principles  as will resolve them, than 
to quarrel with my ignorance (which I readily acknow- 
ledge) and possibly for  that which cannot be done.  I 
shall never think the worse  of mine, because they will 
not  resolve  every one's  doubts, till I  see  those prin- 
ciples,  laid  down  by any one,  that will ;  and  then I 
will quit mine. 
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If any one finds any thing in my  Essay to be  cor- 
rected, he may, when he pleases, write against it; and 
when I think fit I will  answer him.  For I do not in- 
tend my time shdl be wasted  at the pleasure of  every 
one, who  may have  a mind  to pick  holes in my book, 
and show his skill in the art of confut  t'  a ion. 
To  conclude ;  were there nothing else in it, I sho~l~l. 
not think it fit to trouble myself about the questions of 
a  man,  which  he himself  does  not  think  worth  the 
owning. MR. LOCKE'S REPLY 
TO 
THE  RIGHT REVEREND  THE 
LORD  BISHOP  OF  WORCESTER'S  ANSWER 
TO HIS 
SECOND LETTER. 
Wherein, besides  other  incident  Matters,  what  his  Lordship has 
said  concerning  Certainty by  Reason,  Certainty by  Ideas,  and 
Certainty by Faith ;  the Resurrection  of  the Body;  the Imma- 
teriality of  the  Soul ;  the Inconsistency of Mr. Locke's  Notions 
with the Articles of  the Christian Faith,  and their Tendency to 
Scepticism ;  is examined, MR.  LOCKE'S REPLY 
TO  TIIE 
BISHOP OF WORCESTER'S  ANSWER 
SECOND LETTER. 
MY LORD, 
YOUR  lordship, in the beginning of the last letter you 
honoured me with,  seems  so uneasy and displeased at 
my having said  too  much  already in  the question be- 
tween  us,  that I think I  may conclude, you would  be 
well enough pleased if I should say no more ;  and you 
would dispense with  me, for  not  keeping my promise 
I made  you  to answer  the  other  parts  of  your  first 
letter.  If this  proceeds  from any tenderness in  your 
lordship for  my reputation,  that you would  not have 
me  expose  myself  by  an  overflow  of words, in many 
places void of clearness, coherence, and argument, and 
that therefore might have been sparad ;  I must acknow- 
ledge it is a  piece  of great charity, and such wherein 
you will have a lasting advantage over me, since goocl 
manners will  not permit  me to return  you  the like. 
Or should I, in the ebullition of thoughts, which in me 
your  lordship  finds  as  impetuous  as  the springs  of 
Modena mentioned by Ramazzini, be in danger to for- 
get myself,  and to think I had  some right  to return 
the general complaint of length and intricacy without 
force ;  yet  you  have  secured  yourself  from  the  sus- 
picion  of any such  trash on your side, by making cob- 
webs the easy product of  those who write out of  their 
Own  thoughts, which it might be a crime in me to im- 
Pute to your lordship. 
If  this complaint of yours be not a charitable warning 
me, I cannot well  guess  at the design  of it; for I 
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would not think that in a controversy, which you, my 
lord, have dragged me  into, you would  assume it as a 
privilege due to yourself to be as copious as you please, 
and. say what you think fit, and expect I  should reply 
only so,  and  so much,  as would  just  suit your  good 
liking,  and serve to set the cause  right on that side 
which your lordship contends for. 
My lord, I shall  always acknowledge the great  di- 
stance that isbetween your lordship and myself,and pay 
that deference that is due to your dignity and person. 
But controversy, though it excludes not good manners, 
will not be managed tvith all that submission which one 
is  ready to pay  in other  cases.  Truth, which  is in- 
flexible, has here its interest, which must not be given 
up, in a  compliment.  Plato and Aristotle, and  other 
great names, must  give way, rather than  make us re- 
nounce truth, or the friendship we have for her. 
This possibly your  lordship will  allow, for it is not 
spun out of my own thoughts ;  I have the authority of 
others for it, I think it was in print before I was born. 
But you  will  say however,  I am  too  long in  my re- 
plies.  It is not impossible but it may be so.  But with 
all due respect to your lordship's  authority (the great- 
ness  whereof I  shall  always readily  acknowledge), I 
must crave leave  to say, that in  this  case you are by 
no means a proper judge.  We are now, as well your 
lordship  as  myself,  before  a  tribunal to  which  you 
have  appealed,  and before  which  you have  brought 
met it is  the public  must  be  judge,  whether  your 
lordship  has  enlarged  too  far  in  accusing  me,  or 1 
in defending  myself.  Common  justice  makes  great 
allowance to a man pleading in  his own defence ; and 
a little length (if he should be guilty of it) finds excuse 
in the compassion of bystanders, when they see a  man 
causelessly  attacked, after a new way, by a potent ad- 
versary ;  and, under various pretences, occasions sought, 
and words wrested to his disadvantage. 
This, my lord, you  must give  me leave to think to 
be my case, whilst this  strange way your lordship has 
brought me into &is  controversy; your gradual accusa- 
tions of my book, and the different causes your lordship 
has assigned of them:  together with quotations out of 
it, which I cannot find there ; and other things I have 
complained of (to some of  which your lordship has not 
vouchsafed any answer) shall remain unaccounted for, 
as  1 humbly conceive they do. 
I confess my answers are long, and I wish they could 
have been shorter.  But the difficulty I have to find out, 
and set before others, your lordship's  meaning, that they 
may see what I am answming to, and so be able to  judge 
of  the pertinency of  what I say; has  unavoidably en- 
larged  them.  Whether  this  be wholly  owing to my 
dulness,  or whether a little perplexedness, both as  to 
grammar and coherence, caused  by those numbers  of 
thoughts, whether of your  own or  others, that  crowd 
from all parts to be set down when you write, may not 
be allowed to have some share in it, I shall not presume 
to say.  I am at the mercy of your  lordship  and my 
other readers in the point, and know not how to avoid 
a fault that has no remedy. 
Your lordship says, "  the world  soon grows weary 
of controversies,  especially  when  they are about per- 
sonal matters ;  which made your lordship wonder that 
one who understands  the world  so well, should spend 
above fifty pages in renewing  and enlarging  a  com- 
plaint wholly concerning himself." 
To  which give me leave to say, that if your lordship 
had so much considered  the world, and what  it is not 
much pleased with, when you published your discourse 
in Vindication of the Trinity, perhaps your lordship had 
not so personally concerned me in that controversy, as 
it appears now you have, and continue still to do, 
Your lordship wonders ''tl~at  I spend above fifty pages 
in renewing  and enlarging my complaint  concerning 
myself."  Your  wonder, I  humbly  conceive,  will  not 
be so great, wheo you  recollect,  that your  answer to 
my complaint,  and the satisfaction  you  proposed  to 
give  me  and  others in  that personal  matter,  began 
the first  letter you  honoured  me with,  and  ended 
where  you  said,  you  suppose  the reason  of  your 
mentioning  my  words  so  often  was  now  no  longer 
a riddle to me; and so you  proceeded  to other par- 
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ticulars of my vindication."  If therefore I have  spent 
fifty pages  of  my  answer,  in  showing that what you 
offered  in  forty-seven  pages  for  my satisfaction was 
none, but that the riddle was a riddle still ;  the dispro- 
portion in the number of pages is not so great as to be 
the subject of much wonder : especially to those who 
consider, that, in what you call personal matter, I was 
showing that my Essay, having in it nothing contrary 
to  the doctrine of the Trinity, was yet brought into that 
dispute ;  and that therefore I had reason to complain of 
it, and of the manner  of  its being brought in : and if 
you had pleased not to have moved other questions, nor 
brought other charges against my book till this, which 
was the occasion and subject of iny first letter, had been 
cleared ;  by making out that the passages you had, in 
your Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity, quoted 
out of my book, had something in them against the doc- 
trine  of  the Trinity,  and  so  were, with  just  reason, 
brought by you, as they were, into that dispute ;  there 
had been no other but that personal matter, as yon call 
it, between us. 
In  the  examination of those pages meant, as you said, 
for my satisfaction, and of other parts of your letter, I 
found (contrary to  what I expected) matter of renewing 
and enlarging my complaint, and this I took notice of 
and set down in my Reply, which it seems I should not 
have  done : the knowledge of  the world  should have 
taught me better ;  and I should have taken that for sa- 
tisfaction which you were pleased  to give,  in which I 
could not find any, nor, as I believe, any intelligent or 
impartial reader.  So that your  lordship's  care of the 
world, that it should not grow weary of  this  contro- 
versy, and the fault you find of my misemploying fifty 
pages of my letter, reduces itself at last in effect to no 
more but this, that your  lordship should have a liberty 
to say what you please, pay me in what coin you think 
fit; my part sliould be to be satisfied with it, rest con- 
tent, and say nothing.  This indeed might be a way not 
to weary the world,  and to  save  fifty pages  of  clean 
paper, and put such an end to the controversy as your 
lordship would not dislike. 
I learn from your lordsliip, tliat it is the first part of 
Tvisdom,  in some  men's  opinions, not to begin  in such 
disputes.  What the knowledge of the world (which is 
a  sort of  \visdom)  should  in your  lordship's  opinion 
lnake a man do, when one of your lordship's character 
begins  with  him, is very plain : he is  iiot to reply, so 
far as he judges  his  defence  and the matter requires, 
but as your lordship  is  pleased  to allow; which some 
may think no better than if one might not reply at  all. 
-After having thus rebuked me  for liaving  been too 
copious in  my reply, in the  next words your lordship 
irlstructs  me wliat  I should  liave  aiiswcred;  tliat " I 
should have cleared inyself  by declaring to the world, 
that I  owned the doctrine of  the Trinity, as it liath 
been received in the Christian church." 
This, as I take it, is a mere  personal matter, of the 
same woof with a Spanish sail-benito,  and, as it seems 
to me, designed  to sit  close to me.  What must I do 
now, my lord ?  Must I  silently put on  and wear  this 
badge of your  lordship's  favour,  and,  as one well un- 
derstanding the world, say not a word of it, because the 
world soon grows weary of personal matters? If in gr;b 
titude for this personal favour I ought to be silent, yet 
I am forced  to tell you, that,  in what  you  require of 
lne here, you possibly liave cut out too much work for 
a  poor  ordinary layman, for  whom  it is  too  hard to 
know how a doctrine so disputed  has been received in 
the Chistiall church, and who might  have  thought it 
enough to own it as delivered in the Scriptures.  Your 
lordship herein lays upon me what I cannot do, without 
owning to know wliat I am sure I do not know :  for how 
the doctrine of the Trinity has been always received in 
the Christian cliurch, I confess myself ignorant.  I have 
not had time to examine the history of it, and to read 
those coritroversies that have been writ about it :  arid to 
own a  doctrine as  received  by others, when I do not 
k~iow  how these  others received  it, is perhaps a short 
way  to orthodoxy, that may satisfy some men : but he 
that takes this way to give  satisfaction, in my opinion 
"lake6  a little bold with truth; and it may be questioxied 
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requires truth in the inward parts, however acceptable 
it may in any man be to his diocesan. 
I presume your lordship, in your discourse in Vindi- 
cation of the Doctrine of the Trinity, intends to give it 
us as it has been received in the Christian church.  And 
I think your words,viz. '' it is the sense of the Christian 
church which you  are bound  to defend, and no parti- 
cular  opinions of  your  own,"  authorize  one  to think 
so.  But if I am to own  it as your  lordship has there 
delivered it, I must own what I do not understand; for 
I confess your  exposition  of the sense  of  the church 
wholly transcends my capacity. 
If you require me to own it with an implicit faith, I 
shall pay that deference as  soon to your lordship's  ex- 
position of the doctrine of the church, as any one's.  But 
if I must understand  and  know what I own, it is my 
misfortune, and I cannot  deny, that I am  as  far from 
owning what you in that discourse deliver, as I can be 
from professing the most unintelligible thing that ever 
I read, to be the doctrine that I own. 
Whether I make more use of my poor understanding 
in the case, than you are willing to allow every one of 
your readers, T cannot tell ;  but such an understanding 
as God has given me is the best I have, and that which 
1 must use in the apprehending what others say, before 
1 can own the truth of it :  and for this there is no help 
that I know. 
That which keeps me a little in countenance, is, that, 
if I mistake not,  men  of  no  mean parts,  even divines 
of  the  church  of  England,  and those of  neither  the 
lowest reputation nor  rank, find  their understandings 
fail them on this occasion ; and stick  not  to own that 
they understand not your lordship in that discourse, and 
particularly that your sixth chapter is unintelligible to 
them as well as me ;  whether the fault be in their or my 
understanding, the world  must be judge.  But this is 
only by the by, for this is not the answer I here intend 
your lordship. 
Your  lordship  tells  me, that, "  to  clear  myself,  I 
should  have owned  to the world  the  doctrine  of the 
Trinity,  as  it  has  been  received,"  &c.  Answer.  I 
know not whether in a  dispute managed  after a  new 
way, wherein one  man  is  urged against, and another 
man's words all along quoted, it maynot also be a good 
as well as a new rule, for the answerer to reply to what 
was never objected, and  clear  himself  from what was 
never laid to his  charge.  If this  be  not  so, and that 
this new way of attacking requires  not this  new way 
of defence, your lordship's prescription to me here what 
I should have done, will, amongst the most intelligent 
rnd impartial readers, pass  for  a  strange rule in con- 
troversy, and such  as the learnedest  of them will not 
be able to find in all antiquity ;  and therefore must be 
imputed to something else  than your  lordship's  great 
learning. 
Did your lordship in the discourse of the Vindication 
of the Trinity, wherein you first fell upon my book,  or 
in your letter (my answer to which you are here correct- 
ing) did your lordship,  I say, any where object to me, 
that '' I did not own  the doctrine of the Trinity,  as it 
has been received in the Christian church?" &c. If you 
did, the objection was so secret, so hidden, so artificial, 
that your words declared quite  the contrary.  In the 
Vindication of  the Doctrine of the Trinity, your  lord- 
ship says, that my notions were borrowed to  serve other 
purposes  [whereby,  if  I  understand  you  right,  you 
meant against the doctrine  of  the Trinity]  than I in- 
tended them ;  which  you  repeat  again * for  my satis- 
faction, and insistt upon for my vindication. 
You having so solemnly more than once professed to 
clear me and my intentions from all suspicion of having 
any part in that controversy, as appears farther in the 
close  of your first  letter, where  a11 you charge on me 
is the ill use that others had, or might make of my no- 
tions ;  how could I suppose such an objection made by 
your lordship, which you  declare  against, without ac- 
cusing your lordship of manifest prevarication ? 
If your lordship had any thing upon your mind, any 
secret aims, which you did not think fit to own, but yet 
would have me divine and answer to, as if I knew them; 
this, I c,onfess, is  too  much  for  me, who  look  no far- 
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ther into men's  thoughts, than as they appear in their 
books.  Where you have given your thoughts vent in 
your words, I have not, I think, omitted to take notice 
of them, not wholly passing by those insinuations, wliich 
have been  dropped  from  your  lordship's  pen ;  which 
from another, who had not professed so much personal 
respect, would have shown no exceeding good disposi- 
tion ofmind towards me. 
When your lordship shall go on to accuse me of not 
believing the doctrine of the Trinity, as received in the 
Christian church, or any other doctrine you shall think 
fit, 1 shall  answer  as I would  to an inquisitor.  For 
though your lordship tells me, "  I need not be afraid of 
the Inquisition,  or that  you  intended  to charge me 
with heresy in denying the Trinity;"  yet he that shall 
consider your lordship's  proceeding with me from  the 
beginning, as far as it is hitherto gone, may have reason 
to think,  that the methods  and management of that 
holy office  are not wholly unknown  to your lordship, 
nor have escaped your great reading.  Your proceed- 
ings with me have had these steps : 
1. Several passages  of  my Essay of Human Under- 
standing, arid some of them relating barely to  the being 
of a God, and  other matters wholly remote  from any 
question about the Trinity, were brought into the Vin- 
dication of theDoctrine of tlie Trinity,and there argued 
against  as  containing the errors  of those and them; 
wliich those and them are not known to this day. 
2. In  your lordship's  answer to my first letter, when 
what was given as the great reason why my Essay was 
brought into that controversy, viz. because in it "  cer- 
tainty  was  founded  upon  clear  and distinct  ideas," 
was found to fail, and was  only a supposition  of your 
own; other accusations were sought against it, in rela- 
tion to the doctrine of the Trinity: viz. that "  it might 
be of  dangerous consequence  to that doctrine, to in- 
troduce the new term of  ideas, and to place certainty 
in the perception of tlie agreement or disagreement of 
our itieas."  What are bccome  of  these  charges, we 
shall sce in the progress of this  letter, when we  come 
to conbidpi  what your  lordship has  replied  to my  nn- 
swer up051  tlleac points. 
3.  These accusations not having,  it seems,  weight 
enough to  effect what you intended, my book has been 
rummaged again to find new and more important faults 
in it; and now at last, at the third effort, "  my notions 
of ideas are found inconsistent with the articles of the 
Christian faith."  This indeed carries some sound in it, 
and may be thought worthy the name and pains of so 
peat a man,  and zealous a  father of  the church,  as 
your lordship. 
That I may not be too bold in affirming a thing I was 
not privy to, give me leave, my lord, to tell your lord- 
ship why  I presume  my book  has upon this occasion 
been looked over again, to see what could be found in 
it capable to bear a deeper accusation, that might look 
like something in a title-page.  Your lordship, by your 
station in the church, and tlie zeal you  have shown in 
defending its articles, could not be supposed, when you 
first brought my book  into this  controversy,  to have 
omitted these great enormities that it now stands ac- 
cused of, and to have cited it for smaller mistakes, some 
whereof were not found, but only imagined to be in it; 
if you had  then known these great faults, which you 
now charge it with, to have been in it.  If your lord- 
ship had been apprized of its being guilty of such dan- 
gerous  errors,  you  would  not certainly  have  passed 
them by: and therefore I think one may reasonably con- 
clude, that my Essay was new looked into on purpose. 
Your lordship says, "  that  what you have done herein, 
you  thought it your duty to do,  not with respect to 
yourself,  but to some of  the mysteries  of  our faith, 
which  you  do not charge me with apposing,  but by 
laying  such foundations as do tend to the overthrow 
of them."  It cannot be doubted but your duty would 
have made you at the first warn the world, that  my 
notions  were  inconsistent  with  the  articles  of  the 
Christian faith:'  if  your  lordship had then known it: 
though the excessive respect and tenderness you express 
towards me personally in the immediately preceding 
words,  would be enough utterly to confound me, were 
:  not a  little acquainted with your lordship's  civilities 
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together made your lordship think  it necessary to do 
that which you was unwilling to do, until I had driven 
you to it; which was to sllow the reasons you had, why 
you looked on  my notion of  ideas and of certainty by 
them,  as  inconsistent  with  itself,  and with  some  im. 
portant articles of the Christian faith." 
What must I think now, my lord, of  these words? 
Must I take them as a mere compliment, which is never 
to be interpreted  rigorously, according to the precise 
meaning of the w~rds?  Or lnust I believe that your un- 
willingness to do so hard a thing to me restrained your 
duty, and you could not prevail on yourself (how much 
soever  the  mysteries  of  faith  were  in  danger  to be 
overthrown)  to get out these  harsh  words,  viz.  that 
('  my notions were inconsistent with the articles of the 
Christian faith," till your third onset, after I had forced 
you to your duty by two replies of  mine? 
It  will  not become me,  my lord, to make myself  a 
compliment from your words, which you did not intend 
me in them.  But, on the other side, I would not will- 
ingly neglect  to acknowledge  any civility  from your 
lordship in the full extent of it.  The business is a little 
nice, because what is contained in those passages cannot 
by a less skilful hand than yours be well put together, 
though they immediately follow one another.  This, I 
am sure, falls out very untowardly, that your lordship 
should drive me (who had much rather have been other- 
wise employed) to drive your lordship to do that which 
you were unwilling to do.  The world sees how much 
I was driven :  for what censures, what imputations must 
my book  have lain under,  if I had not cleared it from 
those  accusations  your  lordship brought  against  it ; 
when 1  am charged now with evasions, for not clearing 
myself  from  an  accusation which  you  never  brought 
against me ! But if it be an evasion not to answer to an 
objection that has not been made, what is it, I beseech 
you, my lord, to make no reply to objections that have 
been made ?  Of which I promise to give your lordship 
a list, whenever you shall please to call for it. 
I forbear it now, for fear that if I should say all that 
I might  upon  this  new accusation,  it would  be more 
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than would suit with your lordship's  liking; and you 
should complain again that you have opened a passage 
which brings to your mind  Ramazzini and his springs 
of Modena.  But your lordship need not be  afraid of 
being overwhelmed with the ebullition of my thoughts, 
nor much trouble yourself to find a way to give check 
to it: mere ebullition of thoughts never overwhelms or 
any one  but the author himself;  but if it carries 
truth with  it,  that I confess  has force, and it may be 
troublesome to those that stand in its way. 
Your lordship says, "  you see how dangerous it is, to 
give occasion to one of such a fruitful invention as I am, 
to write." 
I am obliged  to your lordship, that you  think  my 
invention worth  concerning yourself  about, though it 
be so unlucky as to have your lordship and me always 
differ about the measure of its fertility.  In your first 
answer you thought I too much extended the fertility 
of my invention, and ascribed to it what it had no title 
to ;  and here, I think, you make the fertility of my in- 
vention greater than it is.  For in what I have answered 
to your lordship, there seems to me no need at all of a 
fertile invention.  It  is true, it has been hard for me to 
find out who you writ  against, or what you  meant in 
many places.  As soon as that was  found, the answer 
lay always  so obvious and so easy, that there needed 
no  labour  of  invention  to discover  what  one  should 
reply.  The things themselves (where there were any) 
stripped of the ornaments of  scholastic language, and 
the less obvious ways of learned writings, seemed to me 
to carry their answers visibly with them.  This permit 
me, my lord, to say, that however fertile my invention 
is,  it has not in all this controversy produced one fiction 
Or  wrong quotation. 
But,  before I leave the answer  you dictate,  permit 
me to observe  that I am so unfortunate  to be blamed 
for  owning what  I was  not  accused  to disown ;  and 
here for not owning what I was  never charged to dis- 
own.  The like  misfortune  have  my  poor  writings: 
fiey offend your lordship in some places, because they 
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Your next words, which  are a  new charge,  I shall 
pass over till I come to your proof of  them, and  pro- 
ceed  to the next paragraph.  Your lordship tells  me, 
rcyou  shall wave all unnecessary repetitions, arid come 
immediately to the matter  of  my complaint,  as  it is 
renewed in my second letter." 
What your lordship means by unnecessary repetitions 
here, seems to be of  a piece with your blaming me in 
the foregoing page,  for  having said  too  much  in my 
own defence ;  and this, taken all together, confirms my 
opinion,  that in  your  thoughts  it would  have  been 
better I should have replied  nothing at all.  For you 
having set down here near twenty lines as a necessary 
repetition  out of  your  former  letter,  your  lordship 
omits my answer to them as wholly unnecessary to be 
seen; and consequently  you  must  think was  at first 
unnecessary  to have  been  said.  For when  the same 
words are necessary to be repeated again, if  the same 
reply which was made to them be not thought fit to be 
repeated too,  it is plainly judged to be nothing to the 
purpose, and should have been spared at first. 
It is true, your lordship has set down some  few ex- 
pressions taken out of  several parts of  my reply;  but 
in what manner, the reader cannot clearly see, without 
going back  to the  original of  this matter.  He must 
therefore pardon me the trouble of a deduction, which 
cannot  be  avoided  where  controversy is  managed  at 
this rate ;  which necessitates,  and so excuses the length 
of the answer. 
My book was brought into the  Trinitarian controversy 
by these steps.  Your lordship says, that, 
'q.  The Unitarians have not explairied the nature 
and bounds of reason. 
'r  2. The author of  Christianity not mysterious, to 
make amends for this, has offered an account of reason. 
"  3.  His doctrine  concerning reason  supposes  that 
we must have clear and distinct ideas of  whatever we 
pretend to any certainty of in our mind. 
"  4. Your lordship calls this s new way of reasoning. 
r6 5.  This gentleman of this new way of reasoning," 
in his  first chapter,  says something which  has a con- 
formity with some of  the notions in my book.  But it 
is to be observed he speaks them as his own thoughts, 
and not upon my authority, nor with taking any notice 
of me. 
6.  By virtue of this, he is presently entitled to I know 
not how much of my book ; and divers passages of my 
Essay are quoted, and attributed to him under the title 
of  the gentlemen of the new way of  reasoning,"  (for 
he is by  this time turned into a troop) and certain un- 
known (if they are not all contained in this one author's 
doublet) they and these, are made by your lordship to 
lay  about them  shrewdly for  several pages  together 
ip your lordship's  Vindication  of  the Doctrine of  the 
Trinity,  &c.  with  passages  taken  out  of  my  book, 
which your lordship was at the pains to quote as theirs, 
i. e.  certain unknown anti-Trinitarians. 
Of this yocr lordship's way, strange and new to me, 
of dealing with my book, I tbok notice. 
To  which your lordship tells me here you replied in 
these  following  words,  which  your  lordship  has  set 
down as no  unnecessary repetition.  Your words are: 
"  it was because the person who opposed the mysteries 
of Christianity went upon my grounds, and made use of 
my words ;"  although your lordship declared  withal, 
"that they were used to other purposes than I intended 
them :" and your lordship confessed, 'r  that the reason 
why you quoted my words so much, was, because your 
lordship  found  my notions,  as  to certainty  by  ideas, 
was  the  main  foundation  on  which  the  author  of 
Christianity  not  mysterious  went;  and  that  he  had 
nothing that looked like reason,  if that principle were 
removed, which made your lordship so much endeavour 
to show, that it would not hold ; and so you supposed 
the reason why your  lordship so often  mentioned  my 
words,  was no  longer a riddle to me."  And  to this 
repetition  your  lordship  subjoins,  that  6r I set  down 
these  passages  in  my second  letter,"  but with  these 
words  annexed,  6c that  all  this  seems  to  me  to do 
nothing to the clearing of this matter." 
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lordship, and if I had said no more, your lordship had 
done me justice  in setting down barely these words as 
my reply,  which  being set down when your lordship 
was in the way of  repeating  your own words with no 
sparing hand,  as we shall see by and by, these few of 
mine set down thus, without the least intimation that 
I had said any thing more, cannot but leave the reader 
under an opinion, that this was my whole reply. 
But  if your lordship will please to turn to that place 
of my second letter, out of which you take these words, 
I presume you will find that I not only said, but proved, 
"  that what you had said in the words above repeated, 
to clear the riddle in your lordship's  way of  writing, 
did nothing towards it." 
That which was  the riddle  to me, was,  that your 
lordship writ against  others, and yet quoted only my 
words;  and  that  you  pinned  my words,  which  you 
argued against, upon a certain sort of  these and them 
that nowhere appeared, or were to be found:  and by 
this way brought my book into the controversy. 
To this  your  lordship says, "  you  told  me it was 
because  the  person  who  opposed  the  mysteries  of 
Christianity, went upon my grounds, and made use of 
my words." 
Answer.  He that will be at the pains  to compare 
this, which you  call a repetition here, with the place 
you quote for it, viz.  Ans.  I. will,  I humbly conceive, 
find  it  a  new  sort of  repetition:  unless  the setting 
down of words and expressions  not to be found in it 
be the repetition of any passage.  But for a repetition, 
let us take it of what your lordship had said before. 
Tlie '*eason, and the only reason there given why you 
quoted my words after the manner you did, was, "  be- 
cause you found my notions  as to certainty by ideas, 
was the  main  foundation  which  the author of  Chri- 
stianity  not  mysterious  went  upon."  These  are the 
words in your lordship's  first letter, and this the only 
reason there given, though it hath grown a  little by 
repetition.  And to this my reply was, "  that J  thought 
your lordship had found,  that that which  the author 
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of  C]lristianity  not  mysterious  went  upon,  and  for 
wllicll  he was  made one of  the gentlemen of  the new 
way  of  reasoning,  opposite  to  the  doctrine  of  the 
Trinity,  was,  that  lie  made  or  supposed  clear  and 
distinct ideas necessary to certainty : but that was not 
my notion as to certainty by ideas,"  &c.  Which reply, 
my lord,  did  not barely say,  but  showed  the reason 
why I said, that what your lordship had offered as the 
reason  of  your  manner  of  proceeding  did  nothing 
towards the clearing of  it: unless  it coulcl  clear the 
matter, to say you joined  me with the author of  Chri- 
stianity not mysterious who goes upon a different notion 
of certainty from mine, because he goes upon the same 
wirlr  me.  For he (as your lordship supposes) making 
certairity to consist in the perception of'the agreement 
or disagreement of  clear and distinct ideas ; and I, on 
the contrary, making it consist in the perception of the 
agreement or disagreement of  such ideas as we have, 
whether they be perfectly in  all their parts clear and 
distinct or no: it is  impossible he should go upon my 
grounds, whilst they are so diffeient, or that his going 
upon  my grounds should be the reason  of your lord- 
ship's  joining  me  with  him.  And now I leave your 
lordship  to judge,  how  you  had  cleared  this matter; 
and whether what I had answered did not prove that 
whilt you said did nothing towards the clearing of it. 
This one thing,  methinks,. your lordship has made 
very clear, that you thought it necessary to find  some 
way  to bring in  my book,  where you  were  arguing 
against that author, that he might be the person, atld 
mine the words you would argue against together.  But 
it is as clear that the particular matter which your lord- 
ship mi~de  use of to this purpose, happened to be some- 
what nnluckily chosen.  For your lordship having nc- 
cuscrl him of supposing clear and distinct ideas necessary 
to certainty, which you declared to be the opinion you 
opl)osed, and for that opinion having made him a gentle- 
man of  tl~e  new way of  reasoning,  your lordship ima- 
~ined  that was the notion of certainty I went on.  But 
lt falling out otherwise,  and I denying it to be mine, 
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expectedly  dissolved;  and  there was  no  appearance 
of reason for  bringing passages  out of  my book,  and 
arguing against them  as  your lordship did,  as if  they 
were that author's. 
To justify this (since my notion  of  certainty could 
not be brought to agree with what he was charged with, 
as opposite to the doctrine of  the Trinity) he at any 
rate must be brought to agree with me,  and to go up011 
my notion  of  certainty.  Pardon me,  my lord,  that I 
say at any rate.  The reason I have to think so is this: 
either that the author  does  make  clear  and  distinct 
ideas necessary to certainty, and so does not gp  upon 
my  notion  of  certainty; and then  your  assigning  his 
going upon my notion  of  certainty, as the reason  for 
your joining us as you did, shows no more but a willing- 
ness in your lordship to have us joined: or he does not 
lay all certainty only in clear and distinct ideas, and  so 
possibly for aught I know may go upon  my notion of 
certainty.  But then, my lord, the reason of your first 
bringing  him and me into this  dispute will  appear to 
have been none.  All your arguing against the gentle- 
men of  this new way of  reasoning will  be found to be 
against nobody, since there is nobody to be found that 
lays all foundation of certainty only in clear and distinct 
ideas ;  nobody to be found, that holds the opinion that 
your lordship opposes. 
Having thus given  you an account of  some part of 
my  reply  (to what  your  lordship  really  answered  in 
your  first  letter)  to  show  that  my  reply  contained 
something more than these words  here  set down  by 
your  lordship,  viz.  "that  all this  seems  to me to do 
nothing to the clearing this matter :" I come  now  to 
those  parts  of  your  repetition,  as  your  lordship  is 
pleased to call it, wherein there is nothing repeated. 
Your lordship  says, "  that you told me"  the reason 
why I was brought into the controversy after the man- 
ner I had complained of, "  was because the person who 
opposed the mysteries of  Christianity, went upon my 
grounds ;"  and for this you quote your first letter.  But 
having  turned to that place,  and finding there these 
words, '' that you found my notions as to certainty by 
ideas was the main foundation which that author went 
upon ;"  which  are  far  from  being  repeated  in  the 
words set down here, unless grounds in general be the 
same with the notions as  to certainty by ideas : I beg 
leave to consider what you here say as new to me, and 
not repeated. 
Your lordship says,  that you  brought  me  into the 
controversy  as  you  did,  " because  the author  went 
upon my  grounds."  It  is possible he did,  or did not: 
but it cannot appear that he did go upon my grounds, 
till those  grounds  are assigned,  and the places  both 
out of him and me produced to show, that we agree in 
the same grounds,  and go both upon them ;  when this 
is done,  there will  be room  to consider whether it be 
so or no. 
In the mean  time,  you have  brought  me  into the 
controversy, for his going upon this particular ground, 
supposed to be mine, '' that clear and distinct ideas are 
necessary to certainty."  It can  do nothing  towards 
the clearing this,  to say in  general,  as  your lordship 
does, "  that he went upon my grounds ;  because though 
he should agree with me in  several other things,  but 
differ from me in this  one  notion  of  certainty,  there 
could be no reason for  your  dealing with  me  as  yo11 
hive done:  that notion  of  certainty being  your very 
exception against his  account of  reason,  and the sole 
occasion  you  took of  bringing in passages out of  my 
book, and the very foundation of arguing against them. 
Your lordship farther  says here,  in  thls  repetition, 
which  you did  not say before in the place referred to 
as repeated, '' that he made use of my words."  I think 
he did of words something like mine.  But as I humbly 
conceive also, he made use of them as his own, and not 
my words;  for I do not remember  that he  quoted 
me for them.  This I am sure, that in the words quoted 
Out of him by your  lordship,  upon  which  my book is 
brought in,  there is not one  syllable of  certainty by 
ideas, 
No doubt whatever he or I, or any one, have said, if 
Your  lordship disapproves  of  it, you  have  a  right to 
question him  that said it.  But I do not see how this 
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gives your lordship  any  right to entitle  anybody to 
what he does not say, whocver else says it. 
The  author of Christianity not mysterious says in his 
book something suitable to what I  had said in mine ; 
borrowed or not borrowed from mine, I leave your lord- 
ship to determine  for  him.  But I  do not  see  what 
ground that gives your  lordship to concern me 'in the 
controversy you have with him, for things I say which 
he does not; and which  I  say to a  different purpose 
from his.  Let that author and I agree in this one no- 
tion of  certainty as much as you please,  what reason, 
I beseech  your lordship,  could  this be,  to quote my 
words as his, who never used them;  and to purposes, 
as you say more than once,  to which I never intended 
them? This was that which I complained was a riddle 
to me.  And  since  your  lordship  can  give  no  other 
reason for it, than those we have hitherto seen, I think 
it is sufficiently unriddled,  and you  are in the  right 
when you say, "  you think it no longer a riddle to me." 
I easily grant my  little reading may  not have  in- 
structed me,  what has been,  or what may be done,  in 
the several ways of  writing  and managing of  contro- 
versy, which,like war, always produces new stratagems : 
only I beg my ignorance may be my apology for saying, 
that this appears a new way of writing to  me, and this is 
the first time I ever met with it. 
But  let the ten lines which you lordship has set down 
out of him be,  if you  please,  supposed to be precisely 
my words,  and that he quoted  my book  for  them; 11 
do not see how even  this  entitles him  to any more of 
my book  than he has quoted; or how  any words  of 
mine,  in  other parts of  my book,  can be ascribed to 
him, or argued against as his,  or rather, as I know not 
whose,  which was  the thing I complained of; for  the 
these and they, those passages of my book were ascribed 
to, could not be that  author,  for  he used  them not; 
nor the author of the Essay of Human Understancling, 
for he was not argued against, but was discharged from 
the controversy under debate.  So that neither he nor 
I being  the they and those,  that so  often occur,  and 
deserved so much pains from your  lordship ; I could 
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not but complain of this, to me, incomprehensible way 
of bringing my book illto that controversy. 
Another part of  your lordship's  repetition,  which,  I 
humbly conceive,  is no repetition,  because  this also I 
find not in tliat passage quoted for it, is this, that your 
lordship confessed that the reason why you quoted my 
words so much. 
My lord, I do not remember any need your lordship 
had  to give  a  reason  why  you  quoted  my words  so 
much, because I do not remember that I made that the 
matter of  my  complaint.  That which  I  complained 
of,  was nut the quantity of what was quoted out of my 
book,  but the manner of  quoting it, viz. "  that I was 
so everywhere joined  wit11  others,  under the compre- 
hensive words  they and them,  though my book alone 
were everywhere quoted,  that the world would be apt 
to think,  1 was  the person  who  argued  againnt  the 
Trinity."  And  again, " that which  I  complained  of 
was, tliat I was made one of the gentlemen of the new 
way of r~zsoning,  without being guilty of  what made 
them so,  and was  so brought into  a  chapter wherein 
I thought myself not  concerned ;  which was managed 
so,  that my book was all along quoted,  and others ar- 
gued against ; others were entitled to what I said, and 
I to what others said,  without knowing why or how." 
Nay,  I  told  your  lordship  in  that very reply, "  that 
if  your  lordship  had  directly questioned  any  of  my 
opinions, I should not have complained."  Thus your 
lordship sees my complaint  was  not of  the largeness, 
but of the manner of your quotations.  But of that, in 
all  these many pages employed  by your  lordship for 
lny  satisfaction,  you,  as I  remember,  have  not been 
pleased to offer  any reason,  nor  can I hitherto find it 
any way cleared : when I do,  I shall readily acknon- 
ledge your great mastery in this,  as in all other wajs 
of writing 
I have in the foregoing  pages,  for  the clearing this 
matter, been pleased to take notice of them and those, 
as directly signifying nobody.  Whether your lordship 
will excuse me for  so doilig, I know not,  since I per- 
ceive such slight words as them and those arc not to bc 
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minded in your lordship's  writings : your lordship has 
a privilege to use such trifling particles, without taking 
any great care what or whom they refer to. 
To show the reader that I do nbt talk without book 
in the case, I shall set down your lordship's own words: 
cc  what a  hard fate doth that man lie under, that falls 
into the hands of a  severe critic!  He must have care 
of  his  but,  and for,  and them,  and  it.  For the least 
ambiguity in  any  of  these,  will  fill  up pages  in  an 
answer,  and  make  a  book  look  considerable for  the 
bulk of it.  And what must  a  man  do,  who is to an- 
swer all such objections  about the use  of particles ?" 
I humbly conceive it is not without  reason,  that your 
lordship here claims an exemption from having a care 
of your but,  and your for,  and your them, and other 
particles.  The sequel  of  your  letter will  show, that 
it is a privilege your lordship makes great use of, and 
therefore have  reason  to be tender of  it,  and  to cry 
out against those unmannerly critics, who question it. 
Upon this consideration, I cannot but look  on it as a 
misfortune to me, that it should fall in my way to dis- 
please your lordship, by disturbing you in the quiet and 
perhaps ancient possession of so convenient a privilege. 
But how great soever the advantages of it may be to a 
writer, I, uponexperience, find it  is very troublesome and 
perplexing to a reader, who is concerned to understand 
what is written, that he may answer to  it.  But to return 
to the place we were upon. 
Your lordship goes on and says, "  whether it  doth, or 
no," i. e. whether what your lordship had said doth clear 
this matter or no, "  you are content to  leave it to  any in- 
different reader; and there it must rest at last, although 
I should write volumes upon it." 
Upon the reading  of  these last words of your lord- 
ship's, I thought you had quite done with this personal 
matter, so apt,  as you  say,  to weary the world.  But 
whether it he that your lordship is not much satisfied 
in the handling of it, or in the letting it  alone ;  whether 
your  lordship  meant  by  these  last words,  that what 
I write  about  it is volumes,  i.  e.  too much,  as  your 
lordship has told me in the first page ; but what your 
lordship says about it, is but necessary: whether these 
or any other be the cause  of  it,  personal matter, as it 
seems, is very  importunate  and  troublesome  to your 
lordship,  as  it is  to the world.  You turn it going in 
the end of one paragraph, and personal matter thrusts 
itself in again in the beginning of the next, whether of 
itself,  without  your  lordship's  notice  or  consent,  I 
examine not.  But  thus stand the immediately following 
words, wherein your lordship  asks me, "  but for what 
cause  do I continue so  unsatisfied?"  To which  you 
make  me  give  this answer,  "  that  the cause, why I 
continue so  unsatisfied,  is,  that  the  author  mentioned 
went upon this ground,  that clear and distinct ideas are 
aecessary to  certainty,  but  that is  not my notion as to 
certain& by ideas; which is, that certainty consists in the 
perception  of the  agreement  or disagreement  of ideas, 
such as we haue, whether they be  in all their parts per- 
fectly  clear  and  distinct or no;  and  that I have no 
notions of certainty more than this one." 
These words, which your lordship has set down for 
mine, I have printed in  a  distinct character, that the 
reader  may take particular notice  of  them;  not  that 
there is any thing very remarkable in this passage itself', 
but because it makes the business of the fourscore fol- 
lowing passages.  For the three several answers that 
your lordship says you have given to it, and that which 
you  call your defence of  them,  reach,  as I take it, to 
the 87th  page.  But another particular reason why this 
answer,  which  your  lordship has  made for  me to a 
question  of  your  own  putting,  is  distinguished  by a 
particular character, is to save  frequent repetitions  of 
it; that the reader,  by having recourse  to it, may see 
whether those things, which  your  lordship says  of  it, 
be  so  or  no,  and judge  whether I am in  the wrong, 
when I assure him,  that I cannot  find them to .be as 
you say. 
Only before I come to what your lordship positively 
says of this which you call my answer, I crave leavt:  to 
observe that it supposes I continue unsatisfied :  to which 
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I may say,  that what is  offered  for satisfaction, gives 
none to me or any body else ; and yet I, as well as other 
people,  lnay be satisfied concerning the matter. 
I come now to what your lordship says positively of it. 
1. You  say that I tell  you,  that "the  cause why I 
continued  unsatisfied  is,  that  the author  mentioned 
went upon this  ground,  that clear  and  distinct ideas 
are necessary to certainty;  but that is not my notion of 
certainty by ideas,"  &c. 
To which I crave leave to reply, that neither in that 
part of my second letter, which your lordship quotes for 
it, nor anywhere else, did I tell your lordship any such 
thing.  Neither could I assign that author's going upon 
that ground, there mentioned, as any cause of dissatis- 
faction  to  me;  because I know  not "  that he  went 
upon  this  ground,  that  clear  and  distinct ideas are 
necessary to certainty :" for I have  met with  nothing 
produced  by your lordship  out of  him,  to prove  that 
he did so.  And if it be true, that he goes upon grounds 
of  certainty  that are not  mine,  I know  nobody  that 
ought to be  dissatisfied  with it but your lordship,  who 
have taken so much  pains  to make his  grounds mine, 
and my grounds his,  and to entitle us both to what each 
has said apart. 
2. Your lordship says,  "this  is  no more  than what 
I had said before  in  my former letter."  Answ.  For 
this I appeal to the 57th,  or  rather  (as I think  you 
writ) 87th page, quoted for it by your lordship; where 
any one must have very good eyes, to find all that is set 
down here in this answer (as you a little lower call it) 
which you have  been  pleased  to put into my mouth. 
For neither in the one  nor the other of  those pages is 
there  any such  answer  of  mine.  Indeed,  in  the 87th 
page there are these words: "  that certainty, in my opi- 
nion,  lies  in  the perception  of  the agreement or dis- 
agreement of ideas, auch as they ere, and not always in 
the having  perfectly  clear  and  distinct  ideas."  But 
these words there are not  given  as an answer to this 
question,  why do I continue  so  unsatisfied?  And  the 
remarkable answer set down is,  as I take it, more than 
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these words, as niuch more in proportion as your iord- 
ship's  whole letter is more than the half of  it. 
3.  Your  lordship  says  of  the  remarkable  answer 
above  set  down,  that "  you  took  particular  notice 
of it." 
To which I crave leave to reply,  that your lordship 
nowhere before took notice  of  this answer, as you  call 
it ;  for it was nowhere before extant, though it be true 
some part of the words of  it were.  But some part of 
the words of this  answer (which too were never given 
as  an answer to the question proposed) can never  be 
this answer itself. 
4. Your lordship farther says, "  that you gave three 
several answers to it." 
To which I must  crave leave  further to reply, that 
never anv one of  the three answers, which you here say  .  .  -- 
you gave  to this nly answer, were given to this answer; 
which,in  the words above set down, you made me give 
to your question, why I continued so unsatisfied ? 
To  justify this my reply, there needs no more but to 
set down  these  your lordship's  three  answers, and to 
turn to the places where you say you gave them. 
The first of your three answers is this : "  that those 
who offer at clear and  distinct ideas,  bid  much  fairer 
for  certainty  than I do  (aceordii~g  to this  answer) 
and  speak more agreeably to my original  ero~mds  of 
certainty."  The place  you  quote for this  is,  Ans.  1, 
p. 80; but in that place it is not given as an answer to 
my saying, that "  the cause, why I continue unsatisfied, 
is, that the author mentioned went upon this ground, 
that clear and distinct ideas are necessary to certainty, 
but,"  &c.  And if  it be  given for answer to it here, it 
seems o very strange one.  For I am supposed to say, 
that  the cause,  why I continue unsatisfied,  is,  that 
the  author mentioned  went upon  a  ground different 
from mine :"  and  to satisfy  me,  I am  told  his  way 
is better than mine;  which cannot  but be thought an 
answer very likely to satisfy me. 
Your  seco~ld  answer,  which  you  say  you  gave  to 
that remarkable passage above set down, is this :  "  that 
it is very possible the author of  Christianity not myste- to the Bishop of  Worcester.  217 
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rious  might  mistake  or  misapply  my  notions;  but 
there is  too much reason  to believe  he thought them 
the same, and we  have  no  reason to be  sorry that he 
hath given  me  this occasion  for  the  explaining  my 
meaning,  and  for  the vindication  of  myself  in  the 
matters I apprehend he had charged me with :" and for 
this you quote your first letter, p. 36.  But neither are 
these words in that place an answer to my saying, "that 
the  cause,  why I continued  dissatisfied,  is,  that that 
author went upon  this ground,  that clear and distinct 
ideas are necessary to certainty, but,"  &c. 
Your third answer, which  you say you gave to that 
passage  above  set down,  is,  "  that my own  grounds 
of  certainty tend to scepticism,  and  that  in  an  age 
where:n the mysteries of faith are too much exposed by 
the promoters of scepticism and infidelity, it is a thing 
of  dangerous consequence to start such new methods 
of  certainty,  as are  apt  to leave  men's  minds  more 
doubtful than before."  For this you refer your reader 
to your first  letter.  But I must  crave leave  also  to 
observe, that these words are not all to be found in that 
place, and those  of them which  are there,  are by no 
means an answer to my saying, "  that the cause why I 
continue unsatisfied is,"  &c. 
What the words which  your  lordship  has here  set 
down as your three answers, are brought in for in those 
three places quoted by your lordship, any one that will 
consult them may see ;  it would  hold  me too long in 
personal matter to explain that here, and therefore for 
your lordship's  satisfaction I pass by those particulars. 
But this I crave leave to be positive in, that in neither 
of them, they are given in reply to that which is above 
set down,  as my answer  to your  lordship's  question, 
"  for what cause do I continue so unsatisfied?"  Though 
your lordship here says, that to this answer they were 
given as a reply, and it was it you had taken notice of, 
and given these  three several replies to.  As  answers 
therefore to what  you  make me say here,  viz.  "  that 
the cause  of  my  continuing  unsatisfied  is,  that the 
author  mentioned  went upon  a ground  of  certainty 
that is  none  of  mine,"  I  cannot  consider them.  For 
to this neither of them  is given as an answer; though 
this and it, in  ordinary construction, make them have 
that reference.  But these are some of your privileged 
Darticles, and may  be  applied how and to what  you 
please. 
But though neither of these passages be any manner 
of answer  to what your  lordship  calls  them answers 
to; yet you laying such stress on them, that well nigh 
half your letter, as I take it,  is  spent in the defence 
of them; it is fit I consider what you  say under each 
of them. 
I say, as I take it, near half your letter is in defence 
of these three passages. 
One reason why I speak so doubtfully is, that though 
you  say here, "  that you will  lay them  together, and 
defend  them,"  and  that in  effect all that is  said  to 
that part is ranged under these three heads ;  yet they 
being brought in as answers to what I am made to say, 
is  "the  cause why I  continued  unsatisfied,"  I should 
scarce think your lordship should spend so many pages 
in this personal matter, after you had but two or three 
pages before so openly blamed me for  spending a less 
number of  pages  in  my answer,  concerning  personal 
matters, to what your lordship had in your letter con- 
cerning them. 
Another reason why I speak so doubtfully is, because 
I do not see how these three passages need so long, or 
any defences, where they are not attacked ; or if they 
be attacked, methinks the defences of them should have 
been applied to the answers I had made to them ;  or if 
I have made  none, and  they be  of  such moment that 
they require answers, your lordship's  minding me that 
they  did  so,  would  either,  by  my  continued  silence, 
have left to your lordship  all that you can pretend to 
for my granting them, or else my answers to them have 
given your  lordship  an occasion  to defend  them, and 
perhaps to have defended them otherwise than you have 
done.  This is  certain, that these  defences  had come 
time enough when they had been attacked, and then it 
would have been  seen, whether what was said did de- 
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givc  me  leave  to speak  my  thoughts  freely,  w1ie1:  I 
co~isicler  these three, as I call them, answers, how they 
theinselves are brought in, and what relation that which 
is brought under each of them has to them, and to the 
rnatter  in  question;  methinks  they  look  rather  like 
texts chosen to be discoursed on, than as answers to be 
defended in a controversy.  For the conrlexion of that 
which in train is tacked on to them, is such that makes 
me  see  I am wholly mistaken  in what I  thought the 
established rule of controversy.  This was also another 
reason why I said you spent,  as I take it, near half of 
your letter in  defence  of them.  For when I consider 
llow one thing hangs on  another, under  the third an- 
swer, where I think that which you call your defending 
it ends;  it is  a hard matter, by the relation  and  de- 
pendency of the parts of that discourse, to tcll where 
it ends. 
But to consider the passages themselves, and the de- 
fence of them. 
That  which you call your first answer, and which you 
say  you  will  defend,  is  in  these  words : those  who 
oRer  at clear  and distinct ideas,  bid  much  fairer for 
certainty  than  I  do  (according  to  this  answer)  and 
speak  more  agreeably to my original grou~ds  of cer- 
tainty."  These words  being brought  in  at first as  a 
reply to what was called  my answer, but was not  my 
answer,  as may be  seen, Lett. 1, I took  no  notice  of 
them in my second letter, as being nothing at all to the 
point in hand ;  and therefore what need they have of a 
farther defence, when nothing is objected to them, I do 
not see.  To what purpose is it to spend seven or eight 
pages to show, that another's  notion about certaintyis 
better than mine ;  when  that tends not  to show how 
your saying, "  that the certainty of  my proof of a God 
is  not  placed  upon  any clear  and distinct ideas, but 
upon  the  force  of  reason  distinct from  it,"  concerns 
me ? which was the thing there to be shown, as is visible 
to any one who will vouchsafe to look into that part of 
my first letter.  And indeed why should your lordship 
trouble yourself to prove, which of  two differcnt mays 
of certainty by ideas  is best, when you  have  so  ill an 
opinion  of  the whole way  of certainty  by  ideas, that 
you accuse it of tendency to scepticism? But it seenls 
your lordship is resolved to have  all-  the faults in  my 
book cleared or corrected, and so you go on to defend 
these words :  "  that those who offer at clear and distinct 
ideas,  bid  much  fairer  for  certainty  than  I  do."  I 
could have wished that your lordship had pleased a little 
to explain  them,  before you  had  defended theill;  for 
they are not, to me, without some obscurity.  However, 
to guess as well  as I can, I think  the proposition that 
you intend here, is this, that those who place certainty 
in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of 
only clear and distinct ideas, are more in the right than 
I am, who place it in the perception  of the agreement 
or  disagreement  of  ideas,  such  as  we  have,  thoug! 
they be  not  in  all their  parts  perfectly clear and dl- 
stinct. 
Whether your  lordship has  proved this,  or  no, will 
be seen when we come to consider what you have said 
in  the  defence  of  it.  In the mean  time, I have  no 
reason to be sorry to hear your lordship say so ;  because 
this supposes, that certainty can be attained by the per- 
ception of the agreement or disagreement of clear and 
distinct ideas.  For if  certainty cannot be attained by 
the perception  of  the agreement  or  disagreement of 
clear and distinct ideas,  how can they be more in tlrc 
right, who place certainty in one  sort of ideas, that it 
cannot be had in, than  those who  place  it in another 
sort of ideas, that it cannot be had in? 
I shall proceed  now to examine what your lordship 
has said in defence of the proposition you have here set 
down to defend, which you may be sure I shall with all 
the favourableness that truth will  allow; since if your 
lordship makes it out to be true, it puts an end to the 
dispute you  have  had with  me.  For it confutes that 
main proposition,  which you  have  so much  contended 
for;  '<  that  to lay  all  foundation  of  certainty,  as  to 
matters  of faith,  upon  clear  and distinct ideas,  does 
certainly overthrow all mysteries  of faith:" unless you 
will  say,  that  mysteries  of  faith  cannot  consist with 
what yon have proved to be true. 980  Mr. Locke's second Reply 
To prove that they are more in the right than I, who 
place certainty in the perception of  the agreement or 
disagreement  of  clear  and  distinct ideas  only,  your 
lordship  says, "that  it is a wonderful thing, in  point 
of reason, for me to pretend to certainty by ideas, and 
not allow these ideas to be clear and distinct."  This, 
my lord, looks as if I placed certainty only in obscure 
and confused ideas, and did not allow that it might be 
had by clear and distinct ones.  But I have  declared 
myself  so clearly  and so fully to the contrary, that I 
doubt not but your lordship would think I deserved to 
be asked, whether this were fair and ingenuous dealing, 
to represent this matter as this expression  does ?  But 
the instances are so many, how apt my unlearned way 
of writing is to mislead your lordship, and that always 
on the side least favourable to my sense, that if I should 
cry out as often as I think I meet with occasion for it, 
your lordsliip would  have reason  to be uneasy at the 
ebullition and enlarging of my complaints. 
Your lordship farther asks, '' how can I clearly per- 
ceive  the  agreement or  disagreement  of  ideas,  if  I 
have not  clear  and distinct ideas? For how is it pos- 
sible for  a  mall's  mind  to know whether  they agree 
or disagree, if  there be some  parts of  those  ideas we 
have  only  general and  confused  ideas  of?"  would 
rather read these latter words, if your lordship please, 
"  if  there be some parts of  those ideas that are only 
general and confused ;" for "  parts of  ideas  that we 
have only general and confused ideas of"  is  not very 
clear and intelligible to me. 
Taking then your  lordship's  question as cleared  of 
$his obscurity,  it will  stand thus : a  how is it possible 
for  a  man's  mind  to know,  whether  ideas  agree or 
disagree, if  there be some parts of  those ideas obscure 
and confused ?"  In answer to which,  I crave leave to 
ask; "  Is it possible  for  a  man's  mind  to perceive, 
whether ideas agree or disagree,  if  no parts of those 
ideas be obscure  arid  confused,"  and  by that percep- 
tion to attain certainty ?  If your lordship says no :  how 
do you hereby prove, that they who place certainty in 
the perception  of  the  agreement  or disagreement of 
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only  clear  and  distinct ideas,  are more  in  the right 
than I?  For they who place certainty, where  it is im- 
possible to be had, can in that be no more in the right 
than  he who  places  it in  any other impossibility? If 
you say yes, certainty may be attained by the perception 
of the agreement or disagreement of clear and distinct 
ideas,  you  give up the main question :  you  grant the 
proposition, which you declare you chiefly oppose ;  and 
so all this great dispute with me  is at an end.  Your 
lordship may take which  of  these  two you  please;  if 
the former,  the proposition here to be proved  is given 
up; if the latter, the whole  controversy is given up : 
one of them, it is plain,  you must say. 
This,  and what  your  lordship  says  farther on this 
point,  seems  to  me  to prove  nothing,  but  that you 
suppose,  that either there are no such things as obscure 
and  confused.  ideas;  and  then,  with  submission,  the 
distinction  between  clear  and  obscure,  distinct  and 
confused,  is useless ; and it is  in vain to talk of  clear 
and obscure, distinct and confused  ideas, in opposition 
to one another :  or else your lordship supposes, that an 
obscure and confused  idea is wholly undistinguishable 
from all other ideas, and so in effect are all other ideas. 
For if  an obscure and confused  idea be not  one and 
the same with  all other ideas,  as it is impossible for it 
to be, then the obscure and confused idea may and will 
be so far different from  some other ideas, that it may 
be perceived whether it agrees or disagrees with them 
or no.  For every idea  in the mind,  clear or obscure, 
distinct or confused, is but that one idea that it is, and 
not another idea that it is not; and the mind perceives 
it to be the idea that it is,  and not another idea that it 
is different from. 
What therefore I mean by obscure and confused ideas, 
I have at large shown, and shall not trouble your lord- 
ship with a repetition of here.  For that there are such 
obscure and confused ideas, I suppose the instances your 
lordship  gives here evince:  to which  I shall  add this 
One  more ;  suppose you should  in the twilight, or in a 
thick mist,  see two things standing upright,  near the 
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light, or at such a distance,  that they appeared very 
much  alike,  and  you  could  not perceive  them  to be 
what they really were,  the one  a  statue,  the other a 
man; would  not  these  two be obscure  and  confused 
ideas ?  Arid yet could  not your lordship be certain of 
the truth of this proposition concerning either of them, 
that it was  something, or did exist ; and that by per- 
ceiving  the agreement of  that idea  (as  obscure  and 
confused as it was) with that of existence, as expressed 
in that proposition. 
This, my lord,  is just the case of  substance,  upon 
which  you  raised  this  argument  concerning  obscure 
and confused  ideas;  which  this  instance  shows  may 
have propositions made about them, of whose truth we 
may be certain. 
Hence I crave liberty to conclude, that I am nearer 
the truth than those who say that "  certainty is founded 
only in clear and distinct ideas,"  if  any body does say 
so.  For  no  such  saying  of  any  one  of  those,  with 
whom your lordship joined  me for so saying, is, that I 
remember,  yet  produced;  though  this  be  that  for 
which ccthey"  and "  those,"  whoever they be, had from 
your  lordship the title of  the gentlemen of  the new 
way of reasoning ; and this be the opinion which your 
lordship declares "  you oppose, as certainly overthrow- 
ing all mysteries of  faith, and excluding the notion of 
substance out of  rational discourse."  Which terrible 
termagant proposition, viz.  cc that certainty is founded 
only in clear and distinct ideas,"  which has made such 
a noise, and been the cause of the spending above ten 
times  fifty  pages,  and  given occasion  to very  large 
ebullition of thoughts ;  appears not, by any thing that 
has  been  yet  produced,  to be  any  where  in  their 
writings,  with  whom  upon  this  score  you  have  had 
so  warm  a  controversy,  but  only  in your lordship's 
imagination, and what you have, at least for this once, 
'' writ out of your own thoughts." 
But if  this paragraph contain so little in defence of 
the proposition which  your lordship, in the beginning 
of it, set down on purpose to defend; what follows is 
visibly more remote from it.  But since your lordship 
has  been  pleased to tack  it on here,  though without 
applying of  it any way,  that I see,  to the defence of 
the  to be defended, which  is  already got 
,-.lean  out of sight ;  I am taught, that it is fit I consider 
it here  in  this, which  your  lordship has thought the 
proper place for it. 
In the next paragraph,  your lordship is pleased to 
take notice of  this part of  my complaint,  viz.  that I 
say more  than  twice  or  ten times, "that  you  blame 
those who  place  certainty in  clear and distinct ideas, 
but I do not; and yet you bring me in amongst them." 
And  for  this,  your  lordship quotes seventeen  several 
pages of my second letter.  Whoever will give himself 
the trouble to turn to those pages, will  see how far I 
am in those places from barely saying,  that you blame 
those who  place  certainty," &c. and what reason you 
had to point to so many places for my so saying, as a 
repetition  of  my  complaint.  And  I believe  they will 
find  the  proposition  about  placing  certainty only in 
clear  and distinct ideas,  is  mentioned  in  them  upon 
several  occasions,  and  to  different  purposes,  as  tlie 
argument required. 
Be  that as it will,  this is  s  part  of  my complaint, 
and you do me a favour, that after having, as you say, 
met with it in so many places,  you are pleased at last 
to take notice of  it,  and promise me a full answer to 
it.  The first  part  of  which  full  answer  is  in  these 
words:  that you  do not deny but the first occasion 
of  your  lordship's  charge, was  in  the supposition that 
clear  and distinct  ideas  were  necessary,  in  order  to 
any certainty in our minds."  And  that the only way 
"  to  attain  this  certainty,  was  by  comparing  these 
ideas together." 
My  lord,  though  I  have  faithfully set down  these 
words out of my second answer, yet I must own I have 
printed  them  in  something  of  a  different  character 
from that which they stand  in your letter.  For your 
lordship has published this sentence so, as cc if the sup- 
position  that clear  and  distinct  ideas were  necessary 
order to any certainty in our minds,"  were my sup- 
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know, that that suppositio~l  is purely your lordship's ; 
for  you  neither  in  your defence of  the Trinity, nor in 
your  first  answer,  prcduce  any  thing to  prove,  that 
that was either an assertion or supposition of  mine ;  but 
your lordship was pleased to suppose it for me.  As to 
the latter words, "  and that the only way to attain this 
certainty, was  by comparing these ideas together :"  if 
your  lordship means  by these ideas, ideas in general ; 
then i acknowlecige these to be my words, or to be my 
sense: but then they are not any supposition in my book, 
though they are made part of  the supposition here; but 
their sense is expressed in my Essay at large in more 
places than one.  But if  by these  ideas your lordship 
means only clear  and distinct ideas,  1 crave  leave  to 
deny that to be my sense, or any supposition of mine. 
Your lordship goes on ; "  but to prove this ;" Prove 
what, I beseech  you, my lord ?  That certainty was to 
be attained by comparing ideas, was  a supposition  of 
mine.  To prove that, there needed no words or prin- 
ciples  of  mine  to  be  produced,  unless  your  lordship 
would prove that which was never denied. 
But if it were to prove this, viz. that "  it was a sup- 
position  of  mine,  that  clear  and distinct ideas  were 
necessary to certainty ;" and that to prove this to be a 
supposition of  mine "  my  words  were  produced,  and 
my principles of  certainty laid down,  and none else ;" 
I answer, I do not remember any words  or principles 
of mine produced to show any ground for such a sup- 
position, that I placed certainty only in clear and distinct 
ideas ;  and if there had  been  any such produced, your 
lordship would have done me and the reader a favour to 
have marked the pages wherein one might have found 
them produced, unless  your lordship thinks you  make 
amends for quoting so many pages of my second letter. 
which might have been spared, by neglecting wholly to 
quote any of  your own where  it needed.  When your 
lordship shall please to direct me to those places where 
such words  and principles  of  mine were  produced  to 
prove such a supposition, I shall readily turn to them, 
to see how far they do really give ground for it.  But 
my bad memory not suggesting to me any thing like it, 
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your lordship, I hope, will  pardon me if I do not turn 
over yniir Defence of  the Trinity and your first letter, 
to see whether you  have  any  such proofs, which  you 
yourself seem so much to doubt or think so meanly of, 
that you do not so much as point out the places where 
they  are to be  found; though we  have  in  this  very 
page so eminent an example, that you are not sparing 
of  your ~ains  in  this kind,  where  you have the least 
thought  that  it  might  serve  your  lordsllip  to  the 
meanest purpose. 
But though you produced no words or principles of 
mine to prove this a supposition of  mine,  yet in  your 
next words here your lordship produces a  reason why 
you  yourself  supposed  it.  For  you  say, "  you could 
not imagine that I could place certainty in the agree- 
ment  or disagreement of  ideas, and not suppose those 
ideas  to be  clear  and  distinct :"  so  that at last the 
satisfaction  you  give me,  why  my book was  brought 
into a  controversy wherein  it was  not  concerned  is, 
that your lordship imagined  I supposed in it, what I 
did not suppose in it.  And here I crave leave to ask, 
whether  the reader may  not  well  suppose  that  you 
had  a  great mind  to bring my  book  into  that con- 
troversy,  when  the only handle  you  could find  for it 
was an imagination of  a supposition to be  in it, which 
in truth was not there ? 
Your lordship adds,  a that I  finding  myself  joined 
in  such  company  which  I  did  not  desire  to be  seen 
in,  I rather  chose  to distinguish  myself  from  them, 
by denying  clear and distinct ideas to be necessary to 
certainty." 
If it lhight be permitted to another to guess at your 
thoughts, as well as you do at mine, he perhaps would 
turn it thus ;  thaf your lordship finding no readier way, 
as YOU thought, to set a  mark upon my book, than by 
bringing  several passages  of  it into a coritroversy con- 
cerning the Trinity, wherein  they had nothing to do; 
and speaking of  them under the name of" those"  and 
'' them,"  as  if  jour  adversaries  in  that  dispute  had 
made use of  those passages against the Trinity, when 
'10  One  opposer  of the doctrine of the Trinity,  that I 
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know,  or that you  have  produced,  ever  made  use  of 
any one  of  them, you  thought fit to jumble  my book 
with  other people's  opinions  after  a  new way,  never 
used by any other writer that I ever heard of.  If any 
one will  consider what  your  lordfihip has said for my 
satisfaction (wherein you have, as P humbly conceive I 
have  shown,  produced  nothing  but imaginations  of 
imaginations, and suppositions of suppositions) he will, 
I conclude, without straining of his thoughts, be carried 
to this conjecture. 
Rut conjectures  apart, your lordship says,  cc that I 
finding myself  joined  in  such  company  which  I did 
not desire ta be seen in,  T rather chose to distinguish 
myself:"  if keeping to my book  be called distinguish- 
ing myself.  You say, "  1 rather chose :" rather ! than 
what,  my lord,  I beseech you? Your learned  way  of 
writing,  I find, is every where beyond  my  capacity; 
and unless I will guess at your meaning (which is not 
very safe) beyond what I can  certainly understand by 
your words, I often know not what to answer to.  It  is 
certain you  mean here, that I preferred "  distinguish- 
ing myself  from them I found myself joined with"  to 
something; but to what, you do not say.  If you mean 
to owning that for my notion of certainty, which is not 
my notion  of  certainty,  this is true; I did and shall 
always rather choose to distinguish myself fronl any of 
them,  than own  that for my notion  which  is  not my 
notion : if you mean that I preferred ''  m  distinguish- 
ing myself from them, to my being joine ii'  with them;" 
you make me clioose, where there neither is nor can be 
any choice.  For what is wholly out of  one's  power, 
leaves  no room  for choice;  and I think  I should  be 
laughed  at, if I should  say, " I rather choose  to di- 
stinguish myself  from the papists, than that it should 
rain."  For it is no more in my choice not to be joined, 
as your lordship has been pleased to  join me, with the 
unknown "  they"  and "them,"  than it is in my power 
that it should not rain. 
It is  like  you  will  scly  here again,  this  is a  nice 
criticism ; I grant, my lard, it is about wards and ex- 
pressions:  hut since I cannot know your meaning but 
by your words  and  expressions,  if  this defect in  my 
very  frequently  overtake me  in  your 
writings to and concerning me, it is troublesome, I con- 
fess ;  but what must I do  ?  Must I play at blind-man's- 
buff?  Catch at what I do not see? Answer to I know 
not what ; to no meaning, i.  e. to nothing ?  Or must I 
presume to know your meaning, when I do not? 
For example, suppose I should presume it to  be your 
rneaning here,  that I found myself joined  in company, 
by your lordship,  with the author of  Christianity not 
mysterious,  by your lordship's  imputing the same no- 
tions of  certainty to us both;  that I did not desire to 
be seen in his company, i.  e. to be thought to be sf his 
opinion in other things ; and therefore "  I chose rather 
to distinguish myself from him, by denying clear and 
distinct ideas to be necessary to certainty,  than to be 
so joined  with  him:"  if I should  presume  this to be 
the sense  of  these your words  here,  and that by the 
doubtf~ll  signification of the expressions of being joined 
in  company  and seen  in  company,  used  equivocally, 
your lordship should mean, that because I was said to 
be of his opinion in one thing, T was to be thought to be 
of his opinion in all things, and therefore disowned to 
be of his opinion in that, wherein I was of his opinion, 
because  I  would  not  be thought  of  his  opinion  all 
through : would  not your lordship be displeased with 
me  for supposing you to have such a meaning as this, 
and ask me again, "  whether  1 could  think you a man 
of so little sense to talk thus?" And yet, my lord, this 
is the best I can make of these words, which seem to  me 
rather to discover a secret in your way of dealing with 
me, than any thing in nle that I am ashamed of. 
For I am not, nor ever shall be ashamed to own any 
opinion I  have, because another man  holds the same ; 
and so far as that brings me intb his company, I shall 
not be troubled to be seen in it.  But I shall never think 
that that entitles me to any other of  his  opinions, or 
makes me of his company in any other sense, how much 
soever that be the design : for  your lordship has used 
no  small art and  pains  to make  me  of  his  and the 
Unitarians' company in all that they say, only because 
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that author has ten lines in the beginning of his book, 
which  agrees  with  something  I  have  said  in  mine ; 
from  whence  we  become  companions.  so universally 
united  in opinion,  that they must  be  entitled to all 
that I say, and I to all that they say. 
My lord, when I writ my book,  I could not design 
to distinguish myself from the gentlemen of the new 
way of  reasoning,"  who were  not  then in being,  nor 
are, that I see, yet : since I find nothing produced out 
of  the Unitarians,  nor  the author of  Christianity not 
mysterious, to show, that they make clear and distinct 
ideas necessary to certainty.  And all that I have done 
since, has been to show, that you had no reason to join 
my hook with men (let them be what " tliey" or "  those" 
you please) who founded certainty only upon clear and 
distinct ideas, when my book did iiot found it only upon 
clear and distinct ideas.  And I cannot tell why the ap- 
pealing to my book now, should be called  a clloosing 
rather to distinguish myself." 
Pvly  reader  must  parclon  me here for  this uncouth 
phrase of  joining  my  book  with  men.  For  as your 
lordship ordered  the matter (pardon  me,  if  1 say in 
your new way of writing) sc it was, if  your own word 
may be taken in the case : for, to give me satisfact,ion, 
you insist  upon  this,  that you  did  llot join  me with 
those gentlemen in their opinions, but tell me  'c  they 
used  my notions  to other  purposes  than I intended 
them;"  and  so  there  was  no  need  for  me  to di- 
stinguish myself  from them,"  when your lordship had 
done it for me as you plead all along: though you are 
pleased  to tell me,  that I was joined with them,  and 
that  I:  found myself joined  in such company, as I clid 
not desire to be seen in." 
My lord, I could  find myself joined  in no company 
upon this occasion, but what you joined  me  in.  And 
therefore I beg leave to ask your lordship, did you join 
me in company with those, in whose company, you here 
say, ('  I do not desire to be seen  ?"  If you own that you 
did, how must 1  understand that passace where you say, 
that " you must do that right to the ingenious  author 
of ths  Essay of  Human Understanding, from whence 
these notions were borrowed,  to serve other purposes 
than  he intended them:"  which  you repeat  again  as 
matter of satisfaction to me, and 3s a proof of the care 
you took not to be misunderstood ?  If you didjoin me 
with them, what is become of all the satisfaction in the 
point,  which your lordship has  bcen at so much pains 
about? And  if  you did  not join  me with  them, you 
could  not think I fo~uld  myself joined  with  them,  or 
chose to  distinguish myself from men I was never joiiled 
with:  for my book was  innocent  of what made  them 
gentlemen of the new way of reasoning. 
There seems to me sometliingr very delicate in this 
matter.  I should be supposed joined  to them, and your 
lordship should not he  supposed to have joined me to 
them, upon so  slight or no occasion;  and yet all this 
comes solely from your lordship. How to do this to your 
satisfaction, I confess myself to be too dull :  and there- 
fore I have been at  the pains to examine how far I have 
this obligation to your lordship, and how far you would 
be pleased to own it, that the world might understand 
your lordship's,  to  me, incomprehensible way of writing 
on this occasion. 
For if you had a mind, by a new and dexterous way, 
becoming the learning and caution of  a  great man, to 
bring me into such company, which you think "  I did 
not desire to be seen in :" I  thought  such a  pattern, 
set by such a hand as your lordship's,  ought not to be 
lost by being passed over too slightly.  Besides, I hope, 
that you will not take it amiss,  that I was willing to 
see what obligation I had to your lordship in the favour 
you designed me.  But I crave leave to assure  your 
lordship I shall never be ashamed to own any opinion 
I  have,  because  another man (of  whom  perhaps your 
lordship  or others  have no very good  thoughts) is of 
it, nor be unwilling to be so far seen in his company : 
though I shall always think I have a right to demand, 
and shall desire to be satisfied, why any one makes to 
himself,  or takes an occasion from thence, in a manner 
that savours not too much of  charity,  to extend  this 
society to those opinions of that man, with which I have 
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good will of such endeavours, and judge whether such 
arts savour not a little of the spirit of the Inquisition. 
For, if  1 mistake not,  it is the inethod of  that holy 
office, and the way of those revered guardians of what 
they call the christian faith,  to raise reports or start 
occasions of suspicion concerning the orthodoxy of any 
one they have no very good will  towards,  and require 
him to clear himself;  gilding all this with  the care of 
religion, and the profession  of  respect and tenderness 
to the person  himself,  even when they deliver him up 
to he burnt by the secular power. 
I sliall not, my lord, say, that you have had any ill- 
will to me; for  T  never dcserved any from you.  But 1 
sliall be better ablc to answer those, who arc apt to think 
the method  you  have  taken lias  some  conformity,  so 
far as it has gone, with what protestants complain of ill 
the Inquisition; when you shall have cleared this matter 
a little otherwise, and assigned a more sufficie~it  reasoli 
for bringing rrre  into the party ol' those tbat oppose thc 
doctrine of the Trinity, than only because the author of 
Christianity not mysterious has, in the beginning of his 
book, half  a score lines which you  guess he borrowed 
out of  mine.  For that, in truth, is all the matter of 
fact upon which all this dust is raised ; and the matter 
so advanced by degrees, that now I am told, "  1  should 
have  cleared  myself,  by  owning  the  doctrine  of  the 
Trinity;"  as if  I had been  ever accused of  disowning 
it.  But  that  which  shows  no  small  skill  in  this 
management is,  that I  am  called  upon  to clear my- 
self,  by the very  same person  who,  raising the whole 
dispute, has himself  over and over  again cleared me ; 
and upon that grounds the satisfaction he pretends to 
give me and others,  in answer to my colnplaint of his 
having,  without  any reason  at all,  brought  my  book 
inta the controversy concerning the Trinity.  But to 
go on. 
If the preceding part of this paragraph had nothing 
ill  it of  defence of  this  proposition, "that  those who 
offer  at clear  and distinct ideas,  bid  much fairer for 
certainty than I do,"  &c. it is certai~i,  that what follows 
is altogether as remote from any s~~ch  def'encc. 
Your  lordship  says,  "that  certainty by  sense,  cer- 
tainty by reason,  and  certainty by remembrance,  are 
to be distinguished  from the certainty" under  debate, 
and to be shut out from it: and upon  this you  spend 
three pages.  Supposing it so, how does this at a12  tend 
to the defence  of  this  proposition,  that "  those  who 
offer at clear  and distinct  ideas,  bid  much  fairer  for 
certainty than I do ?"  For whether certainty by sense, 
by reason, and by remembrance, be or be not compre- 
hended in the certainty under debate, this proposition, 
6c  that those who offer at clear and distinct ideas,  bid 
much fairer for certainty than I do,"  will  not at all be 
confirmed or invalidated thereby. 
The proving therefore, that "  certainty by sense, by 
reason, and by remembrance,"  is to be excluded from 
the certainty under debate, serving nothing to the de- 
fence of the proposition to be defended, and so having 
nothing to do here ;  let us now consider it as a proposi- 
tion that your lordship has a mind to prove, as serving 
to some other great purpose of your own, or perhaps in 
some other view against my book :  for you seem to lay 
no small stress upon it, by your way of  introducing it. 
For you very solemnly set yourself to prove, "  that the 
certainty under  debate is the certainty of knowledge, 
and that a proposition whose ideas are to be compared 
as to their agreement or disagreement, is  the proper 
obkct of this certainty."  From whence your lordship 
infers,  that "  therefore  this  certainty is  to be  distin- 
guished  from a  certainty by  sense, by reason,  snd  by 
remembrance."  But by what  logic this. is inferred, is 
mot  easy to nre to discover.  For, "  if  a  proposition, 
whe  ideas are to be compared  as to their agreement 
or disagreement, be the proper object of the certainty" 
under debate ;  if propositions whose certainty we arrive 
at by sense, reason, or remembrance, be of  idea^, which 
may  be compared  as to their agreement  or disagree- 
ment ;  then they cannot be excluded from that certainty, 
which is to be had by so comparing those ideas :  unless 
thep must be shut out for the very same reason  that 
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1. Then as to certainty by sense,  or propositions of 
that kind : 
<<The  object of the certainty under debate,"  your lord- 
ship owns, "  is a proposition whose ideas are to be  com- 
pared  as to their  agreement or  disagreement."  The 
agreement or disagreement of the ideas of a proposition 
to be compared, may be examined  and  perceived  by 
sense, and is certainty by sense :  and therefore how this 
certainty is to be distinguished and shut out from that, 
which col~sists  in the ~erceiving  the :,rrrccn~ent or dis- 
agreement of the ideas of  any proposit~on,  will  not be 
easy tu show ;  unless one certainty is distinguished from 
another,  by having that which  makes the other to be 
certainty, viz.  the perception of  the agreement or dis- 
agreement of two ideas, as expressed in that proposition : 
Q.  6.  may I not be certain, that a ball of ivory that lies 
before my eyes is not square  ?  And is it not my sense 
of seeing, that makes me perceive the disagreement of 
that square figure to that round matter, which are the 
ideas expressed in that proposition ?  How then is cer- 
tainty  by  sense  excluded  or  distinguished  from  that 
knowledge,  which  consists  in  the perceptiorl  of  the 
agreement or disagreement of ideas ? 
2.  Your lordship  distinguishes  the certainty which 
consists in the perceiving the agreement or disagreement 
of  ideas, as expresbed in any proposition, from certainty 
by reason.  To  have made good this distinction, J humbly 
conceive, you would have done well to have showed that 
the agreement or disagreement of two ideas could not be 
perceived by the intervention of  a third, which  I, and 
as I guess other people, call reasoning, or knowing by 
reason.  As for example, cannot the sides of a given tri- 
angle be known to be  equal by the intervention of two 
circles, whereof one of these sides is a common radius ? 
To which, it is like, your lordship will answer, what 
1 find you  do here,  about the knowledge of  the exist- 
ence of substance,  by the intervention of  the existence 
of modes, "  that you grant one may come to certainty 
of knowledge in the case ;  but not a certainty by ideas, 
but  by  a  consequence  of  reason  deduced  from  the 
ideas  we  have  by  our  senses."  This,  my lord,  you 
have said, and thus you have more  than once opposed 
reason and ideas as inconsistent; which I should be very 
glad to see proved once, after these several occasions I 
have given your lordship, by excepting against that sup- 
position.  But since the word idea has the ill luck to be 
so constantly opposed by your lordship to reason, permit 
me, if you please, instead of it, to put what I mean by 
it, viz. the immediate  objects  of the mind  in thinking 
(for that is it  which I would signify by the word ideas) 
and then let us  see how your  answer will  run.  You 
grant, that from the sensible modes of bodies,  we may 
come to a certain knowledee, that there are bodily sub- 
stances; but this you say is not a certainty by the im- 
mediate objects of the mind in thinking, "  but by a con- 
sequence of  reason  deduced  from  the  immediate ob- 
jects of the mind  in  thinking, which we  have  by our 
senses."  When you  can  prove  that we  can  have  a 
certainty by a consequence of  reason, which  certainty 
shall not also be by the immediate objects of the mind 
in using its reason ; you may say such certainty is not 
by icieas,  but by  consequence  of  reason.  But that I 
believe will not  be,  till you  can show, that the mind 
can think, or reasorl,  or  know, without immediate ob- 
jects of thinking, reasoning, or knowing ;  all which ob- 
jects,  as your lordship knows, I call ideas. 
You subjoin, "  and this can never prove that we have 
certainty by ideas, where the ideas themselves are not 
clear  and  distinct."  The question is  not  " whether 
we can have certainty by ideas that are not clear and 
distinct ?'or whether  my  words  (if  by  the  particle 
this  you  mean my words  set down in  the  foregoing 
page) prove any such thing,  which I humbly conceive 
they do not: but whether  certainty by reason be  ex- 
cluded from the certainty under debate ? which I hum- 
bly conceive you have not from my words, or any other 
way, proved. 
3. The third sort of propositions that your lordship 
excludes, are those whose certaii~ty  we know by remem- 
brance: but in these two the agreement or disagreement 
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indeed, as it was at first, by an actual view of the con- 
nexion of all the intermediate ideas, whereby the agree- 
ment or disagreement of those in the proposition was at 
first percei~ed  ; but by other intermediate  ideas, that 
show the agreement or disagreement of  the ideas con- 
tained  in  the  proposition,  whose  certainty  we  re- 
member. 
As in the instance you here make use of, viz. that the 
three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones: 
the certainty of which proposition we know by remem- 
brance, ': though the demonstratiou hath  slipt  out of 
our minds ;"  but we  know it in a  different way from 
what your  lordship supposes.  The agreement of the 
two ideas, as joined  in  that proposition, is  perceived ; 
but it is by the intervention of  other ideas than those 
which at first produced that perception.  I remember, 
i. e. I know  (for  remembrance  is  but the reviving of 
some past  knowledge)  that I was once  certain  of the 
truth of this proposition, that the three angles of  re tri- 
angle are equal to two right ones.  The immutability 
ofthe same relations  between thesame immutable things, 
is now the idea that shows me, that if the three angles 
of a triangle were once  equal  to two right ones, they 
will always be equal to two right ones ; and hence I 
come to be certain, that what was once true in the case, 
is  always  true; what  ideas  once  agreed, will  always 
agree ;  and consequently what I once knew to be true, 
I shall always know to be true as long as I can remem- 
ber that I once knew it. 
Your lordship says,  <'  that the debate between us is 
about  certainty of  knowledge,  with  regard  to  some 
proposition whose ideas are to be compared as to their 
agreement or disagreement :" out  of  this debate, you 
say, certainty by sense, by reason, and by remembrance, 
is to be  excluded.  I desire you  then, my lord, to tell 
what  sort  of  propositions  will  be within  the debate, 
and to name me  one  of  them ; if  propositions,  whose 
certainty we  know by sense, reason, or remembrance, 
are excluded. 
However, from what you have said concerning them, 
your 1ol:dship in the next paragraph conclucles them out 
of the question ;  your words are, "  these things then 
being out of the question." 
Out of what question, I beseech you, my lord? The 
question here, and that of your own proposing to be de- 
fended in the affirmative is  this,  &'  whether those who 
offer  at clear  and distinct ideas  bid  much  fairer for 
certainty than I do ?"  And how  certainty by sense, by 
reason, and by remembrance comes  to have  any par- 
ticular exception in reference to this question, it is my 
misfortune not to be able to find. 
But your  lordship, leaving  the examination of the 
question under debate, by a new state of the question, 
would  pin  upon  me what  I never  said.  Your words 
are, "  these things then being put out of the question, 
which belong  not  to it ; the question truly stated is, 
whether we  can attain to any certainty of knowledge 
as to the truth of a  proposition  in  the way of  ideas, 
where the ideas themselves, by which we came to that 
certainty, be not clear and distinct."  With submission, 
rny  lord, that which I say in the point is,  that we may 
be certain of the truth of a  proposition concerning an 
idea which  is  not  in  all its parts clear and distinct; 
and therefore  if your  lordship will  have  any question 
with me  concerning this  matter, "  the question truly 
stated is,  whether we  can  frame any proposition con- 
cerning  a  thing whereof we  have but an obscure and 
confused idea, of whose truth we can be certain ?" 
That this is the question, you will easily agree, when 
you will give yourself the trouble  to look back to the 
rise of it. 
Your lordship having found out a strange sort of men, 
who had broached "  a doctrine which supposed that we 
must  have  clear  and  distinct  ideas  of  whatever  we 
pretend  to a  certainty of  in our minds,"  was pleased 
for this to call them  <'  the gentlemen of a new way of 
reasaning,"  and  to  make  me  one  of  them.  I  an- 
swered,  that I placect  not  certainty only in  clear and 
distinct ideas,  and so  ought  not  have been  made one 
of them, being not guilty of what made "  a gentleman 
of this  new way of  reasoning."  It is pretended still, 
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know now whether I am or  no, it must  be  considered 
what you lay to their charge, as the consequence of that 
opinion ; and that is, that upon this ground "  we can- 
not come to any certainty that there is  such  a thing 
as substance."  This' appears by more places than one. 
Your lordship  asks, "  how is  it possible  that we may 
be  certain that  chere  are  both  bodily  and  spiritual 
substances,  if  our  reason  depend  upon  clear  and di- 
stinct ideas ?"  And again, "  how come we  to be  cer- 
tain that there  are  spiritual  substances in  the world, 
since we can have no clear  and distinct ideas concern- 
ing them ?"  And your  lordship having set down some 
words out of my book, as if they were inconsistent with 
my principle  of  certainty  founded  only in  clear  and 
distinct ideas, you  say, "  from whence  it follows that 
we may be certain of the being of a spiritual substance, 
though we have no clear and distinct ideas of it." 
Other places might be produced, but  these are  enough 
to show, that those who  held  clear  and distinct ideas 
necessary to certainty, were accused  to extend it thus 
far, that  where any idea was obscure and confused, there 
no proposition  could be made concerning it, of whose 
truth we could be certain ;  u. g. we could not be certain 
that there was in the world such a thing as substance, 
because  we  had  but  an  obscure  and  confused  idea 
of it. 
In  this sense therefore I denied that clear and distinct 
ideas were necessary to  certainty, v. g. I denied it to be 
my doctrine, that where an idea was obscure and con- 
fused, there no proposition  could be made  oncerning 
it, of whose truth we could be certain.  For I held we 
might be certain of the truth of  this proposition, that 
there was substance in the world, though we have but 
an obscure and confused  idea of substance :  and your 
lordship endeavoured to prove we could not, as may be 
seen  at, large in that 10th chapter  of  your Vindica- 
tion, &c. 
From all which,  it is evident, that the question be- 
tween us truly stated is this, whether we can attain cer- 
taintyof the truth of a proposition concerning any thing 
whereof we have but an obscure and confused idea ? 
This being the question, the first thing you say is, 
that Des Cartes was of your opinion against me.  Ans. 
If the question were to be decided by authority, I had 
rather it should be by your lordship's than Des Cartes's : 
and  therefore I should  excuse  myself  to you, as  not 
having ileeded, that you should have added his autho- 
rity to yours, to shame me into a submission ; or that 
you should have been at the pains to have transcribed 
so much out of  him, for my sake, were it fit for me  to 
hinder the display of  the riches of your lordship's  uni- 
versal reading ;  wherein T doubt not but I should take 
pleasure myself, if I had it to show. 
I come therefore to what I think your lordship prin- 
cipally aiined  at; which,  as I hi~mbly  conceive,  was 
to show out of  my book, that I founded certainty only 
on clear and distinct ideas.  '(  And yet,"  as you say, '' I 
liave complail?ecl of your lordship in near twenty places 
of my second letter, charging this upon me.  By this 
the world will judge  of  the justice of my complaints, 
and the consistency of my notion of ideas." 
Answ.  What  c'  consistency of my notion  of ideas" 
has  to do  here, 1 know not; for  I  do not remember 
that I made any complaint concerning that.  But sup- 
posing  my  complaints  were  ill-grounded  in  this  oilc 
case concerning certainty, yet they might be reasonable 
in  other  points;  and  therefore,  with  submission,  I 
humbly conceive the inference was  a  little too large, 
to coilclude from this particular against my complaint 
in general. 
111 the next place I answer, that supposing the places 
which your lordship  brings  out of my book did prove 
what they do not, viz. that I founded certainty only in 
clear and distinct ideas, yet my complaints in the case 
are very just.  For your  lordship  at first brought me 
into the  controversy,  and made  me one of  cc  the gea- 
tlemen  of  tlrc  new  way  of  reasoning,"  for  founding 
all certainty on clear  and  distinct  ideas, only upon  a 
bare  supposition  that I  did  so; which  I tlrink  your 
lordship confesses in these words, where you say,  that 
you do not deny but the first occasion of your charge, 
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necessary  in  order  to  any  certainty  in  our minds; 
and that the only way to attain this certainty, was the 
comparing  these,  i.  e.  clear  and  distinct ideas,  to- 
gether:  but to prove  this,  my words,"  your  lordship 
says,  were produced, and my principles  of  certainty 
laid  down,  and  none  else."  Answ.  It is  strange, 
that when my principles  of  certainty were laid down, 
this (if  I held it) was not found among them.  Having 
looked therefore, I do not find in that place, that any 
words  or  principles  of  mine  were  produced to prove 
that I held, that the only way to attain certainly was 
by  comparing  only clear  and distinct  ideas; so  that 
all that then made me one of the gentlemen of the new 
way of reasoning, was only your supposing that I sup- 
posed that clear and distinct ideas are necessary to cer- 
tainty.  And therefore I had then, and have still, reason 
to complain, that your  lordship brought  me into this 
controversy  upon  so  slight grounds, which I  humbly 
conceive will always show it to have proceeded not so 
much from any thing you had then found in my book, 
as from a great willingness in your lordship at any rate 
to do it; and  of  this  the  passages which  you  have 
here now produced  out of  my Essay,  are  an evident 
proof. 
For if your lordship had then known any thing that 
seemed  so  much  to your  purpose, "  when  you  pro- 
duced,  as you  say,  my  words  and  my  principles  to 
prove,"  that I held  clear  and distinct  ideas necessary 
to certainty; it cannot be believed that you would have 
omitted these passages, either then  or in your answer 
to  my first letter, and deferred them to this your answer 
to my second.  These passages  therefore  now quoted 
here by your lordship, give me leave, my lord, to sup- 
pose have been by a new and diligent search found out, 
and are now at last brought  "post factum"  to give 
some  colour  to  your  way  of  proceeding  with  me; 
though these  passages  being,  as I suppose,  then  un- 
known to you, they could not he the ground of making 
me one of  those who place certainty only in clear and 
distinct ideas. 
Let  11s  come  to  the  passages  themselves,  and  see 
what help they afford you. 
The first words you  set down  out of  my Essay are 
these :  a  the mind not being certain of the truth of that 
it  doth  not  evidently  know*."  From  these  words, 
that which I infer in that place is, "  that therefore the 
mind is bound in such cases to gi: e up its assent to an 
unerring  testimony."  But your  lordship  from  them 
infers here, "  therefore I make clear ideas necessary to 
certainty;"  or therefore, by considering the inimediate 
of the mind  in  thinking, we cannot be certain 
that substance  (whereof we have an  obscure and csn- 
fi~sed  idea) doth exist.  I shall  leave your lordship to 
make good this  consequence ~vlien  you  think  fit, and 
proceed to the next passage you allege, which you say 
provesit more plainly.  I believe it will be thought it 
should be proved  more  plainly, or  else  it will  not  be 
proved at all. 
This plainer proof is out of B. iv. c. 4.  $ 8, in  these 
words : '' that which  is  requisite to make  our  know- 
ledge  certain, is  the clearness  of our  ideas."  Answ. 
The certainty here spoken of, is the certainty of general 
propositions  in  morality,  and  not  of  the particular 
existence of any thing ; and therefore tends  not at alI 
to any such position as this, that we cannot be certaiil 
of the existence of any particular sort of  bein::,  ihougli 
we have but an obscure and confused idea of it: though 
it doth affirm, that we cannot have any certain percep- 
tion of  the relations of general moral  ideas  (wherein 
consists the certainty of general moral propositions) any 
farther than those ideas are clear  in our minds.  And 
that this  is  so, I refer  my reader  to that chapter for 
satisfaction. 
Tile  thirri  place produced  by your  lordship  out of 
B. ir. c.  12. $ 14,  is,  6c for  it being  evident  that our 
Lnowl~dge  cannot exceed  our  ideas; where they are 
either  imperfect, confused,  or  obscure, wc  cannot ex- 
i'c~t to  ];are  certain,  perfect,  or  clear  knowledge." 
lo  ill~deratand  thebe words aright, we moat sec in what 
place t1lry staod, and that is  in  n  cllnptcr of tlw  im- 
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provement of our knowledge, and therein are brought 
as a reason  to show how necessary it is, "  for the en- 
larging of  our  knowledge,  to get  and  settle in our 
minds, as  far  as we  can, clear,  distinct, and constant 
ideas  of  those  things  we would  consider  and know." 
The reason whereof there given, is this :  that as far as 
they  are either imperfect,  confused,  or  obscure,  we 
cannot expect to have  certain, perfect,  or clear know- 
ledge;  i, e. that our  knowlege will  not  be  clear  and 
certain  so  far as  the idea is  imperfect  and obscure. 
Which will  not  at all reach your  lordship's  purpose, 
who would argue, that because I say our  idea of sub- 
stance is  obscure  and  confused,  therefore,  upon  my 
grounds, we cannot know that such a thing as substance 
exists ;  because I placed  certainty  only in  clear  and 
distinct ideas.  Now to this I answered, that I did not 
place  all certainty  only  on  clear  and distinct  ideas, 
in such a sense as  that ;  and therefore,  to avoid being 
mistaken, I said, "  that my notion of certainty by ideas 
is,  that  certainty  consists  in  the  perception  of  the 
agreement or disagreement of ideas ;  such as we have, 
whether  they  be  in  all  their  parts perfectly  clear 
and distinct or no :" vie. if they are clear and distinct 
enough to be  capable of  having  their  agreement or 
disagreement  with  any  other  idea perceived,  so  far 
they are capable of  affording us knowledge, though at 
the same time they are so obscure and confused, as that 
there are other ideas, with which we can by no means 
so  compare  them, as to perceive  their  agreement  or 
disagreement with them.  This was  the clearness and 
distinctness which I denied to be necessary to certainty. 
If your lordship mould have done me the honour to 
have  considered  what I  understood  by  obscure and 
confused  ideas, and what  every one  must  understand 
by them, who thinks clearly  and distinctly concerning 
them,  I am  apt to  imagine  you  would  have  spared 
yourself the trouble of raising this question, and omitted 
these quotations out of my book, as not serving to your 
lordship's  purpose. 
The fourth passage,which you seem to lay most stress 
on, proves  as  little  to your  purpose  as either  of  the 
former  three : the  words  are  these ; "  but  obscure 
and  confused ideas  can never  produce any clear  and 
certain knowledge, because as far as any ideas are con- 
fused or obscure,  the mind can never  perceive clearly 
whether they agree or no."  The latter part of  these 
words  are a plain  interpetation of  the former,  and 
show  their meaning  to be  this,  viz.  our obscure  and 
confused  ideas,  as  they stand in  contradistinction to 
clear and distinct, have all of them something in them, 
wlrereby they are kept from being wholly imperceptible 
and  ~erfectly  confounded with  all  other ideas, and so 
theiL agreement or disagreement,  with  at least  some 
other ideas,  may  be  perceived,  and  thereby produce 
certainty, though they are obscure and confused ideas. 
But so far as they are obscure and confused, so that their 
agreement or disagreement cannot be perceived,  so far 
they cannot produce certainty;  v. g. the idea of  sub- 
stance is clear and distinct enough to have its agreement 
with that of  actual existence perceived:  but yet it is 
so far obscure and confused, that there be a great niany 
other ideas, with which, by reason of its obscurity and 
confusedness, we  cannot compare it so as to produce 
such a perception ;  and in all those cases we necessarily 
conle  short  of  certainty.  And  that this  was  so,  and 
that I meant so, I humbly conceive you could  not but 
have seen, if you had given yourself the trouble to re- 
flect on  that  passage  which  you  qaoted,  vie. '' that 
certainty consists  in the perception  of  the agreement 
or  disagreement  of  ideas,  such as we  have,  whether 
they be  in  all their parts perfectly clear  and distinct 
0'  no."  To which,  what  your  lordship  has  here 
brought  out of  the second  book  of  my  Essay,  is  no 
manner  of  contradiction; unless it be  a contradiction 
to say,  that an idea, which  cannot  be well  compared 
with  some  ideas,  from  which  it  is  not  clearly  and 
sufficiently distinguishable, is yet capable of having its 
agreement or disagreement perceived  with some other 
idea,  with  uhich it is  not so confounded,  but that it 
be colnpared:  and therefore I had, and hare still 
reason to complain of  your lordship, for charging that 
'Pan me, ivhicli I never said nor meant. 
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To  make this yet more visible, give me leave to make 
use of  au instance in the object of  the eyes in seeing, 
from whence the metaphor of  obscure and confused is 
trnnsferred to ideas, the objects of the mind in thinking. 
There is no object which the eye sees, that can be said 
to be perfectly obscure, for then it would not be seen at 
all ;  nor perfectly confused, for then it could not be di- 
stiuguished from any other, no not from a clearer.  For 
example, one sees in the dusk something of  that shape 
and size, that a man in that degree of light and distance 
would appear.  This is not so obscure, that he sees no- 
thing;  nor so  confused, that he  cannot distinguish it 
from a steeple or a star ;  but is so obscure, that he can- 
not, though it be a statue, distinguish it from a man ; 
and therefore, in regard of  a  man,  it can produce no 
clear and distinct knowledge : but yet as obscure and 
confused an idea as it is, this hinders not but that there 
may many propositions be made concerning it, as par- 
ticularly that it exists, of  the truth of  which we may 
be certain.  And that without any contradiction to what 
I  say in my  Essay,  viz.  'c  that obscure  and confused 
ideas  can never  prod~t-e  any clear and certain know- 
ledge ; because as far 2s they are confused or obscure, 
the minct  cannot perceive  clearly whether  they agree 
or no."  This reason that I there give plainly limiting it 
only to knomledgc,  whcre the obscurity and confusion 
is such, that it h~nders  the perception of  agreement or 
disagreement, which is not so great in any obscure and 
confused idea, but that there are some other ideas, with 
which  it niay be perceived  to agree or disagree,  and 
there it is capable to produce certainty in us. 
And thus I am coine to the end of  your defence of 
your first answer, as you call it, and desire the reader 
to consider how much, in the eight pages employed in 
it, is  said to defend this proposition, "  that those who 
offer  at clear  and distinct ideas,  bid  much  fairer  for 
certainty than I do ?" 
But your  lordship  having,  under  this head,  taken 
occasion to examine my making clear and distinct ideas 
necessary to certainty, I crave  leave to consider  here 
what you say of  it in another place.  I find one argu- 
ment  more  to  prove,  that I place  certainty onIy  in 
clear and distinct ideas.  Your  lordship tells me, and 
bids me  observe my own words,  that I positively say, 
6c that the mind not being certain of  the truth of that 
it doth not  evidently know : so that,"  says your lord- 
ship, "it is plain here, that I place certainty in evident 
knowledge,  or  in  clear  and  distinct  ideas,  and  yet 
my  great  complaint  of  your  lordship  was,  that you 
charged this  upon  me,  and now  you  find  it in  my 
own words."  Answer.  I do observe  my  own  words, 
but do  not  find  in  them "  or  in  clear  and  distinct 
ideas,"  though your  lordship  has set these  down  as 
my words.  I there indeed say, 'c  the mind  is not cer- 
tain of what it does not  evidently know."  Whereby 
I place certainty, as your lordship says, only in evident 
knowledge ;  but evident knowledge may be had in the 
clear and evident perception of  the agreement or dis- 
agreement of ideas, though some of  them should not 
be in all their parts perfectly clear and distinct, as is 
evident in this proposition, "  that substance does exist." 
But you give not off this matter so : for these words 
of mine  above quoted by your lordship, viz.  6c it being 
evident that our knowledge  cannot exceed our ideas, 
where  they  are imperfect,  confused,  or  obscure,  we 
cannot expect to have certain,  perfect, or clear know- 
ledge ;" your lordship has here up again : and there- 
upon charge it on me as a contradiction, that confessing 
our ideas to be imperfect, confused, and obscure, I say 
1 do not yet place certainty in clear and distinct ideas. 
Answer.  The reason is plain, for I do not say that all 
our ideas  are imperfect,  confused,  and obscure;  nor 
that obscure and confused ideas are in all their parts 
SO  obscure and confused,  that  no  agreement .or dis- 
agreement  between  them  and any  other idea  can be 
perceived;  and therefore  my confession of  imperfect, 
obscure, and confused ideas takes not away ~ll  know- 
ledge, even concerning those very ideas. 
But, says your lordship, '<  can certainty he had with 
imperfect  and obscure ideas,  and yet  no  certainty he 
had by them?"  Add if yo11  please,  my  lord [by  those 
~2 244  Mr. LocX~e's  second Rep4 
parts of  them which  are obscure  anti confused]:  and 
then the question will be right put, and have this easy 
answer:  Yes,  my  lord; and  that  without  any  con- 
tradiction, because an idea that is not in all its parts 
perfectly clear and distinct, and is therefore an obscure 
and  confused  idea,  may  yet  with  those  ideas,  with 
which,  by  any obscurity it has,  it is not  confounded, 
be:  capable: to produce knowledge by the perception of 
its agreement or disagreement with them.  And yet it 
will hold true, that in that part wherein it is imperfect, 
obscure, and confused,  we  cannot expect to have cer- 
tain, perfect, or clear knowledge. 
For example : he that has the idea of  a leopard, as 
only of a spotted animal, must be confessed to have but 
a very imperfect,  obscure,  and conf~~sed  idea of  that 
species of animals ; and yet this obscure and conf~~sed 
idea is capable by  a  perception of  the agreement or 
disagreement of the clear part of it, viz. that of animal, 
with several other ideas, to produce certainty :  though 
as far as  the obscure part of it confounds it with  the 
idea of  a lyns, or other spotted  animal,  it can, joined 
with  them,  i11  many  propositions,  produce  no  know- 
leiige. 
This might easily be  understood  to be my meaning 
by these words, which your lordship quotes out of  my 
Essay, viz.  'l that our knowledge consisting in the per- 
ception of  the agreement or disagreement of  any two 
ideas,  its clearness or  obscurity  consists in the clear- 
ness  or  obscurity  of  that perception,  and not  in  the 
clearness or obscurity of  the ideas themselves."  Upon 
which your lordship asks, " how is  it possible  for the 
mind  to have a  clear perception of  the agreement of 
ideas,  if  the  ideas  themselves  be  not  clear  and  di- 
stinct?'  Answer.  Just as the eyes can  have  a clear. 
perception  of  the agreement or  disagreement  of  the 
clear  and  distinct parts  of  a writing, with  the  clear 
parts of another,  though one,  or both  of  them,  be  so 
obscure and blurred in other parts, that the eye cannot 
perceive any agreement or disagreement they have one 
with  another.  And  I  am sorry  that  tl~esc  words  of 
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mine, "  my  notion  of  certainty by  ideas is,  that cer- 
tainty consists  in  the perception of  the agreement or 
disagreement of  ideas, such as we  Ilave, whether they 
be in a11  their parts perfectly clear and distinct or no;" 
were not plain  enough to make your lordship under- 
stand my meaning,  and save you all this new, and, as 
it seems to me, necdlcss trouble. 
In your  15th page,  your  lordship  comes  to  your 
second  of  the three  answers, which  you  say you  had 
given, and would lay together and defend. 
You  say,  (2)  you  answered,  '<  that it is  very  pos- 
sible the author of  Christianity not mysterious might 
mistake  or  misapply  my  notions,  but  there  is  too 
much  reason  to believe  he thought them  the  same; 
and we have no reason to be sorry that he hath given 
me  this occasion  for  the explaining my meaning,  and 
for the vindication  of  myself  in the matters I appre- 
hend  he had  charged 111e  with."  These words  your 
lordship quotes out of your first letter.  But as I have 
already observed, they are not there given as an answer 
to this that you  make me here say; and therefore to 
what purpose you repeat them here is not easy to dis- 
cern, unless  it can  be  thought  that an unsatisfactory 
answer in  one place can become  satisfactory by being 
repeated in another, where it is, as I humbly conceive, 
less to the purpose, and no answer at all.  It  was there 
indeed given as an answer to my saying, that I did not 
place certainty in clear and distinct ideas, which I said 
to show that you  had no reason  to bring me into the 
controversy,  because  the  author  of  Christianity  not 
mysterious placed certainty in clear and distinct ideas. 
To  satisfy me for your doing so, your lordship answers, 
"  that it was very possible that author might mistake 
ar misapply my notions."  A reason indeed, that will 
equally justify  your  bringing  my  book  into  any con- 
troversy :  for there is no author so infallible, write he 
in  what controversy  he pleases,  but it is possible  he 
may mistake, or misapply my notions. 
That was the force of  this pour lordship's  answer in 
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this place  of your second letter, I have not wit enough 
to see.  The remainder of  it I have  answered  in my 
second letter, and therefore cannot but wonder to see 
it repeated  here  again,  without  any notice  taken of 
what I said in  answer to it,  though you  set it down 
here again, as you say, on purpose to defend. 
But all the defence made is only to that part of my 
reply, which you set down as a  fresh complaint that I 
make  in  these  words:  this  can  be  no reason  why 
I should  be joined  with  a  man  that had  misapplied 
my notions,  and that no man hath so much  mistaken 
and  niisapplied  my  notions  as  your  lordship;  and 
therefore I ought rather to be joined with your lord- 
ship."  And  then  you,  with  some  warmth,  subjoin: 
but  is  this  fair and  ingenuous dealing to represent 
this  matter  so, as  if  your  lordship had joined  us  to- 
gether, because he had  misunderstood and misapplied 
my  notions?  Can  I think  your lordship a man of  so 
little sense to make that the reason  of  it  ?"  No,  sir, 
says your  lordship,  '<  it was  because  he  assigned  no 
other grounds but mine,  and that in my own words; 
however,  now  I  would  divert  the meaning  of  them 
another way." 
My lord, I did set down your words at large in my 
second letter, and therefore do not see how I could be 
liable to any charge of  unfair or disingenuous dealing 
in representing the matter:  which I am sure you will 
allow as a proof of my not misrepresenting, since I find 
you  use it yourself  as a sure fence against any such 
accusation;  where  you  tell me,  cc  that you  have  set 
down  my  words  at  large,  that  I  may  not  complain 
that  your  lordship  misrepresents  my  sense."  The 
same answer I must desire my reader to apply for me 
to those pages, where  your lordship makes complaints 
of the like kind with this here. 
The reasons you give for joining me with the author 
of  Christianity not mysterious  are put down verbatim 
as you  gave them; and if they did not give me that 
satisfaction they were designed for, am I to be blamed 
that I did  not find  them better than they were ?  You 
joined me with that author, because he placed certainty 
only in clear and distinct ideas.  I told your lordship 
I did not do so, and therefore that could be no reason 
for your joining me with him.  You  answer,  cc it was 
possible he might mistake or misapply  my notions :" 
so  that our  agreeing in  the notion  of  certainty  (the 
pretended reason for which we were joincd) failing, all 
the reason which  is  left,  and which  you  offer in this 
answer for your joining of  us,  is the possibility of  his 
mistaking my notions.  And I think it a very natural 
inference, that if the mere possibility of any one's mis- 
taking me be a reason for my being  joined  with  him, 
any one's actual mistsking me, is a stronger reason why 
I should be joined  with him.  But if such an inference 
shows (more than you would have it)  the satisfactoriness 
and force of your answer, I hope you will not be angry 
with me, if I cannot change the nature of  things. 
Your lordship indeed adds in that place, that  there 
is too much reason to believe that the author thought 
his notions and mine the same." 
Answer.  When your  lordship  shall  produce  that 
reason, it will be seen whether it were too much or too 
little.  Till it is produced, there appears no reason at 
all ;  and such concealed reason, though it may be too 
much,  can  be  supposed,  I think,  to give  very  little 
satisfaction to me or any body else in the case. 
But to make good what you have said in your answer, 
your  lordship here replies, that " you  did  not join  us 
together,  because  he  had  misunderstood  and misap- 
plied my notions."  Answer.  Neither did I say, that 
therefore  you did join  us.  But this  I crave leave to 
say, that all the reason you there gave for your joining 
US  together,  was  the possibility of his  mistaking  and 
misapplying my notions. 
But  your lordship  now  tells  me,  " No,  sir,"  this 
was  not the reason  of  your joining  us; but  it was 
because  he assigned no  other grounds but mine,  and 
in my own  words."  Answer.  My lord, I do not re- 
member  that in that place  you  give this as rt  reason 
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place to what you did not there say,  but to what you 
there did  say.  Now  your lordship does  say it here, 
here I take the liberty to answer it. 
The reason  you now give  for your joining  me with 
that author, is "  because he assigned no other grounds 
but mine ;" which,  however  tenderly expressed,  is  to 
be understood, I suppose, that he did assign my g.roonds. 
Of what,  I  beseech  your lordship,  did  he asslgn  my 
grounds, and in my words? If it were not my grounds 
of certainty, it could be no manner of reason for your 
joining me with hiin ; because the only reason why at 
first you made him (and  me with him)  'c  a gentleman 
of the new way of reasoning, was his supposing clear 
and distinct ideas  necessary to certainty,"  which was 
the opinion that you declared you opposed.  Nuw, my 
lord,  if you  can show  where  that author has in  my 
words assigned my grounds of certainty, there will  be 
some grounds for what you say.  But till your lordship 
does that, it will  be pretty hard to believe  that to be 
the ground of your joining us together;  which, being 
nowhere to be found,  can scarce be thought the true 
reason of your doing it. 
Your lordship adds, "however,  now I would  divert 
the meaning of them  [i.  e.  those  my words]  another 
way. 
Answer.  Whenever  you  are pleased  to set down 
those words of mine,  wherein  that author assigns my 
grounds of certainty, it will be seen how I now divert 
their meaning another  way: till  then,  they must re- 
main with several other  of  your  lordship's  invisible 
"  them,"  which are nowhere to be found. 
But to your asking me, '' whether I can think your 
lordship a  man of that little sense ?"  I crave leave to 
reply,  that I hope it must not be concluded,  that as 
often as in your way of writing I meet with any thing 
that does not seem to me satisfactory, and I endeavour 
to show that it does  not prove what it is made use of 
for,  that I prescntly "  think  your lordship a man of 
little  sense."  This wo~~ld  be  a very hard  r~lle  in de- 
fending one's  sclf; especially for mc, against so great 
and learned a man, whose reasons and meaning it is not, 
I find, always easy for so  mean a capacity as mine to 
and therefore I have taken great care to set dowil 
your words in most places,  to secure myself  from the 
imputation of misrepresenting your sense, and to leave 
it fairly before the reader to judge, whether I mistake 
it, and how far I am to be blamed if I do.  And I would 
have set down your whole letter page by page as I an- 
swered it, ~vould  not that have made my book too big. 
If I must write under this fear, that you apprehend I 
think meanly of you, as often as I think any reason you 
make use of is not satisfactory in the point it is brought 
for; the causes of  uneasiness would return too often, 
and it would be better once for all to conclude your 
lordship infallible, and acquiesce in whatever you say, 
than in every page to be so rude as to tell your lord- 
ship, "  I think you have little sense ;"  if that be the in- 
terpretation  of  my  endeavouring to show,  that your 
reasons come short anywhere. 
My lord, when you did me the honour to answer my 
first letter (which  I thought might have passed  for n 
submissive  complaint  of  what I  did  not  well  uncler- 
stand, rather than a dispute with your lordship)  you 
were pleased to insert into it direct accusations against 
my book ; which looked as if you had a mind to enter 
into a direct controversy with me.  This condescension 
in your lordship has made me think myself  under the 
protection  of  the laws  of  controversy,  which  allow  n 
free examining and showing the weakness  of  the rca- 
sons  brought by  the other side,  without  any offence. 
If this be not permitted me, I must confess I have been 
mistaken, and have been guilty in answering you any 
thing at all : for how to answer without answering, 1 
do not know. 
I wish you had never writ any thing that I was par 
titularly concerned to examine ;  and what I have been 
concerned to examine, I wish it had given me no occa- 
sion  for any other answer,  but an admiration of  the 
manner  and justness  of  your corrections,  and an ac- 
knowledgment  of  an  increase  of  that  great opinion 
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not  expected  from  me  in  this  debate,  that I  should 
admit as good and conclusive all that drops from your 
pen, for fear of causing so much displeasure as you seem 
here to have upon this occasion, or for fear you shoultl 
object to me the presumption of  thinking you had but 
little  sense,  as  often  as  P endeavoured  to show that 
what you say is of little force. 
When those words and grounds of mine are produced, 
that the author of Christianity not n~ysterious  assigned, 
which your lordship thinks a sufficient reason for your 
joining  me with him,  in  opposing the doctrine of  the 
Trinity ; I shall consicier then?, arid endeavour to give 
you satisfaction  about them, as well as I have already 
concerning those ten lines, which you  have more than 
once quoted out of  him,  as taken out of  my book, and 
which is all that your lordship has produced out of him 
of that kind :  in all which there is not one syllable of 
clear  and  distinct  ideas,  or  of  certainty  founded  in 
them.  In the  mean  time,  in  answer to your  other 
question, "  but is this fair and ingenuous dealing?"  I 
refer my reader to my second letter, where he may see 
at large all this whole  matter, and all the i~nfairness 
and disingenuity of  it, which I submit to him, to judge 
whether  for  any fault of  that kind  it ought to have 
drawn on me the marks of so much displeasure. 
Your  lordship  goes  on  here,  and  tells  me,  that 
"  although  you  were  willing  to allow  me  all reason- 
able occasions for  my own vindication,  as appears by 
your words ; yet you were sensible enough that I had 
given too just an occasion to apply them in that man- 
ner, as appears by the next page." 
What was it, 1  beseech you,  my lord, that I was to 
vindicate  myself  from, and what was those " them" I 
had given too just an occasion to apply in that manner; 
and what was that manner  they were applied in,  and 
what  was  the occasion  they  were  so  applied?  For 
I can find none of all these in that next page to which 
your lordship refers me.  When those are set down, the 
world will be better able to  judge of the reason you had 
to join me after the manner you did.  However, saying, 
my lord,  without  proving,  I  humbly  conceive,  is  but 
saying ; and in such personal  matter so turned, shows. 
more the disposition of the speaker, than any ground for 
what is said.  Your lordship, as a proof of your great 
care of me, tells me at  the top of that page, that you had 
said so much, that nothing could  be  said more for my 
vindication : and, before you come to the bottom of it, 
you labour to persuade the world, that I have need to 
vindicate myself.  Another possibly,  who could find in 
his heart to say two such things, would have taken care 
they should not have stood in the same page, where the 
juxta-position  might enlighten them too much, and sur- 
prise the sight.  But possibly your lordship is so well 
satisfied of the world's  readiness  to believe  your pro- 
fessions of good-will to me, as a mark whereof you tell 
me here of your willingness " to allow me all reason- 
able occasions to vindicate  myself;"  that nobody can 
see any thing but kindness in whatever you say, though 
it appears in so different shapes. 
In the following words,  your lordship accuses me of 
too nice a piece of criticism;  and tells me it looks like 
chicaning.  Answ.  I did  not  expect,  in a  controversy 
begun and managed as this which your lordship has been 
pleased  to have with me,  to be  accused of chicaning, 
without  great  provocation ; because  the mentioning 
that word might perhaps raise in the reader's mind some 
odd thoughts which were better spared.  But this accu- 
sation made me look back  into the places you quoted 
in the margent, and there find the matter to  stand thus: 
To a pretty large quotation set down out of the post- 
script to my first letter,  you  subjoin;  cc  which words 
seem to express so much of  a Christian spirit and tem- 
per, that your lordship cannot believe I intended to  give 
any advantage to the enemies of the Christian faith; but 
whether there hath not been  too just  an occasion for 
them to apply '  them'  in  that manner is  a  thing very 
fit for me to consider." 
In my answer, I take notice  that the term 6c them," 
in this passage of your lordship's,  can in the ordinary 
Construction of our language be applied to nothing but 
<I  which words"  in  the beginning of  that passage,  i.  e. 
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ship calls chicaning,  and  gives  this  reasqn for it, viz. 
6c  because any one that reads without a design to cavil, 
would easily interpret 'them'  of my words and notions 
about which  tlie  debate was."  Answ.  That any one 
that reads  that  passage,  with  or  without  clesign  to 
cavil, coulcl  hardly make it intelligible without inter- 
preting" them" so, I readily grant ; but that it is easy 
for me or any body to interpret any one's  meaning con- 
trary to the necessary construction and plain import of 
the words,  that I crave  leave  to deny.  I am sure it 
is not chicaning to presume that so great an author as 
your lordship writes according to  the rules of grammar, 
and as another man writes,  who understands our lan- 
guage,  and would be understood : to do the contrary, 
would be a presumption liable to blame, and might de- 
serve the name of  chicaning  and cavil.  And  that in 
this case it was not easy to avoid the interpreting the 
term "  them" as I did, the reason you give why I should 
have done it, is a farther proof.  Your lordship, to  show 
it was  easy,  says,  cc the postscript  comes  in but as a 
parenthesis :"  now I challenge  any one living to show 
me where in that place the parenthesis must begin,  and 
where end, which can make "  them" applicable to any 
thing,  but the words  of  my postscript.  I have  tried 
with more care and pains than is usually required of a 
reader in such cases, and cannot, Imust own, find where 
to make a breach in the thread of your discourse, with 
the imaginary parenthesis,  which  your lorclship men- 
tions, and was not, I suppose, omitted by the  pririter for 
want of marks to print it.  And if this, which you give 
as the  key, that opens to the interpretation that I should 
have made, be so hard to be found, the interpretation 
itself could not be so very easy as you speak of. 
But  to  avoid all blame for understanding that passage 
as I did, and to secure myself from being suspected to 
seek a subterfuge in the natural import of your words, 
against what might be conjecturecl to be your sense, I 
added, "  but if by any new way of  construction, unin- 
telligible  to me,  the  word  them'  here shall  be  ap- 
plied  to any passages of  my Essay of Human Under- 
standing; I must  llutnbly crave  leave  to observe this 
one thil~g,  in tlie whole  course of what your lordship 
has designed  for my satisfaction, that though my com- 
plaint  be  of  your lordship's  manner of applying what 
I had published in my Essay,  so as to interest me in a 
controversy  wherein I  meddled  not;  yet  your  lord- 
ship all along tells me of others,  that have misapplied 
I know not what words in  my book,  after I know not 
what manner.  Now as to this matter, I beseech your 
lordship to believe  that when  any one in such a man- 
ner  applics  my  words  contrary to what I intended 
them, so as to make then] opposite to the doctrine of 
the Trinity, and me a party in that controversy against 
the Trinity,  as your lordship knows I complain  your 
lordship has done ; I shall  complain  of them too,  and 
consider, as well as I can,  what satisfaction  they give 
me  and  others  in  it."  This  passage  of  mine  your 
lordship here represents thus, viz. that I say, that if by 
an unintelligible  new  way  of  constructioll  the word 
"  them" be applied to any passages in my book, what 
then?  Why then, whoever they are, I intend to com- 
plain of them too.  But,  says your lordship, the words 
just  before  tell  me who they are,  viz.  the enemies of 
the  Christian  faith.  And  then  your  lordship  asks, 
whether this be all that I intend, viz.  only to cnmplain 
of  them  for  making  me  a  party in the  controversy 
against the Trinity ? 
My lord, were I given to chicaning, as you call my 
being stopt by faults of grammar that disturb the sense, 
and make the discourse incoherent and unintelligible, if 
we are to take it from the words as they are, I shoultl 
not want matter enough for such an exercise of my pen ; 
as for example, here again, where your lordship makes 
me  say,  that  if  the word "them"  be  applied to any 
passages in my book, then whoever they are, I intend to 
complain, &c,  These being set down for my words, I 
would be very glad to be able to put them into a gram- 
matical construction, and make to inyself an  intelligible 
Sense of them.  But "they"  being  not  a word  that I 
have  an absolute  power over,  to place where and for 
what I will,  I confess  I  cannot  do it.  For the term 
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down, having nothing that it can refer to, but passages, 
or "them,"  which  stand for words, it must be a very 
sudden metamorphosis that must change them into per- 
sans, for it is for persons that the word "  they" stands 
here;  and yet I crave leave to say, that as far as I un- 
derstand English,  "  they"  is  a  word  cannot  be used 
without  reference  to  something  mentioned  before. 
Your lordship tells me, "  the words just before tell me 
who they are."  The words  just mentioned before are 
these ;  if by an unintelligible new way of  construc- 
tion the word  them'  be  applied  to  any  passage  of 
my book :"  for it is to some words before indeed,  but 
before  in the same contexture of  discourse,  that the 
word '(  theyY'  must refer, to make it anywhere intelli- 
gible.  But here are no persons mentioned in the words 
just before, though your lordship tells me the words just 
before show who they are; but this just before,  where 
the persons are mentioned whom your lordship intends 
by '6  they" here, is so far off,  that sixteen pages of your 
lordship's letter, one hundred and seventy-four  pages 
of my second  letter,  and above one hundred pages of 
your lordship's  first letter come between :  so that one 
must read above two hundred and  eighty pages from the 
enemies of the  Christian faith, in your first letter, before 
one can come to the "they"  which refers to them here 
in your lordship's  second letter. 
My lord, it is my  misfortune,  that I cannot pretend 
to any figure amongst the men of learning; but I would 
not for that reason  be  rendered  so  despicable, that I 
could not write ordinary sense in my own language ; I 
must beg leave  therefore  to inform  my reader,  that 
what your lordship has set down here as mine, is neither 
my words, nor my sense.  For, 
1. I say not, "  if  by  any unintelligible new way of 
construction ;" but I say, "  if by any new way of con- 
struction unintelligible  to me :"  which  are  far  dif- 
ferent expressions.  For that may be very intelligible 
to others, which may be unintelligible to me.  And in- 
deed, my lord, there are so many passages in your writ- 
ings in this controversy with  me,  which for their con- 
struction, as well as otherwise,  are so unintelligible to 
me,  that if I should  be  so  unmannerly as to measure 
your  understanding by mine, I should not know what 
to think of them.  In those cases therefore, I presume 
not  to go beyond my own capacity :  I tell your lordship 
often (which I hope modesty will permit) what my weak 
will not reach ;  but I am far from saying 
it  is therefore absolutely unintelligible.  I leave to others 
the benefit of their better judgments, to be enlightened 
by your lordship where I am not. 
2. The  use your lordship here makes of these words, 
66 but if by any new way of construction unintelligible 
to me,  the word  'them'  be  applied  to any passages 
in  my book;"  is  not  the principal,  nor  the only (as 
your lordship makes it) use for which I said them :  but 
this;  that if  your  lordship  by "them"  in that place 
were to be understood to mean, that there were others 
that misapplied passages of my book ;  this was no satis- 
faction for what  your  lordship  had done in that kind. 
Though this, I observed, was your way of defence ;  that 
when I complained of what your lordship had done, you 
told  me, that others had done so too : as if that could 
be  any manner  of  satisfaction.  I added in the close, 
"that when any one in such a manner applies my words 
contrary  to what  I intended  them,  so  as to  make 
them opposite to the doctrine of  the Trinity, and me 
a  party  in  that controversy  against  the  Trinity,  as 
your  lordship  knows  I complain  your  lordship  has 
done ; I shall complain of  them too,  and consider, as 
well  as I can,  what  satisfaction  they  give  me  and 
others  in  it."  Of  this  '(any  one"  of  mine,  your 
lordship  makes  your  forementioned "  they,"  whether 
with any advantage of sense or clearness to my words, 
the reader  must judge.  However, this latter part of 
that passage, with  the particular  turn your  lordship 
gives to it,  is what  your words would  persuade  your 
reader is all that I say here: would not your lordship, 
upon  such  an occasion  from  me,  cry out again,  "is 
this  fair  and  ingenuous  dealing ?"  And  would  not 
You  think  you  had reason to do so ?  But let us  see 
what we must guess your lordship makes me say, and 
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Your  lordship  makes  me say, "whoever  they are," 
who misapply my words,  as I complain your  lordship 
has  done (for these words  must  be supplied, to make 
the sentence to me  intelligible) "I  intend to complain 
of  them  too:"  and then  you  find  fault with  me  for 
using the indefinite word "whoever,"  and as a reproof 
for the unreasonableness of it, you say, "but the words 
just  before  tell  me  who  they  are."  But my  words 
are not, "  whoever they are,"  but my words are, 6C when 
any one in such a manner  applies  my words contrary 
to what I intended them,"  &c.  Your  lordship would 
here have me understand, that there are those that have 
done it, and rebukes  me that I speak as if I knew not 
any one that had done it ;  and that I may not plead ig- 
norance, you say "your  words just before told me who 
they were, viz. the enemies of the Christian faith." 
What must I do now to keep my  word,  and satisfy 
your lordship ?  Must I complain of the enemies of  the 
Christian faith  in  general, that they have  applied my 
words as aforesaid, and then consider, as well as I can, 
what satisfaction they give me and others in it  ?  For that 
was all I promised  to do.  But this would  be strange, 
to complain of  the enemies of  the Christian faith, for 
doing what it is very likely they never all did, and what 
I do not know that any one of them has done.  Or must 
I, to content your  lordship, read over a11  the writings 
of the enemies of the Christian faith, to see whether any 
one 5f them has applied my words, i.  e. in such a man- 
ner as 1  complained your lordship has done, that if they 
have, 1  may complain of them too ?  This truly, my lord, 
is more than I have time for ;  and if it were worth while, 
when it is done, I perceive I should  not  content your 
lordship in it.  For you ask me here, "is this all I in- 
tend,  only  to  complain  of  them  for  making  me  a 
party in the controversy  against the Trinity?"  No, 
my lord, this is not  all.  I promised too,  "to consider 
as well  as I can what satisfaction  (if  they offer  any) 
they  give  me  and  others  for  so  doing."  And  why 
should not this content  your  lordship in  reference to 
others, as well as it does in reference to yourself?  I have 
but ol~c  measure for your lordship and others.  When 
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&hers treat me after the manner you have done, why 
should it not be enough to answer them after the same 
manner I have done your lordship ?  But perhaps your 
lordship has some dexterous meaning under this, which I 
am not quick-sighted enough to perceive,  and so do not 
reply right, as you would have me. 
I must: beg my reader's  pardon as well as your lord- 
ship's for using so many words about passages, that seem 
not of themselves of  that importance.  1  confess, that in 
themselves they are not;  but yet it is  my misfortune, 
that, in this controversy, your way of writing and repre- 
senting my sense forces me to it. 
Your lordship's  name in writing is established above 
control,  and therefore it will  be  ill-breeding  'in one, 
who barely reads what you write, not to take every thing 
for perfect in its kind, which your lordship says.  Clear- 
ness,  and force,  and consistence  are to be  presumed 
always, whatever your lordship's words be :  and there is 
no other remedy for an answerer, 71'110  finds it difficult 
anywhere to come  at your meaning  or argument, but 
to make his excuse for it, in laying the particularsbefore 
the reader, that he may be judge where the fault lies ; 
especially where any matter of fact is contested, deduc- 
tions from the rise are often necessary, which cannot be 
made in few words, nor without several repetitions :  an 
inconvenience possibly fitter to  be  endured, than that 
your lordship, in the run of your learned notions, should 
be  shackled with  the ordinary and strict rules of Ian- 
page  ; and, in the delivery of  your sublimer specula- 
tions, be tied down to the mean and contemptible rudi- 
ments of grammar ;  though your being above these, and 
freed from servile observance in the use of trivial par- 
ticles, whereon the connexion  of  discourse  chiefly de- 
pends, cannot but cause great difiiculties to the reader. 
And however it may be  an ease  to any great man, to 
find himself above the ordinary rules of writing, he who 
is  bound  to  follow  the  connexion,  and  find  out his 
meaning, will have his task much increased by it. 
I am very sensible how much this has swelled these 
Papers already, and yet I do not see how any thing less 
than  what I have said could clear those passages, which 
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we have hitherto esamined,  and set them in their due 
light. 
Your next words are tliese :  "  but whether I have not 
made myself too much  a party in  it [i. e. the contro- 
versy against  the Trinity]  will appear before we have 
clone."  This is  an item  for me,  which your lordship 
seems so very fond of, and so careful to inculcate, where- 
ever you bring in any words it can be tacked to,  that if 
one can avoid thinking it to be  the main end of  your 
writing, one cannot yet but see, that it could not be so 
much in the thoughts and words of a great man, who is 
above such personal mattcrs,  and which he knows the 
world soon grows weary of, unless it had some very par- 
ticular business there.  Whether it be the author that 
has prejudiced you against his book,  or the book  pre- 
judiced you against the author, so it is, I perceive, that 
both I and my Essay are fallen under your displeasure. 
I am not unacquainted what great stress is often laid 
upon invidious narnes  by skilful  disputants,  to supply 
the want of  better arguments.  But give me leave, my 
lord, to say,  that it is too late for me now to begin to 
value those marks of  good-will,  or a good cause ;  and 
therefore I shall say nothing more to them, as fitter to 
be left to the examination of the thoughts within your 
own breast, from what  source  such reasonings spring, 
and whither they tend. 
I am going,  my lord,  to a  tribunal that has a right 
to  judge of thoughts, and being secure  that I there shall 
be found of no party but that of truth (for which there 
is required nothing but the receiving truth in the love 
of it) I matter not much of what party any one shall, as 
may best  serve his  turn, denominate me here.  Your 
lordship's is not the first pen from which I have received 
such strokes as these, without any great harm; I never 
found freedom of style did me any hurt with those who 
knew me, and if those who know me not will take up 
borrowedprejudices, it  will be more to their own harm 
than mine : so that in  this, 1 shall give your lordship 
little other trouble but my thanks sometimes,  where I 
find you skilfully and industriously recommending me 
to the world, under the character you have chosen for 
me.  Only give me  leave to say, that if  the Essay I 
shall leave behind me hat11 no other fault to sink it but 
heresy and inconsistency with the articles of the Chri- 
stian faith, I am apt to think it will last in the world, 
and do service lo truth, even the truths of  religion, not- 
withstanding that imputation laid on it by so mighty a 
hand as your lordship's. 
In your two next  paragraphs  your lordship accuses 
me of  cavilling in my second letter, whither for short- 
ness T refer my reader.  I shall only add, that though 
in the debate about mysteries of faith, your adversaries, 
as you say, are not heathens;  yet any one among  us 
whom your lordship should speak of, as not owning the 
Scripture to be the foundation and rule of faith, would, 
I presume, be thought to receive from you a character 
very little  different from  that of  a  heathen.  Which 
being a part of your compliment to me,  will, I humbly 
conceive,  excuse what I there  said  from  being  a  ca- 
villing exception. 
Hitherto your lordship, notwithstanding that you un- 
derstood the world so well,  has employed your pen in 
personal matters, how unacceptable soever to the world 
you declare it to be:  how must I behave myself in the 
ease? If I answer nothin$,  my silence is so apt to be in- 
terpreted guilt or concession, that even the deferring my 
answer to some points,  or not giving it in  the proper 
place, is reflected on as no small transgression, whereof 
there  are two examples  in the two following  pages. 
And if 1  do answer so at large, 2,s  your way of writing 
requires,  and as  the matter deserves, I recall to your 
memory the crsprings  of  Modena,  by the ebullition of 
my thoughts."  It is hard, my lord, between these two 
to manage one's self  to your good liking :  however, I 
shall endeavour to collect the force of your reasonings, 
wherever I can find it, as short as I can, and apply my 
answers  to that, though with  the omission of a great 
many incidents deserving to be taken notice of: if my 
~lowness,  not able to keep pace every where with your 
uncommon  flights,  shall  have  missed  any  argument 
whereon you lay any stress; if you   lease to point it out 
s 2 260  Mr. 1,ocke's  second Reply 
to mc, I sliall  not fail to endeavour to give you satis- 
faction thcrcin. 
In  the  nest paragraph your lordship says, "those who 
are not sparing of wnting about  articles of  faith,  and 
among them  take  great  care  to avoicl  some  whicli 
have been  always  esteelnecl  fundan~ental,"  &c.  This 
seems also to contain  something personal in it.  But 
how far I am concerned  in  it I shall know, when you 
shall be pleased  to tell me who those are, ancl then it 
will be time enough for me to answer. 
This is what your lordship has brought in under your 
second answer, in these four pages,  as a defence of it : 
2nd how much of it is a defence of that second answer, 
lct the reader judge. 
I am now come to the  third of those answers,which you 
said you would lay together and defend.  And it  is this : 
'' That my grounds of  certainty tend to scepticism, 
and that in  an age whcrein  the mysteries of faith are 
too much expose0  by the promoters of scepticisill and 
infidelity, it  is a thing of dangerous consequence to start 
such  new  methods  of  certainty,  as  are  apt to leave 
men's  rnincls morc doubtful than before. 
This is what you set down here to be defended :  the 
defence  follows, wherein  your lordship  tells  me that 
I say, '' these  words  contain  a  farther accusation  of 
my book,  which  shall  bc  considered  in its due place. 
But this is  the  proper  place  of  considering it;  for 
your lordship said,  that hereby I have  given too just 
occasion to the enemies of the Christian faith, to make 
use of my words and notions,  as was evidently proved 
from my own concessions.  And if this be so, however 
3'011  were  willing  to have  had me explain  myself  to 
the general satisfaction;  yet since I decline it,  you 
do insist upon it, that I cannot clear myself from laying 
that foundation, which  the author of Christianity not 
mysterious built upon." 
In which  I crave  leave  to acquaint your lordship 
with what I do not understand. 
First,  I do not understand what is meant, by "  this 
is  the proper place ;"  for,  in ordinary  construction, 
these words seem to denote this 20th page of your lord- 
ship's second letter,  n  liicli you were then writing,  tliough 
tile sense would make  me  tliink  the 4Gth page of my 
second letter, whicli you were then answering, should be 
meant.  This perhaps your lordship may tliink a nice 
of criticism ; but till  it be  cleared, I cannot tcll 
what to say in my excuse.  For it is likely your lordship 
would again ask me, n~liether  I could think you a man of 
so little sense,  if I slioulcl  understand  these  words  to 
mean tlie 20th page of J our second lcttcr, which nobody 
can conceive your lordship shou!d  think a proper place 
for me to consider and answer what you had writ i11 your 
first? It  would be ashard to  understand,"  this is," to mean 
a place in my formerletter,which was past and done; but 
it  is no wonder for me to be mistaken in your privilege- 
word "  this."  Besides, there is this farther difficulty to 
understand "this is the proper place," of the 4<6th  page 
of my former letter ;  because I do not see why the S2d 
page of that letter, where I clid  consider and answer it, 
was not as propcr a place of considering it as tlle 436th, 
where 1 give a reason why I deferred it.  Farther, if I un- 
derstood what you  incant  here by "  this is the propcr 
place,"  I should possibly  apprehend Fetter the force of 
your argument subjoined to prove this, vv!latcver it be, 
to be the proper place; the casual particle "  for,"  whicli 
introduces the following words, making them a reason of 
those preceding.  But in the present obscurity of this 
matter,  I confess I do  not  see  how your having.  said 
"  that I gave occasion  to the enemies of the Cllristiari 
faith,"  &c.  proves  any thing concerning  the  proper 
place at all. 
Anotber thing that I  do not understand in this defence 
is your inference in the next period, where you tell me, 
"  if this  be  so,  you  insist upon  it that I should clear 
myself:"  for I do not  see  how your having said what 
you there said (for  that is it which "  this" here, if it be 
not within privilege, must signify) can be a reason for 
yourinsistingon my clearing myself df any thing,thougli 
1 allow this to be your lordship's  ordinary way of pro- 
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tions in one place, as if they were foundations to build 
what you pleased on in another. 
Thus then stands your defence : "  my grounds of  cer- 
tainty tend to scepticism, and to start new methods of 
certainty is of dangerous consequence."  Because I did 
not consider this your accusation in the proper place of 
considering  it,  this is  the proper place of  considering 
it : because your lordship said, "  1 had  given  too just 
occasion to the enemies of  the Christian faith to make 
use of my words and notions;" and because your lordship 
said so, therefore you insist upon it that I  clear myself, &c. 
This appears, to me, to be the connexion  and force of 
your defence hitherto: if I am mistaken in it, your lord- 
ship's words are set down; the reader mustjudgewhether 
the construction of the words do not make it so. 
But before I leave them, there are some things that 
I crave permission to represent to your lordship more 
particularly. 
1. That to the nccusations  of scepticism, I have an- 
swered in another, and, as I think, a proper place. 
2.  That the accusation of  dangerous consequence, I 
have  considered  and  answered  in  my  former  letter; 
but that being,  it seems, not the proper place of consi- 
dering it, you have not in this your defence thought fit 
to take any notice of it. 
3. That your lordship has not any where proved, that 
my placing of certainty in the perception of the agree- 
mwt or disagreement  of  ideas,  is  apt to leave men's 
minds more doubtful than  they were before ;  which is 
what  our accusation supposes. 
4.  I hat you  set down  those words of mine, "  these 
words contain a farther accusation  of  my book, which 
shall be considered in its due place;"  as all the answer 
which I gave to that new accusation, except what you 
take notice of, out of my 95th page ;  and take no notice 
of what I say from page 82 to 95;  where I considered 
it as I promised, and, as I thought, fully answered it. 
5.  That the too just occasion,  you say, I have given 
to the enemies of the Christian faith to make use of my 
words and notions,"  wants to be proved. 
6. That "  what use the enemies of  the Christian faith 
have  made  of  my  words  and notions,"  is  nowhere 
&own,  though often talked of. 
7.  That "  if the  enemies of  the Christian faith Ilarr: 
made  use  of  my  words  and  notions,"  yet  that,  as I 
have  shown, is  no  proof,  that they are  of  dangerous 
consequence :  much less is it a proof, that this proposi- 
tion,  certainty consists in the perception of  the agree- 
ment or disagreement  of ideas,"  is  of dangerous con- 
sequence.  For some words  or  notions in a book, that 
are of dangerous consequence, do not make all the pro- 
positions of that book to be of dangerous consequence. 
8. That your  lordship  tells  me,  "  you were willing 
to have had me explained myself  to the general satis- 
faction;''  which  is what, in the place  from which  the 
former words are taken, you expressed thus :  that "  my 
answer  did  not  come  fully  up in  all things  to that 
which  you  could wish."  To which  I have  given  an 
answer : and methinks your  defence here should  have 
been applied to that,  and not the  same thing (which 
has been answered) set down again as part of  your de- 
fence.  But pray, my  lord, give  me  leave  to ask,  is 
not this meant for  a  personal  matter ?  which though 
the world, as you say, is soon weary of,  your lordship, 
it seems, is not. 
9. That you  say, "  you insist ~1pon  it, that I cannot 
clear  myself  from laying  that  foundation  which the 
author  of  Christianity  not  mysterious  built  upon." 
Certainly this personal matter is of some very great con- 
sequence, that your lordship,\vho understands the world 
so well, insists so much upon it.  But if it be true, that 
he built upon my foundation, and if it be  of such  mo- 
ment to your lordship's  business in the present contro- 
versy;  methinks, without so much intricacy,  it should 
not be hard to show it: it is but proving what founda- 
tion of certainty (for it is of that, all this dispute is) he 
Went  upon, which, as I humbly  conceive,  your  lord- 
ship has not  done;  and then  showing that  to be my 
foundation of certainty ;  and the  business is ended.  But 
ihstead of this your lordship says, that "his  account of 
reason  supposes clear  and distinct ideas  necessary to 964  Mr. Locke's  secontZ Reply  to the Bishop of  Worcester.  265 
certainty; that he imagined he built upon my grounds; 
that he thought  his and my notions  of  certainty to  be 
the same ;  that there has been too just occasion given, 
for  the enemies  of  the Christian  faith  to apply  my 
words  in  I know not what manner."  These  and the 
like arguments, to  prove that he goes upon my grounds, 
your  lordship has  used;  but  they  are, I  confess,  too 
subtile and too fine  for  me to feel the force  of them, 
in a matter of fact wherein  it was  so easy to produce 
both his and nly grounds out of our books (without all 
this talk about  suppositions and imaginations, and oc- 
casions so far remote from any direct proof) if it were 
a matter of that consequence to  be so insisted upon, as 
your lordship professedly does. 
Your lordship has spent a great many pages to tie me 
to that author; and "  you still insist upon it, that I can- 
not  clear  myself  from  laying that  foundation  which 
the author of Christianity not mysterious built upon." 
What this great concern in a matter of so little moment 
means, I leave the reader to guess :  for, I beseech your 
lordship, of what great consequence is it  to the  world? 
What great interest has  any truth of  religion in this, 
that I and another man (be he who he will) make use 
of the same grounds to different purposes ?  This I am 
sure, it tends not to the clearing or confirming any one 
material truth in the world.  If the foundation I have 
laid be true, I shall neither disown nor dislike it, what- 
ever this or any other author shall  build upon it ; be- 
cause, as your lordship  knows, ill things  may be built 
upon a good foundation, and yet the foundation never 
the worse for it.  And  therefore  if  that or any other 
author hath built upon my foundation, I see nothing in 
it, that 1 ought  to be concerned to clear myself from. 
If  you can show that my foundation is false, or  show 
me a better foundation of certainty than mine, I promise 
you immediately to renounce and relinquish mine, with 
thanks to  your lordship: but till you can prove, that he 
that first  invented syllogism as a rule of right reasoning, 
or first laid down this principle,  '<  that it is impossible 
for the same thing to be and not to be,"  is answerable 
for all those opinions which have been endeavoured to be 
proved by mode and figure,  or  have  been built upon 
that maxim; I shall not think myself concerned, what- 
ever any one shall build upon this founclation ~f'  mine, 
that certainty consists in the perception of the agree- 
ment or disagreement of any two ideas, as they are ex- 
pressed in any proposition :  much less shall I think my- 
self concerned,  for  what you  shall  please  to suppose 
(for that, with submission, is all you have done hitherto) 
any one has built  upon it, though he were ever so op- 
posite  to your lordship in  any one  of  the opinions he 
sjhould build on it. 
In that case, if he should prove troublesome to your 
lordship with any argument pretended to be built upor) 
my foundation, I  humbly conceive you  have  no other 
remedy, but to show either the foundntion false, and in 
that case I confess myself concerned ;  or his deduction 
from it wrong, and that I shall not be at  all concerned 
in.  But if,  instead  of  this, your  lordship  shall  find 
no other way to subvert  this  foundation of certainty, 
but by saying, "  the enemies of the Christian faith build 
on it,"  because you  suppose  one author builds  on it ; 
this I fear, my lord, will very little advantage the cause 
you  defend, whilst  it so visibly strengthens and gives 
credit to your  adversaries,  rather than weakens  any 
foundation they go  upon.  For theunitarians, I imagine, 
will be apt to smile at such a way of arguing, viz. that 
they go  on this ground, because the  author  of Christianity 
not mysterious goes upon it, or is  supposed  by  your 
lordship to go upon it: and bystanders will  do little 
less than smile, to find my book brought into the Soci- 
nian controversy, and the ground of certainty laid down 
in  my Essay condemned, only because  that author is 
supposed by your lordship to build upon it.  For this 
in short is the case, and this the way your lordship has 
used in answering objections against the  Trinityin point 
of reason.  I know your lordship cannot be suspected of 
writing booty: but I fear such a way of arguing, in so 
great a man as your lordship, will, "  in an age wherein 
the mysteries of faith are too much exposed, give too 
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of the Christian faith, to suspect that there is a great 
failure somewhere. 
But to pass by that :  this I am sure is personal mat- 
ter, which  the world  perhaps  will  think  it need  not 
have been troubled with. 
Your Defence of  your third Answer goes on; and to 
prove that the  author ofChristianity not mysterious built 
upon  my foundation, you  tell me,  that my ground of 
certainty is the agreement or disagreement of ideas,  as 
expressed in any proposition :  which are my own words. 
'c  From hence you urged, that let the proposition come 
to us  any way, either by  human  or  divine  authority, 
if our certainty depend  upon this, we call  be no more 
certain,  than we  have  clear  perception  of  the  agree- 
ment or  disagreement  of  ideas contained in it.  And 
from  hence the  author of Christianity  not  mysterious 
thought he had  reason to reject all mysteries of faith 
which are contained in propositions,  upon my grounds 
of certainty." 
Since this personal matter appears of such weight to 
your lordship,  that it needs to be farther prosecuted ; 
and you think this your argument, to prove that author 
built  upon  my foundation,  worth  the repeating here 
again ;  1 am obliged to enter so far again into this per- 
sonal matter, as to examine this passaGe, which I for- 
merly passed by as of no moment. For it 1s easy to show, 
that what you say visibly proves not, that he built upon 
my foundation;  and next, it is  evident, that if it were 
proved that he did so, yet this is no proof  that my me- 
thod of certainty is  of dangerous consequence ;  which 
is what was to be defended. 
As to the first of  these,  your lordship would prove, 
that the author of Christianity not mysterious built upon 
my grounds ;  and how do you prove it  ? viz. "  because 
he  thought  he  had  reason  to reject  all mysteries  of 
faith,  which are contained  in  propositions,  upon my 
grounds."  How  does  it  appear,  that  he  rejected 
them upon  my grounds  ?  Does  he any where say so ? 
No! that is not offered ;  there is no need of such an evi- 
dence of matter of fact, in a case which is only of matter 
to the Bishop of  Worcesfer,  267 
of fact.  But '(  he thought he had reason to reject them 
upon my grounds of certainty."  How does  it appear 
that he thought so ? Very plainly :  because  let the pro- 
position  come to us  by human  or divine  authority, if 
our certainty depend upon the perception of the agree- 
ment or disagreement of the ideas contained in it, we 
can be no more certain than we have  clear perception 
of  that  agreement."  The consequence,  I  grant,  is 
good,  that if certainty, i.  e.  knowledge, consists in the 
of the agreement or disagreement of ideas, 
then we can certainly know the truth of no proposition 
further than we perceive  that agreement or disagree- 
ment.  But how  does  it follow from  hence,  that he 
thought he had reason upon my grounds to reject any 
proposition,  that contained  a  myatery of faith ; or, as 
your lordship expresses it,  rc a11  mysteries of faith which 
are contained in propositions ?" 
Whether your lordship by the word rejecting, accuses 
him of not knowing, or of not believing  some proposi- 
tion that contains an  article of  faith ; or what he has 
done or not done ;  I concern not myself:  that which I 
deny,  is  the  consequence  above-mentioned,  which  I 
submit to your lordship to be proved.  And when  ou 
have proved it,  and shown  yourself  to be  so fami iar  f 
with the thought of that author, as to be able to be posi- 
tive what he  thought, without his  telling you ; it will 
remain farther to be proved, that beeause he thought so, 
therefore he built right upon my foundation ;  for other- 
wise no prejudice will  come to my  foundation, by any 
ill use made of  it; nor will it be  made good, that my 
method or way of certaintyis of dangerous consequence; 
which is what  your  lordship is  here to defend.  Me- 
thinks your lordship's  argument here  is  all  one with 
this:  Aristotle's  ground  of  certainty (except  of  first 
principles) lies in this, that those things which agree in 
a third, agree themselves ;  we can be certain of no pro- 
position (excepting first principles) coming to us either 
by divine or human authority, if our  certainty depend 
upon this, farther than  there is  such  an agreement : 
therefore  the author  of  Christianity  not  mysterious 
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which  are contained in  propositions  upon  Aristotleys 
grounds.  This consequence, as strange as it is, is just 
the same with what is in your lordship's repeated argu- 
ment against me.  For  let Aristotle's  ground  of cer- 
tainty be this that I have  named, or what it will, how 
does it follow, that because my ground of  certainty is 
placed in the agreement or disagreement of ideas, there- 
fore the author of  Christiaiiity not mysterious rejected 
any proposition more upon my grounds than Aristotle's? 
And will not Aristotle, by your lordship's way of argu- 
ing here, from the use any one  may make or think he 
makes of it, be guilty also of starting a new method of 
certainty of dangerous consequence, whether this me- 
thod be true or false, if that or any other author whose 
writings you  dislike, thought  he  built  upon  it, or be 
supposed by your lordship to think so ? But, as I humbly 
conceive, propositions, speculative propositions, such as 
mine are, about which  all this  stir  is made, are to be 
judged of by their truth or falsehood, and not by the use 
any one shall make of  them; much less by the persons 
who are supposed to build on them.  And therefore it 
may be justly ~ondered,  since you say it is dangerous, 
why you never proved or attempted toprove it to  be false. 
But you complain here again, that I answered not a 
word to this in the proper place.  My lord, if I offended 
your lordship by passing it by, because I thoueht there 
was no argument in  it; I hope I have  now given you 
some sort of satisfaction,  by sliowing there is no argu- 
ment in it, and letting you  see, that your consequence 
here could not be  inferred  from your  antecedent.  If 
you think it may,  I desire you to try it in a syllogism. 
For,  whatever you are pleased to say in another place, 
my way of certainty by ideas will admit of antecedents 
and consequents, and of  syllogism, as the proper form 
to try whether the inference be right or no.  I shall set 
down your following words,  that the reader may see 
your  lordship's  manner  of  reasoning  concerning this 
matter in its full force and consistency, and try it in a 
syllogisn~  if he pleases.  Your words are : 
<'  By this  it evidently appears,  that although your 
lordship  was  willing  to  allow  me  all  fair  ways  of 
interpreting  my  own  sense;  yet  you  by  no means 
thought,  that my  words  were  wholly  misunderstood 
or misapplied by that  author : but rather that, he saw 
into the true Consequence of  them,  as  they lie in my 
book.  And what  answer  do I give to this ?  Not a 
word in the proper place for it." 
You tell me, '<you were willing to allow me all fail 
ways  of  interpreting my  own  sense."  If  your  lord- 
ship had been conscious to yourself, that you had herein 
meant  me  any kindness,  I think  I may presume  you 
would  not  have  minded  me  here  again  of  a  favour, 
which  you  had told me of  but in the preceding page, 
and, to make it an obligation, need not have been more 
than once talked of;  unless your lordship thought the 
obligation was such, that it  would hardly be seen, unless 
I were told of it in words at length, and in more places 
than one.  For what favour, I beseech you, my lord, is 
it to allow me to do that which needed not your allow- 
ance to he done, and I could have done (if it had been 
necessary) of  myself, without being blamed for taking 
that liberty ?  Whatsoever therefore your meaning was 
in  these words,  I cannot  think  you  took  this way to 
make me sensible of your kindness. 
Your  lordship  says, "you  were willing to allow me 
to interpret my own sense."  What you were willing 
to allow me to do,  J have done.  My sense is, that cer- 
tainty consists in the perception of the agreement or dis- 
agreement of ideas ;  and my sense therein I  have inter- 
preted  to be the agreement or disagreement, not only 
ofperfectly clear and distinct ideas, but such ideas as we 
have, whether they be in all their parts perfectly clear 
and  distinct or no.  Farther, in answer to your objec- 
tion, that it might be of  dangerous consequence ;  1 so 
explained  my sense,  as to show, that certainty in that 
sense was not, nor could be,  of dangerous consequence. 
This, which was the point in question between us!  your 
lordship  might  have found  at large explained m my 
second letter, if you had been pleased to have taken no- 
tice of it. 
But it seems you were more willing to tell me, "that 
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interpreting  my  own  sense,  yet  you  by  no  means 
thought that my words were wholly misunderstood  or 
misapplied by that author, but rather that he saiv into 
the true consequence of them as they lie in my book." 
I shall here set down your lordship's words, where (to 
give me and others satisfaction) you say,'c you took care 
to  prevent  being  misunderstood,"  which  will  best 
appear by your own words, viz. "that you must do that 
right to the ingenious  author of the Essay of  Human 
understanding,  from  whom  these  notions  are  bor- 
rowed to serve other purposes than he intended them. 
It was too plain, that the bold  writer against the my- 
~teries  of  our faith  took  his  notions  and expressions 
from  thence,  and  what  could  be  said  more  for  my 
vindication, than that he turned  them to other pur- 
poses than the author intended them?"  This you en- 
deavoured to prove, and then concluded ; "  by which it 
is sufficiently proved, that you had reason to say, that 
my notion was  carried beyond  my intentioll."  These 
words out of your first letter I shall leave here, set by 
those out of your second, that you may at your leisure, 
if you think fit, (for it will not become me to tell your 
lordship that I am willing to allow it) explain yourself 
to the  general  satisfaction, that  it  may  be  known 
which of them  is now your  sense ;  for they are, I sup- 
pose, too mucb to be together  any one's  sense  at the 
same time. 
My intention  being thus so well vindicated  by your 
lordship, that you think nothing could be said more for 
my vin'dicatio;,  the misunderstanding or not misunder- 
standing of  my book,  by that or  any other author, is 
what I shall not waste my time about.  If your lordship 
thinks he saw into the true consequence of this position 
of  mine, that certainty consists in the perception of the 
agreement or disagreement of  ideas (for it is from the 
inference that you suppose he makes from that my de- 
finition of knowledge, that you are here proving it  to be 
of dangerous cousequence) he is beholden to your lord- 
ship for your good opinion of his quick sight :  I take no 
part in that,  one way or other.  What consequences 
your lordship's quick sight (which  must be allowed to 
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have outdone what you  suppose of  tliat gentleman's) 
has found  and charged on that notion as dangerous, I 
shall endeavour to give you satisfaction in. 
You farther add, that "  though I answered not a word 
in the proper  place,  yet afterwards, Let. 9. p. 95, (for 
you  would  omit  nothing  that may  seem  to help my 
cause) I offer something towards an answer." 
I shall be at a loss hereafter what to do with the 82d 
and following pages to the 95th ; since what is said in 
those pages of my second letter goesfor nothing, because 
it is not in its proper  place.  Though if  any one will 
give himself the trouble to look into my second letter, 
he will find, that the argument I was upon in the 46th 
page obliged me to defer what I had farther to say to your 
new accusation :  but tliat I reassumed it in the 82d, and 
answered it in that and the following pages. 
But supposing every writer had not that exactness of 
method, which showed, by the natural and visible con- 
nexion  of  the parts of  his discourse, that every thing 
was  laid in its proper  place ; is it a sufficient answer, 
not to take any notice of it  ?  The reason why I put this 
question is, because if  this  be a rule  in controversy, I 
humbly conceive, I might have passed over the greatest 
part of what your lordship has said to me, because the 
disposition it has under numerical figures, is so far from 
giving me n view  of the orderly connexion of the parts 
of  your  discourse,  that 1 have often  been  tempted to 
suspect the negligence of  the printer, for  misplacing 
your lordship's  numbers ;  since, so ranked as they are, 
they do  to  me, who  am confounded by them, lose all 
order and connexion quite. 
The next thing in the defence, which you go on with, 
is  an exception  to my use of the word certainty.  In 
the close of the answer I had made in the pages you pass 
over, I add, cc that though the laws of disputation allow 
bare  denials  as a suficient answer to sayings without 
any offer of a proof;  yet,  my lord,  to show how will- 
ing I am to give  your lordship all satisfaction in what 
YOU  apprehend  may be of  dangerous  consequence  in 
my book,  as to that  article,  I shall  not  stand  still 
sullenly, and put your  lordship  upon the dificulty of 
showing  wherein  that danger lies;  but  shall  on  the 279  Mr. Lockc's sccontl Rep@ 
other side endeavour  to show your lordship, that that 
definition of mine, whether true or false, right or wrong, 
can  be  of  no  dangerous  consequence to that  arti- 
cle  of  faith.  The reason which I shall  offer for it, is 
this ;  because it can be of no consequence to lt at all." 
And the reason of it  was clear from what I had said be- 
fore,  that knowing  and believing  were two different 
acts of  the mind.  and that my placing of certainty in 
the  perception of the  agreement or  disagreement  of ideas, 
i. e. that my definition of knowledge, one of those .acts 
of the mind, would not at all alter or shake the defini- 
tion of faith, which was another act of the mind distinct 
from it.  And therefore I added, "that  the certainty 
of faith (if  your lordship  thinks fit to call it so)  has 
nothing to do with the certainty of  knowledge.  And 
to talk of the certainty of faith,  seems  all  one  to me, 
as to talk  of  the knowledge of  believing;  a  way  of 
speaking not easy to nle to understand." 
These and other words to this purpose in the follow- 
ing  paragraphs your lordship  lays  hold on, and sets down 
as liable to no small exception :  thougl? as you tell me, 
<(the  main strength of  my defence  lles  in  it."  Let 
what strength you please lie in it, my defence was strong 
enough  without  it.  For to  your  bare saying,  "my 
method  of  certainty  might  be  of  dangerous  consc- 
quence to any article of  the Christian faith,''  without 
proving it,  it was a defence  strong enough  barely to 
deny, and put you upon showing wherein that clangcr 
lies ;  which therefore, this main strength of my defcnce, 
as you call it, apart, I insist on. 
But as to your exception to  what I said on this occa- 
sion, it  consists in this, that there is a certainty of faith, 
and therefore you set down my saying, "  that to talk of 
the certainty of faith, seems all one  as  to talk  of  the 
knowledge  of  believing ;" as that "  which  shows  the 
inconsistency of  my notion  of  ideas  with  the articles 
of the Christian faith."  These are your words  here, 
and yet you tell me, "that it  is not my way of ideas, but 
my way  of  certainty  by  ideas,  that your  lordship is 
unsatisfied  about."  What must I 40 rlow in the case, 
when your words are expressly: that my notion of ideas 
have an inconsistency with the articles of the Christian 
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faith ?  Must I presume that your  lordship means  my 
notion of certainty? All that I  can do is to search ol~t 
your meaning the best I can, and then show where I ap- 
prehend it  not conclusive.  Rut this uncertainty, in most 
places, what you mean, makes me so much work, that a 
great deal is omitted, and yet my answer is too long. 
Your  lordship  asks  in  the next  paragraph, '' how 
comes the certainty of faith to be so hard a point with 
me?"  Answer.  I suppose you ask this question more 
to give  others hard thoughts of  my  opinion  of  faith, 
than to be informed yourself.  For yola cannot be igno- 
rant that all  along in  my  Essay  I  use certainty for 
knowledge ;  so that for you to ask me, "how comes the 
certainty of faith to become so hard a point with me  ?" 
is  the same thing as for  you  to ask,  how comes  the 
knowledge of faith, or, if you please, the knowledge of 
believing,  to be so hard a point with me? A question 
which, I suppose, you will  think  needs  no answer, let 
your meaning in that doubtful phrase be what it will. 
I used in my book the term certainty for knowledge 
so generally, that nobody that has read my book, though 
much less attentively than your lordship, can doubt of 
it.  That I used it in that sense there, I shall refer my 
reader  but to two places  amongst many to convince 
him*.  This, I  am sure,  your  lordship could  not  be 
ignorant of, that by certainty I mean knowledge,  since 
I have so used it in my letters to you, instances whereof 
are not a few; some of them may be found in the places 
marked in the margent :  and in my second letter, what 
I say in the leaf immediately preceding that which you 
quote upon this occasion, would have put it past a pos- 
sibility for any one to make show of a doubt of it, b.irl 
not that been amongst those pages of my answer n  11icl1, 
for its king  out of it:  proper place, it seeliis you were 
resolved  not to take notice of; and therefore I hope it 
will not be besides my purpose here to mind  you of  it 
again. 
After  having  said  something to show  why  I  used 
certainty ancl  knowledge for the same thing, I added, 
<.-  that your lordship could not but take notice of this in 
*  13.4.~.  1,s l,a~\dc.  11.49. 
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the 18th sect. of chap. iv. of my fourth book, it being a 
passage you had quoted, and runs thus : Wherever we 
perceive the agreement or disagreement of cLny  of our 
ideas, tliere is certain knowledge ;  and wherever we are 
sure those ideas agree with the reality of things, there 
is certain real knowledge : of which  having given the 
marks, I think I have  shown  wherein  certainty,  real 
certainty, consists."  And I farther add,  in the imme- 
diately following words, "  that my definition of know- 
ledge, in the beginning of the fourth book of my Essay, 
stands thus : Knowledge seems to be nothing but the 
perception  of  the connexion,  and  agreement or  dis- 
greement,  and  repugnancy  of  any  of  our  ideas." 
Which is  the very  definition  of  certainty  that your 
lordship is here contesting. 
Since then you could not but know that in this dis- 
course certainty with  me  stood for,  or  wcts  the same 
thing with knowledge; niay not one justly wonder how 
you come to ask me such a question as  this, "how comes 
the knowledge of  believing to become so hard a point 
with me ?'  For that was in effect the question that you 
asked, when you put in the term certainty, since  you 
knew as undoubtedly that I meant knowledge by cer- 
tainty, as that I meant believing by faith ;  i. e. you could 
doubt of neither.  And that you did not doubt of it, is 
plain from what you say in the next page, where you 
endeavour to prove this an improper way of speaking. 
Whether it be a proper way of  speaking, I allow it 
to be a fair question.  But when you knew what I meant, 
though I expressed it improperly, to put questions in a 
word of mine, used in a sense different from mine, which 
could not but be apt to insinuate to the reader, that my 
notion of certainty derogated from the mhypopopia or full 
assurance of  faith, as the Scripture calls it; is what I 
guess, in another, would make your lordship ask again, 
"  is this fair and ingenuous dealing  ?" 
My lord, my Bible expresses the highest degree of 
faith, which the apostle recommended to believers in his 
time, by full assurance*.  But assurance of faith, though 
it be what assurance soever, will by no means down with 
* Heb. x. 22. 
your lordship in my writing.  You say, I allow assurance 
of faith ; God forbid I should do otherwise ; but then 
you  ask,  "why  not  certainty as well  as  assurance?" 
My lord, I think it may be a reason not misbecoming 
a poor layman,  aid such as he might presume would 
satisfy a bishop of the church of England, that he found 
his Bible to speak so.  I find my Bible speaks of the as- 
surance of faith, but nowhere, that I can remember, of 
the certainty of faith, though in many places it speaks 
of the certainty of knowledge, and therefore I speak so 
too; and shall not, I think, be condemned for keeping 
close to the expressions of  our Bible, though the Scrip- 
ture-language, as it is, does not so well serve your lord- 
ship's turn in the present case.  When I shall see, in an 
authentic translation of our Bible, the phrase changed, 
it will then be time enough for me to change it  too, and 
call it not the assurance, but certainty of faith :  but till 
then, I shall not be ashamed of it, notwithstanding you 
reproach me with it, by  terming it,  the assurance of 
faith, as I:  call it; when you might as well have termed 
it, the assurance of faith, as your Bible calls it. 
It  being plain, that by certainty I meant knowledge, 
and  by  faith  the  act of  believing;  that these  words 
where you ask, "  how comes the certainty of  faith to 
become so hard a point with  me ?"  and where you tell 
me, "  I will allow no certainty of faith ;" may make no 
wrong impression on men's  minds, who may be apt to 
understand  them of  the object, and not merely of  the 
act of believing :  I crave leave to say with Mr. Chilling- 
worth*,  "  that I do heartily acknowledge and believe 
the articles  of  our faith to be  in themselves truths as 
certain and  infallible,  as the very  common principles 
of geometry or metaphysics.  But that there is not re- 
quired of  us a knowledge of  them,  and a11  adherence 
to them, as certain as that of  sense or science:"  and 
that for this reason (amongst others given both by Mr. 
Chillingworth and Mr. Hooker) viz. " that faith is not 
knowledge, no more than three is four, but eminently 
contained  in it: so that he that knows,  believes,  and 
something more ;  but he that believes, many times does 
* C.  vi. Q 3. 
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not  know;  nay, if  he doth barely and  nierc.ly  believe, 
he  dot11  ntxer  '&  knour*."  These  are  Mr.  Chilling- 
worth's  ow11 words. 
That tltis assurance of faith may approach very near 
to certainty,  mid  not  come short of  it in  a  sure and 
steady influence on the mind, I have so plainly declared, 
that nobody,  I think, can question it.  111 my chapter 
of reason I-,  which has received the honour of your lord- 
ship's animadversions, I sap of some propositions wherein 
knowledge [i.  e. in my sense, certainty]  fails us, "  that 
their probability is  so clear and strong, that assent as 
necessarily follows, as knowledge does demonstration." 
Does your lordship ascribe any greater certainty than 
this to an article of  mere faith? If you do not, we are 
it seems agreed in the thing ;  and so all, that you have 
so emphatically said  about it,  is but to correct a mis- 
t2ke of  mine in the English tongue,  if it prove to be 
one : a  weighty point,  and well worth  your lordship's 
bestowing so irlany pages upon.  I sap mere faith, be- 
cause though  a  man  nlay be  a Christian, who  merely 
believes that there is a God,  yet that is not an article 
of  mere faith, because  it may  be  demonstrated  that 
\nown.  there is a God, and so may certainly be 1- 
Your  lordship goes on  to ask, "  have not all man- 
kind,  who  have  talked  of  matters of  faith,  allowed  a 
certainty of faith as well as a certainty of knowledge?" 
To answer a  question  concerning what  all mankind, 
who have talked of faith, have done, may be within the 
reach of  your  great learning : as for me,  my  reading 
reaches not so far.  The apostles and the evangelists, I 
can answer,  have talked  of  matters of  faith, but 1 do 
not find in my Bible that they have any where spoken 
(for it is of  speaking here the question  is) of  the cer- 
tainty of faith: and what they allow, which they do not 
speak of,  I cannot  tell.  1 say,  in my Bible, meaning 
the English translation  used  in our  church: tllougll 
what all mankind, who  speak not of  faith in  English, 
can do towards the deciding of  thi~  question, I do not 
see ;  it being about the signification of an Englisli word. 
Alld whether in propriety of speech it can be applied to 
faith,  can only be  decided  by  those  who  understand 
English, which all mankind who have talked of matters 
of  faith, I humbly conceive, did not. 
To prove that certainty in English may be applied to 
faith, you say, that among the Romans it was  opposed 
to doubting ;  and for that you bring this Latin sentence, 
66 Nil tam  certum est quam pod de dubio certum." 
Answer.  Certum,  among  the Romans,  might be  op- 
posed  to doubting,  and  yet  not  be  applied  to faith, 
because knowledge, as  well as believing, is opposed to 
doubting:  and  therefore  unless  it had  pleased  your 
lordship to have quoted the author out of which  this 
Latin sentence is taken,  one  cannot tell whether cer- 
turn be not in it spoken of  a thing known,  and not of 
a thing believed:  though if  it were  so, I humbly con- 
ceive, it would not prove what you  say, viz. that "  it," 
i. e. the word certainty (for to that "it"  must refer here, 
or to nothing that I understand) was among the Romaiis 
applied to faith ; for, as I take it, they never used the 
English word certainty; and though it be true, that the 
English word  certainty be taken  from the Latin word 
certus,  yet that therefore certainty in English is used 
exactly in the same sense that certus is in Latin, that I 
think you will not say; for then certainty in  English 
must signify purpose and resolution of mind, for tc  that 
certus is applied in Latin. 
You are pleased here to tell me, "  that in my former 
letter"  I said, '<that  if we knew the original of words, 
we should be much helped to the ideas they were first 
applied  to, and made to stand for."  I grant it true, 
nor shall I unsay it here.  For I said not, that a word 
that had  its  original  in  one  language,  kept  always 
exactly  the  same  signification  in  another  language, 
into which it was from thence transplanted.  But if you 
will give me leave to remind you of it, I remember that 
YOU,  my lord, say in the same place,  '<  that Iittie weight 
1s  to be laid upon a bare grammatical etymology, when 
a word is used  in  another sense by the best  authors.'' 
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instance to verify that saying, than that which you pro- 
duce here. 
But pray,  my lord, why so far about? Why are we 
sent to the ancient Romans ?  Why must we consult 
(which  is no easy task) all mankind, who have talked 
of  faith,  to know whether  certainty be properly used 
for faith  or no; when to determine it between  your 
lordship and me, there is so sure a remedy, and so near 
at hand? It is but for  you to say wherein  certainty 
consists.  This, when I gently offered to your lordship 
in my first letter, you interpreted it to be a design to 
draw you out of your way. 
I am sorry, my lord, you should think it out of your 
way to put an end, a short end to a controversy, which 
you think of such moment: methinks it should not be 
out of your way, with one blow finally to overthrow an 
assertion, which you think "to be of  dangerous conse- 
quence to that article of faith,  which your lordship has 
endeavoured to defend."  I proposed  the same again, 
where I say,  cc for  this  there is  a very easy remedy : 
"  it is but for your lordship to set aside this definition 
of knowledge,  by giving us a  better, and this danger 
is over.  But you choose rather to have a controversy 
with my book,  for having it in it, and to put me upon 
the  defence  of  it."  This  is  so  express,  that  your 
taking no notice of  it puts me  at a loss what to think. 
To say that a man so great in  letters does not know 
wherein  certainty  consists,  is  a  greater  presumption 
than I will be guilty of;  and yet to think that you do 
know and will not tell, is yet harder.  Who can think, 
or will  dare to say,  that your lordship, so much con- 
cerned  for  the articles of  faith,  and engaged in this 
dispute with me, by your duty, for the preservation of 
them, should choose to keep up a controversy with me, 
rather than remove tliat danger, which  my wrong no- 
tion of certainty threatens to the articles of faith ?  For, 
my lord, since the question is moved, and it is bronght 
by your lordship to a public dispute, wherein certainty 
consists, a great many, knowing no better, may take up 
wit11 what I have said; and rather than have no notiotr 
of certainty at all, will  stick  by mine,  till a better be 
&owed  them.  And if mine tends to scepticism, as you 
say, and you will not furnish them with one tliat does 
not, what is it but to give way to scepticism, and let it 
quietly prevail on  men,  as either having my notion of 
certainty, or  none  at all ?  Your lordship indeed says 
something  in excuse,  in your 75th page;  which, that 
my answer may be  in the proper place,  shall be  con- 
sidered when we come there. 
Your lordship declares, "that you are utterly against 
any private  mints of  words."  I know  not what the 
public  may do for  your particular  satisfaction  in the 
case ;  but till public mints of words are erected, I know 
no remedy for it, but that you must patiently suil'er  this 
matter to go on in the same course, that I think it has 
gone in ever since language has been in use.  Were in 
this island,  as far as my knowledge reaches,  I do not 
find, that ever since the Saxons' time, in the alterations 
that have  been  made in our language, that any one 
word  or phrase  has had its authority from  the great 
seal, or passed by act of parliament. 
When  the dazzling metaphor  of  the mint and new 
milled  words,  &c.  (which  mightily,  as it seems,  de- 
lighted your lordship when you were writing that para- 
graph) will give you leave to consider this matter plainly 
as it is, you will find, that the coining of money in pub- 
licly authorized  mints affords no manner of  argument 
against private men's  meddling in the introducing new, 
or changing the signification of old words; every one of 
which alterations always has its rise from some private 
mint.  The case in short is this : money,  by virtue of 
the stamp received  in the public mint, which vouches 
its intrinsic worth, has authority to pass.  This use of 
the public stamp would he lost, if private men were suf- 
fered  to offer money stamped by themselves.  On the 
contrary, words are off'ered to the public by every man, 
coined in his private mint, as he pleases ; but it is the 
receiving  of  them  by others,  their very  passing,  that 
gives them their authority and currency, and  not the 
mint they come out of.  Horace*, I think, has given a 
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true account of  tliis matter, in a country very jealous 
of any usurpation upon the public authority. 
Multa renascentur,  quae jam cecidere, cadcntq ue ; 
QUE nunc sunt in  honore vocnbula,  si volet usus, 
Quem penes arbitrium est et jus,  et llorrna loquendi." 
But yet whatever change is made in the signific  a  t'  lon 
or credit of  any word  by  public use,  this change lias 
always its beginning in some private mint:  so Horace 
tells us it was  in  the Rornan  language quite down to 
his time : 
-"  Eyo cur acquirere pauca, 
Si possum, invi(leor; quum I~ngua  Catonis et Ennf 
Sermonem pntrium ditaverit, et nova rerum 
Nomina protulerit ?  Licuit, semperqus licebi~ 
Siq:latun~  prcesente not2 procudere nomen." 
Here we see Horace expressly says, that  private mints 
of  words  were  always licensed;  and,  with  Horace,  I 
humbly  conceive  so  they  will  always  continue,  how 
utterly  soever  your  lordship  may  be  against  them. 
And  therefore  he that offers to the public new milled 
words from his own private mint, is not always in that 
so  bold  an  inviider  of  the  public  authority  as  you 
would make him. 
This I say not to excuse nlyself in the present case ; 
fbr I deny, that I have at all changed the signification 
of  the  word  certainty.  And  therefore,  if  yon  had 
pleased, you  might, my lord, have spared your saying 
on  this  occasion,  "that  it seems our old words  must 
not now pass in  the current sense; and those persons 
assume too much authority to themselves, who will not 
suffer common words  to pass in their general accepta- 
tion :"  and  other things  to the same  purpose  in  this 
paragraph, till you had proved that in strict propriety 
of  speech it could  be  said,  that a man was  certain  of 
that which he did not know, but only believed. 
If you had had time, in the heat of  dispute, to have 
made a little refiection on the use of the English word 
certainty in strict speaking, perhaps your lordship would 
not have been so forward to have made my using it, only 
fbr prccise knowledge, so enormous an impropriety; at 
least you would not have  accused it of  weakening  the 
credibility of any article of faith. 
It  is true indeed, people commonly say, they are cer- 
tain of what they barely believe, without doubting. But 
it is as true, that they as commonly say that they lrilow 
it too.  But nobody from  thence  concludes  that  be- 
lieving is knowing.  As  little  can they conclude from 
the like vulgar way of speaking, that believing is  cer- 
tainty.  A11  that is meant thereby is no more but this, 
that the full assurance of  their faith as steadily deter- 
mines their assent to the embracing of that truth, as if 
they actually knew it. 
Buthowever such phrasesas these are used toshow the 
steadiness and assurance of their faith, who thus speak; 
yet they alter not the propriety ofour language, which I 
think appropriates certainty only  to knowledge, when 
in strict and philosophical discourse it is, upon that ac- 
count, contradistinguished to faith; as in this case here 
your lordship knows it is :  whereof there is an express 
evidence in my first letter, where I say, "that I speak of 
belief,  and  your  lordship  of  certainty;  and  that  I 
meant belief, and not certainty.  And that I made not 
an  improper,  nor  unjustifiable  use  of  the word  cer- 
tainty, in contradistinguishing it thus to faith,  I think 
I have an unquestionable authority, in  the learned and 
cautious Dr. Cudworth, who so uses it : What essence, 
says  he,  is to generation,  the  same  is  certainty  of 
truth, or knowledge,  to faith."  P.  899 
Your lordship says, "  certainty is common  to both 
knowledge  and faith,  unless  I think  it impossible  to 
be certain  upon  any testimony  whatsoever.''  I think 
it is possible to be certain upoil the testimony of  God 
(for that, I suppose, yoti mean) where I know that it is 
the  testimony  of  God ;  because in  such  a  case,  that 
testimony is capable riot only  to make me believe, but, 
if I considzr it right, to make mc know the thing to be 
so ;  and so I may be certain.  For the veracity of God 
is as capable of  making me know  a proposition to be 
true, as any other way of proof can be ;  and therefore I 
riot in such a case barely believe, but know such  a 
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The  sum of your accusation is drawn up thus :  "  that 
I have appropriated certainty to the perceptiorl of the 
agreement or disagreement  of  ideas in  any proposi- 
tion; and  now I find  this will not hold  as to articles 
of  faith;  and  therefore I will  allow no  certainty  of 
faith; which  you  think  is  not  for  the advanta~e  of 
my  cause."  The truth  of  the  matter  of  fact  1s  in 
short this, that I have placed knowledge in the percep- 
tion of the agreement or disagreement of  ideas.  This 
definition of knowledge, your lordship said, "  might be 
of  dangerous  consequence  to  that  article  of  faith, 
which  you  have endeavoured  to defend."  This I de- 
nied,  and gave this reason  for it, viz. that a definition 
of knowledge, whether a good or bad, true or false de- 
finition, could not be of  ill or  any consequence to an 
article of faith: becausea definition of knowledge, which 
was one act of the mind, did  not  at all concern faith, 
which was another act of  the mind quite distinct from 
it.  To  this then, which was the proposition in question 
between  us, your  lordship,  H humbly conceive,  should 
have answered.  But instead of that, your lordship, by 
the use of the word  certainty in a sense that I used it 
not, (for you knew I used it only for knowledge) would 
represent me as having strange notions of faith.  Whe- 
ther  this be  for  the  advantage of  your  cause,  your 
lordship will do well to consider. 
Upon such an use of the word certainty in a different 
sense from what I used it in, the force of all your lord- 
ship says under your first head, contained in the two or 
three next paragraphs, depends, as I think; for I must 
own (pardon my/dulness) that I do not clearly compre- 
hend the force of what your lordship there says: and it 
will take up too many pages to examine it period by 
period.  In short, therefore, I take your lordship's mean- 
ing to be this : 
"  That there are some  articles of faith, viz. the fun- 
damental  principles  of  natural  religion,  which  man- 
kind may attain  to a  certainty in  by reason, without 
revelation ;  which, hecause  a  man that proceeds upon 
my grounds canriot attain to a  certainty in by reason, 
their  credibility to liim, whe~l  they are corisidered  as 
purely  matters  of  faith,  will  be  weakened."  Those 
which your  lordship  instances in,  are the being of a 
God, providence, and the rewards and punishments of 
a future state. 
This is the way, as I humbly conceive, your lordship 
takes here to prove my grounds of certainty (for so you 
call my definition of knowledge)  to be of  dangerous 
consequence to the articles of faith. 
To  avoid ambiguity and confusion in the examining 
this argument of your lordship's,  the best way, I hum- 
bly conceive, will be to lay by the term certainty; which 
your lordship and I using in different senses, is the less 
fit to make what we  say to one another clearly under- 
stood ;  and instead thereof, to use the term knowledge, 
which with me, your lordship knows, is equivalent. 
Your lordship's proposition then, as far as it has any 
opposition to me, is this, that if knowledge be supposed 
to consist in the perception of the agreement  or disagree- 
ment of ideas, a  man cannot attaln to the knowledge 
that these  propositions, viz. '' that there is  a God, a 
providence, and rewards  and punishments  in a future 
state, are true ;  and therefore  the  credibility of these 
articles, considered  purely as  matters of faith, will be 
weakened to him."  W-herein there  are these things 
to be proved by your lordship. 
1. That upon  my grounds of knowledge, i.  e. upon 
a supposition that knowledge consists in the perception 
of the agreement or disagreement  of ideas, we cannot 
attain to the knowledge of the truth of either of those 
propositions,  viz.  "  that there is a  God,  providence, 
and rewards and punishmefits in a future state." 
2. Your lordship is to prove,  that the not knowing 
the truth of any proposition lessens the credibility of it; 
which, in  short,  amounts  to this, that want  of  know- 
ledge lessens  faith in any proposition proposed.  This 
is the proposition  to be proved,  if your  lordship uses 
certainty in the sense I use  it, i. e. for knowledge ;  in 
which only use of it will it here bear upon me. 
But since I find your lordship, in these two or three 
paragraphs, to use the word certainty in so uncertain a 
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sometimes believing in general,  i. e.  any degree of be- 
lieving;  give me  leave  to  add,  that if your  lordship 
means by  these words, "  let us suppose a person by na- 
tural reason to attain to a  certainty as to the being of 
;I  God,  i.  e.  attain  to a belief  that  there  is  a  God, 
kc. or the  soul's  immortality :" I say, if you  take cer- 
tainty in such a sense, then it will be  incunlberit upon 
your lordship to prove, that if  a man finds the natural 
reason whereupon  he  entertained the belief of a God, 
or of the immortality of the soul,  uncertain, that will 
weaken the credibility of those fundamental articles, as 
matters of faith : or, which is in  effect  the  same, that 
the weakness  of  the credibility of  any article of faith 
from reason, weakens the credibility of  it from revela- 
tion.  For it  is this which these following words of yours 
import : "  for before, there was a natural credibility in 
them on the account of  reason; but by going on wrong 
grounds of certainty, all that is lost." 
To  prove the first of these propositions, viz. that upon 
the supposition that knowledge consists in the percep- 
tion of the agreement or disagreement of ideas, we can- 
not  attain to the knowledge  of  the truth of  this pro- 
position that there is a God ;  your lordship argues, that 
I have said, "  that no  idea proves the existence of the 
thing  without  itself:"  which  argument  reduced  to 
form,  will  stand thus; if it be true, as I say, that no 
idea proves the existence of the thing without itself, then 
upon the supposition that knowledge consists in the per- 
ception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas, we 
cannot attain to the knowledge of the truth of this pro- 
position,  "  that there is  a God :" which  argument so 
manifestly proves not, that there needs no more to be 
said to it, than to desire that consequence to be proved. 
Again, as to the immortality of the soul, your lord- 
ship urges, that I have said, that T cannot know but that 
matter may think; therefore upon my ground of know- 
ledge, i. e.  upon a supposition that knowledge consists 
in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of 
ideas, there is an end of the soul's immortality.  This 
consequence I must also desire your lordship to prove. 
Only I crave leave by the by to point out some things 
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in these paragraphs, too remarkable to be passed over 
without any notice. 
One  is, that you  suppose  a  Inan is  made certain 
upon  my  grounda  of  certainty,"  i.  e.  knows  by  the 
of the agreement or disagreement of ideas, 
that there is a God; and yet, "upon  a farther esamina- 
tion of my method, he  finds that the way of ideas will 
not  do."  Here,  my  lord,  if by  my grounds  of  cer- 
tainty,  my methods,  and  my way of  ideas, you  mean 
one and the same thing ; then your words will have  a 
consistency, and tend to  the  same point.  But then I 
must beg your lordship to consider, that your supposi- 
tion carries a cor~tradiction  in it, viz. that your lordship 
supposes, that by my grounds, my method, and my way of 
certainty, a man is made certain, and not made certain, 
that there is a God.  If your lordship means here by my 
grounds of certainty, my method, and my way of ideas, 
different things, (as it seems to me you do) then, what- 
ever your lordship may suppose here, it makes nothing 
to thepoint in hand; which is to show, that by this my 
ground of certainty, viz. that knowledge consists in the 
perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas, 
a man first attains to a knowledge that there is a God, 
and afterwards  by the same grounds  of  certainty he 
comes to lose the knowledge that there is a God; whicl.1 
to me seems little less than a contradiction. 
It is likely your lordship will say you mean no suc]~ 
thing;  for you allege  this  proposition, '' that no idea 
proves the existence  of any thing without itself;"  ancl 
give that as an instance, that my way of ideas will not 
do, i. e.  will not prove the being of a God.  It is true, 
your lordship  does  so.  But withal,  my lord, it is  as 
true,  that this proposition,  supposing  it  to be  mine, 
(for it is not here set down  in my words) contains not 
my method, or way, or  notion of certainty;  though it 
is in that sense alone, that it can here be useful to your 
lordship to ;all it my method, or  the way by ideas. 
Your lordship undertakes to show, that my defining 
knowledge to consist in the perception of the agreement 
Or  disagreement of ideas,  .' weakells the credibility of 
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what is your lordship's  proof of it  ? Just this :  the saying 
that no idea proves the existence  of the thing without 
itself, will not do; ergo, the saying that knowledge con- 
sists in the perception of the agreement or disagreement 
of  ideas, weakens the  credibllity of  this  fundamental 
article.  This, my lord, seems to me no proof; and all 
that I can find, that is offered to make it a proof, is only 
your calling these propositions "  my general grounds of 
certainty, my method  of proceeding, the way of ideas, 
and my own  principles  in point of reason ;"  as if that 
made these two propositions the same thing, and what- 
soever were a consequence of one, may be charged as a 
consequence  of the other ;  though it be visible,  that 
though the  latter of these be ever so false, or ever so far 
from being a proof  of  a God, yet it will by no means 
thence follow, that the former of them, viz. that know- 
ledge consists in the perception of the agreement or dis- 
agreement of ideas, weakens the credibility of that fun- 
damental article.  But  it is but for your lordship to call 
them both  the way of ideas,"  and that is enough. 
That I may not  be  accused  by your lordship  for 
unfair and disingenuous dealing,  for representing this 
matter  so;"  I shall  here  set  down  your  lordship's 
words at  large :  "  let us now suppose a person by natural 
reason  to attain to a  certainty, as to the being of a 
God,  and immortality  of  the soul; and he proceeds 
upon J. L.'s  general grounds  of  certainty,  from the 
agreement or disagreement  of ideas:  and so from the 
ideas of God and the soul, he is made certain of these 
two points  before-mentioned.  But let 11s  again sup- 
pose that such  a person, upon  a  farther examination 
of  J. L.'s  method of  proceeding,  finds  that  the way 
of ideas in these cases will  not do : for no idea proves 
the  existence  of  the  thing without  itself,  no  more 
than the picture  of  a  man  proves  his  being,  or  the 
visions  of  a  dream  make a true history;  (which  are 
J. L.'s  own expressions).  And for the soul he cannot 
be  certain, but that  matter may think,  (as  J. L. af- 
firms)  and then what  becomes  of  the soul's  immate- 
riality  (and  consequently immortality)  from  its ope- 
rations? But for all this,  says J. L., his  assurance of 
faith  remains  firm on its basis.  Now you  appeal to 
any man of sense, whether the finding the uncertainty 
of  his  own principles,  which  he went  upon  in point 
of  reason,  doth not  weaken  the  credibility  of  these 
fundamental articles, when they are considered purely 
as  matters  of faith ?  For before,  there was  a  natural 
credibility in them  on the  account  of  reason ;  but by 
going on wrong  grounds  of certainty, all that is lost; 
and instead of being certain, he is more doubtful than 
cver."  These  are  your  lordship's  own  words ; and 
now I appeal to any man of sense, whether they contain 
any other argument against my placing of certainty as I 
cio, but this,  viz.  a  man mistakes  and thinks that this 
proposition, no idea proves  the existence of  the thing 
without itself, shows that in the way of ideas one cannot 
prove a God :  ergo, this proposition, "  certainty consists 
in the perception of the agreement or  disagreement of 
ideas,  weakens  the  credibility of  this  fundamental 
article, that there is  a God."  And so of  the immor- 
tality of the soul ;  because I say, I know not but matter 
may think :  your lordship would infer, ergo, my defini- 
tion  of  certainty weakens the credibility of  the  reve- 
lation of the soul's  immortality. 
Your lordship is pleased here to call this proposition, 
"  that  knowledge or certainty consists in the perception 
of the  agreement  or disagreement  of  ideas,"  my ge- 
neral grounds of certainty; as if I had some more par- 
ticular grounds of certainty.  Whereas I have no other 
ground or notion of certainty, but this  one  alone ; all 
my notion of  certainty is contained in that one  parti- 
cular proposition :  but perhaps  your  lordship  did it, 
that you might make the proposition above-quoted, viz. 
"  no  idea proves  the existence of  the thing without 
itself,"  under  the title  you  give  it,  of  "  the  way  of 
ideas,"  pass for  one  of  my particular grounds of cer- 
tainty; whereas it is no more any ground of certainty of 
mine, or definition  of knowledge, than any other pro- 
position in my book. 
Another thing very remarkable in what your lordship 
here says is, that you make the failing to attain know- 
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to  be he finding the uncertainty of the way itself; which 
is all one as to say, that if a  man misses by algebra the 
certain  knowledge  of some  propositions  in mathemu- 
tics, therefore he finds the way or principles of algebra 
to be uncertain or false.  This is your lordship's way of 
reasoning here: your lordship quotes out of me,  "  that 
I say no idea proves  the existence  of the  thing with. 
out itself ;" and that I say, "  that one cannot be  cer- 
tain  that matter  cannot  think:"  from  whence  your 
lordship argues, that he who says so, cannot attain to 
certainty that there  is  a God, or  that the soul is im- 
mortal ; and  thereupon your lordship  concludes, "  he 
finds the uncertainty of  the principles he went upon, 
in point  of reason,"  i.  e. that he  finds  this principle 
or ground of eertainty he went upon in reasoning, viz. 
that certainty or knowledge consists in the perception 
of the agreement or disagreement of ideas, to be uncer- 
tain.  For if your lordship means here, by ''  principles 
he went upon  in point  of reason,"  any thing else but 
that definition of knowledge, which your lordship calls 
my  way,  method,  grounds,  &c. of  certainty,  which I 
and others, to the endangering  some  articles of faith, 
go upon ;  I crave leave to say, it  concerns nothing at all 
the argument your lordship is upon, which is to prove, 
that the placinq  of  certainty in the perception of the 
ngreement or disagreement of ideas may \be  of danger- 
ous consequence to any article of  faith. 
Your lordship, in the next  place, says, "  before we 
can  believe  any  thing, upon  the  account  of  revela- 
tion,  \re must  suppose  there  is  a  God."  What  use 
does your  lordship  make of this? Your  lordship thus 
argues ;  but by my way of certainty, a man is made un- 
certain whether there be a God or 110:  for that to me is 
the meaning of those words, "  how can his faith stand 
firm as to divine  revelation, when  he is  made uncer- 
tain by his own way, whether there be  n God or no?" 
or they can to me mean nothing to the question in hand. 
What is the conclusion  from hence? This it must be, 
or nothing to the purpose ;  ergo,  my definition of know- 
ledge, or, which is the same th~ng,  my placing of cer- 
tainty in the pcl.crptioli  of the agreement or disagree- 
merit of ideas, leaves not the articles of faith the same 
credibility they had before. 
To excuse my dulness in not being able to compre- 
hend  this  consequence,  pray,  my  lord,  consider,  that 
your lordship says ;  before we can believe any thing 
upon the account of revelation,  it must  be  supposed 
that there is a God."  But cannot he, who places cer- 
tainty in the perceptiorr of  the agreement or disagree- 
ment of ideas, suppose there is a God ? 
But your lordship means by "suppose,"  that one must 
be certain that there is a God.  Let it be so, and let it 
be your lordship's  privilege in controversy to use one 
word for another, though of a different signification, as 
I think  to "  suppose"  and "  be certain"  are.  Cannot 
one that places certainty in the perception of the agree- 
ment or disagreement of ideas, be certain there is a God ? 
I can assure you, my lord, I am certain there is a God; 
and yet I own, that I place certainty in the perception 
of the agreement or disagreement of ideas :  nay, I dare 
venture to say to your lordship, that I have proved there 
is a God, and see no inconsistency at all between these 
two propositions, that certainty consists in the percep 
tion of  the agreement  or disagreement of  ideas,  and 
that it is  certain  there  is  a  God.  So that this my 
notion  of  certainty, this  definition of  knowledge,  for 
any thing your lordship has said to the contrary, leaves 
to this  fundamental article the same  credibility  2nd 
the same certainty it had before. 
Your lordship says farther, '  to  suppose divine revela- 
tion,  we must be certain that there is a principle above 
matter and motion in the world!'  Here, again, my lord, 
your way of writing makes work for my ignorance ;  and 
before I can either admit or deny this proposition,  or 
judge  what farce it has  to prove  the proposition  in 
question,  I  must  distinguish  it  into  these  different 
senses, which I think your lordship's  way of  speaking 
map comprehend.  For your lordship may mean it thus, 
to suppose divine revelation, we must be certain, i. e. 
we must believe  that there is a principle above matter 
ad  motion in the word."  Or your lordship may mean 
thus,  "we must  be  certain, i. e. we  must  know that 
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there is  something above  matter  and  motion  in the 
world."  I11  the next place,  your  lordship  may mean 
by something  above  matter and motion, either simply 
an  intelligent  being;  for  knowledge,  without  deter- 
mining what being it is in,  is a princ~ple  above matter 
and motion :  or your lordship may mean an immaterial 
intelligent  being.  So that this undetermined way of 
expressing includes at least four distinct propositions, 
whereof some are true, and others not so.  For, 
I. My lord, if your lordship means,  that to suppose 
a divine revelation,  a man must be  certain,  i.  e. must 
certainly know, that there is an intelligent being in the 
world, and that that intelligent being is immaterial from 
whence that revelation comes ; I deny it.  For a man 
may suppose revelation upon the belief of an intelligent 
being,  from  whence  it comes,  without  being  able to 
make  out to himself,  by a  scientifical reasoning, that 
there is  such  a  being.  A  proof  whereof,  I  humbly 
conceive, are the anthropomorphites among the Chri- 
stians heretofore, who nevertheless rejected not the re- 
velation of  the New Testament: and he that will talk 
with  illiterate  people  in  this  age,  will,  1  doubt not, 
find many who  believe  the Bible  to be  the word  of 
God, though they imagine God himself in the shape of 
an old man sitting in heaven ;  which they could not do, 
if  they knew, i. e.  had examined  and understood  any 
demonstration whereby he is proved to be immaterial, 
without which they cannot know it. 
2. If your lordship means, that to suppose a divine 
revelation, it is necessary to know, that there is simply 
an intelligent being ; this also I deny.  For to suppose 
a divine revelation, it is not necessary that a man should 
know  that there  is  such  an intelligent being  in the 
world: I say, know, i. e. from things that he does know, 
demonstratively deduce the proof of such a being :  it is 
enough, for the receiving divine revelation, to believe 
that there is such a being, without having by demon- 
stration attained to the knowledge that there is a God. 
Every one that believes  right,  does not always reason 
exactly,  especially  in  abstract  metaphysical  specula- 
tions :  and if nobody can believe the Bible to be of divine 
reveIation,  but. he that clearly comprehends the whole 
deduction, and sees the evidence of the demonstration, 
wherein the existence of an intelligent being, on whose 
will  all other beings  depend,  is  soientifically proved ; 
there are, I fear,  but few Christians among illiterate 
people, to look no farther.  He that believes there is a 
God, though he does no more than believe  it, and has 
not attained to the certainty of knowledge, i.  e. does not 
see the evident demonstration of it, has ground enough 
to admit of  divine  revelation.  The apostle tells  us, 
cC that he that will come to God,  must believe that he 
is;"  but I do not remember the Scripture any where 
says, that he must know that he is. 
3.  In the next place,  if  your lordship means,  that 
"  to suppose  divine  revelation,  a  man  must  be  cer- 
tain,"  i.  e.  explicitly believe,  that there is a  perfectly 
immaterial Being; I shall leave  it to your lordship's 
consideration,  whether  it may not be ground enough 
for the supposition of a reveIation, to believe that there 
is an all-knoGing, unerring Being, who can neither de- 
ceive nor be deceived, without a man's  precisely deter- 
mining in his thoughts, whether that unerring,  omni- 
scient Being be immaterial or no.  It  is past all doubt, 
that every one  that examines and reasons  right,  may 
come to a certainty, that God is perfectly immaterial. 
But it may be a question, whether every one, who be- 
lieves a revelation  to be from  God,  may have entered 
into the disquisition of the immateriality of his being ? 
Whether, I say,  every ignorant day-labourer, who be- 
lieves the Bible to be the word of God, has in his mind 
considered materiality and immateriality, and does ex- 
plicitly believe  God to be immaterial, 1 shall leave to 
your lordship to determine, if  you think fit, more ex- 
pressly than your words do here. 
4.  If your lordship means, "  that to suppose a divine 
revelation,  a  man  must be certain,  i.  e.  believe  that 
there is a supreme intelligent Being,"  from whence it 
comes,  who  can neither  deceive  nor be  deceived;  I 
grant it to be true. 
These being the several propositions, either of which 
may be meant in your lordship's so general, and to me 
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cloubtful,  way  of  expressing  yourself;  to  avoid  the 
length,  which  a  particular  answer  to each of  them 
would run me into, I will venture (and it is a venture 
to answer  to an ambiguous proposition  in one sense, 
when the author has the liberty of  saying he meant it 
in another; a great convenience of  general, loose, and 
doubtful expressions)-I  will, I say, venture to answer 
it, in the sense I guess most suited to your lordship's 
purpose ;  and see what your lordship proves  by it.  I 
will therefore suppose your lordship's reasoning to be 
this ; that, 
"  To suppose divine revelation,  a man must be cer- 
tain, i. e. believe that there is a principle above matter 
and motion, i. e.  an immaterial intelligent being in the 
world."  Let it be so ;  what does your lordship infer? 
"  Therefore upon  the principle  of  certainty by ideas, 
he [i.  e. he that places certainty in the perception of 
the  agreement  or  disagreement  of  ideas]  ca,nnot be 
certain of  [i. e. believe]  this."  This consequence seems 
a little strange, but your lordship proves it thus :  'C  be- 
cause he does not know but matter may think;" which 
argument, put into form, will stand thus : 
If one who places certainty in the perception of the 
agreement or disagreement of  ideas, does not know but 
matter may think ;  then whoever  places  certainty so, 
cannot believe there is an immaterial intelligent being 
in the world. 
But there is  one who,  placing certainty in the per- 
ception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas, does 
not know but matter may think : 
Ergo, whoever places certainty in the perception of 
the agreement or disagreement of  ideas, cannot think 
that there is an intelligent immaterial being. 
This argumentation is so defective in every part of it, 
that for fear I should be thought to make an argument 
for your lordship, in requital for the answer your lord- 
ship made for me, I must desire the reader to consider, 
your lordship says, "  we must be certain; hi cannot be 
certain, because he doth not know :" which in short is, 
he cannot because  he canilot ;  and he cannot because 
he doth not.  This considered will justify the syllogism 
I have made to contain your lordship's argument in its 
full force. 
I come therefore to the syllogism itself, and there first 
I deny the minor, which is this : 
"  There is  one  who,  placing  certainty  in  the per- 
ception  of  the agreement  or  disagreement  of  ideas, 
doth not know but matter may think." 
I begin with this, because this is the foundation of all 
your lordship's  argument ; and therefore I desire your 
lordship would produce any one, who, placing certainty 
in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of 
ideas,  does not know but matter may think. 
The reason why I press this is,  because, I suppose, 
your lordship means me here, and would have it thought 
that I say, I do not know but that matter may think: 
but that I do not say so ;  nor any thing else from whence 
may be inferred what your lordship adds in the annexed 
words,  if  they  can be  inferred from it ; '' and conse- 
quently all revelation may be nothing but the effects of 
an exalted fancy, or the heats of a disordered imagina- 
tion, as Spinosa affirmed."  On the contrary, I do say*, 
"  it is impossible to conceive  that matter, either with 
or without  motion,  could have originally in  and from 
itself perception and knowledge."  And having in that 
chapter established this truth, that there is an eternal, 
immaterial,  knowing Bcing, I think nobody but your 
lordship could have imputed to me the doubting, that 
there was such a being, because I say in another place, 
and to another  purpose t, 'c  it is impossible for us, by 
the contemplation of  our own ideas, without revelation, 
to discover,whether  Omnipotency has not given to some 
systems of  matter, fitly disposed,  a power to perceive 
and think, or else joined and fixed to matter so disposed 
a thinking iinnlaterial  substance:  it being  in  respect 
of  our notions not much  more remote from our com- 
prehensions  to conceive,  that God  can,  if  he pleases, 
superadd  to our idea of  matter a faculty of  thinking, 
than that he should  superadd to it another substance, 
with  a  faculty of  thinking."  From my  saying thus, 
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that God (whom  T  have proved  to be  an immaterial 
being)  by his omnipotency,  may,  for aught we  know, 
au~eradd  to some parts of  matter a faculty of thinking, 
it requires some skill for any one to represent  me,  as 
your  lordship does  here,  as one  ignorant or doubtful 
whether matter may not think ; to that degree, "  that 
I am not certain,  or I do not believe  that there is a 
principle above matter and motion in the world,  and 
consequently  all  revelation  may  be  nothing but the 
effects of an exalted fancy, or the heats of a disordered 
imagination, as Spinosa affirmed."  For thus I or some- 
body else (whom  I  desire  your  lordship  to produce) 
stands painted  in this your lordship's  argument from 
the supposition of  a divine revelation ;  which your lord- 
ship brings  here to prove,  that the defining of  know- 
ledge, as I do, to consist in the perception of the agree- 
ment or disagreement of ideas, weakens the credibility 
of the articles of the Christian faith. 
But if your lordship thinks it so dangerous a position 
to say, ''  it is not much harder for us to conceive, that 
God can,  if he pleases,  superadd to niatter a faculty 
of thinking, than that he should superadd to it another 
substance with a faculty of  thinking;"  (which  is the 
utmost I have said concerning the faculty of  thinking 
in matter):  I humbly  conceive  it would  be  more  to 
your  purpose  to prove,  that the  infinite  omnipotent 
Creator of all things out of nothing, cannot, if he pleases, 
superadd to some pareels of matter, disposed as he sees 
fit, a faculty of  thinking, which the rest of matter has 
not; rather than to represent me,  with that candour 
your lordship does,  as one, who so far makes matter a 
thinking thing,  as thereby to question the being of a 
principle  above matter and motion in the world,  and 
consequently to take away all revelation : which  how 
natural and genuine a representation it is of my sense, 
expressed in the  passages of my Essay, which T  have above 
set down,  I humbly submit to the reader's  judgment 
and your lordship's zeal for truth to  determine ;  and shall 
not stay to examine whether a man may not have an ex- 
alted fancy, and the heats of a disordered imagination, 
equally  overthrowing  divine  revelation,  though  the 
power of thinking be placed only in an immaterial sub- 
stance. 
I come now to the sequel of your major, which is this : 
66  If any one who places certainty in the perception of 
the agreement or disagreement of ideas, does not know 
but matter may think ; then whoever places  certainty 
so,  cannot  believe  there is  an  immaterial  intelligent 
being in the world." 
The consequence here is  from  does not to cannot, 
which I cannot but wonder to find  in  an argument of 
your lordship's.  For he that does not to-day believe or 
know, that matter cannot be so ordered by God's omni: 
potency,  as to think (if  that subverts the belief of an 
immaterial intelligent being in the world) may know or 
believe  it to-morrow;  or if  he should  never  know  or 
believe it, yet others who define knowledge as lie does, 
may know or believe it.  Unless your lordshlp can prove, 
that it is impossible for any one, who defines knowledge 
to consist in the perception  of  the agreement  or dis- 
agreement of ideas, to know or believe that matter can- 
not think.  But this, as I remember, your lordship has 
not attempted any where to prove.  And yet without 
this  your lordship's  way of  reasoning  is no more than 
to argue, one cannot do  a  thing because another does 
not do it.  And yet upon  this  strange consequence is 
built all that your lordship brings here to prove,  that 
my definition of knowledge weakens  the credibility of 
articles of faith, u. g. 
It  weakens the credibility of this fundamental article 
of faith, that there is a God !  How so?  Because I who 
have so defined knowledge, say in my Essay ",  "  That the 
knowledge of  the existence of any other thing [but of 
God]  we can have  only by sensation ; for there being 
no necessary connexion of  real existence with any idea 
a man hath in his memory, nor of any other existence but 
that of  God, with the existence of any particular man ; 
no particular man can know the existence of any other 
being,  but only when, by actual operating upon him, it 
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idea of any thing in our mind, no more proves the exist- 
ence of that thing, than the picture of a man evidences 
his being in the world,  or the visions of a dream make 
thereby a true history."  For  so  are the words of my 
book, and not as your lordship has been pleased to set 
then, down here :  and they were well  chosen by your 
lordship, to show that the way of ideas would not do; 
i. e.  in my way of ideas, I cannot prove there is a God. 
But supposing I had said in that place, or any other, 
that which would hinder the proof of a God, as I have 
not,  might I not  see  my error, and alter or renounce 
that opinion, without changing my definition of know- 
ledge ?  Or could not another man, who defined know- 
ledge as I do,  avoid  thinking,  as your lordship says I 
say, "  that no  idea proves  the existence of  the thing 
without itself ;" and  so  be  able,  notwithstanding my 
saying so,  to prove that there is a God? 
Again,  your lordship  argues,  that my  definition  of 
knowledge  weakens  the credibility  of  the articles of 
faith, because it takes away revelation ;  and your proof 
of that is, "  because I do not know, whether matter may 
not think." 
The same sort of argumentation your lordship goes on 
with in the next page, where you say;  'c  again, before 
there can be any such thing as assurance of faith upon 
divine revelation, there must be a certainty as to sense 
and tradition;  for  there  can  be  no  revelation  pre- 
tended now,  without  immediate inspiration:  and the 
basis of our faith is a revelation contained in an ancient 
book,  whereof  the  parts  were  delivered  at  distant 
times,  but conveyed  down  to us by an universal  tra- 
dition.  But  now,  what  if  my  grounds of  certainty 
can give  us no  assurance  as to these  things ?  Your 
lordship says you  do not mean,  that they cannot de- 
monstrate matters of  fact,  which  it were most unrea- 
sonable to expect, but that these grounds of certainty 
make  all things  uncertain ; for  your  lordship  thinks 
you  have proved,  that this way  of  ideas  cannot give 
a satisfactory account, as to the existence of the plainest 
objects  of  sense; because  reason  cannot perceive the 
connexion between the objects arid the ideas : how then 
can  we  arrive  to any  certainty in perceiving  those 
objects by their ideas ?" 
All the force of which  argument lies in this,  that I 
have said (or am supposed to have said, or to hold ;  for 
that, I ever said so, I  do not  remember) that ccreason 
cannot perceive the connexion between the objects and 
the ideas :" Ergo, whoever holds that knowledge con- 
sists in the perception  of  the agreement  or disagree- 
ment of ideas, cannot have any assurance of faith upon 
divine revelation. 
My lord, let that proposition,  viz.  cc that reason can- 
not perceive  the connexion  between  the objects  and 
the ideas,"  be mine as much  as your lordship pleases, 
and let it be as inconsistent as you please with the assur- 
ance of faith upon divine revelation :  how will it follow 
from thence,  that the placing of  certainty in the per- 
ception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas is the 
cause that there "cannot be any such thing as the assur- 
ance of  faith  upon  divine  revelation"  to any  body? 
Though I who  hold  knowledge to consist in the per- 
ception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas, have 
the misfortune  to run into this error,  viz.  'c  that rea- 
son  cannot  perceive  the  connexion  between  the ob- 
jects  and  the  ideas,"  which  is  inconsistent  with  the 
assurance of faith upon divine revelation ;  yet it is not 
necessary that all others who with  me hold,  that cer- 
tainty consists in the perception  of  the agreement  or 
disagreement of  ideas,  should also hold, "  that reason 
cannot  perceive  the  connexion  between  the objects 
and the ideas,"  or  that I myself  should  always hold 
it ;  unless  your lordship will say,  that whoever places 
certainty, as I do,  in  the perception of the agreement 
or disagreement of ideas, must necessarily hold all the 
errors that 1 do, which are inconsistent with, or weaken 
the belief of any article of faith, and hold them incorri- 
gibly.  Which has as much consequence, as if I should 
argue, that because  your lordship,  who lives at Wor- 
cester, does  sometimes mistake in quoting me ; there- 
fore nobody who lives at  Worcester can quote my words 
right,  or your  lordship  ~211  never  mend  your wrong 
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consist in the perception of the agreement or disagree- 
ment of ideas, is no more a necessary cause of holding 
those  erroneous  propositions which  your lordship im- 
putes to me, as weakening  the credibility of  the men- 
tioned articles of faith, than the place of your lordship's 
dwelling is a necessary cause of wrong quoting. 
I shall not here go about to trouble your lordship, 
with divining again what may be your lordship's precise 
meaning in several of the propositions contained in the 
passages  above  set down ; especially that remarkable 
ambiguous, and to me obscure one, viz. "  there must be 
a certainty as  to sense  and  tradition."  I fear I have 
wasted too much of  your  lordship's  and my reader's 
time in that employment already;  and there would be 
no end, if I should endeavour to explain whatever I am 
at a loss about the determined sense of,  in any of your 
lordship's expressions. 
Only I will crave leave to beg my readers to observe, 
that in this first head, which we are upon, your lordship 
has used  th? terms certain and certainty near  twenty 
times, but without determining in any of them, whether 
you mean knowledge, or the full assurance of faith, or 
any degree of believing ; though it be evident, that in 
these  pages  your  lordship uses  certainty for all these 
three : which ambiguous use  of  the main word in that 
discourse, cannot but render your lordship's  sense clear 
and perspicuous, and your argument very cogent ;  and 
no doubt will do so to any one, who will be but at the 
pains to reduce that  one word  to a  clear determined 
sense all through these few paragraphs. 
Your lordship says, "have not all mankind, who have 
"  talked of matters of faith, allowed a certainty of faith, 
as well as a  certainty of  knowledge?"  Ans.  But did 
ever any one of all that mankind allow it as a tolerable 
way of speaking, that believing  in  general (for which 
your lordship has used it) which contains in it the lowest 
degree of faith, should be called  certainty?  Could he, 
who said,  I believe ;  Lord, help my unbelief !" or any 
one who is weak in faith, or of little faith, be properly 
said  to be  certain,  or  de  dubio  certus,  of  what  he 
believes but with a weak degree of assent?  I shall not 
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question  what  your  lordship's  great  learning  may 
authorize;  but 1  imagine  every one  hath not  skill,  or 
will not assume the liberty to speak so. 
If a  witness  before  a judge,  asked  upon  his  oath 
whether he was certain of such a thing, should answer, 
Yes, he was certain ;  and, upon farther demand, should 
give this account of  his certainty,  that he believed it ; 
would  he  not make  the  court  and auditors  believe 
strangely of him ?  For to say that  a  man is certain, 
when he barely believes, and that perhaps with no great 
assurance of faith, is to say that he is certain, where he 
owns an uncertainty.  For he that  says he barely be- 
lieves, acknowledges that he assents to a proposition as 
true, upon bare probability.  And where any one assents 
thus to any proposition, his assent excludes not a possi- 
bility that it may be otherwise ;  and where, in any one's 
judgment, there is  a  possibility to be otherwise, there 
one cannot deny but there is some uncertainty; and the 
less  cogent  the probabilities  appear,  upon  which  he 
assents, the greater the uncertainty.  So that all barely 
probable proofs, which procure assent, always containing 
some visible possibility that it may be otherwise (or else 
it would be demonstration (and consequently the  weaker 
the probability appears, the weaker the assent, and the 
more  the uncertainty;  it thence follows,  that where 
there is such a mixture of uncertainty, there a man is so 
far uncertain : and therefore to say, that a man is cer- 
tain  where  he barely believes  or assents but weakly, 
though he does  believe, seems to me to say, that he is 
certain and uncertain together.  But  though bare belief 
always includes  some  degrees of  uncertainty,  yet it 
does  not  therefore necessarily include  any degree of 
wavering ; the  evidently  strong  probability  may  as 
steadily  determine the man  to assent to the truth, or 
make  him  take  the  proposition  for  true,  and  act 
accordingly, as knowledge makes them see or be cer- 
tain that it is true.  Arid he that dotli so,  as to truths 
revealed  in the Scripture, will  show  his faith by his 
works ; and has,  for aught I can see,  all the faith ne- 
cessary to a Christian, and required  to salvation, 300  Mr. Locke's second Reply 
My lord,  when I consider the length of  my answer 
here,  to these  few pages  of  your lordship's,  I cannot 
but bemoan my own dulness, and own my unfitness to 
deal with so learned an adversary as your lordship, in 
controversy:  for I know not how to answer but a pro- 
position of a determined sense.  Whilst it is vague and 
uncertain in a genera1 or equivocal  use  of  any of the 
terms, I cannot tell what to say to it.  I know not but 
such comprehensive ways of expressing one's  self may 
do well enough in declamation ;  but  in reasoning there 
can be no judgment made, till one can get to some posi- 
tive determined sense of  the speaker.  If your lordship 
had pleased to have condescended so far to my low ca- 
pacity, as to have delivered  your meaning here deter- 
mined to any one of the senses  above set down, or any 
other that you may have in these words I gathered them 
from ;  it would have saved me a great deal of  writing, 
and your lordshiplossof time in reading. I should not say 
this here to your lordship, were it only in this one place 
that  I find this inconvenience.  It  is every where in all your 
lordship's  reasonings, that my want of  understanding 
causes me this difficulty, and against my will multiplies 
the words of my answer: for notwithstanding all that 
great deal that I have already said to these few pages 
of your lordship's ;  yet my defence is not clear, and set 
in its due light, unless I show in particular of every one 
of those  propositions  (some whereof I admit  as true, 
others 1 deny as not so) that it will not prove what is to 
be proved, viz. that my placing of knowledge in the per- 
ception of the agreement  or disagreement of ideas,lessens 
the  credibility of any article of faith, which it  had before. 
Your  lordship having  done  with  the fundamental 
articles of natural religion, you come in the next place 
to  those  of  revelation;  to inquire,  as  your  lordship 
says,  whether those who embrace the articles of faith, 
in the way of  ideas, can retain their certainty of those 
articles,  when these  ideas  are  qultted."  What  this 
inquiry is, I know not very well, because I neither un- 
derstand what it is to embrace articles of  faith in the 
way of ideas,  nor know  what your  lordship means by 
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retaining their certainty of  those  articles,  when  these 
ideas are quitted.  Rut it is  no  strange thing for my 
short sight not always distinctly to discern your lord- 
ship's  meaning:  yet here I presume to know that this 
is the thing to be  proved, viz.  ic  that my definition  of 
knowledge does  not leave  to the articles of  the Chri- 
stian faith the same credibility they had before."  The 
articles your  lordship instances in, are, 
1.  The resurrection  of  the dead.  And  here your 
lordship proceeds just  in the same method of  arguing 
as you did in the farmer:  your lordship brings several 
passages concerning identity out of myEssay,which you 
suppose inconsistent with the belief of the resurrection 
of the same body;  and this is your argument to prove, 
that my defining of knowledge to consist in the percep- 
tion of the agreement or disagreement of ideas, '' alters 
the foundation of  this  article of  faith, and  leaves it 
not  the same  credibility  it  had  before."  Now,  my 
lord, granting all that your lordship  has here quoted 
out of  my chapter of identity and  diversity,  to be as 
false as your lordship  pleases,  and  as inconsistent  as 
your lordship  would  have  it,  with  the  article  of  the 
resurrection from the dead ; nay, granting all the rest 
of my whole Essay to be false ;  how will it follow from 
thence, that the placing certainty in the perception of 
the agreement or disagreement  of ideas,  weakens the 
credibility of this article of faith, that "  the dead shall 
rise ?"  Let it be, that I who place certainty in the per. 
ception of the agreement  or disagreement of ideas am 
guilty  of  errors,  that weaken  the  credibility  of  this 
article of faith ;  others who place certainty in the same 
perception may not run into those  errors,  and so not 
have their belief of  this article at all shaken. 
Your lordship therefore, by all the long discourse yo11 
have made here against my notion of personal identity, 
to prove that it weakens the credibility of the resurrec- 
tion  of  the dead,  should  you  have  proved  it ever so 
clearly, has  not,  I humbly conceive,  said therein any 
one word  towards  the proving,  that my definition  of 
knowledge weakens thecredibility of this article of faith. 
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your  lordship  cannot but remember, if you please  to 
recollect what is said in your Blst and following pages, 
and what, in the 95th page of my second letter, quoted 
by your lordship, it was designed as an answer to.  And 
so I proceed to the next articles of faith your lordship 
instances in.  Your lordship says, 
2. '<  The next  articles  of  faith which  my notion of 
ideas is  inconsistent  with,  are no less  than those  of 
the Trinity,  and  the  incarnation  of  our  Saviour." 
Where I must humbly crave leave to observe  to your 
lordship, that in this  second  head here, your lordship 
has changed the question from my notio~ls  of certainty 
to  my notion of ideas.  For the question, as I have often 
had occasion  to observe  to your  lordship, is, whether 
my notion of certainty, i. e. my placing of certainty in 
the perception of the  agreement  or disagreement  ofideas, 
alters the foundation, and lessens the credibility of any 
article of faith ?  This being the question between your 
lordship and me, ought, I humbly conceive, most espe- 
cially to have been  kept close  to in this article of the 
Trinity; because it was upon the account of my notion 
of certainty, as prejudicial to the doctrine of the  Trinity, 
that my book was .first brought into this dispute.  But 
your lordship offers  nothing, that I can  find, to prove 
that my definition of knowledge  or certainty does any 
way lessen the credibility of either of the articles here 
mentioned, unless your  insisting  upon some  supposed 
errors of mine about nature and person, must be taken 
for proofs of this proposition, that my definition of cer- 
tainty lessens the credibility of the articles ofthe  Trinity, 
and our Saviour's incarnation.  And then the answer I 
have already given to the same way of argumentation 
used by your lordship, concerning the articles of a God, 
revelation, and the resurrection, I think may suffice. 
Having,  as I beg leave  to think,  shown that your 
lordship has not in the least proved this proposition, that 
the placing of certainty in the perception of the agree- 
ment or disagreement of ideas, weakens the credibility 
of any one article of faith,which was your former accusa- 
tion against this (as your lordship is pleased to call it) 
"new method of certainty, of so dangerous consequence 
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to that article of faith which your  lordship has endea- 
voured to defend;"  and all  that your  terrible  repre- 
sentation of it being, as I humbly conceive, come to  just 
nothing: I come now to vindicate my book  from your 
new accusation in your last letter, and to show that you 
no more prove the passages you allege out of my Essay 
to have any inconsistency with the articles of the Chri- 
stian faith you oppose them to,  than you have proved 
by them, that my definition of knowledge weakens the 
credibility of any of  those articles. 
1. The article of  the Christian  faith your lordship 
begins with, is that of the resurrection of the dead ;  and 
concerning that, you say, '' the reason of believing  the 
resurrection  of  the  same  body, upon  my grounds,  is 
from  the  idea  of  identity:'  Answ.  Give  me  leave, 
my lord, to say that the reason of believing any article 
of the  Christian faith (such as your lordship is here speak- 
ing of) to me and upon my grounds, is its being a part 
of divine revelation.  Upon  this  ground I believed it, 
before I either writ that chapter of identity and diver- 
sity, and before I  ever  thought  of  those propositions 
which your  lordship  quotes out of  that chapter, and 
upon the same ground I believe it still ;  and not from 
my idea  of  identity.  This  saying of your  lordship's 
therefore, being a proposition neither self-evident, nor 
allowed by me to be true,  remains to be proved.  So 
that your foundation failing,  all your large superstruc- 
ture built thereupon comes to nothing. 
But, my lord, before we go any farther, I crave leave 
humbly to represent  to your  lordship, that I thought 
you undertook to make out that my notion of ideas was 
inconsistent with the articles of the Christian faith.  But 
that which your lordship instances in here, is not, that 
.I  yet know,  any article of the Christian faith.  The re. 
surrection of the dead I acknowledge to be an article 
of the Christian faith :  but that the resurrection of the 
Same body,  in your lordship's  sense of the same body, 
is an article of the Christian faith, is what, I confess, I 
do not yet know. 
In the New Testament (wherein,  I think, are con- 
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Saviour and the apostles to preach  the resurrection of 
the dead, and the resurrection from the dead, in many 
places :  but I do  not  remember  any place, where  the 
resurrection of the same body is so much as menlioned. 
Nay, which is very remarkable in the case, I do not re- 
member in any place of the New Testament (where the 
general resurrection at the last day is spoken of) any 
such expression as the resurrection of the body, much 
less  of the same  body.  And it may seem  to be, not 
without some special reason, that where St. Paul's  dis- 
course was particularly concerning the body, and so led 
him to name it; yet when he speaks of the resurrection, 
he says, you, and not your bodies.  1 Gor. vi. 14. 
I  say, the  general resurrection at  the last day ;  because 
where the resurrection of some particular persons, pre- 
sently upon  our Saviour's  resurrection,  is  mentioned, 
the words  are, "  The graves were  opened,  and many 
bodies of saints, which slept, arose and came out of the 
graves after his resurrection, and  went into the holy city, 
and appeared  to  many*."  Of which peculiar way ofspeak- 
ing of this resurrection, the passage itself gives a reason 
in these words,  cc appeared to many;"  i.  e.  those who 
slept appeared, so as to be known to be risen.  But this 
could not be known, unless they brought with them the 
evidence,  that they were  those  who  had  been  dead, 
whereof there were these two proofs ;  their graves were 
opened, and their bodies not only gone out of them, but 
appeared to be the same to those who had known theill 
formerly alive, and knew them to be dead and buried. 
For if they had been those who had been dead so long, 
that all who knew them once alive were now gone, those 
to whom they appeared might have known them to be 
men, but could not  have  known they were risen from 
the dead, because they never knew they had been dead. 
All that  by their appearing they could have known, was, 
that they were so many living strangers, of whose resur- 
rection they knew nothing.  It  was necessary therefore, 
that they should come in such bodies, as might in make 
and size,  &c. appear  to be  the same they had before, 
that they might  be known to those of their acquaint- 
* Matt. xxvii. 52, 53. 
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ante whom they appeared to.  And it is probable they 
were such as were newly dead, whose bodies were not 
dissolved and dissipated ;  and thcrefore it is particularly 
said here  (differently from what is  said of  the general 
resurrection) that their bodies arose: because they were 
the same that were then lying in their graves the rno- 
ment before they rose. 
But your lordship endeavours to prove it must be the 
same body : and let us grant, that your lordship, nay, 
and others too, think you  have  proved  it niust be  the 
same body; will you therefore say, that he holds what 
is inconsistent with an article of faith, who having never 
seen this your lordship's interpretation of the Scripture, 
nor your reasons  for  the same body, in your sense  of 
same body; or, if he has seen them, yet not understand- 
ing them, or not perceiving the force of  them ;  believes 
what the Scripture proposes to him, viz. that at the last 
day  the dead shall he  raised," without  determining 
whether it should be with the very same bodies or no? 
I  know your lordship pretends not to erect your par- 
ticular interpretations of Scripture into articles of faith; 
and if you do not, he that believes  the dead shall be 
raised,"  believes that article  of  faith which the Scrip- 
ture proposes ;  and cannot be accused  of  holding any 
thing inconsistent with it, if it should happen, that what 
he holds  is  inconsistent with  another proposition, viz. 
"  that the dead shall be raised with  the same bodies," 
in your lordship's sense ;  which I do not find proposed 
in holy writ as an article of faith. 
Butyour lordship argues, "it must be thesame body;" 
which, as you explain same body,  c6 is riot the same in- 
dividual  particles  of matter which were  united at the 
point of death,  nor  the same  particles  of matter that 
the  sinner  had  at the time of  the  colnrnission of his 
sins : but that it must he  the same material substance 
which was vitally united  to the soul here ;"  i. e.  as I 
understand it, the same individual particles of  matter, 
which were, some time during his life here,vitally united 
to the soul. 
Your first  argument, to prove  that it must be the 
Same body, in this sense of the same body, is taken from 
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these words of our Saviour :  6'  All that are in the graves 
shall  hear his  voice,  and  shall come forth*."  From 
whence your  lordship  argues, that these words, "  all 
that are in  the graves,"  relate to no  other substance 
than  what  was  united  to  the  soul  in  life ;  because 
'' a  different  substance cannot  be  said to be  in  the 
graves, and to come out of  them."  Which words  of 
your lordship's,  if they prove any thing, prove that the 
soul too is lodged in the grave, and raised out of it at the 
last day.  For your lordship says,  can a different sub- 
stance be said to be  in  their  graves, and come out of 
them ?"  So that,  according  to this  interpretation  of 
these words of our Saviour, no  other substance being 
raised but what hears his voice ;  and no other substance 
hearing his voice but what, being called, comes out of 
the grave ;  and no  other substance coming out of the 
grave but what was  in  the grave,  any one  must con- 
clude, that the soul, unless it be in the grave, will make 
no part of the person that is raised, unless,  as your lordp 
ship argues against me, "  you can make it 6ut, that a 
substance which never was in the grave may come out 
of it,"  or that the soul is no substance. 
But setting aside the substance of the soul, another 
thing that will make any one doubt, whether this your 
interpretation of our Saviour's words be necessarily to be 
received as their true sense, is, that it will not be very 
easily reconciled to your saying, you do not mean by the 
same body "  the same individual particles which were 
united  at the point  of  death."  And yet  by  this  in- 
terpretation  of our Saviour's  words, you  can mean no 
other particles but such as were united at the point of 
death: because you mean no other substance but what 
comes out of the grave ;  and no substance, no particles 
come out, you say, but what were in the grave: and I 
think your lordship will not say, that the particles that 
were separate from  the body by perspiration,  before 
the point of death, were laid up in the grave. 
But your lordship, I find, has an answer to this ;  viz. 
c'  that by comparing this with  other places, you  find 
that the words  [of our Saviour  above  quoted]  are to 
* John v. 28, 29. 
be understood of the substance of the  body, to which 
the soul was united ; and not to (I suppose your lord- 
ship  writ  of)  those  individual  particlcs,"  i.  e.  those 
individual particles that are in the grave at the resur- 
rection:  for so they must be  read, to make your lorci- 
ship's  sense entire, and  to  have  the purpose  of your 
answer here.  And then methinks this last sense of our 
Saviour's words  given  by your  lordship wholly  over- 
turns the sense which you  have given of  thein above ; 
where from those wosds you press the'belicf of the resur- 
rection of the same body, by this strong argument, that 
a substance could not, upon hearing the voice of Christ, 
"  come out of  the grave which was never in the grave.'' 
There (as far as 1  can  understand  your words)  your 
lordship argues, that our Saviour's words  rnust be un- 
derstood of' the particles in the grave, "unless,"  as your 
lordship says, "  one  can make it out that a substance 
which  was  never  in  the grave  may come  out of it." 
And here your lordship expressly says, "  that our  Sa- 
viour's  words are to be understood of the substance of 
that  body,  to  which  the  soul  was  [at  any  time] 
united, and not to those individual particles that are in 
the grave."  Which put together, seems to me to say, 
that oui Saviour's  words are to be understood of those 
particles  only that are in  the grave,  and not of those 
particles only which  are in  the grave,  but of  others 
also which have at any time been vitally united to the 
soul, but never were in the grave. 
The ne~t  text your lordship brings, to make the re- 
surrection of the same body,in your sense, an article of 
faith,  are these words  of St. Paul : a For we must all 
appear before the judgment-seat  of Christ, that every 
one  may  receive  the  things  done  in  his  body,  ac- 
cording to that he hath done, whether it  be  good or 
bad "."  To which your lordship subjoins this question : 
"  Can  these  words be  understood  of  any other ma- 
terial substance,  but  that body in which  these things 
were  done ?"  Answ.  A man  may suspend  his  deter- 
mining the meaning of the apostle to be, that a sinner 
$hall suffer for his sins in the very same body wherein 
* 2 COT.  v. 10, 
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he  comnlitted  them; because  St. Paul does  not  say 
he shall  have  the very  same body  when  he  suffers 
that he 11atl  when he sinned.  The apostle says, indeed, 
6c  done in his body."  The body he had, and did things 
in, at five or fifteen, was no doubt his body, as much as 
that which he did things in at  fifty was his body, though 
his body were not the very same body at those different 
ages : and so will  the body which  he shall have after 
the resurrection be his body, though it be not thevery 
same with that which he had at five, or fifteen, or fifty. 
He that at  threescore is broke on the wheel, for a mur- 
der he committed at twenty, is punished  for what he 
did in his body ;  though the body he has,  i.  e. his body 
at  threescore, be not the same, i. e. made up of the same 
individual particles ofmatter that that  body was which 
he had  forty years  before.  When your lordship  has 
resolvecl with yourself what that same immutable he is, 
which at  the last  judgment shall receive the things done 
in his body ;  your lordship will easily see, that the  body 
he had, when  an embryo in the womb, when  a  child 
playing in coats, when a man marrying a wife, and when 
bed-rid, dying of a consumption, and at last, which he 
shall have after his  resurrection ;  are each of them his 
body, though neither  of  them be  the same body, the 
one with the other. 
But farther to your lordship's  question, "  can these 
words be understood of  any other material substance, 
but  that body  in which  these  things were done ?"  I 
answer, these words  of  St. Paul may be understood of 
another  material  substance, than that body in which 
these things were done ;  because your lordship teaches 
me, and gives me a strong reason so to understand them. 
Your lordship says, that "  you do not say the same par- 
ticles  of  matter,  which  the  sinner  had  at the  very 
time  of  tlie  commission  of his sins,  shall be  raised at 
the last  day."  And your  lordship  gives  this reason 
for it : " for then  a  long sinner must have a vast body, 
considering  the  continual  spending  of  particles  by 
perspiration."  Now, my lord,  if  the apostle's  words, 
as your lordship would argue, cannot be understood of 
any other material  substance,  but that body in which 
these things were done; and nobody, upon the removal 
or change of some of the particles that at  any time make 
it  up, is the same material substarlce, or the same body : 
it will, I think,  thence  follow,  that either  the sinner 
must have all the same  individual particles vitally united 
to  his so111 when he is raised, that he had vitally united 
to his  soul when  he sinned:  or  else St. Paul's words 
here cannot be understood  to mean the same body in 
which "  the things were done."  For if there were other 
particles of matter in the body wherein the thing was 
done than in that which is raised, that which is raised 
cannot  be  the same  body in  which they were  done : 
unless that alone, wllicli has just all the same individual 
particles when any action is done, beir~g  the same body 
wherein it was done, that also, which has not the same 
individual particles wherein  that action was done, can 
be the same body wherein it was done ;  which is in eff'ect 
to make the same body sometimes to be the same, and 
sometiines not the same. 
Your lordship thinks it  suffices to  make the same body 
to have not  all, but  no other particles of matter, but 
such as were sometime  or other vitally united  to the 
sodl before : but such  a body, made up of part of the 
particles sometime or other vitally united to the soul, is 
no more the same body wherein the actions were done 
in the distant parts of the long sinner's life, than that is 
the same body in which  a  quarter, or half,  or three 
quarters, of  the  same particles,  that made  it up, are 
wanting.  For example :  a sinner has acted here in his 
body an hundred years ;  he is raised at  the last day, but 
with what body? The same, says your lordship, that he 
acted in ;  because St. Paul says, "  he must receive the 
things  done in  his  body."  What therefore  must  his 
body at the resurrection consist  of? Must it consist of 
all the   articles  of matter that have  ever been vitally 
united to his soul? for they,  in succession, have  all of 
them made up his body, wherein he  did  these things. 
No, says your lordship, that would make his body too 
vast ; it suffices to make the same body in which  the 
things were done, that it consists of some of the parti- 
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his life,  vitally united  to his  so11l.  But  according to 
this account, his body at the resurrection being, as your 
lordship seems to limit it,  near  the same size ~t  was in 
some part of his life ;  it will be no more the same body, 
in which the things were done in the distant parts of his 
life, than that is the same body,  in which half, or three 
quarters, or  more  of the individual  matter, that then 
made it up, is now wanting.  For example, let his body, 
at  fifty years old, consist of a million of parts; five hun- 
dred thousand at least  of those  parts vill be different 
from those which made up his body at ten years, and at 
an hundred.  So that to take the numerical particles 
that made up his  body at fifty, or any other season of 
his life ; or to gather them promiscuously out of those 
which at different times  have successively been vitally 
united to his  soul ;  they will no  more make the same 
body, which was his, wherein some of his actions were 
done, than that is  the same body which  has but half 
the same particles :  and yet all your lordship's  argument 
here for the same body is, because St. Paul says it must 
be his body, in which these things were done; which it 
could  not be,  "if  any other  substance were joined  to 
it,"  i. e. if  any other particles  of  matter  made up the 
body, which were  not vitally united  to the soul, when 
the action was done. 
Again, your lordship says, "  that you do not say the 
aame individual  particles  [shall make up the body at 
the resurrection]  which  were united  at the point of 
death; for there must  be  a great alteration  in them, 
in a lingering disease, as, if  a fat man falls into a con* 
sumption."  Because  it is  likely your  lordship thinks 
these  particles  of  a  decrepit,  wasted,  withered  body 
would be too few, or unfit to make such a plump,strong, 
vigorous, well-sized  body, as it has pleased your lord- 
ship to proportion out in your thoughts to men at  the 
resurrection ; and therefore some  small portion of the 
particles formerly united vitally to that man's  soul shall 
be re-assumed,  to make up his  body to the bulk your 
lordship judges  convenient : but the greatest part of 
them shall be  ltft out,  to avoid the making his body 
more vast than your  lordship  thinks will be fit, as ap- 
pears by these your  lordship's words  immediately fol- 
lowing, viz.  "that  you do not  say the same particles 
the sinner had  at the very time  of  commission  of  his 
sins ;  for then a long sinner must have a vast body." 
But then pray,  my lord, what  must an embryo do, 
who, dying within a few hours after his body was vitally 
united to his  soul,  has no  particles  of  matter, which 
were formerly vitally united to it, to make up his body 
of that size and proportion which your lordship seems 
to require in bodies at  the resurrection? or must we be- 
lieve he shall remain content with that small pittance of 
matter,and that yet imperfect body to  eternity; because 
it is an article of faith to believe the resurrection of the 
very same body? i. e. made up of only such particles as 
have been vitally united to the soul.  For if it be so, as 
your lordship says, "  that life is the result of the union 
of soul and body,"  it will  follow,  that the body of an 
embryo dying in the womb may be very little, not the 
thousandth part of an ordinary man.  For since from the 
first conception and beginning of formation it has life, 
and "  life is the result of the union of the soul with the 
body;"  an embryo,  that  shall  die  either  by the un- 
timely death of  the mother,  or by any other accident 
presently after it has life, must, according to your lord- 
ship's  doctrine, remain a man not an inch long to eter- 
nity; because there are not particles of matter, formerly 
united to his soul, to make him bigger ;  and no other 
can be made use of to that purpose ;  thoughwhat greater 
congruity the soul hath with  any particles  of matter, 
which were once vitally united to it, but are now so no 
longer, than it hath with particles  of  matter which  it 
was never united to,  would  be  hard  to determine,  if 
that should be demanded. 
By  these, and not a few other the  like consequences,one 
may see what service they do to religion and the Chri- 
stian doctrine,  who raise questions, and make articles of 
faith about the resurrection  of  the same  body, where 
the Scripture  says nothing of the same body ;  or if it  does, 
it is  with no small reprimand to those who make such 
an inquiry.  But some man will say, how are the dead 
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fool, that which  thou sowest  is not  quickened except 
it die.  And  that wl~ich  thou  sowest, thou sowest not 
that body that shall be, but bare grain ;  it nlay chance 
of  wheat  or  some  other grain: but  God  giveth  it a 
body as hath pleased him *."  Words, I should think, 
suficient to deter us from determining any thing for or 
against the same body being raised at the last day.  It 
suffices, that all the dead shall be raised, and every one 
appear and answer for the things done in this life, and 
receive according to the things he hath done in his body, 
whether good  or  bad.  I-Ie  that believes this, and has 
said nothing inconsistent herewith, I presume may, and 
must be acquitted from being guilty of  any thing incon- 
sistent with the article of the resurrection of the dead. 
But your lordship,  to prove  the resurrection of the 
same body  to be an article of faith, farther asks, "  how 
could  it be  said,  if  any other substance be joined  to 
the soul  at the resurrection,  as  its  body,  that they 
were the thinqs done in or by the body?"  Answ.  Just 
as it may be sad  of  a man at an hundred years old, that 
hath then another substance joined to his soul than he 
had at twenty, that the murder or drunkenness he was 
guilty of at twenty were things done in the body: how, 
"  by the body" comes in here, I do not see. 
Your lordship adds,  "  and St. Paul's  dispute  about 
the manner of raising the body might soon have ended, 
if there was  no  necessity  of  the same body."  Answ. 
When I understand  what  argument  there is in these 
words to prove the resurrection of the same body, with- 
out the mixture  of  one  new atom of  matter, I  shall 
know what to say to it.  In the mean time this I under- 
stand, that St. Paul would have put as short an end to 
all disputes  about  this  matter, if he  had  said,  that 
there was a necessity of the same body, or that it  should 
be the same body. 
The next text of  scripture you  bring for the same 
body is, "  if there be no resurrection of the dead, then is 
not Christ raised t."  From which your lordship argues, 
.'it  seems then other bodies are to be raised as his was." 
I grant other dead, as certainly raised asChrist was; for 
*  1 Cor. xv. 35, &c.  -f  2 Cor. xv. 16. 
else his  resurrection would be of no use  to  mankind. 
But I do not see how it follows that they shall be raised 
with  the same  body,  as  your lordship  infers in these 
words annexed; "and can there be any doubt, whether 
his  body was  the same  material  substance which was 
united to his soul before ?"  I answer, none at all ; nor 
that it had just the same distinguishable lineaments and 
marks,  yea,  and the same wounds that it had  at the 
time of his death.  If therefore your lordship will argue 
from other bodies  being  raised  as  his was,  that they 
must keep  proportion with  his  in  sameness; then we 
must believe,  that every man shall be raised with the 
same linea~nents  and other notes of distinction he had at 
the time of  his  death,  even with his wounds yet open, 
if he had any, because our Saviour was so raised; which 
seems to me scarce reconcileable with what your lord- 
ship says of  a fat man falling into a consumption, and 
dying. 
But whether it will consist or no with your lordship's 
meaning in that place, this to me seems a consequence 
that will need to be better proved, viz. that our bodies 
must be raised the same, just as our Saviour's was? be- 
cause St. Paul says, "if  there be no resurrection of the 
dead,  then  is  not  Christ  risen."  For it  may  be  a 
good consequence, Christ is risen,  and therefore there 
shall be a resurrection of the dead; and yet this may not 
be a good consequence, Christ was raised with the same 
body he had at his  death,  therefore  all  men  shall be 
raised with the same body they had at their death, con- 
trary to what your lordship says concerning a fat man 
dying of a consumption.  But the case I think far dif- 
ferent  betwixt  our Saviour  and those to be raised at 
the last day. 
I.  His body  saw  not  corruption,  and  therefore to 
give him another body, new moulded, mixed with other 
particles, which were not contained in it as it lay in the 
grave, whole and entire as  it was laid there, had been 
to destroy his body to frame him a new one without ariy 
need.  But why with the remaining particles of a man's 
body long since dissolved and mouldered into dust and 
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gone variety of  changes,  and  entered into other con- 
cretions even  in  the  bodies  of  other men)  other new 
particles of matter mixed with them, may not serve to 
make his  body again,  as well  as  the  mixture of  new 
and different particles of matter with the old, did in the 
compass of his  life  make  his  body;  I think no reason 
can be given. 
This may serve to show, why,  though the materials 
of our Saviour's  body were not changed at his resurrec- 
tion;  yet it does  not  follo~v,  but  that the body  of  a 
man,  dead  and rotten  in his  grave, or  burnt, may at 
the last day have  several  new particles  in it, and that 
without any inconvenience.  Since whatever matter is 
vitally united to  his soul, is his body,  as much as is that 
which was  united  to it when  he was  born,  or in any 
other part of his life. 
2. In the next  place,  the  size,  shape,  figure,  and 
lineaments of our Saviour's  body,  even to his wounds, 
into which doubting Thomas put his fingers and hand, 
were to be kept in the raised body of our Saviour, the 
same they were at his  death, to be a conviction to his 
disciples, to whom he showed himself, and who were to 
be witnesses of his  resurrection,  that their master, the 
very same  man,  was  crucified,  dead,  and buried,  and 
raised again; and therefore  he was  handled  by them, 
and eat before them after he was risen, to give them in 
all points full satisfaction that it was really he, the same, 
and not  another,  nor a  spectre or apparition of him: 
though I do not think your lordship will thence argue, 
that because others are to be raised as he was, therefore 
it is necessary to believe,  that because he eat after his 
resurrection, others at the last day shall eat and drink 
after they are raised from the dead; which seems to  me its 
good an argument, as because his undissolved body was 
raised out of the grave, just as it there lay entire, with- 
out the mixture of any new particles, therefore the cor- 
rupted and consumed bodies of the  dead at  the resurrec- 
tion shall be new-framed only out of those scattered par- 
ticles,  which  were  once vitally  united  to their souls, 
without the  least mixture of any one single atom of new 
matter.  But at the last day, when all men are raised, 
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there will be no need  to be  assured of  any one parti- 
cular man's  resurrection.  It is enough that every one 
shall appear before  the judgment-seat  of  Christ,  to 
receive according to what  he  had  done  in  his  former 
life;  but in what  sort of  body he  shall appear,  or of 
what  particles  made  up,  the Scripture  having  said 
nothing, but that it shall be a spiritual body raised in 
incorruption, it is not for me to determine. 
Your lordship asks, '' were they [who saw our Saviour 
after his resurrection]  witnesses  only of some material 
substance, then united to his  soul 2"  In answer, I beg 
your lordship to consider,  whether you suppose our Sa- 
viour was to be known to be the same man (to the wit- 
nesses that were to see him, and testify his resurrection) 
by his soul, that could neither be seen, nor known to be 
the same;  or by his  body,  that could be seen, and, by 
the discernible structure and marks of it, be known to be 
the same?  When your lordship has resolved that, all 
that you say in that page will answer itself.  But he- 
cause one man cannot know another to be the same, but 
by the outward visible lineaments, and sensible marks he  . 
has been wont to be known and distinguished by; will 
your lordship therefore argue, that the great Judge at 
the last day, who  gives  to each man, whom he raises, 
his new body, shall not  be  able to know who is who, 
unless  he give to every one of them a body, just of the 
same figure, size, and features, and  made up of the very 
same individual  particles  he had  in  his  former life? 
Whether such a way of arguing for the resurrection of 
the same body to be an article of faith contributes much 
to the strengthening the credibility of the article of the 
resurrection of the dead, I shall leave to the judgment 
of others. 
Farther, for the proving the resurrection of the same 
body to be an article of faith, your lordship says: "but 
the apostle insists upon the resurrection of Christ, not 
merely as an argument of the possibility of ours, but of 
the certainty of it; because he rose, as the first-fruits; 
Christ the first-fruits, afterwards they that areChrist's  at 
his comingk." Answ. No doubt the resurrection of Christ 
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is a proof of the certainty of our resurrection.  But is it 
therefore a proof of the resurrection of  the same body, 
consisting of the same individual particles which con- 
curred to the making up of our body here, without the 
mixture of any one other particle of matter?  I confess 
I see no such consequence. 
But your lordship goes on : "  St. Paul was aware of 
the objections  in  men's  minds, about the resurrection 
of the same body;  and it is  of  great consequence,  as 
to this  article,  to show  upon  what grounds he  pro- 
ceeds.  But some  men  will  say,  how  are the dead 
raised  up,  and with what body do they come?  First, 
he shows  that the seminal  parts of  plants  are won- 
derfully improved by the ordinary providence of  God, 
in the manner  of  their vegetation."  Answ.  I do not 
perfectly understand what it is, "  for the seminal parts 
of plants to be wonderfully improved  by the  ordinary 
providence of God, in the manner of their vegetation ;" 
or else perhaps I should better see how this here tends 
to the proof  of  the resurrection  of  the same body, in 
your lordship's  sense. 
It continues, "they sow bare grain of wheat, or of some 
other  grain, but God giveth it a body, as it hath pleased 
him, and to every seed his own body.  Here, says your . 
lordship, is an identity of  the material substance sup- 
posed."  It  may be so.  But to  me a diversity of the ma- 
terial substance, i. e. of the component particles, is here 
supposed, or in direct words said.  For the words of St. 
Paul, taken all together,  run thus, "  that which thou 
sowest, thou sowest not that body which shall be, but 
bare grain*:"  and so on,  as your lordship has set down 
the  remainder of them.  From which words of St. Paul, 
the natural argument seems to me to stand thus :  if 
the body  that is  put  in the  earth in sowing  is  not 
that body which shall be, then the body that is put in 
the grave is not that, i. e. the same, body that shall be. 
But your lorclship proves it to be the same body,  by 
these three Greek words of the text, 16  21ov  aw'pa, which 
your lordship interprets thus, <'  that proper body which 
belongs to it."  Answ.  Indeed  by those Greek words, 
*  1 Cor. xv. 37. 
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76  T&IV  a+a,  whether our translators ha~~c?  rightly ren- 
dered them '(  his  own body,"  or  your  lordship  more 
rightly "  that  proper  bocly  which  belongs  to it,"  I 
formerly understood no more but this, that in the pro- 
duction of wheat and other grain from seed,  God con- 
tinued every species distinct;  so that from grains of 
wheat sown, root, stalk, blade, ear, and grains, of wheat, 
were produced, and not those of barley;  and so of the 
rest :  which I took to be the meaning of "  to every seed 
his own body."  No,  says your  lordship,  these words 
prove, that to every plant of wheat, and to every grain 
of wheat produced in it, is given the proper body that 
belongs  to it, which  is the same body with the grain 
that was sown.  Answ.  This I confess I do not under- 
stand ;  because I do not understand how one individual 
grain can be the same with twenty, fifty, or an hundred 
individual grains, for such sometinles is the increase. 
But your lordship proves it.  For, says your lordship, 
"  every seed having that body in little, which is after- 
wards so much enlarged, and in grain the seed is cor- 
rupted before its germination;  but it hath its proper 
organics1 parts,  which  makes it the same body with 
that which it grows up to.  For although grain be not 
divided into lobes as other seeds are,  yet it hath been 
found,  by the most  accurate observations,  that upon 
separating the membranes, these seini~al  parts are dis- 
cerned in them, which afterwards grow up to that body 
which we call corn."  In which words I crave leave to 
observe, that your lordship supposes, that a body may 
be enlarged by the addition  of  an hundred or a thou- 
sand times as much in bulk as its own mattcr, and yet 
continue the same body;  which,  I  confess,  I cannat 
understand. 
But in the next place,  if that could be  so,  and that 
the plant in its full growth at harvest, increased by a 
thousand  or s  million  of  times as much  new  matter 
added to it as it had when it lay in little concealed in 
the grain that was sown, was the very same body ;  yet 
I do not think that your lordship will say, that every 
minute,  insensible,  and inconceivably  small  grain of 
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seminal plant, is every one of them the very same with 
that  grain which contains that whole little seminal plant, 
and all those  invisible  grains in  it ; for  then it will 
follow, that one grain is the same with an hundred, and 
an hundred distinct  grains the same with one ; wliich 
I shall be able to assent to, when I can conceive that 
all the wheat in the world is but one grain. 
For,  I  beseech  you,  my lord,  coilsider  what it is 
St. Paul here speaks of!  It is  plain  he speaks of  tliat 
which is sown and dies ; i. e.  the grain that the hus- 
bandman takes out of his barn to sow in his field.  And 
of this  grain St. Paul says, "  tliat it is not that body 
that shall be."  These two, viz. "  that which is sown, 
and that body that shall be,"  are all the bodies  that 
St. Paul here speaks of, to represent the agreement or 
difference of  men's  bodies  after the resurrection, with 
those they had before  they died.  Now I crave leave 
to ask  your lordship, which of  these two is that little 
invisible seminal plant, which your lordship here speaks 
of? Does your lordship mean by it the grain that is 
sown ?  But  that  is not what St. Paul speaks of; he could 
not mean this embryonated little plant, for he could not 
denote it  by these words, "  that which thon sorvest, "  for 
that lie says must dic; but this little cmbryonated plant, 
contained in tlie seed that is  sown, ;tics not: or does 
your lordship mean by it, "  the body that shall be?" 
But neither by these words, "  the body that shall be," 
can St. Paul be supposed to rleilotc this insensible little 
embryonated plant ; for that is already in being, con- 
tained in the seed that is sown, and therefore could iiot 
be spoken of undcr the name of the body that sliall be. 
And therefore, 1 confess, I cannot see of what use it is 
to YOL~  lordship  to  irltrocluce  here  this  third  body, 
which  St. Paul incntions not; and to make that the 
same  or  not  the  same with  any  other,  when  those 
which  St. Paul speaks  of  are,  as I htunbly  conceive, 
these two visible  sensible bodies, the grain sown, and 
the corn grown up to ear ; with neither  of wllich this 
insensible  einbryonated  plant can be  the same body, 
unless an inse~isible  body can be the same body wit11 a 
sensible body,  and a little body can be the same body 
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one ten thousand, or an hundred thousand tinics 
as big as itself.  So that yet, I confess,  I sec not thc 
resurrccti~n  of the same body proved from these words 
of St. Paul to be an article of faith. 
Your lordship goes on: "  St. Paul indeed saitll, tllnf 
we SOW not that body that shall be; but he speaks 110t 
of  the identity but the perfection  of  it."  Plerc  iny 
understanding fails me again :  for I cannot understancl 
St. Paul to say, that the same identical sensible grain of 
wheat, which was  sown at seed-time,  is the very same 
with  every grain of wheat in the ear at harvest,  that 
sprang from it :  yet so I must understand it, to make it 
prove that the same sensible body, that is  lnid in thp 
grave, shall be the very same with that which sliall be 
raised st the resurrection.  For I do not know of any 
seminal body in little, contained in the dead carcass of 
any man or woman ; which,  as your  lordship says, in 
seeds,  having  its proper  organieal  parts,  shall  after- 
wards be  enlarged,  and  at tlie  resurrection  grow up 
into the same man.  For I never thought of  any sec:l 
or seminal parts, either of plant or animal, '<so  woncler- 
fully  improved  by  the providence  of  God,"  whereby 
the same plant or animal should beget itself; nor ever 
heard,  that it was  by divine  Providence  desijincd  to 
produce the same individual, but for the producing of 
future and distinct individuals, for the continuation of 
the same species. 
Your lordship's next words are,  and although therc 
be  such  a  difference  from  the  grain  itself,  whcn  it 
comes up to be  perfect  corn, :vith  root, stalk, blade, 
and ear, that it may be  said to outward appearance 
not  to be  the  same  body;  yet,  with  regard  to  thc 
seminal  and organic31 parts, it is  as much the sanlc, 
as the man grown up is tlie  same with the embryo in 
the womb."  Answer.  It docs not appear, by any tllii?,R 
1 can find in the text, that St. Paul here compared th: 
body produced with  the seminal and organical parts 
contained in the grain it sprang from,  but with  tl~r 
whole sensible grain that was sown.  Microscopes had 
not then discovered the little embryo plant in tlx  seeci: 
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(though  in  the Scripture we  find  little  revelation of 
natural  philosophy)  yet  an argument taken  from  a 
thing perfectly unknown to the Corinthians, whom he 
writ to,  could  be  of  no  manner  of  use  to them,  nor 
serve at a11  either to instruct or convince them.  But 
granting that those  St. Paul writ to knew as well  as 
Mr.  Lewenhocke;  yet  your  lordship  thereby  proves 
not the raising of the same body: your lordship saj~s  it 
is as much the same [I crave leave to add body]  "as  a 
man  grown  up is the same,"  (same  what,  I  beseech 
your lordship?) '' with the embryo in the womb."  For 
that the body  of  the embryo  in the womb,  and  the 
body of the man  grown up,  is the same body, I think 
no one will say ;  unless he can persuade himself that a 
body, that is not an hundredth part of  another,  is the 
same with that other; which I think  no one will  do, 
till,  having  renounced this dangerous way by ideas of 
thinking and reasoning, he has learnt to say that a part 
and the whole are the same. 
Your lordship goes on : "  and although many argu- 
ments  may  be  used  to  prove,  that a man is not the 
same, because  life, which depends  upon  the course of 
the blood, and the manner of  respiration and nutrition, 
is so different  in both states; yet that man would  be 
thought ridiculous, that should seriously affirm that it 
was not the same man.  And your lordship says, I grant, 
that the variation of  great parcels of  matter in plants 
alters  not  the identity;  and that the organization  of 
the parts in one coherent body, partaking of one com- 
mon life, makes the identity of a plant."  Answer.  My 
lord, I think the question is not about the same man, 
but the  same body:  for though I  do say,  (somewhat 
differently from what your lordship  sets down  as  my 
words hereX) "  that which  has such an organization, 
as is fit to receive and distribute nourishment, so as to 
continlie and frame the wood, bark, and leaves, &c. of 
a plant, in which consists the ve,rretab!e  life ;  continues 
to be tl~c  same plant, as long as it partakes of  the same 
lifc, though that life be communicated to new particles 
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of matter, vitally united to the living  plant :" yet I do 
not remember that I any where say, that a plant, which 
was once no bigger than an oaten straw, and afterwards 
grows to be above  a fathom about, is the same body, 
though it be still the same plant. 
The well  known  tree  in  Epping-forest,  called  tlie 
king's  oak, which from not weighing an ounce at first, 
grew to have many tons of timber i11  it, was all along 
the same oak, the very same plant ;  but nobody, I think, 
will say it was the same body when it weighed a ton, as 
it was when it weighed but an ounce ; unless he has a 
mind  to signalize himself  by  saying, that that is  the 
same body, which has a thousanel, particles of different 
matter in it, for one particle that is the same :  which is 
no better than to say, that a thousand different particles 
are but one and the same particle, and one and the same 
particle is a thousand  different  particles;  a  thousand 
times greater absurdity, than to say half is the whole, 
or the whole is the same with the half.  TVhich will be 
improved ten times yet farther, if a man shall say (as 
your lordship seems to me to argue here) that that great 
oak is the very same body with the acorn it sprang from, 
because there was in that acorn an oak in little, which 
was afterwards (as your lordship expresses it) so much 
enlarged as to make that mighty tree :  for this embryo, 
if I may so call it, or oak in little, being not the hun- 
dredth, or perhaps the thousandth part of the acorn, and 
the acorn being not the thousandth  part of  the grown 
oak ; it will  be very extraordinary to prove the acorn 
and the grown  oak  to be  the same  body,  by  a way 
wherein it cannot be pretended that above one particle 
of an hundred thousand, or a million, is the same in the 
one body that it was in the other.  From which way of 
reasoning it will  follow,  that a nurse and  her sucking 
child  have the same body;  and be past doubt, that a 
mother and her infant have the same body.  But this is 
a way of certainty found out to establish the articles of 
faith,  and to overturn the new method of certainty that 
your lordship says c6 I have started, which is apt to leave 
men's  mmds more doubtful than before," 
And now  1 desire your lordship to consider of what 
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use it is to you in the present case to quote out of  my 
Essay these words, "  that partaking of one common life 
makes the ide~itity  of  the plant ;" since the question is 
not about the identity of  a plant, but about the identity 
of a body ;  it being a very different thing to be the same 
plant, and to be the same body :  for that which makes 
the same plant, does not make the same body ;  the one 
being  the partaking in the same continued vegetable 
life,  the other  the  consisting of  the same numerical 
particles of  matter.  And therefore your lordship's  in- 
ference from my words  above quoted,  in these  which 
you subjoin, seems to me  a very strange one, viz. <'so 
that in things capable of  any sort of life, the identity is 
consistent with a continued silccession of parts ;  and so 
the wheat grown  up is the same body with the grain 
that was sown :" for, I believe, if my words, from which 
you infer, '' and so the wheat grown up is the same 
body with the grain that was  sown,"  were put into a 
syllogism, this would hardly be brought to be the con- 
clusion. 
But your lordship  goes on with consequence  upon 
consequence, though I have not eyes acute enough every 
where to see the connexion, till you bring it to the re- 
surrection of  the same body.  The connexion of  your 
lordship's  words is as followeth: "  and thus the altera- 
tion of  the parts of  the body,  at the resurrection,  is 
consistent with its identity, if  its organization and life 
be the same;  and this is a real identity of  the body, 
which depends not upon consciousness.  From whence 
it follows,  that to make the same body no more is re- 
quired but restoring life to the organized  parts of  it." 
If the question were about raising the same plant, I do 
not say but there might be some appearance for making 
such inference  from  my  words  as  this; "  whence  it 
follows,  that to make  the same  plant no more is re- 
quired but to restore life to the organized parts of  it." 
But this deduction, wherein from those words of mine, 
that speak only of  the identity of  a plant,  your lord- 
ship infers  there is more  required  to make the same 
body,  than to make the same plant,  being too subtile 
for me, I leave to my reader to find out. 
Your lordship goes on and says, that I grant likewise, 
"that the identity of the same man consists in aparticipa- 
tion of  the same continued life, by constantly fleeting 
particles of  matter in  succession, vitally united  to the 
same organized body."  Answ.  I speak in these words 
of  the identity of  the same  man;  and your  lordship 
thence roundly concludes, '(  so that there is no difficulty 
of the sameness of the body."  But your lordship knows, 
that I do not take these t.wo sounds, man and body, to 
stand for the same thing ; nor the identity of  the man 
to be the same with the identity of the body. 
But let us read out your lordship's words : "  so that 
there is no difficulty as to the sameness of the body, if 
life  were  continued;  and if  by  divine  power  life  be 
restored to that material substance, which was before 
united, by a reunion of  the soul to it, there is no rea- 
son to deny the identity of the body :  not from the con- 
sciousness of the soul, but from that life, which is the 
result of the union of the soul and body." 
If I  understand  your  lordship  right,  you  in  these 
words,  from  the  passages  above  quoted  out  of  my 
book,  argue,  that  from  those  words  of  mine  it will 
follow,  that it is or  may  be the same body,  that is 
raised at the resurrection.  If so, my lord,  your lord- 
ship has then proved, that my book is not inconsistent 
with, but conformable to, this article of the resurrection 
of the same  body,  which  your lordship contends for, 
and will  have to be  an article of faith:  for though I 
do  by  no  means  deny that the same  bodies  shall be 
raised at the last day, yet I see nothing your lordship 
has said to prove it to be an article of faith. 
But your  lordship  goes on  with  your  proofs,  and 
says :  "but St. Paul still supposes that it must be that 
material substance to which the soul was before united. 
For, saith he, '  It is sown in corruption,  it is raised in 
incorruption;  it is  sown  in  dishonour,  it is raised  in 
glory ;  it is sown in weakness, it is raised in power ; it 
is  sown a natural body,  it is raised a spiritual body.' 
@an  such a material substance, which was never united 
to  the body, be said to  be sown in corruption, and weak- 
ness,  and dishonour?  Either therefore he must speak 
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of  the same body,  or his meaning  cannot  be compre- 
hended."  I  answer, "  can such a material substance 
which was never laid in the grave, be said to be sown ?" 
&c.  For  your  lordship  says, "  you  do  not  say  the 
same  individual  particles,  which  were  united  at the 
point of death, shall be raised  at  the last day;" and no 
other particles are laid in the grave, but such as are 
united  at the  point  of  death;  either  therefore  your 
lordship  must  speak  of  another  body  different  from 
that which  was  sown,  which  shall be  raised; or else 
your meaning,  P think, cannot be comprehended. 
But whatever be your meaning, your lordship proves 
it to be St. Paul's meaning, that the same body shall be 
raised which was sown, in these following words :  "for 
what  does  all  this  relate  to a  conscious  principle ?" 
Answer.  The Scripture being express,  that the same 
persons  should be raised  and appear before the judg- 
ment-seat of Christ, that every one may receive accord- 
ing to what he had done in his body ;  it was very well 
suited  to  common  apprehensions  (which  refined  not 
about  ri  particles that had  been vitally  united  to the 
soul")  to speak of the body which each one mas to have 
after the resurrection,  as he would  be apt to speak of 
it himself.  For it being his body both before and after 
the resurrection, every one ordinarily speaks of his body 
3s the same, though in a strict and philosophical sense, as 
your lordship speaks, it be not the very same.  Thus it 
is no inlpropriety of speech to say, "this  body of mine, 
which  was  formerly strong and plump,  is  now weak 
and wasted :I'  though, in such a sense as you are speak- 
ing here, it be not the same body.  Revelation declares 
nothing any where concerning the same body,  in your 
lordship's  sense of the same body, which appears not to 
have been then thought of.  The apostle directly pro- 
poses nothing for or against the same body, as necessary 
to be believed:  that which he is plain and direct in, is 
his  opposing  and  condemning such curious questions 
about the body, which could serve only to perplex, not 
to confirm what was material and necessary for them to 
believe,  viz. a day of judgment and retribution to men 
in a future state; and therefore it is no wonder that, 
mentioning their bodies, he should use a way of speak- 
ing suited to vulgar  notions,  from which it would  be 
hard  positively  to concl~tde  any  thing. for  the deter- 
mining of  this question (especially  aga~nst  expressions 
in the same discourse that plainly incline to the other 
side)  in  a  matter  which,  as  it appears,  the  apostle 
thought not necessary to determine,  and  the Spirit of 
God thought not fit to gratify any one's  curiosity in. 
But your lordship says, "  the apostle speaks plainly 
of that body which was once quickened, and afterwards 
falls to corruption, and is to be restored with more noble 
qualities."  I wish your lordship had quoted the words 
of St. Paul, wherein he speaks plainly of  that numerical 
body that was once  quickened ;  they would presently 
decide  this question.  But your lordship proses it by 
these following words of St. Paul ;  "for this corruption 
must put on incorruption, and this mortal must put on 
immortality :" to which your lordship adds, ''  that you 
do not  see  how  he  could  more  expressly  affirm  the 
identity of  this  corruptible  body with  that after  the 
resurrection."  How  expressly  it is  affirmed  by  the 
apostle, shall be considered by and by.  In the mean 
time,  it is  past doubt that your lordship  best  knows 
what you do or do not see.  But this I will be bold to 
say, that if St. Paul had any where in this chapter (where 
there are so many occasions for it, if it had been neces- 
sary to have been believed) but said in express words, 
that the same bodies should be  raised,  every one  else 
who thinks of it will see he had more expressly affirmed 
the identity of  the bodies which  men  now  have,  with 
those they shall have after the resurrection. 
The remainder of  your lordship's  period  is : <'  and 
that without  any respect  to the principle  of  self-con- 
sciousness."  Answer.  These words, I doubt not, have 
some  meaning,  but  I  must  own,  I  know  not  what ; 
either  towards  the proof  of  the  resurrection  of  the 
same body, or to show that any thin$ I have said con- 
cerning self-consciousness  is inconsistent : for I do not 
remember that I have any where said, that the identity 
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From your preceding words, your lordship concludes 
thus : "  and so if the Scripture be the sole foundation of 
our faith,  this is an article of it."  My lord, to make 
the conclusion  unquestionable,  I humbly conceive, the 
words must run thus: "  and so  if the Scriptnre,  and 
your lordship's  interpretation of it, be the sole founda- 
tion of  our faith,  the resurrection of  the same body is 
an article of it."  For, with submission, y?ur  lordship 
has neither produced express words of Scripture for it, 
nor so proved that to be the meaning of  any of  those 
words  of  Scripture which  you have produced for  it, 
that  a  man who  reads  and  sincerely  endeavours  to 
understand  the  Scripture,  cannot  but  find  himself 
obliged to believe,  as expressly, "that the same bodies 
of the dead,"  in your lordship's  sense, shall be raised, 
as "  that the dead shall be raised."  And I crave leave 
to give your lordship this one reason for it: 
He who  reads with  attention  this discourse of St. 
Paul*, where he discourses of the resurrection, will see 
that he plainly  distinguishes  between  the dead that 
shall be raised,  and the bodies of  the dead.  For it is 
~~~401,  'zJCIYIE~,  d(i,  are the nominative cases to iy~i,~ov?ar,  two- 
*oi$3~rov?ai,  Ey~p8<uov~ar,  all along, and not rdpala, bodies, 
which one may with reason think would somewhere or 
other have been expressed, if all this had been said,  to 
propose it as  an article of  faith,  that the very  same 
bodies should  be raised.  The same manner of  speak- 
ing the  Spirit of  God observes  all through the New 
Testament, where it is said, "  raise t the dead, quicken 
or make alive the dead, the resurrection of  the dead." 
Nay, these very words of our $ Saviour, urged by your 
lordship  for  the resurrection  of  the same  body,  run 
thus : ~'Ia'v7~5  oi  ;v  roig  pvrjpsio~r  cExrjaov7ar  ryg pwvcg  a;E,  xa\l 
~%noi;~Juovrai,  ci 12  dyaOd woi$uav7~g  :is  civauraurv <w<~,  oi 6i  roi  paiiha: 
mpa~a'v7~g   is dvciutauiv xpir~wr. Would not a well-meaning 
searcher of the Scriptures be apt to think, that if  the 
thing here intended by our Saviour were to teach and 
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propose  it as an article of  faith,  necessary to be be- 
lieved  by every one,  that the very same bodies of the 
dead should be raised;  would  not,  I say,  any one be 
apt to think,  that if our Saviour meant so,  the words 
should rather have been, mdv'la  ~d udpa'la  oi  iv  to75  pnjp~ioig, 
i.  e. "  all the bodies that are in the graves,"  rather than 
all who are in the "  graves ;" which must denote per- 
sons, and not precisely bodies ? 
Another evidence, that St. Paul makes a distinction 
between the dead and the bodies of  the dead, so that 
the dead cannot be taken in this (1 Cor. xv.)  to stand 
precisely for the bodies of the dead, are these words of 
the apostleq:  "but  some  inan will  say,  how are the 
dead raised,  and  with  what bodies  do they  come ?" 
Which words "  dead" and "  they,"  if supposed to stand 
precisely for the bodies of  the dead, the question will 
run thus : "  how are the dead bodies raised, and with 
what bodies do the dead bodies come ?"  which seems to 
have no very agreeable sense. 
This therefore being so, that the Spirit of God keeps 
so expressly to this phrase or form of speaking in the 
New Testament, "  of raising, quickening, rising, resur- 
rection, &c. of the dead,"  where the resurrection at the 
last day is spoken of; and that the body is  not men- 
tioned,  but  in answer  to this  question, "  with  what 
bodies shall those dead, who are raised, come ?"  so that 
by the dead cannot precisely be meant the dead bodies : 
I do not see but ct  good Christian, who reads the Scrip- 
ture with an  intention to  believe all that is therc revealed 
to  him concerning the resurrection, may acquit himself 
of his duty therein, without entering into tlic  inquiry 
whether the dead shall have the very same bodies or no; 
which  sort of  inquiry the apostle,  by the appellation 
he bestows here on him that makes it, seeins not much 
to encourage.  Nor, if he shall think himself bound to 
determine concerning the identity of the bodies of the 
dead raised at the last day, will he, by the remainder of 
St. Paul's answer, find the determination of the apostle 
to be much in favour of the very same body ;  unless the 
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being told,  that the body sown is not that body that 
shall be ;  that the body raised is as different from that 
which was laid down  as  the flesh  of  man is from the 
flesh of  beasts,  fishes,  and birds,  or as the sun,  moon, 
and stars are different  one  from  another;  or as dif- 
ferent as a corruptible, weak,  natural, mortal body, is 
from  an incorruptible,  powerful,  spiritual,  immortal 
body;  and, lastly, as different  as a body that is flesh 
and blood, is from a  body that is not flesh and blood ; 
for flesh  and  blood  cannot,"  says  St.  Paul* in this 
very place, ('inherit the kingdom of God :" unless, I say, 
all this,  which is contained in  St. Paul's words, can be 
supposed to be the way to deliver this as an article of 
faith, which is required to be believed by every one, viz. 
"  that the dead should  be raised with the very  same 
bodies tliat they had before in this life ;" which article, 
yroposed in these or the like plain and express words, 
could have left no room for doubt in the meanest capa- 
cities, nor for contest in the most perverse minds. 
Your lordship adds, in the next words ; "  and so it 
hath been always understood by the Christian church, 
viz. that the  resurrection of the same body, in your lord- 
ship's sense of same body, is an article of faith."  Answ. 
What the  Christian  church  has  always  understood, 
is beyond my knowledge.  But for those who,  coming 
short of  your lordship's  great learning, cannot gather 
their articles of faith from the understanding of all the 
whole Christian church, ever since the preaching of the 
Gospel, (who make far the greater part of Christians, I 
think I may say,  nine hundred ninety and nine  of  a 
thousand) but are forced to have recourse to the Scrip- 
ture to find  them there; I do not see,  that they will 
easily find there this  proposed  as an article of  faith, 
that there shall be a  resurrection  of the same body; 
but that there shall be 3  resurrection of the dead, with- 
out explicitly  determining,  that they shall  be  raised 
with  bodies  made  up  wholly  of  the  same  particles 
which were once vitally united to their souls,  in their 
former  life;  without  the  mixture  of  any  one  other 
particle  of  matter, which  is that which  your lordship 
means by the same body. 
But supposing. your lordship to have  demonstrated 
this to be an article of  faith,  though I crave leave to 
own, that I do not  see  that all your lordship has said 
here makes it so much as probable ; what is all this to 
me  ?  Yes,  says your lordship in the following words, 
"  my idea  of  personal  identity is  inconsistent with it, 
for it makes the same body which was  here united to 
the soul  not  to be  necessary  to the doctrine  of  the 
resurrection.  But any material substance united to the 
same  principle of consciousness, makes the same body." 
This is  an argument of  your lordship's  which I am 
obliged to answer to.  But is it not fit I should first un- 
derstand it, before I answer it  ?  Now here I do  not well 
know what it is  to make  a thing not be necessary to 
the doctrine of  the resurrection."  But to help myself 
out the best way I can with  a guess, I will  conjecture 
(which, in disputing with learned men, is not very safe) 
your lordship's  meaning is,  that "  my idea of personal 
identity makes it  not necessary" that, for the raising the 
same person, the body should be the same. 
Your lordship's  next word is, "  but ;" to which I am 
ready to reply,  but what?  What does my idea of per- 
sonal identity do ?  For something of that kind the ad- 
versative particle "but"  should, in  the  ordinary  construc- 
tion of our language, introduce, to  make the proposition 
clear and intelligible : but here is no such thing ;  "but" 
is one of  your lordship's  privileged  particles, which I 
must not meddle with, for fear your lordship complain 
of  me again,  <'  as so severe a critic, that for the least 
ambiguity in any particle,  fill  up pages in my answer, 
to make my book  look  considerable for  the bulk  of 
it.  But since  this  proposition  here,  my idea of  per- 
sonal identity makes  the same body,  which was here 
united to the soul, not necessary to the doctrine of the 
resurrection; but any material substance being united 
to the same principle of conscio~~sness,  makes the same 
body;  is brought to prove my idea  of  personal iden- 
tity inconsistent with the article of the resurrection :" 
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I must make it out in some direct sense or other, that 
I may see whether it be  both  true and conclusive.  I 
therefore venture to read it thus : "  my idea of personal 
identity makes  the same  body which was here united 
to the soul,  not  to be  necessary at the resurrection; 
but allows that any material substance being united to 
the same  principle of  consciousness,  makes  the same 
body :  Ergo, my idea of personal identity is inconsistent 
with the article of the resurrectioq of the same body." 
If this be your lordship's  sense in this passage, as I 
here have guessed it to be ;  or else I know not what it  - 
is : I answer, 
1. ic  That my idea of personal identity does not allow 
that any mateha1 subshnce being united to the same 
- 
principle  of  consciousness,  makes  the same  body."  I 
say no  such thing in  my  book,  nor  any  thing from 
whence it may be inferred;  and your iordship would 
have done me  a  favour,  to have  set  down  the words 
where I say so,  or those  from which you infer so, and 
showed how it follows from any thing T have said. 
2.  Granting that it were a consequence from my idea 
of personal identity, that "  any material substance being 
united to the same  principle  of  consciousness, makes 
the same body;"  this would  not prove  that my idea 
of personal identity was inconsistent with this proposi- 
tion,  that the same body shall be raised ;" but, on the 
contrary, affirms it : since, if I affirm, as I do, that the 
same persons shall be raised,  and it be a consequence 
of my idea of personal identity, that "  any material sub- 
stance being  united  to  the  same  principle  of  con- 
sciousness,  makes  the same  body;"  it follows,  that if 
the same person be raised, the same body must be :  and 
so I have herein not only said nothing inconsistent with 
the resurrection  of the same body, but have said more 
for it than your lordship.  For there can be  nothing 
plainer, than that in  the Scripture it is revealed, that 
the same persons shall be raised,  and appear before the 
judgment-seat  of  Christ, to answer for what they have 
done in their bodies.  If therefore whatever matter be 
joined to the same principle of consciousness, makes the 
same body;  it is  demonstration,  that if  the same per- 
sons are raised, they have the same bodies. 
How then your lordship makes this an inconsistency 
with the resurrection, is beyond my conception.  "Yes," 
says your lordship, '<  it is inconsistent with it,for it makes 
the same body which was  here united to the soul, not 
to be necessary." 
3.  I answer therefore,  thirdly,  that' this is the first 
time I ever learnt, that "  not necessary" was the same 
with "  inconsistent."  I say,  that a  body made up of 
the same numerical parts of matter, is not necessary to 
the making  of  the same person;  from whence  it will 
indeed follow, that to the resurrection of the same per- 
son,  the same  numerical  particles  of  matter  are not 
required.  What does your lordship infer from hence ? 
to wit, this: therefore he who thinks that the same par- 
ticles of matter are not necessary to the making of the 
sameiperson, cannot believe that the same persons shall 
be raised with bodies, made of the very same particles 
of matter, if God should reveal  that it shall be so, viz. 
that the same persons shall be raised with thesame  bodies 
they had before.  Which is  all one as to say, that tr: 
who thought the blowing of rams-horns was not neces- 
sary in itself to the falling down of the walls of Jericho, 
could not believe that they would fall upon the blowing 
of rams-horns, when God had declared it should be so. 
Your lordship  says, my idea of  personal  identity is 
inconsistent with the article of  the resurrection;"  the 
reason you ground it on  is  this,  because it makes not 
the same body necessary to the making the same person. 
Let us  grant your lordship's  consequence to be good, 
what will follow from it?  No less than this, that your 
lordship's  notion (for I dare not say your lordship has 
any so dangerous things as ideas)  of personal identity 
is inconsistent with the article of the resurrection.  The 
demonstration of it is thus :  your lordship says, it is not 
necessary that the body,  to be  raised  at the last day, 
'' should consist of the same particles of matter, which 
were united at the point  of  death ; for there must be 
a great alteration in  them in a  lingering disease, as if 
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the same  particles  which  the sinner had  at the very 
time of commission of  his sins ; for then a long sinner 
must  have  a  vast  body,  considering  the  continual 
spending  of  particles  by  perspiration."  And  again, 
here your lordship says, "you  allow the notion of per- 
sonal identity to belong to the same man under several 
changes  of  matter."  From  which  words  it  is  evi- 
dent, that your lordship supposes a person in this world 
may be continued  and preserved  the same,  in a body 
not consisting of the same  individual particles of mat- 
ter; and hence it demonstratively follows, that let your 
lordship's  notion of personal identity be what it will, it 
rnakes "  the same body not to be necessary to  the same 
person;"  and therefore it is,  by your  lordship's  rule, 
inconsistent with the article of the resurrection.  When 
your lordship shall think fit to clear your own notion of 
personal identityfrom this inconsistency with the article 
of the resurrection, I do not doubt but my idea of per- 
sonal identity will be  thereby cleared  too.  Till then, 
all inconsistency with that article which your lordship 
has here charged on mine, will  unavoidably fall upon 
your lordship's  too. 
But for the clearing of  both,  give me  leave to say, 
my  lord,  that whatsoever  is  not  necessary,  does  not 
thereby becorne inconsistent.  It  is not necessary to the 
same person, that his body should always consist of the 
same numerical particles ;  this is demonstration,because 
the particles of  the bodies of  the same persons in this 
life  change  every moment,  and your  lordship  cannot 
deny it; and yet  this  makes it not inconsistent with 
God's preserving, if he thinks fit, to the same persons, 
bodies consisting of the same numerical particles, always 
from  the resurrection  to eternity.  And  so  likewise, 
though I say any thing that supposes it not necessary, 
that the same numerical  particles, which were vitally 
united to the soul  in  his  life,  should be reunited to it 
at the resurrection, and constitute the body it shall then 
have;  yet it is not inconsistent with this, that God may, 
if he pleases, give to every one  a body consisting only 
of such particles as were before vitally united to  his soul. 
And  thus,  I  think,  I have  cleared  my book  from  all 
that inconsistency which  your lordship charges on it, 
and would  persuade  the world it has with  the article 
of the resurrection of  the dead. 
Only before I leave it, I will set down the remainder 
of what your lordship says upon this head, that thougll 
I see not the coherence nor tendency of it, nor the force 
of any argument in it  against me; yet that nothing may 
be omitted, that your lordship has thought fit to enter- 
tain your  reader with on this new point, nor any one 
have reason to suspect, that I have passed by any word 
of your lordship's  (on this now first introduced subject) 
wherein he might find your lordship had proved what 
you had promised in your title-page.  Your remaining 
words are these:  "the dispute is not how far personal 
identity in itself may consist in the very same material 
substance;  for  we  allow the notion  of  personal iden- 
tity to belong to the same man under several changes 
of  matter;  but  whether it doth  not  depend  upon  a 
vital  union  between  the  soul  and  body, and  the life 
which  is consequent upon it: and therefore in the re- 
surrection,  the  same  material  substance must  be  re- 
united, or else  it cannot be called a  resurrection,  but 
a renovation,  i.  e.  it may be a new life,  but not rais- 
ing the body  from  the  dead."  I confess,  I  do not 
see how what is here ushered  in,  by  the words  6'  and 
therefore,"  is  a  consequence  from  the  preceding 
words ;  but as to the propriety of the name, I think it 
will not be much questioned, that if the same man rise 
who was  dead, it may very properly be  called the re- 
surrection of  the dead; which is the language of  the 
Scripture. 
I must not part with this article of  the resurrection 
without  returning  my  thanks  to  your  lordship  for 
making me take notice of a fault in my Essay.  When I 
writ  that book, I took  it for  granted, as I doubt not 
but many others have done, that the Scripture had men- 
tioned in express terms, "  the resurrection of the body:" 
but upon  the occasion  your  lordship has given me in 
your last letter to look a little more narrowly into what 
revelation has declared concerning the resurrection, and 
finding no such express words in the Scripture, as that 
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the body;"  I  shall in  the next edition  of  it change 
these words of  my book, "  the dead bodies of men shall 
rise,"  into these of the Scripture, "  the dead shall rise*." 
Not that I question, that the dead shall be raised with 
bodies :  but in matters of revelation, I think it not only 
safest, but our duty,  as  far  as  any one delivers it for 
revelation, to keep close to the words of the Scripture; 
unless he will assume  to himself the  authority of one 
inspired, or make himself wiser  than the Holy  Spirit 
himself:  if  I had  spoken  of  the  resurrection  in pre- 
cisely Scripture terms, I had avoided giving your lord- 
ship the occasion  of making here such a verbal reflec- 
tion on my words ;  6c What, not if there be an idea of 
identity as to the body?" 
I come now  to your  lordship's  second  head of  ac- 
cusation :  your lordship says, 
2. " The next articles of  faith, which  my notion of 
ideas is inconsistent with, are no less than those of the 
Trinity and the incarnation of our Saviour."  But all 
the proof  of inconsistency your  lordship  here brings, 
being  drawn  from  my notions  of nature  and person, 
whereof so  much  has been  said  already, the swelling 
my answer  into too  great  a  volume will  excuse  me 
from setting down at  large all that you have said there- 
upon  so particularly as I have  done  in  the precedent 
article of the resurrection, which is wholly new. 
Your lordship's  way of  proving, "  that my ideas of 
nature  and person  cannot consist with  the articles of 
the Trinity and  incarnation,"  is, as  far  as I can  un- 
derstand it,  this,  that I say we have no simple ideas, 
but by sensation and reflection. "  But,"  says your lord- 
ship, "  we cannot have any simple ideas of nature  and 
person  by  sensation  and  reflection;  ergo,  we  can 
come  to 110  certainty about the distinction  of  nature 
and person in my way of ideas."  Answ.  If your lord- 
ship had concluded from  thence, that therefore, in my 
way of ideas, we can have no ideas at all of nature and 
person, it would have had some appearance of a conse- 
quence ;  but as it is, it seems to me such an argument 
as this : no simple  colours, in  sir  Godfrey Kneller's 
* Essay, b,  iv, c.  18. § 7. 
way of painting, come into his exact and lively pictures, 
but by his pencil ;  but no simple colours of a ship and 
a man come into his pictures by his pencil; ergo, " we 
can  come  to no  certainty about the distinction  of  a 
ship and a  man, in sir Godfrey Kneller's  way of paint- 
ing." 
Your lordship says, "  it is not possible for us to have 
any  simple  ideas  of nature  and person  by  sensation 
and reflection,"  and I say so  too;  as impossible as it 
is to have  a  true picture of a  rainbow in one  simple 
colour,  which  consists  in  the  arrangement  of  many 
colours.  The ideas signified by the sounds nature and 
person are each of them complex ideas ;  and therefore 
it is as impossible to have a simple idea of either of them 
as to have  a  multitude  in  one, or  a composition in  a 
simple.  But if your lordship means, that by sensation 
and reflection we cannot have the simple ideas, of which 
the complex ones of nature and person are compounded; 
that I must crave leave to dissent from, till your lord- 
ship can produce  a  definition  (in  intelligible  words) 
either of nature or person, in which all that is contained 
cannot  ultimately  be  resolved  into  simple  ideas  of 
sensation and reflection. 
Your lordship's  definition of person is,  "that it is a 
complete intelligent substance with a peculiar manner 
of  subsistence."  And  my definition of  person, which 
your lordship quotes out of my Essay, is, "  that person 
stands for a thinking intelligent being, that has reason 
and reflection,  and can  consider  itself  as  itself,  the 
same  thinking  thing in  different times  and places." 
When  your  lordship  shall show  any  repugnancy  in 
this my idea (which I denote by the sound person) to 
the incarnation  of our Saviour, with which your  lord- 
ship's  notion of person may not be equally charged ;  I 
shall give your  lordship  an answer to it.  This I say 
in answer to these words, "  which is repugnant to the 
article  of  the  incarnation  of  our  Saviour :"  for  the 
preceding  reason,  to which  they refer,  I must  own I 
do not understand. 
The  word person naturally signifies nothing, that  you 
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stand for a general abstract idea.  Person then, in your 
lordship, is liable to the same default which you lay on 
it in me,viz.  "that  it is no more than a notion in  the 
mind."  The same  will  be  so  of  the  word  nature, 
whenever your lordship  pleases  to define it; without 
which you can have no notion of it.  And then the conse- 
quence, which you there draw from their being no more 
than notions of the mind, will hold as much in respect 
of your lordship's  notion  of nature  and person  as of 
mine, viz. "  that one nature and three persons can  be 
no more."  This I crave leave  to say in answer to all 
that  your  lordship  has  been  pleased  to  urge  from 
p. 46, to these words of your lordship's, p. 52. 
General terms (as nature and person are in their ordi- 
nary use in our language) are the signs of general ideas. 
and general ideas exist only in the aind; but particular 
things (which are the foundations of these general ideas, 
if they are abstracted as they should be) do, or may exist 
conformable  to those general ideas, and so fall under 
those general names ;  as he that writes this paper  is a 
person to him,  i. e.  may be denominated a person  by 
him to whose abstract idea of person  he bears  a con- 
formity:  just as what I here write is to him a book or 
a letter, to whose abstract idea of a book or a letter it 
agrees.  This is what 1  have said concernin,o this matter 
all along, and what, I humbly conceive, will serve  for 
an answer to those words of your lordship, where you 
say, "  you affirm that those who make nature and per- 
son to be only abstract and complex ideas, can neither 
defend  nor  reasonably  believe  the  doctrine  of  the 
Trinity;"  and to all that you  say,  p. 52-58.  Only 
give me leave to wish, that what your lordship, out of 
a mistake of what I say concerning the ideas of nature 
and person, has  urged, as you  pretend,  against them, 
do not  furnish your  adversaries in that dispute with 
such arguments against you  as your lordship will not 
easily answer. 
Your lordship sets down these words of mine, "  per- 
son  in  itself  signifies  nothing;  but as  soon  as  the 
common  use  of  any language has  appropriated it to 
any  idea,  then  that is  the true  idea  of  a  person ;" 
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which  words your lordship interprets thus :  i.  e. "  men 
may  call a  person  what they please,  for there is  no- 
thing but common  use required  to it: they may call 
a horse,  or a tree,  or a stone,  a person,  if  they think 
fit."  Answer.  Men,  before  common  use had  appro- 
priated  this name  to  that  complex idea  which  they 
now signify by the sound  person,  might have denoted 
it by the sound  stone,  and vice versa:  but can  your 
lordship  thence  argue,  as  you  do here,  men  are  at 
the  same liberty in a country where  those  words are 
already  in common  use?  There he  that will  speak 
properly,  and so  as  to  be  understood,  must  appro- 
priate each sound used in that language to an idea in 
his mind (which to himself is defining the word) which 
is in some degree conformable  to the idea that others 
apply it to. 
Your lordship, in the next paraaraph, sets down my 
definition of the word person, viz.?'  that person stands 
for a thinking intelligent  being  that hath reason  and 
reflection,  and  can  consider  itself  as itself,  the same 
thinking being  in  different  times  and  places ;" and 
then ask many questions upon it.  I shall set down your 
lordship's  definition  of  person, which is this;  cc a per- 
son is a complete intelligent substance with a peculiar 
manner of  subsistence :"  and then  crave  leave  to ask 
your lordship the same questions concerning it, which 
your  lordship  here  asks me  concerning mine:  "how 
comes person to stand for this and nothing else ?  from 
whence  comes  complete  substance,  or peculiar  man- 
ner of subsistence,  to make up the idea of  a person ? 
Whether it be true or false, [ am not now to inquire; 
but how  it comes  into this  idea  of  a  person ?  Has 
common  use  of  our language appropriated it to this 
sense?  If not, this seems to me a mere arbitrary idea, 
and may as well be  denied  as affirmed.  And what a 
fine pass are we  come to, in your lordship's  way,  if a 
mere arbitrary idea must be  taken into the only true 
rnethod of certainty!-But  if this  be the true idea 
of a person, then there can be no union of two natures 
in  one  person.  For  if  a  complete  intelligent  sub- 
stance  be  the  idea  of  a  person,  and the divine  and 
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human natures  be  complete  intelligent  substances; 
then the doctrine of the union of two natures and one 
person is quite sunk, for here must be two persons in 
this way  of  your  lordship's.  Again,  if  this  be  the 
idea of a person,  then where  there are three persons, 
there must be three distinct, complete, intelligent sub- 
stances;  and so there cannot  be three  ersons in the 
same individual essence.  And thus both t  % ese doctrines 
of the Trinity and incarnation are past recovery gone, 
if this way, of your lordship's,  hold."  These, my lord, 
are your lordship's  very words;  what force there is in 
them, I will not inquire :  but I must beseech your lord- 
ship to take them  as  objections I make against your 
notion ,of person, to show the danger of it, and the in- 
consistency it has with the doctrine of the Trinity and 
incarnation of our Saviour; and when your lordship has 
removed the objections that are in them, against your 
own definition of person, mine  also,  by the very same 
answers, will be cleared. 
Your lordship's  argument, in the following words, 
to page 65, seems to me (as far as I can collect) to lie 
thus :  your lordship tells me,  that I say, "  that in pro- 
positions,  whose certainty is built on clear and perfect 
ideas, and evident deductions of  reason,  there no pro- 
position  can be  received  for  divine  revelation  which 
contradicts them."  This proposition,  not serving your 
lordship's  turn  so  well,  for  the  conclusion  you  de- 
signed to draw  from  it,  your  lordship is pleased  to 
enlarge it.  For you  ask, "  But suppose I have  ideas 
sufficient  for  certainty,  what  is  to be  done  then?" 
From which words  and your  following discpurse, if I 
can uqderstand it,  it seems to me,  that your lordship 
supposes it reasonable for me to hold, that wherever we 
are any how certain of any propositions,  whether tbeir 
certainty be built on clear and perfect ideas or no, there 
no proposition  can be  received  for  divine  revelation, 
which  contradicts  them.  And  thence  your lordship 
coscludes, that because I say we may make some pro- 
positions,of  whose truth we may be certain concerning 
things, whereof we have not ideas in all their parts per- 
fectly clear and distinct ;  cr therefore my rlotion or' cer- 
tainty by  ideas must  overthrow  the credibility  of  a 
matter  of  faith  in  all  such propositions,  which  are 
offered to be  believed  on the account of  divine reve- 
lation:"  a  conclusion  which  I am  so  unfortunate  as 
not to find how it follows from your lordship's premises, 
because I cannot any way bring them into mode and 
figure  with such a conclusion.  But  this being no strange 
thing to me in my want of skill ill your lordship's  way 
of  writing, I, in  the mean  time,  crave  leave  to ask, 
Whether there be any propositions your lordship can be 
certain of, that are not divinely revealed?  And here I 
will presume that your lordship is not so sceptical, but 
that.you can allow certainty attainable in many things, 
by your natural faculties.  Give me leave then to ask 
your lordship, Whether, where there be propositions, of 
whose truth you  have  certain knowledge,  you can re- 
ceive  any proposition  for divine revelation which con- 
tradicts that certainty? Whether that certainty be built 
upon the agreement of  ideas,  such as we  have,  or oil 
whatever else your lordship builds it  ?  If you cannot, as 
I presume  your lordship will  say you  cannot, I make 
bold to return you your lordship's questions here to me, 
in your own words : "  let us now suppose that you are 
to  judge of a proposition delivered as a matter of faith, 
where  you  have  a  certainty  by  reason  from  your 
grounds,  such as they are.  Can you, my lord,  assent 
to this as a matter of faith, when you are already cer- 
tain of  the contrary by  your way?  How  is  this pos- 
sible?  Can you believe that to be true, which you are 
certain is not true  ?  Suppose it to be,  that there are 
two natures  in one  person,  the question  is,  whether 
you  can assent to this  as a  matter of  faith?  If you 
should say, where  there are only probabilities  on  the 
other side, I grant that you then allow revelation is to 
prevail.  But when  you  say  you  have  certainty  by 
ideas,  or without  ideas  to the contrary, I do not see 
how it is possible for you to assent to a matter of faith 
as  true,  when  you  are  certain,  from  your  method, 
that it is not true.  For how can you  believe  against 
certainty-because  the  mind  is  actually  determined 
by certainty.  And  so your  lordship's  ~iotion  of  cer- 
tainty by  ideas,  or without  ideas,  be  it what  it win, 
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lllust overthrow the credibility of  a  matter of faith in 
all such propositions,  which  are offered to be believed 
on the account of divine revelation."  This argumenta- 
tion  and  conclusion  is  good  against  your lordship, if 
it be good against me : for certainty is certainty,  and 
he that is certain is certain, and cannot assent to "that 
as  true, -vhich he is certain  is not true:'  whether he 
supposes certainty to consist in the perception  of the 
agreement or disagreement of ideas, such as a man has, 
or  in  any thing else.  For  whether  those  who  have 
attained certainty, not by the way of ideas,  can believe 
against  certainty,  any  more  than  those  who  have 
attained certainty by ideas,  we  shall then  see,  when 
your lordship shall be  pleased to show the world your 
way to certainty without ideas. 
Indeed, if what  your lordship insinuates  in the be- 
ginning of  this  passage, which we  are now upon,  be 
true, your lordship is safer (in your way without ideas, 
i. e. without immediate objects of the mind in thinking, 
if  there be any such way) as to the understanding divine 
revelation right, than those who make use of ideas :  but 
yet you are still as far as they from assenting to that as 
true which you are certain is not true.  Your lordship's 
words  are : "  so great a  difference is  there between 
forming ideas first,  and then judging of revelation by 
them,  and the  believing  of  revelation  on  its  proper 
grounds,  and the interpreting the sense of  it by due 
measures  of  reason."  If it be the privilege  of  those 
alone who  renounce ideas,  i. e.  the immediate objects 
of  the mind  in thinking, to believe  revelation on its 
proper grounds, and the interpreting the sense of it, by 
the due measures of reason; I shall not think it strange, 
that any one who undertakes to interpret the sense of 
revelation, should renounce ideas, i. e. that he  who would 
think right of  the meaning of  any text of  Scripture, 
should renounce and lay by all immediate objects of the 
mind in thinking. 
But perhaps your lordship does not here extend this 
difference of believing revelation on its proper grounds, 
and not on its proper grounds,  to all those who are not, 
and all those who  are for ideas.  But your  lordship 
makes  this  comparison  here,  only between your lord- 
ship and me, who you think am guilty of forming ideas 
first, and then judging  of  revelation by them.  Answ. 
If so,  then  this lays  the blame not 011  my doctrine of 
ideas, but on my particular ill use of them.  That then 
which your lordship would  insinuate  of me here, as a 
dangerous way to mistaking the sense of the Scripture, 
is,  "  that I form ideas first,  and  then judge of revela- 
tion  by them;"  i. e. in plain  English,  that I  get to 
myself,  the best I can,  the signification  of the words, 
wherein the revelation is delivered, an6 so endeavour to 
understand the sense of the revelation delivered in them. 
And  pray, my lord,  does your lordship do otherwise ? 
Does  the  believing  of  revelation  upon  its  proper 
pounds, and the due measures of reason, teach you to 
judge of revelation, before you understand the words it 
is delivered in ;  i. e.  before you have formed the ideas in 
your mind,  as well as you can, which those words stand 
for ?  If the due measures of reason teach your lordship 
this, I beg the favodr of your lordship to tell me those 
due measures of reason,  that I may leave those undue 
measures of reason, which I have hitherto followed in 
the interpreting the  sense  of  the  Scripture;  whose 
sense it  seems I should have interpreted first, and under- 
stood the signification of the words afterwards. 
My lord, I read the revelation of  the holy Scripture 
with a full assurance that all it delivers is  true : and 
though this be a submission to the writings of those in- 
spired authors, which I neither have, nor can have, for 
those of any other men; yet I use (and know not how 
to help it, till your lordship show me a  better method 
in those  due measures of  reason, which you mention) 
the same way to interpret  to myself the sense of that 
book,  that I do of  any other.  First, I endeavour to 
understand the  words and  hrases of the language  Iread  R  it in,  i.  e. to form ideas t  ey stand for.  If your lord- 
ship means any thing else by forming ideas first, I con- 
fess I understand it not.  And if there be any word or 
expression, which in that author, or in  that place of that 
author, seems to have a peculiar meaning,  i.  e. to stand 
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common use of that language has made it a sign of, that 
itlcn  also  I  endeavour  to form  in  my mind,  by  com- 
paring  this  author  with  himself,  and  observing  the 
design of his  discourse,  so  that,  as far as I can,  by a 
sincere endeavour, I may have the same ideas in every 
place when I  read the words, which the author had when 
he writ them.  But here,  my lord,  I take care not to 
take those for words of divine revelation, which are not 
the words  of  inspired writers ; nor think  myself con- 
cerned with that submission to receive the expressions 
of fallible men, and to labour to find out their meaning, 
or, as your lordship phrases it, interpret their sense ;  as 
if they were the expressions of the Spirit of God, by the 
mouths or pens of men inspired and guided by tha* in- 
fallible Spirit.  This, my lord,  is the method I use in 
interpreting the sense  of  the revelation of  the Scrip- 
tures; if  your  lordship knows  that I do otherwise, I 
desire you  to convince me  of it; and if your lordship 
does otherwise, I desire you to show me wherein your 
method differs from mine,  that I may reform upon so 
good  a pahtern : for as, for what you  accuse me of in 
the following words, it is that which either has no fault 
in it, or if it has, your lordship, I humbly conceive, is as 
guilty as I.  Your words are- 
"  I may pretend what 1  please,  that I hold the assur- 
ance of  faith, and the certainty by ideas,  to go upon 
very  different  grounds;  but  when  a  proposition  is 
offered to me out of  Scripture to be believed,  and 3 
doubt about the sense of it, is not recourse to be made 
to my  ideas 1"  Give  me leave,  my lord, with all sub- 
mission, to return your lordship the same words:  "Your 
lordship may pretend what  you  please, that you hold 
the assurance of faith, and  the certainty of knowledge, 
to stand upon different grounds,"  (for I presume your 
lordship will not say, that believing and knowing stand 
upon the same grounds,  for that would, I think, be to 
say, that probability and de~nonstration  are the same 
thing) "  but when a proposition  is offered you  out of 
Scripture to be believed, and you doubt about the sense 
of it,  is not  recourse  to be made  to your  notions ?*' 
What,  my lord,  is  the difference  here  between  your 
lordship's and my way in the case ? I must have recourse 
to my ideas, and your lordship must have recourse to 
your notions.  For I think you cannot believe  a pro- 
positioll  contrary to your own notions;  for then you 
would have the same, and different notions, at  the same 
time.  So that all the difference between your lordship 
and me is, that we do both the same thing ; only yuur 
lordship shows a great dislike to my using the term idea. 
But the instance your lordship here gives, is beyond 
my comprehensioll.  You say, 'c  a prop~sition  is offered 
me out of  Scripture to be believed, and I doubt about 
the sense  of  it.-As  in  the present  case,  whether 
there can be three persons  in  one nature, or two na- 
tures and one person."  My lord, my Bible is faulty 
again; for I do not remember that I ever read in it 
either  of  these  propositions,  in  these precise  words, 
cC there are three persons in one nature, or, there are 
two natures  and one  person."  When your  lordship 
shall show me a Bible wherein they are so set down, I 
shall then think them a  good instance of  propositions 
offered me out of Scripture ;  till then, whoever shall say 
that they are propositions in the Scripture, when there 
are no such words, so put together, to be found in ho1) 
writ,  seems to me to make a new Scripture in words 
and propositions, that the Holy Ghost dictated not.  I 
do not here question  their truth, nor deny that they 
Map be drawn from the Scripture :  but I deny that these 
very propositions are in express words in my Bible.  For 
that  is the only thing I deny here ; if your lordship can 
show them me ih yours, I beg you to do it. 
In the mean time, taking them td be as trhe as if they 
were the very words of divine revelation ;  the question 
thm  ih,  how innst we interpret the sense of them? For 
snpposihg them to be divine revelation, to ask, as your 
lordship here does, what resolution I,  or any one,  can 
come to about their possibility, seems to me to involiie 
a contradiction in it.  For whoever admits a proposition 
to be  of divine  revelation, supposes it not only to be 
pasal-ble, but true.  Your lordship's  question then can 
mexn only this, what  sense can I, upon my principles, 
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of ideas ?  And I crave leave to ask your lordship, what 
sense of them can your lordship, upon your principles, 
come to,  but in  the way of  notions? Which, in  plain 
English, amounts to no more than this, that your lord- 
ship must understand thern according to the sense you 
have of those terms they are made up of, and I accord- 
ing to the sense I have of those terms.  Nor can it be 
otherwise, unless your lordship can take a term in any 
proposition to have one sense, and yet understand it in 
another : and thus we see, that in effect men have dif- 
ferently understood and interpreted the sense of  these 
propositions ;  whether  they used  the way of  ideas or 
not, i. e. whether they called what any word stood for, 
notion, or sense, or meaning, or idea. 
I think myself  obliged to return your lordship my 
thanks, for the news you write me here, of one who has 
found a secret way how the same body may be in distant 
places at once.  It  making no part, that I can see, of 
the reasoning your lordship was then upon, I can take 
it only for a piece  of  news:  and the favour  was  the 
greater, that your lordship was pleased to stop yourself 
in the midst of  so serious an argument as the articles 
of the Trinity and incarnation, to tell it me.  And me- 
thinks it is  pity that author had  not used some of  the 
words of  my  book,  which  might have served  to have 
tied him and me together.  For his secret about a body 
in two places at once, which he does keep up ;  and "my 
secret about certainty, which your lordship thinks had 
been better kept up too:'  being all your words ;  bring 
me into his  company but very untowardly.  If your 
lordship would be pleased to show, that my secret about 
certainty (as you think fit  to call it)  is false or erroneous, 
the world would  see  a  good  reason  why you should 
think it better kept up ; till then perhaps they may be 
apt to suspect, that the fault is not so much in my pub- 
lished secret about certainty, as somewhere else.  But 
since your lordship thinks it had been better kept up, 
1 promise that,  as soon  as you  shall do me the favour 
to make public a better notion of certainty than mine, 
I will by a public retraction call in mine: which I hope 
your lordship will do, for I dare say nobody will think 
it good or friendly advice to your lordship, if you have 
such a secret, that you should keep it up. 
Your lordship, with some emphasis, bids me observe 
my own  words,  that I here positively say, '' that the 
mind not being certain of the truth of that it doth not 
evidently know."  So that it is plain here, that cc I place 
certainty only in evident  knowledge,  or  in  clear  and 
distinct ideas;  and yet my  great complaint  of  your 
lordship was, that you charged this upon me,  and now 
your lordship finds it in my own words."  Answer.  My 
own words, in that place, are, '(  the mind is not certain 
of what it doth not evidently know ;" but in them, or 
that passage,  as  set down  by your  lordship,  there  is 
not the least mention of  clear and distinct ideas ; and 
therefore I should  wonder to hear  your  lordship  so 
solemnly call them my own words, when they are but 
what your lordship would have to be a consequence of 
my words;  were it not, as I humbly conceive,  a way 
not  unfrequent with  your  lordship  to speak  of  that, 
which  you  think a consequence  from any thing said, 
as if  it were  the very thing said.  It rests  therefore 
upon  your lordship to prove that evident knowledge 
can be  only  where  the  ideas  concerning which  it is 
are perfectly clear and distinct.  I am certain, that I 
have  evident  knowledge,  that  the  substance  of  my 
body  and soul exists,  though I am as certain that I 
have but a very obscure and confused idea of any sub- 
stance at all:  so that my complaint of  your lordship, 
upon  that  account,  remains  very  well  founded,  not- 
withstanding any thing you allege here. 
Your lordship,  summing up the force of  what  you 
have said, adds, "that you have pleaded, (1.) That my 
method of  certainty shakes the belief of revelation in 
general.  (2.) That it shakes the belief  of  particular 
propositions  or articles of  faith,  which  depend upon 
the sense of words contained in Scripture." 
That your lordship has pleaded, I grant ; but, with 
submission, I deny that you have proved, 
(1.) That my definition of knowledge, which is that 
which  your  lordship  calls  my  method  of  certainty, 
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your lordship offers for proof of it, is only the alleging 
some  other passages  out of  my book,  quite  different 
from  that  my  definition  of  knowledge,  which,  you 
endeavour  to show, do shake  the  belief  of  revelation 
in general:  but indeed have  not,  nor,  I humbly con- 
ceive,  cannot  show, that they do any ways shake the 
belief  of  revelation  in  general.  But if  they  did,  it 
does not at all follow from thence, that my definition 
of  knowledge,  i.  e.  my  method  of  certainty,  at all 
shakes the belief of  revelation in general, which was 
what your lordship undertook to prove. 
(2.) As to the shaking the belief  of  particular  pro- 
positions or articles of faith, which depend, as you here 
say, upon the sense of words ;  I think I have sufficiently 
cleared  myself  from that clfarge,  as will yet be more 
evident from what your lordship here farther urges. 
Your  lordship  says, "  my  placing  certainty in the 
perceptioil of the agreement or disagreement of ideas, 
shakes the foundations of  the articles of  faith [above- 
mentioned]  which  depend  upon  the  sense of  words 
contained  in  the  Scripture :"  and  the reason  your 
lordship gives fbr it is this,  c'  because I do not say we 
are to believe all that we find there expressed.*  My 
lord, upon reading these words, I consulted the efrata, 
to see whether the printer had injured you :  for I codld' 
not easily believe that yodr lordship should reason after 
a fashion, that would justify such a conclusibn as this, 
via your lordship in your letter tc me, 'c  does not sriy 
that we  are to believe  all that we  find  expressed  in 
Scripture ;" therefore  your notion of  certaihty shakes 
the belief  of this article of  faith, that Jesus Christ de- 
scended into hell.  This, I think, *ill  scarce hold for a 
good consequence, till not saying any truth be the deny- 
lng of it; and then if my not saying in my bobk, that 
TW ate to believe all there expressed, be to deny, that 
we  are to believe  all that we  find there expressed, I 
fkar  many of  your  lordship's  books will  be  fohnd  to 
shake the belief of seveml of  all the articles af our faith. 
But  svpposing this  cmbequenee tu be good, viz. I do 
not say, therdfore I deny, and thereby 1  shake the belfef 
of some artieles of faith ;  how dbes this prove, that my 
placing of certainty in the perception of the agreement 
or disagreement of  ideas,  shakes any article of  faith? 
unless my saying, that certainty consists in the percep- 
tion of  the agreement or disagreement of  ideas, B. iv. 
chap. 12,  $ 6, of  my Essay,  be a proof,  that I do  not 
say,  in any other part of  that book, '' that we  are to 
believe all that we find expressed in Scripture." 
But perhaps the remaining words of tho period will 
help us out in your lordship's  argument, which all to- 
gether stands thus: "  because I do not say we are to 
believe all that we find there expressed ;  but [I do say] 
in case we have any clear and distinct ideas, which limit 
the sense another way,  than the words  seem to carry 
it, we are to judge that to be the true sense."  My lord, 
I do not remember where I say what in the latter part 
of this period  your lordship  makes me say ; and your 
lordship would  have done me a favour to have quoted 
the place.  Indeed, I do say, in the chapter your lord- 
ship  seems  to be  upon, '' that no  proposition  can  be 
received for divine revelation,  or obtain the assent due 
to all such, if it be coiltradictory to our clear intuitive 
knowledge."  This is what I there say,  and all that I 
there say:  which in effect is this,  that no proposition 
can  be  received  for  divine  revelation,  which  is  con; 
tradictory to a self-evident proposition ; and if that be 
it which  your lordship makes me say here in tlie fore- 
going words, I agree to it, and would be glad to know 
whether your lordship differs in opinion from me in it. 
But this  not  answering  your purpose,  your lordship 
would, in the following words of this paragraph, change 
self-evident  proposition  into a proposition we have at- 
tained certainty of, though by imperfect'ideas :  in  which 
sense the proposition your lordship atgtles fro& as mine 
will stand thus :  that no proposition can be ~*t?cdved  for 
divine revelation,  or obtain the assent due to all such, 
if it be contrzdicturp to any proyosition; of *hose  truth 
we are by any way certain.  And then I desire your lord- 
ship to name  the two contradictory propositions, the 
one of divine revelatim, I do  flati assent to ;  th'e other, 
that I have attained to a certainty of by ibp imperfect 
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divine revelation.  The very setting down of  thcse two 
contradictory propositions will be demonstration against 
me, and if your lordship cannot (as I humbly conceive 
you cannot) name  any two such propositions,  it is an 
evidence, that all this dust, that is raised, is only a great 
deal of talk about what your lordship cannot prove :  for 
that your lordship has not yet proved any such thing, I 
am humbly of opinion I have already shown. 
Your lordship's discourse of  Des Cartes, in the fol- 
lowing pages,  is, I think,  as far as I am concerned in 
it, to show, that certainty cannot be bad by ideas ;  be- 
cause Des Cartes using the term ideas, missed  of  it. 
Answ.  The  question between your lordship and me not 
being  about Des Cartes's,  but my notion of  certainty, 
your lordship will put an end to my notion of certainty 
by ideas, whenever your lordship shall prove, that cer- 
tainty cannot be attained any way by the immediate ob- 
jects  of  the mind  in  thinking, i.  e.  by ideas;  or that 
certainty does not consist in the perception of the agree- 
ment or disagreement of  ideas ;  or, lastly, when  your 
lordship shall show us what else certainty does consist 
in.  When your lordship shall do either of these three, 
I promise your lordship to renounce my notion, or way, 
or method, or grounds (or whatever else your lordship 
has been pleased to call it) of certainty by ideas. 
The next paragraph is to show the inclination your 
lordship has to favour me in the words "it  may be." 
I shall be  always  sorry to have  mistaken  any  one's, 
especially  your  lordship's  inclination  to  favour  me: 
but since the press has published  this to the world, 
the world must  now  be judge of  your lordship's  in- 
clination to favour me. 
The three or four following pages are to show, that 
your lordship's  exception against ideas was not against 
the term ideas, and that I mistook you in it.  Answer. 
My lord, I must own that there are very few pages of 
your letters, when I come to examine what is the pre- 
cise meaning of  your words,  either as making distinct 
propositions, or a continued discourse, wherein I do not 
think myself in danger to be mistaken; but whether in 
the present case, one much more learned than I would 
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not have understood your lordship as I did, must be left 
to those who will be at  the pains to consider your words, 
and my reply to them.  Your lordship saying, "  as I 
have stated my notion of ideas, it may be of dangerous 
consequence."  This seeming too general an accusation, 
I endeavoured to find what it was more particularly in 
it. which your lordship thought might be of dangerous 
consequence.  And  the first  thing I thought you  ex- 
cepted against was the use of the term idea:  b~it  your 
lordship tells me here, I was mistaken; it was not the 
term  idea  you excepted  against,  but the way of  cer- 
tainty by ideas.  To excuse my mistake, I have this to 
say for  myself,  that reading in your first letter these 
express words :  "When  new terms are made use of by 
ill men  to promote  scepticism  and infidelity,  and to 
overthrow the mysteries of our faith, we then have rea- 
son to inquire into them,  and to examine the founda- 
tion and tendency of them ;"it could not be very strange, 
if  I understoood them to refer to terms :  but it seems I 
was mistaken, and should have understood by them '(my 
way of  certainty by ideas,"  and should have read your 
lordship's words thus : ''  When new terms are made use 
of by ill men, to promote scepticism and infidelity, and 
to overthrow the mysteries of  faith, we have then rea- 
son to inquire into them,"  i. e.  Mr.  L.'s  definition of 
knowledge, (for that is my way of  certainty by ideas) 
"  and then to examine the foundation and tendency of 
them,"  i.  e.  this  proposition,  viz.  that knowledge  or 
certainty consists in the perception of the agreement or 
disagreement  of  ideas.  '' Them,"  in your lordship's 
words,  as I thought  (for I am scarce ever  sure what 
your lordship means by "  them")  necessarily referring 
to what  ill  men  made  use  of  for  the  promoting of 
scepticism and infidelity,  1 thought it had referred to 
terms.  Why so ? says your lordship.  Your quarrel, you 
say, was  not with  the term ideas.  "  But that which 
you insisted  upon was the way of  certainty by  ideas, 
and the new terms as employed to that purpose ;" and 
therefore it is that which your lordship must be under- 
stood to mean,  by what "  ill men  make  use  of,"  &c. 
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cused, if I took  them rather to refer to terms, a word 
in the plural number preceding in the same period, than 
to cC way of  certainty by ideas,"  which  is the singular 
number, and neither preceding, no nor so much as ex- 
pressed in the same sentence ?  And if by my ignorance 
in the use of the pronoun them, it is my misfortune to 
be often  at a loss in  the understanding  of  your lord- 
ship's writings, I hope I shall be excused. 
Another excuse for my understanding that one of the 
things in my book which  your lordship thought might 
be  of  dangerous consequence was  the term idea, may 
be found in these words of your lordship : "  But what 
need  all  this  great noise  shout ideas  and  certainty, 
true and real certainty by ideas; if  after all it comes 
only  to this,  that our  ideas only  present  to us  such 
things from whence we bring arguments to prove the 
truth of  things? But the world  hath been  strangely 
amused with ideas of late ;  and we have been told, that 
strange things might  be  done  by  the help  of  ideas, 
and yet these ideas at last come to be common notions 
of  things, which we  must make use of  in our reason- 
ing."  I shall offer one passage more for my excuse, out 
of the same page.  I had said in my chapter about the 
existence of  God, I thought it most  proper to express . 
myself in the most usual and familliar way, by common 
words and expressions : "  Your  lordship wishes I had 
done so quite through my book;  for then I had never 
given  that occasion  for  the enemies  of  our  faith  to 
take up my new way of  ideas,  as an effectual battery 
(as they imagined) against  the mysteries of  the Chri- 
stian faith.  Bl~t  I might have enjoyed the satisfaction 
of  my  ideas  long enough,  before  your  lordship  had 
taken notice of  them, unless  you had found them em- 
ployed in doing mischief."  Thus this passage stands in 
your lordship's  former letter, though here your lord- 
ship  gives  us  but  a  part  of  it;  and that part your 
lordship breaks off into two, and gives us inverted and 
in other words.  Perhaps those who observe this, and 
better understand the arts of controversy that I do, mny 
find some skill in it.  But your lordship breaks off the 
former passage at these words, "  strange things might 
be done by the help of ideas :" and then adding these 
new ones, i. e. "as to matter of  certainty,"  leaves  out 
those which contain your wish, '' that T  had expressed 
myself  in the most  usual way  by common words  and 
expressions  quite through  my  book,"  as I  had  done 
in my chapter of the existence of a God ;  for then, says 
your lordship, " I had not given that occasion  to the 
enemies of  our faith to take up my new way of  ideas, 
as an effectual battery,"  &c. which wish  of  your  lord- 
ship's is,  that I had all along left out the term idea, as 
it is plain  from my words which  you  refer to in  your 
wish,  as they stand in my first letter ;  viz.  66 I thought 
it most proper to express myself in the most usual and 
familiar way-by  common  words  and known  wags 
of expression ;  and therefore, as I think,  I have scarce 
used  the word  idea in that whole  chapter."  Now I 
must again appeal to my reader,  whether  your lord- 
ship having so plainly wished that I had used comtnon 
words and expressions  in opposition  to the term idea, 
I am not excusable if  I took  you to mean that term ? 
though y,our lordship leaves out the wish,  and instead 
of  it puts in, i.  e. "as  to matter of  certainty,"  words 
which were not in your former letter; though it be for 
mistaking you  in  my answer to that letter, that you 
here blame me.  I must own, my lord, my dulness will 
be very apt to mistake you in expressions seemingly so 
plain as these, till I can presume myself.quick-sighted 
enough to understand men's  meaning in their writings, 
not  by their  expressions : which I coafess I am not, 
and is an art I find myself too old now to learn. 
But bare mistake is not  all; your lordship accuses 
me also of unfairness and disingenuity in understanding 
these words  of  yours, "  the world has been strangely 
amused with ideas, and yet these ideas at last come to 
be only common potions of  things, as if in them your 
lordship owned  ideas to be  only common  notions  of 
things."  To this, my lord, I must humbly crave leave 
to answer, that there was no unfairness or disingenuity 
in my saying your lordship  owned  ideas for such, be- 
cause I understood you to speak in that place in your 
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idea need not be introduced when it signified only the 
common notions of things, i. e. signified no more than 
notion doth, which is a more usual word.  This I took to 
be your meaning in that place ; and whether I or any 
one  might not so understand  it, without deserving to 
be told, that "this is a way of turning things upon your 
lordship, which you did not expect from me,"  or such 
a  solemn  appeal as this,  'c  judge  now,  how  fair  and 
ingenuous  this  answer  is;"  I  leave  to any  one,  who 
will but do me the favour to cast his eye on the first 
passage above-quoted,  as it stands in your lordship's 
own words in your first letter.  For I humbly beg leave 
to say, that I cannot but wonder to find, that when your 
lordship is  charging me with want of  fairness and in- 
genuity, you should leave out, in quoting of your own 
words, those which  served most to justify the sense I 
had taken them in, and put others in the stead of them. 
In your first letter they stand thus : "  But the world 
hath been strangely amused with ideas of late, and we 
have been told  that strange things might be done by 
the help of  ideas ; and yet these ideas at last come to 
be only common notions of things, which we must make 
use of: in our reasoning ;" and so on, to the end of what 
is above set down ;  all which I quoted,  to secure my- 
self  from being  suspected  to turn things  upon  your 
lordship in a sense which your words (that the reader 
had before him) would not bear:  and in your second 
letter, in the place now under consideration, they stand 
thus :  "  but the world hath been strangely amused with 
ideas of  late, and we have been told that strange things 
may be done with ideas, i. e. as to matter of certainty :" 
and there your lordship ends.  Will your lordship give 
me leave now to use your own words, "judge now how 
fair and ingenuous this is ?"  words which I should not 
use, but that I find them used by your lordship in this 
very passage, and upon this very occasion. 
I grant myself a mortal man very liable to mistakes, 
especially in your writings : but that in my mistakes I 
am guilty of any unfairness or disingenuity, your lord- 
ship will,  I humbly conceive, pardon me,  if I think it 
will  pass for want of fairness and ingenuity in any one, 
without  clear  evidence to accuse  me.  To avoid  any 
such suspicion, in my first letter I set down every word 
contained in those pages of your book which I was con- 
cerned in ; and in my second,  I set down most  of  the 
passages ofyour lordship's first answer that I replied to. 
But because the doing it all along in this, would, I find, 
too much increase the bulk of my book; I earnestly beg 
every one, who will think this my reply worth his per- 
usal,  to lay your lordship's  letter before him,  that he 
may see whether in these pages I direct my answer to, 
without setting them down at large, there be any thing 
material unanswered, or unfairly or disingenuously re- 
presented. 
Your lordship, in the next words, gives a reason why 
I ought to have understood your words, as a consequence 
of  my assertion, and not as your  own sense, viz.  cc Be- 
cause you all along  distinguish the way of reason, by 
deducing  one  thing  from  another,  from  my  way  of 
certainty in the agreement  or  disagreement sf ideas." 
Answ. I know your lordship does all along talli. of rea- 
son and my way  of  ideas, as distinct or opposite : but 
this is the thing I have and (to  complain of, ;hat  your 
lordship does speak of them as distinct, without showing 
wherein they are different,  since the perception  of the 
agreement or disagreement of ideas, which is iny way of 
certainty, is also the way of reason.  For the perception 
of the agreement or disagreement of ideas is either by 
an immediate comparison of two ideas, as in self-evident 
propositions ;  which way of knowledge  of truth is the 
way of reason ;  or by  the interventiou of intermediate 
ideas, i. e.  by the deduction of one thing from another, 
which is also the way of reason, as J have shown; where' 
I answer to your speaking of certainty placed in good 
and sound reason,  and not in ideas: in ~vhicl~  place, as 
in several others,your lordship opposes ideas aild reason, 
which your lordship calls here distin~uishing  them.  But 
to continue  to speak frequently  of' two things as dif- 
ferent, or of two ways as opposite, without ever sllowing 
any difference or opposition  in them, after it has been 
pressed for, is a way of ingenuity which yolxl- lordship 
will  pardon  to  my ignorance, if I  11a1-c not  fhrmcrl\- 
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been  acquainted with : and therefore, when  you  shall 
have shown, that reasoning about ideas, or by ideas,is 
not the same way of reasoning, as that about or by no- 
tions or conceptions, and that what I mean by ideas.is 
not the same that your lordship means by notions; you 
will have some reason  to blame me for mistaking you 
in the passages above-quoted. 
For if your lordship, in those words, does not except 
against the term ideas, but allows  it to have the same 
signification with notions, or conceptions, or apprehen- 
sions; then your lordship's words will run thus :  '< But 
what  need all this  great noise  about notions, or con- 
ceptions,  or  apprehensions? and  the  world  has been 
strangely  amused  with  notions,  or  conceptions,  or 
apprehensions of  late :" which, whether it be that which 
your  lordship will  own  to be  your  meaning, I must 
leave to your consideration. 
Your lordship proceeds to examine my new method 
of certainty, as you are pleased to call it. 
To  my asking, "  whether there be any other or older 
method  of  certainty?" your  lordship  answers,  "that 
is  not  the  point,  but whether  mine  be  any  at a11 : 
which  your lordship  denies."  Answ.  I grant, to him 
that  barely  denies it to be  any at all; it is  not  the 
point,  whether  there be  any  older; but to him,  that 
calls  it a  new method, I humbly conceive  it will  not 
be thought wholly besides the point to show an older; at 
least, that it ought to have prevented these following 
words of your lordship's,  viz.  "  that your lordship did 
never  pretend to inform  the world  of new methods :" 
which being in answer to my desire, that you would be 
pleased to show me an older, or another method, plainly 
imply, that your lordship  supposes,  that whoever will 
inform the world  of another  method of certainty than 
mine, can do it only by informing them of a new one. 
But  since this is the answer your lordshippleases  to make 
to my request, I crave leave to consider it a little. 
Your lordship having pronounced concerning my de- 
finition of  knowledge, which  you  call  my  method of 
certainty, that it might be of dangerous consequence to 
an article of  the Christian faith; I desired you to sho,w 
in what certainty lies :  and desired it of your lordship 
by these pressing considerations,  that it would secure 
that article of faith against any dangerous consequence 
from my way, and be a great service to truth in general. 
To  which your lordship replies here, that you did never 
pretend  to  inform  the world  of  new  methods;  and 
therefore are not  bound  to go any farther than what 
you found fault with, which was my new method. 
Answ. My lord, I did not desire any new method of 
you.  I observed  your  lordship, in  more  places  than 
one, reflected on me for writing out of my own thoughts, 
and therefore I could  not  expect  from your  lordship 
what you so much condemil in another,  Besides, one 
of the faults you  found with  my method was,  that it 
was new :  and therefore if your lordship will look again 
into that passage, where I desire you to set the world 
right in a thing of that great consequence, as it is  to 
know wherein certainty consists ;  you will not find, that 
I mention any thing of a new method of certainty: my 
words were "  another,"  whether old or new was indif- 
ferent.  In truth, all that I requested, was  only such a 
method of certainty as your  lordship approved of, and 
was secure in; and therefore I do not see how your not 
pretending to inform  the world in any new  methods 
can be any way alleged as a reason for refusing so use- 
ful and so charitable a thing. 
Your lordship farther adds, "  that you are not bound 
to go any farther than what you  found  fault  with." 
Answ. I suppose your  lordship means, that "you  are 
not  bound  by  the law  of  disputation;"  nor are you, 
as  I  humbly conceive; by this  law  forbid: or  if  you 
were, the law of the schools could not dispense with the 
eternal divine law of charity.  The law of  disputing, 
whence had it its so mi~hty  a sanction? It  is at best but 
the law of wrangling, if it shut out the great ends of 
information and instruction; and serves only40 flatter a 
little guilty vanity, in a victory over an adversary less 
skilful in this  art of  fencing.  Who can believe, that 
upon so slight an account your lordship should neglect 
your design of writing against me? The great motives 
of your concern for an article of the Christian faith, and 
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of that duty which you profess has made you do what 
you have done, will be believed to work more uniformly 
in pour lordship, than to let a father of the church, and 
a teacher in Israel, not tell one who asks him, which is 
the right and safe way, if he knows  it.  No, no, my 
lord, a character so much to the prejudice of your cha- 
rity, nobody will receive of your lordship, no, not from 
yourself: whatever  your  lordship  may say,  the world 
will believe, that you would have given a better method 
of certainty, if  you  had  had  one; when  thereby you 
would have secured men  from the danger of running 
into errors  in  articles  of  faith,  and effectually have 
recalled them from my way of certainty, which leads, as 
your lordship  says, to scepticism  and  infidelity.  For 
to turn inen from a way they are in, the bare telling 
them it  is dangerous, puts but a short stop to  their going 
on in it :  there is nothing effectual to  set them a going 
right, but to  show them which is the safe and sure way; 
a piece of humanity, which when asked, nobody,  as far 
as he knows, refuses another ;  and that I have earnestly 
asked of your lordship. 
Your lordship represents to me the unsatisfactoriness 
and inconsistency of nly way of certainty, by telling me, 
that it seems still a strange thing to  you, that I should 
talk so much of  a new method of  certainty by ideas ; 
and yet allow, as I do, such  a want of ideas, so much 
imperfection  in them, and such a want of  connexion 
between our ideas and the things themselves."  Answ. 
This objection being so visibly against the extent of our 
knowledge, and not the certainty of it by ideas, would 
need no other answer but this, that it proved nothing to 
the point;  which was  to show,  that my way by ideas 
was no way to certainty at a11 ;  not to true certainty, 
which is a term your lordship uses here, which I shall 
be able to conceive whet you mean by, when you shall 
be pleased to tell me what false certainty is. 
Rut because what you say here is in short what you 
ground your  charge of scepticism on, in your  former 
lettcr, I shall here,  according to my promise, consider 
nhat your lordship says there, and hope you will allow 
this to be no unfit place. 
Your  charge of scepticism, in your former letter, is 
as followeth. 
Your lordship's first  argument consists in these pro- 
positions, viz. 
1. That I say, Book IV. Chap. 1, that knowledge is 
the perception  of the agreement  or  disagreement  of 
ideas. 
I.  That I go about to prove, that there are very rnally 
more beings, of which  we  have  no  ideas,  than  those 
of  which we have ; from whence  your lordship draws 
this conclusion, '' that we are excluded from attainin5 
any knowledge,  as to the far greatcst part of'the unl- 
verse :" which  I agree to.  But with  submission, tliis 
is not the proposition  to be  proved, but tliis, viz. that 
nny  way by ideas, or my way of certainty by ideas, for 
to that your lordship reduces it ;  i. e.  iny placing cjf  cer- 
tainty in the perception  of the agreement or disagrec- 
ment of ideas ;  leads to scepticism. 
Farther, from my saying, that the intellectual world 
is greater and more beautiful certainly than thenlaterial, 
your lordship argues, that if  certainty may be hall by 
general reasons without particular ideas in one, it may 
also in other cases.  Answ.  It  may, no doubt: but this 
is nothing  against any thing I have said ;  for I haveneither 
said, nor suppose, tlaat certainty by general reasons, 01. 
any  reasons, can  be  had without  ideas; no more than Isay, 
or  suppose,  that we  can  reason without  thinking, or 
think without immediate objects in our minds in thiiik- 
ing, i. e. think without ideas.  Rut your lordship asks, 
"  whence comes this certainty (for I say certainty) where 
there  be  no particular ideas,"  if knowledge  consists 
in the perception of the agreement or disagreemellt of 
ideas  ? I answer, we have ideas as far as we are certain; 
and  beyond that, we have neither certainty, no nor pro- 
bability.  Every thing which we either know or believe, 
is some proposition :  now no proposition can be framed 
as the object of our knowledge or assent, wherein two 
ideas are not joined to, or separated from one another. 
As, for example, when I affirm that "something  exists 
in  the  world, whereof I  have  no  idea,"  existenoe  is 
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an idea of existence and something, the two thin,  ms  j oined 
in that proposition, as I have of them in this proposition, 
'(  something exists in the world, whereof I have an idea." 
When therefore I affirm, that the intellectual world is 
greater and more beautiful than the material; whether 
1 should know the truth  of this proposition, either by 
divine revelation, or should assert it as highly probable 
(which is  all I do in that chapter*  out  of  which this 
instance  is brought)  it means  no more  but this,  viz. 
that  there are more, and more beautiful beings, whereof 
we have  no  ideas,  than  there  are of which we  have 
ideas ;  of which  beings, whereof we have no ideas, we 
can, for want of ideas, have no farther knowledge, but 
that such beings do  exist. 
If your lordship shall now ask me, how I know there 
are such beings; I answer, that, in that chapter of the 
extent of our knowledge,  I do  not  say I know, but I 
endeavour to show, that it is most highly probable :  but 
yet a man is capable of knowing it to be true, because 
he is capable of having it revealed to him by God, that 
this proposition  is  true, viz. that in the works of God 
there are more, and more beautiful beings, whereof we 
have  no ideas, than  there are whereof we  have ideas. 
If God, instead of showing the very thin.gs to St. Paul, 
had only revealed  to him, that this proposition was true, 
viz. that there were things in heaven, c6which  neither eye 
had seen, nor ear had heard, nor  had  entered into the 
heart of man to conceive;"  would he not have known 
the  truth ofthat proposition of whose terms he hadideas, 
viz. of beings, whereof he had no other ideas, but barely 
as something, and of existence; though in the want of 
other ideas of them, he could attain no other knowledge 
of them but barely that they existed ? So that in what I 
have there said, there is no contradiction,  nor shadow of 
a contradiction, to my placing  knowledge  in the per- 
ception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas. 
But  if I should any where mistake, and say any thing 
inconsistent with that way of certainty of mine; how, I 
beseech your lordship, could you conclude from thence, 
that the placing knowledge  in  the perception  of  the 
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agreement or disagreement of ideas tends to  scepticism  ? 
That which is the proposition here to be proved, would 
remain  still unproved: for  1 might  say things  incon- 
sistent with this proposition,  that "  knowledge consists 
in the  perception of  the connexion  and  agreement or 
disagreement and repugnancy of our ideas;"  and yet 
that proposition  be  true, and very far from tending to 
scepticism,  unless  your  lordship will argue that every 
proposition  that is  inconsistent with what  a man  any 
where  says, tends to scepticism ;  and then I should be 
tempted to infer, that many propositions in the letters 
your lordship has honoured me with will tend to seep- 
ticism. 
Your lordship's  second argument is from my saying, 
"we  have  no ideas of  the mechanical affections of the 
minute particles  of  bodies, which  hinders  our certain 
knowledge  of  universal truths concerning natural bo- 
dies :" from  whence  your  lordship  concludes,  "  that 
since we  can  attain to  no  science,  as  to  bodies  or 
spirits,  our  knowledge  must  be  confined  to a  very 
narrow  compass."  I  grant it;  but I  crave  leave  to 
mind  your  lordship again, that this is not the proposi- 
tion to be proved :  a little knowledge is still knowledge, 
and not  scepticism.  But let  me  have  affirmed  our 
knowledge to  be comparatively very little ; how, I be- 
seech  your lordship, does that any way prove, that this 
proposition,  ccknowledge  consists  in the perception of 
the agreement or  disagreement of  our ideas,"  any way 
tends to scepticism ? which was  the proposition  to be 
proved.  But the inference your lorclship shuts up this 
head  with,  in  these  words:  "so  that all certainty is 
given  up in  the way of  knowledge,  as to the visible 
and  invisible  world,  or  at least  the greatest part of 
them :"  showing in the first part of it what  your lord- 
ship should have inferred, and was willing to infer ;  does 
at last  by these words  in  the close, "or  at least the 
greatest part of  them,"  I guess come just to nothing: 
I say, I gueSs ;  for what a  them,"  by grammatical con- 
struction, is to be referred to, seems not clear to me. 
Your third argument being just of the same kind with 
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to a very narrow compass, in respect of the whole extent 
of beings ;  is already answered. 
In the fourth place,  your lordship  sets  down  some 
words of mine concerning reasoning and demonstration ; 
and then concludes, "but if there be no way of coming 
to deinonstration  but this,  I  doubt we  must be  con- 
tent without  it."  Which  being  nothing  but  a  de- 
claration of your doubt, is, I grant, a very short way of 
proving any proposition ;  and T shall leave to your lord- 
ship tlie satisfaction  you  have  in such a proof, since I 
think it will scarce convince others. 
111 the last place, your lordship argues,  ' at  because I 
say, that the idea in the mind proves not  ,he existence 
of that thing whereof it is an idea, therefore we cannot 
know the actual existence  of  any thing by our senses : 
because we  know nothing, but by the perceived agree- 
ment of ideas.  But  if you had been  to  have consi- 
dered my answer there to  the sceptics, whose cause you 
here seem, with no small vigour, to  manage ;  you would, 
I humbly conceive,  have found that you  mistake one 
thing for  another, viz.  the idea  that has  by a former 
sensation  been lodged in the mind, for actually receiv- 
ing any idea,  i.  e.  actual sensation; which,  I think, I 
need not go  about to prove are two distinct things, after 
what you have here quoted out of my book.  Now the 
two ideas, that in this case are perceived to agree, and 
do thereby produce  knowledge, are the idea of  actual 
sensation (which is an action whereof I have a clear and 
distinct idea) and the idea of  actual existence of some- 
thing without me that causes that sensation.  And what 
other certainty your lordsl~ip  has by your senses of the 
existing  of  any thing without you,  but the perceived 
connexion  of  those  two ideas,  I would  gladly  know. 
When you have destroyed this certainty, which I con- 
ceive  is  the utmost,  as  to this matter, which our infi- 
nitely wise alid bountiful Maker has made us capable of 
in this  state ; your lordship will have well assisted the 
sceptics in carrying their arguments against certainty by 
sense, beyond what they could have expected. 
I cilllnot but fcar, my lord, that what you have said 
Ilerc in favour of' scepticism, against certainty by sense 
(for it  is not at  all against me, till you show we can have 
no idea of actual sensation) without tlie proper antidote 
annexed, in showing wherein that certainty consists (if 
the account I give be not true) after you have so strenu- 
ously endeavoured to  destroy what I have  said for it ; 
will, by your authority, have laic1 no  small foundation 
of scepticism : which they will not fail to lay hold of, 
with advantage to their cause, who have any disposition 
that way.  For I desire any one to read this your fifth 
argument, and then  judge which of us two is a promoter 
of scepticism ;  I who have endeavoured, and, as I think, 
proved certainty by our senses;  or your lordship, who 
has (in your thoughts at least) destroyed these proofs, 
without giving us any other to supply their place.  All 
your other arguments amount to no more but this, that 
I have given instances to show, that the extent of our 
knowledge, in comparison of the whole extent of being, 
is very little and narrow : which, when "your lordship 
writ your Vindication  of  the Doctrine of  the Trinity, 
were very fair and ingenuous confessions of the short- 
ness  of  human  understanding,  with  respect  to the 
nature and manner of such things, which we  are most 
certain of the being  of, by constant and undoubted expe- 
rience :"  though  since you have showed your dislike of 
them in more places t,hail one,  particularly p. 33, and 
again more at  large, p. 43,  and at  last you have thought 
fit to represent then1 as arguments for scepticism.  And 
thus I have  acquitted myself, I hope to your lordship's 
satisfaction, of my proniise  to answer your accusation 
of a tendency to scepticism. 
But to return to your second letter, where I left off. 
In  the following pages you have another argument "to 
prove my way of  certainty to be none,  but to lead to 
scepticism:" which, after a  serious perusal of it, seems 
to me to amount to no more but this,  that Des Cartes 
and I go both in the way of ideas, and we differ;  ergo, 
the placing of certainty in the perception of the agree- 
ment or disygreement of  ideas is  no way of certainty, 
but leads to scepticism; which is a consequence I cannot 
adrriit, and I think is no better than this :  your lordship 
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ergo, the placing of knowledge in the perception of the 
agreement or disagreement  of  ideas is  no way of cer- 
tainty at all, but leads to scepticism. 
Your lordship will perhaps think I say more than I 
can justify, when I say your lordship goes in the way of 
ideas ;  for you will tell me, you do not place certainty 
in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of 
ideas.  Answ.  No more does Des Cartes; and therefore, 
in that respect, he and I went no more in the same way 
of ideas than your lordship and 1  do.  From whence it 
follows,  that how much soever he  and I may differ ill 
other points,  our difference  is  no  more  an  argument 
against  this proposition, that knowledge or certainty con- 
sists in the perception of the agreement or disagreement 
of ideas, than your lordship's and my difference in any 
other point, is an argument against the truth of that my 
definition of knowledge, or that it tends to scepticism. 
But you will say, that Des Cartes built his system of 
philosophy upon ideas ;  and so I say does your lordship 
too, and every one else as much as he,  that has any sy- 
stem of that or any other part of knowledge.  For ideas 
are nothing but the immediate  objects of our minds in 
thinking ;  and your  lordship,  I conclude, in building 
your system of any part of knowledge thinks on some- 
thing : and therefore  you can  no  more build, or have 
any system of knowledge without ideas, than you  can 
think without some immediate objects of thinking.  In- 
deed,  you  do not so often  use  the word  ideas as Des 
Cartes or I[ have done ;  but using the things signified by 
that term as much as either of  us  (unless you can think 
without an immediate object of thinking) yours also is 
the way of ideas,  as much as his  or mine.  Your con- 
demning the way of ideas, in those general terms, which 
one meets with so often  in your writings on this occa- 
sion, amountsat last to no more but an exception against 
a poor sound of  three syllables,  though your lordship 
thinks fit not to own, that you have any exception to  it. 
If, besides this,  these ten  or twelve pages have any 
other  argument  in  them,  which  I  have  not  seen,  I 
humbly desire  you would  be pleased to put it into a 
syllogism,  to eonvince  my reader, that 1  have silently 
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passed by an argument of importance ;  and then I pro- 
mise an answer to it:  and the same  request and pro- 
mise I make to your lordship, in reference to all other 
passages in your letter, wherein you think there is any 
thing of moment unanswered. 
Your lordship comes to answer what was in my former 
letter, to show, that what you had said concerning na- 
ture and person, was to me and several others, whom I 
had talked with about it, hardly to be understood.  To 
this purpose the sixteen next pages are chiefly employed 
to show what Aristotle and others have said about p6ms 
and natura, a Greek and a Latin word; neither of which 
is the English word  nature,  nor can  concern it at all, 
till it be proved that nature in English has, in the pra- 
priety of  our tongue,  precisely the same signification 
that ~6~11  had among the Greeks, and nata  among the 
Romans.  For would it not be pretty llarsh to  an En. 
glish ear, to say with Aristotle,  '<  that nature is a cor- 
poreal substance, or a corporeal substance is nature?" 
to instance but in this one,  among those many various 
senses which your lordship proves he used the term Q&, 
in : or with Anaximander,  <'  that nature is  matter,  or 
matter  nature?"  or  with  Sextus  Empiricus,  tc that 
nature is  a  principle  of  life,  or  a  principle of  life  is 
nature?"  So that though  the philosophers  of  old of 
all kinds did understand the sense of the terms pluji and 
natura, in the languages of their countries ;  yet it does 
not follow, what you would here conclude from thence, 
that they understood the proper signification of the term 
nature in English.  Nor has an Englishman any more 
need to  consult those Grecians in the use of their sound 
~Jujs,  to know what nature signifies in  English,  than 
those Grecians had  need  to consult our  writings,  or 
bring instances of the use of the word nature in English 
authors,  to justify their using of  the term pLnr in any 
sense they had used it in Greek.  The like may be said 
of what is brought out of the Greek Christian writers ; 
for I think an Englishman could scarce be justified in 
saying in English, "  that the angels were natures,"  be- 
cause Theodoret and St.  Basil call them pdujs.  To these, 
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word pdu~  may be  found,  made use of  by the Greeks, 
which are not  taken  notice  of  by  your  lordship;  as 
particularly Aristotle,  if  I  mistake  not,  uses it for  a 
plastic  power,  or a kind  of  anima mundi,  presiding 
over  the  material  world,  and  producing  the  order 
and  -.  regularity of motions,  formations, and generations 
in it. 
Indeed, you lordship brings a proof from an authority 
that is proper in the case, and would go a great way in 
it ; for it is of  an Englishman, who, writing of nature, 
gives an account of the signification of the word nature 
in English.  But the mischief is, that among eight sig- 
nifications  of the word  nature, which he gives, that IS 
not  to be  found,  which you  quote him for,  and  had 
need of.  For he says not that nature in Eoglish is used 
for substance ;  which is the sense your lordship has used 
it in, and  worlld justify by the authority of  that ingenious 
and honourable  person : and to make  it out,  you tell 
us, a  Mr. Boyle says the word essence is of great affinity 
to nature,  if  not  of  an  adequate import ;" to which 
your lordship adds, "but the real essence of  a thing is 
a  substance."  So that, in  fine,  the authority  of  this 
excellent person and philosopher amounts to thus much, 
that he says that nature and essence are two terms that 
have a great affinity;  and you say, that nature and sub- 
stance are two terms that have a great affinity.  For the 
learned Mr. Boyle says no  such thing, nor can it ap- 
pear that he ever thought so, till it can be shown, that 
he has said that essence  and substance have  the same 
signification. 
I humbly conceive, it would have been a strange way 
in any body, hut your lordship, to have quoted an author 
for saying that nature and substance had the same sig- 
nifieation, when one of those terms,  viz.  substance, he 
does not, upon that occasion,  so  much  as name.  But 
your lordship has this privilege, it seems, to speak of 
your inferences  as  if  they  were  other men's  words, 
whereof I think I have  given  several  instances; I am 
sure I have given one, where you seem to speak of clear 
and distinct ideas as my words, when they are only your 
words,  there  inferred  from my words "  evident know- 
ledge :'' and other the like instances might be produced, 
were there any need. 
Had your lordship produced Mr. Boyle's  teshimony, 
that nature, in our tongue, had the same signification 
with substance, I should presently have submitted to so 
great an authority, and taken it for proper English, and 
a clear way of expressing one's  self, to use nature and 
substance promiscuously one for another.  But since, I 
think, there is no instance of any one who ever did so, 
and therefore it must be a new,  and consequently no 
very clear way of speaking ;  give me leave, my lord, to 
wonder, why in all this dispute about the term nature, 
upon  the clear  and  right understanding  whereof you 
lay so much stress, you have not been pleased to define 
it: which would  put an end to all disputes about the 
meaning of it, and leave 110  doubtfulness, no obsc~lrity 
in your use  of  it,  nor  any room for any dispute what 
you mean by it.  This would have saved many pages of 
paper, though perhaps it would have made us lose your 
learned account of what the ancients have said concern- 
ing Q~CIS,  and the several acceptations they used it in. 
All the other authors, Greek and Latin, your lord- 
ship has quoted,  may, for aught I know, have used the 
term pdars  and natura, properly in their languages ;  and 
have discoursed very clearly and intelligibly about what 
those terms in their countries signified.  But how that 
proves  there were  no difficulties in the sense or con- 
struction in that discourse of yours, concerning nature, 
which I, and those I consulted upon it, did not under- 
stand ; is hard to see.  Your lordship's  discourse was 
obscure,  and too difficult then  for me,  and so I must 
own it is still.  Whether my friend  be any better en- 
lightened  by what you have said to him here, out of so 
many  ancient  authors, I am  too remote from him  at 
the writing of  this to know,  and so shall not trouble 
your  lordship with  any conversation,  which  perhaps, 
when we meet again, we may have upon it. 
The next  passage  of  your  vindication,  which  was 
complained of  to be very hard  to be understood, was 
this, where you say, "  that you grant that by sensation 
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perties of things ;.  but our reason is satisfied that there 
must  be  something  beyond  these,  because  it is  im- 
possible  they should  subsist  by  themselves.  So that 
the nature of  things properly  belongs to our reason, 
and not to mere ideas."  To rectify the mistake that 
had been made in my first letter, p. 157, in taking rea- 
son here to mean  the faculty of reason,  you tell me, 
ce I might easily have seen,  that by reason  your lord- 
ship understood principles of  reason allowed by man- 
kind."  To  which it was replied, that then this passage 
of  yours must be read thus, viz.  e'  that your lordship 
grants that by  sensation  and  reflection  we  come  ta 
know the properties of  things ;  but our reason,  i.  e. the 
principles of  reason allowed by mankind,  are satisfied 
that there must be  something beyond  these ;  because 
it is impossible they should subsist by thenlselves.  So 
that the nature of  things properly belongs  to our rea- 
son,"  i.  e. to the principles of  reason  allowed by man- 
kind,  and not  to mere  ideas;  ge  which  made  it seem 
more unintelligible than it was before." 
To  the complaint was made of the unintelligibleness 
of  this passage in this last sense given  by your  lord- 
ship, you answer nothing.  So that we [i.  e. my friends 
whom  I  consulted  and I]  are still  excusable,  if  not 
understanding what is signified  by these expressions : 
'c the principles  of  reason  allowed  by  mankind  ate 
satisfied, and the nature of things properly belongs to 
the principles of  reason  allowed by mankind,''  we see 
not  the connexion  of  the  propositions  here tied  to- 
gether by  the words "  so that,"  which  was the thing 
complained of in these words, viz. "  the inference here, 
both for its connexion and expression, seemed hard to 
be understood ;" and more to the same purpose, which 
your lordship takes no notice of. 
Indeed, your  lordship repeats these words  of  mine, 
" that in both senses of  the word  reason, either taken 
for  a faculty,  or for the principles  of  reasoil allowed 
by mankind,  reason  and ideas may consist together :" 
and then  subjoins, "  tliat this  leads your  lordship  to 
the examination  of  that which  may  be of  some  use, 
viz. to show the  difference of  my method  of  certainty 
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by  ideas,  and  the  metl~ocl of  certainty  by  reason." 
Whicll  lion it any way jllstifies  your  opposing  ideas 
and  reason,  as  you  here,  and  elsewhere often do; or 
shows,  that ideas are incorisistent with the principles 
of  reason  allowed  by mankind ; I leave to the reader 
to judge.  Your lordship, for the clearing of what you 
had  said  in  your Vindication,  &c. from oBscurity  and 
unintelligibleness, which  were  complained  of  in  it,  is 
to  prove,  that  ideas  are  inconsistent  with  tlie  prin- 
ciples of  reason  allowetl by  manliind;  and in  answer 
to this, you say,  " you will  show the difference of  my 
method  of  certainty by ideas,  ancl  the method of cer- 
tainty by reason." 
My lord, as I remember,  the expression in question 
was not, "  tlint the riat~~re  of  things properly belongs 
to our reason,  and not to my method of  certainty by 
ideas; but this,  that the nature of  things  belongs to 
our reason, and not to rnere ideas.  So that the thing 
you were here to show was, tliat reason, i. e. the prin- 
ciples of  reason  allowed  by mankind,  and ideas; and 
not ihe principles of reason, and my method of certainty 
by ideas, cannot consist together :"  for the principles of 
reason allowed by mankind, and ideas, may consist to- 
wether;  though, perhaps,  my  method of  certainty by  b  ideas  should prove  inconsistent with  those principles. 
So that if all that you say, from this to the 15Sd page, 
i. e. forty-eight pages, were as clear demonstration, as 
I hombly conceive  it is the contrary; yet it does  no- 
thing to clear  the passage  in  hand,  but leaves  that 
part of  your discourse,  concerning nature,  lying still 
under tlie  objection was  made against it,  as much as 
if you had not said one word. 
But since  I  am  not  unwilling  that my method  of 
certainty should be examined, and I should he glad (if 
there be  any faults  in  it) to learn the defects of  that 
my definition of knowledge, from so great a master as 
your lordship ; I will consider what you here say, cc  to 
show the difference of my method OF certainty by ideas, 
and the method of certainty by reason." 
Your lordship  says, " that tlie  nay of  certainty by 
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" 1. The certainty of principles. 
'<  2. The certainty of deductions." 
I grant, that a part of that which is called certainty 
by  reason,  lies  in  the certainty of  principles;  which 
principles, I presume, your  lordship and I are agreed, 
are several propositions. 
If then these principles are propositions, to show the 
difference between your lordship's  way of certainty by 
reason, and my way of certainty by ideas ; I think it is 
visible, that you  ought to show wherein the certainty 
of  those propositions  consists in your way  by reason, 
different from that wherein I make it consist in my way 
by  ideas.  As,  for  example,  your  lordship and I  are 
agreed,  that this  proposition,  whatsoever  is,  is; is  a 
principle of reason, or a maxim.  Now my way of cer- 
tainty by ideas is, that the certainty of this proposition 
consists in this,  that there is a  perceivable  connexion 
or agreement between the idea of being and the idea 
of being, or between the idea of existence and the idea 
of existence, as is expressed in that proposition.  But 
now, in your way of reason, pray wherein does the cer- 
tainty of this proposition consist ?  If it be in any thing 
different from that perceivable agreement of the ideas, 
affirmed of  one  another in it, I  beseech your lordship 
to tell me ; if  not, I beg leave to conclude,  that your 
way of  certainty by reason,  and my  way of  certainty 
by ideas, in this case are just the same. 
But instead of saying any thing, to show wherein the 
certainty of principles is different, in the way of reason, 
from the certainty of principles  in the way  of  ideas, 
upon my friend's  showing, that you had no ground to 
say as you did, that I had no idea of reason, as it  stands 
for principles of reason; your lordship takes occasion (as, 
what will not, in a skilful hand, serve to introduce any 
thing one has a mind to?)  to tell me,  '<  what ideas I have 
of them must appear from my book,  and you do there 
find a chapter of self-evident propositions and maxims, 
which you cannot but think extraordinary for the de- 
sign of  it, which is thus summed in the conclusion*, 
viz.  that it was  to show,  that these maxims,  as they 
*  B, iv. c. 7. 3 20. 
are of little use, where we have clear and distinct ideas, 
so they are of dangerous use, where our ideas are not 
clear and distinct.  And is not this a fair way to con- 
vince your lordship, that my way of  ideas is very mn- 
sistent with  the  certainty of  reason, when the way of 
reason hsth been always supposed to proceed  upon ge- 
neral  principles, and I assert  them to  be  useless and 
dangerous  ?" 
In which words I crave leave to observe, 
1.  That the  pronoun  '<  them"  here  seems  to have 
reference to self-evident  propositions, to  maxims, and 
to principles,  as terms used  by your lordship and me; 
though it be certain,  that you and I use them in a far 
different sense ;  for,  if I mistake not, you use them all 
three promiscuously one for another; whereas it is plain, 
that in that chapter *,  out of  which  you bring .your 
quotations here, I distinguish  self-evident proposit~ons 
from those, which I there mention urder the name of 
maxims, which are principally these two, "  whatsoever 
is,  is;  and it is  impossible  for the same  thing to be, 
and not to be."  Farther it is plain, out of the same 
place,  that by maxims I there mean general proposi- 
tions, which are so universally received under the name 
of maxims or axioms, that they are looked upon as in- 
nate ;  the two  chief whereof,  principally there meant, 
are those above-mentioned :  but what the propositions 
are which you comprehend under maxims, or principles 
of reason,  cannot  be  determined,  since your  lordship 
neither defines nor enumerates  them ; and so it is im- 
possible, precisely, t#o  know what you mean by "them" 
here :  and that which makes me more at a loss is, that 
in  this  argument  you  set  down  for  principles  or 
maxims, propositions that are not self-evident, viz. this, 
"  that the essential properties  of a man  are to reason 
and discourse," &c. 
2.  I crave leave to observe, that you tell me, that in 
my book  '<  you find  a chapter  of self-evident  proposi- 
tions  and maxims,"  whereas  I  find  no such chapter 
in my book: I have in  it indeed a chapter of maxims, 
but never an one intitled "  of self-evident  propositions 
* Essay, b. iv. c. 7. 
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and  maxinis."  This,  it  is possible,  your  lordship 
will call a nice criticism ;  but yet it is  such an one as 
is very necessary in the case: for in that chapter I, as is 
before observed, expressly distinguish self-evident pro- 
positions from the  received  maxims  or axioms, which 
I there speak of:  whereas it seems  to me  to be your 
design (in joining them in a title of a chapter, contrary 
to what I had done)  to have it thought, that I treated 
of them as one and  the same thing;  and so all that I 
said there, of the uselessness of  some few general pko- 
positions, under the title of  received maxims,might be 
applied to all self-evident propositions ;  the quite con- 
trary whereof was the design of that chapter.  For that 
which I endeavour to show there is, that all our know- 
ledge is not built on  those few received  general pro- 
positions,which are ordinarily called maxims or axioms ; 
but that there are a great many truths may be known 
without them :  but that there is any knowledge, with- 
out self-evident propositions, I am so far from denying, 
that I am  accused  by your  lordship for  requiring,  in 
demonstration, more such than you think are necessary. 
This seems, I say, to be your design; and T  wish your 
lordship, by entitling my chapter as I myself did, and 
not as it would  test serve your  turn, had not made it 
necessary for  me  to make  this  nice  criticism.  This 
is certain, that without  thus confounding maxims and 
self-evident propositions, what you here say would not, 
so much as in appearance, concern me :  for, 
3. I crave  leave  to  observe,  that  all the  argument 
your lordship uses  here  against me to prove that my 
way of certainty by ideas is inconsistent with '' the way 
of certainty by reason,  which  lies  in  the certainty of 
principles,  is  this,  that  the way of  reason hath been 
always supposed  to proceed  upon general principles, 
and I assert them to be  useless and dangerous."  Be 
pleased, my lord, to define or enumerate  our general 
principles,  and then we shall see whether r as~ert~them 
to be  useless  and  dangerous, and whether  they, who 
supposed the  way of reason was to proceed upon general 
principles,  differed  from  me;  and if  they did  differ, 
whether theirs was more the way of reason than mine: 
but  to talk thus ofgeneral principles, which have always 
been  supposed  the way  of  reason,  without  telling  so 
much as which, or what they are, is not so much as by 
authority to show, that my way of  certainty by ideas 
is  inconsistent  with  the way of  certainty  by reason; 
much less is it in reality to prove  it.  Because admit- 
ting I  had said any thing contrary to what, as you say, 
has been always supposed, its being supposed proves it 
not to be  true ; because  we  know that several things 
have been for many ages generally supposed, which at 
last, upon examination, have been found not to he true. 
What  hath been always supposed, is fit only for your 
lordship's great reading to declare :  but such arguments, 
I confess, are wholly lost upon me, who have not time 
or occasion to examine what has always been supposed; 
especially in those questions which concern truths, that 
are to be known from the nature of things: because, I 
think, they cannot be established by majority of votes, 
not easy to be  collected;  nor  if  they were  collected, 
can convey certainty till it can be  supposed that the 
greater part of mankind  are always in the right.  In 
matters of fact, I own we must govern ourselves by the 
testimonies of others ;  but in matters of speculation, to 
suppose on, as others have supposed before us, is sup- 
posed  by many to be only a way to learned ignorance, 
which enables to talk much, and know but little.  The 
truths, which the penetration and  labours  of  others 
before us have discovered and made out, I own we are 
infinitely indebted to them for ;  and some of  them are 
of that consequence, that we  cannot acknowledge too 
muchthe  advantages  we receive from thosegreat masters 
in knowledge: but where they only supposed, they left 
it to us to search, and advance farther.  And in those 
things,  I  think,  it becomes  our  industry  to employ 
itself  for  the improvement  of  the  knowledge,  and 
adding to the  stock of  discoveries  left us by our in- 
quisitive  and thinking predecessors. 
4. One thing more I crave leave to observe, viz. that 
to these words,  these maxims, as they are of little use 
where we have clear  and distinct ideas, so they are of 
dangerous  use  where  our  ideas  are  not  clear  and 
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distinct,"  quoted out of my  Essay ;  you subjoin,  cf  and 
is not  this a fair way to  convince your  lordship, that 
my way of ideas is very consistent with  the certainty 
of  reason ?"  Answ.  My  lord,  my  Essay, and those 
words in it,  were  writ  many  years  before  I  dreamt 
that you or any body else would ever question the con- 
sistency of my way of certainty by ideas, with the way 
of certainty by reason ;  and so could not be intended to 
convince  your  lordship  in  this point:  and since you 
first said, that these two ways are inconsistent, I never 
brought  those words  to convince you,  a  that my way 
is consistent with the certainty of  reason ;"  and there- 
fore why you ask, whether that be a  fair way to con- 
vince you, which was never made use of as any way to 
convince you of any such thing, is hard to imagine. 
But your  lordship goes  on  in the following  words 
with the like kind of argument, where you tell me that 
I say, '<that  my  first design is to prove, that the con- 
sideration of  those general maxims  adds  nothing  to 
the evidence or certainty of knowledge*;  which,  SayB 
your lordship, overthrows all that which hath been ac- 
counted science  and demonstration, and must lay the 
foundation of scepticism: because our true grounds of 
certainty depend upon  some general principles of rea- 
son,  To  make this plain, you say, you will  put a case 
grounded upon my words ;  which are, that I have dis- 
coursed with very rational men, who have actually de- 
nied  that they  are men.  These words J. S.  under- 
stands as spoken of themselves,  and charges them with 
very ill consequences; but you  think they are capable 
of another  meaning :  however,  says your lordship, let 
us  put the case,  that men  did  in  earnest  question 
whether they were  men  or not ;  and then you do not 
see, if I set aside general maxims, how I can convince 
them that they are men.  For the way your lordship 
looks on as most, apt to prevail upon such extraordinary 
sceptical men, is by general  maxims and principles of 
reason." 
Answ. I can neither in that paragraph nor chspter 
find that I say, "that my first design is to prove, that 
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these  general  maxims"  [i.  e. those which  your  lord- 
ship calls general principles of reason]  add nothing to 
the evidence and certainty of knowledge in general :  for 
so these words must be understood, to make good the 
consequence which your lordship charges on them, viz. 
"that they overthrow all that has been accounted science 
and demonstration.  and  lay the foundations of  scep- 
ticism." 
What my design in that place is, is evident from these 
words  in  the foregoing  paragraph : "  let us consider 
whether  this  self-evidence  be  peculiar  only  to those 
propositions, which are received for maxims,  and have 
the  dignity of  axioms  allowed:  and here  it is plain, 
that several  other  truths, not  allowed  to be axioms, 
partake  equally  with  them  in  this  self-evidence*." 
Which shows that my design there, was ts evince that 
there were truths that are not called maxims, that are 
a  self-evident as those received maxims.  Pursuant to 
this design,  1 say,  <'  that the  consideration  of  these 
axioms"  [i. e. whatsoever  is,  is; and it is  i~npossible 
for the same  thing to  be,  and not  to be]  "  can add 
nothing to the evidence and  certainty of  its [i. e. the 
mind's]  knowledge t ;" [i. e. of the truth of  more par- 
tieular  propositions  concerning identity.]  These are 
my words in that place, and that the sense of them is 
according to the limitation  annexed  to them between 
those crotchets, Irefer my reader to that fourth section; 
where he will find that all that I say amounts to  no more 
but what is expressed in these words, in the close of it: 
"  I appeal to every one's  own  mind, whether this pro- 
position, a  circle is  rt  circle, be  not as self-evident  a 
proposition,  as that consisting of more general terms, 
whatsoever  is,  is:  and  again,  whether  this  proposi- 
tion,  blue  is  not red,  be  not  a  proposition  that the 
mind can no more doubt of, as soon  as it understands 
the words, than it does  of that axiom, it is impossible 
for the same thing to be, and not  to be : and so of all 
the like?"  And  now  I  ask your  lordship,  whether 
yon  do  affirm  of  this,  "  that it overthrows  all  that 
which  hath been counted  science  and demonstration, 
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md  must lay  the foundation  of  scepticism?" If  you 
do, I shall desire you to prove it; if you do not, I must 
desire  you  to consider  how fairly my sense  has been 
represented. 
But supposing you had represented my sense right, 
and that the little or dangerous use which I there limit 
to certain maxims, had been meant of all principles of 
reason in general, in your  sense ;  what had  this been, 
my lord, to the question under debate ?  Your lordship 
undertakes to show, that your way of certainty by rea- 
son is different from my way of certainty by ideas.  To 
do this, you say in the preceding page, "  that certainty 
by  reason  lies,  1.  in  certainty  of  principles;  2. in 
certainty of deductions."  The first  of  these you  are 
upon here ;  and if in order to what you had undertaken, 
your lordship had shown, that in your way  by reason, 
those principles were certain ;  but in my way by ideas, 
we could not attain to any certainty concerning them: 
this indeed had been to show a difference between my 
way of certainty, which you call the way by ideas; and 
yours, which you call the way  by  reason;  in this part 
of certainty, that lies in the certainty of principles.  I 
have said in the words quoted by your lordship, that the 
consideration of those  two maxims, '' what is, is ; and 
it is  impossible for  the same thing to be,  and  not to 
be;"  are not of use  to add any thing to the evidence 
or certainty of  our knowledge of the truth of identical 
predications; but I never said those maxims were in the 
least uncertain :  I may perhaps think otherwise of their 
use than your lordship does, but I think no otherwise of 
their truth and certainty than you do ;  they are leFt in 
their full force and certainty for your  use, if you  can 
make any better use of them, than what I think can be 
made.  So that in  respect  of the allowed certainty of 
those principles, my way differs  not  at all  from  your 
lordship's. 
Pray, my lord, look over that chapter again, and see 
whether I bring their truth and certainty any more into 
question than you yourself  do; and it is about their 
certainty, and not use, that the question here is between 
your lordship and me: we both agree, that they are both 
undoubtedly certain ;  all then that you bring in the fol- 
lowing pages about their use, is nothing to the present 
question about the certainty of  principles, which  your 
lordship is upon in th~s  place :  and you will prove, tliat 
your way of  certainty by reason  is  different  from my 
way of certainty by ideas, when you can show, that you 
are certain of  the truth of those, or any other maxims, 
any otherwise than by the perception of  the agreement 
or disagreement of  ideas as expressed in them. 
But your lordship passing by that wholly, endeavours 
to prove, that my saying, that the consideration of those 
two general maxims  can  add nothing to the evidence 
and certainty of  lrnowledge  in identical predications, 
(for that is a11  that I there say) "  overthrows all that 
has  been  accounted  science  and  demonstration,  and 
must  lay the foundation of  scepticism;"  and it is  by 
a  very  remarkable  proof,  viz.  "  because  our  true 
grounds of  certainty depend  upon some general prin- 
ciples  of  reason :" which is the very thing 1 there not 
only deny,  but have  disproved ; and therefore sllould 
not, I huimbly conceive, have been rested on as a proof 
of  any thing else, till my arguments against it had been 
answered. 
But instead of that, your lordship says, you will put 
a case that shall make it plain;  which is the business 
of the six following pages, which are spent in this case. 
The case  is  founded  upon  a  supposition,  which 
you  seem willing to have thought that you  borrowed 
either from J. S. or from me : whereas truly that sup- 
position  is  neither  that  gentleman's  nor  mine,  but 
purely your lordship's  own.  For however grossly Mr. 
J. S. has mistaken (which  he has since  acknowledged 
in  print)  the  obvious  sense  of  those  words  of  my 
Essay*,  on which you say you ground your case ; yet 
I must do him right herein, that he himself supposed 
not that any man in his wits ever in earnest questioned 
whether  he himself were  a man or  no: though by  a 
mistake (which I cannot but wonder at, in one so much 
exercised in controversy  as Mr. J. S.)  he charged me 
with saying it. 
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Your lordship indeed says, "  that you think my words 
there may have another meaning."  Would you thereby 
insinuate, that you think it possible they should have that 
meaning which J. S. once gave them? If you do not, 
my lord,  Mr. J. S. and his  understanding them  so,  is 
in vain  brought in  here to countenance your making 
such a supposition.  If you do think those words of my 
Essay capable of  such a meaning as J. S. gave them, 
there  will  appear a  strange harmony  between  your 
lordship's  and Mr. J. S.'s understanding, when he mis- 
takes what is said in my book ;  whether it will continue, 
now Mr. J. S. takes me right, I know not :  but let us 
come to the case as you put it.  Your words are, 
" Let us put the case, that men did in earnest question 
whether they were men or not.  Your lordship says, you 
do not then see, if I set aside general maxims,  how I 
can convince them that they are men."  Answer.  And 
do you,  my lord,  see that with maxims you can con- 
vince them of that or any thing else? I confess, what- 
ever you should do, I should think it scarce worth while 
to  reason with them about any thing.  I believe you are 
the Arst that ever supposed a man so much beside him- 
sdf, as to question whether he were a man or no, and 
yet so rational as to be thought capable of  being con- 
vinced of that or any thing by discourse of reason.  This, 
methinks, is little different from supposing a man in and 
out of his wits at the same time. 
But let us suppose your lordship so lucky with your 
maxims,  that  you  do  convince  a  man  (that  doubts 
of  it)  that he is  a  man; what  proof,  I beseech  you, 
my  lord,  is  that of  this  proposition, "  that our true 
grounds of certainty depend upon some general prin- 
ciples of reason ?" 
On the contrary,  suppose it should  hzppen,  as is 
the more likely, that your setting upon him with your 
maxims cannot convince him; are we not by this your 
case to take this for a proof,  cc that general principles 
of reason are not the grounds of  certainty?"  For it is 
upon  the success  or  not success  of  your endeavours 
to convince  such a  man with maxims, that your lord- 
ship puts the proof of this proposition, "  that our true 
grounds of certainty depend upon general principles of 
reason ;"  the issue whereof must remain in suspense, till 
you have found such a man to bring it to trial :  and so 
the proof is far enough off, unless you think the case so 
plain, that every one sees such a man will be presently 
convinced  by  your maxims, though I should think it 
probable that most people may think he will not. 
Yoor  lordship  adds, "  for the way  you  look  on,  as 
most apt to prevail upon such extraordinary sceptical 
men, is by  general maxims and principles of  reason." 
Answer.  This indeed is a  reason why  your  lordship 
should  use  maxims,  when  you have to do with  such 
extraordinary sceptical  men;  because  you  look  on it 
as  the likeliest way to gr evail 
.  But pray, my lord, is 
your looking on it as t  e best way to prevail on such 
extraordinary sceptical men, any proof,  c6 that our true 
grounds of  certainty depend upon some general prin- 
ciples of  reason?"  for it was  to make this plain  that 
thi~  case was put. 
Farther, my lord, give me leave to ask, what we have 
kre  to do with the ways of convincing others of what 
they do not know or assent to  ?  Your lordship and I are 
not, as I think, disputing of the methuds of persuaditlg 
others of  what they are ignorant  of,  and do not y& 
assmt to ;  but our debate here is about the ground of 
certainty, in what they do know and assent to. 
However,  you  go on to set down several maxims, 
which you look on as most apt to prevail upon your 
extraordinary sceptical man,  to convince  him that he 
exists,  and that he is a man.  The maxims are, 
"  That nothing can have no operation. 
That all different sorts of  being are distinguished 
by  essential properties. 
66 That  the essential properties of a man, are to rea- 
son, discourse, kc. 
5c That these properties cannot subsist by themsel~, 
without a real substance." 
I will not question whether a man cannot know that 
he exists, or be certain (for it is of knowledge and cer- 
tainty the question here is) that he is a Inan without the 
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how you know that these are maxims? For methinks 
this, "that the essential properties of a man are to rea- 
son, discourse,"  &c. an imperfect proposition, "  and so 
forth" at the end of it, is a pretty sort of  maxim.  That 
therefore which  I desire to be  informed here is,  how 
your  lordship  knows  these,  or any other propositions 
to be maxims ;  and how propositions, that are maxims, 
are to be distinguished  from propositions that are not 
113axirns ?  and the reason why I insist upon it is this : 
because this, and this only, would show whether what 
I have said in my chapter about maxims, "  overthrows 
all that has been accounted science and demonstration, 
and lays the foundation of scepticism."  But I fear my 
request,  that you  would be  pleased  to tell me what 
you mean by maxims, that I may know what proposi- 
tions, according to your lordship, are, and what are not 
maxims;  will  not  be easily  granted me:  because  it 
would presently put an end to a11  that you  impute to 
me, as said in that chapter against maxims, in a sense 
that J use not the word there. 
Your lordship makes me, out of my book, answer to 
the use you make of  the four above-mentioned proposi- 
tions, which you call maxims,  as if I were  declared of 
an opinion  that maxims  could  not  be  of  any use  in 
arguing with others :  which methinks you should not 
have done, if you had considered my chapter of maxims, 
which you so often quote.  For I there say, "  maxims 
are useful to stop the mouths of wranglers-to  show, 
that wrong opinions lead to absurdities *,"  &c. 
Your lordship nevertheless goes on to prove, "  that 
without the help of  these principles or maxims, I can- 
not prove to any that doubt it, that they are men, in 
my way of ideas."  Answer.  I beseech you, my lord, to 
give me leave to mind you again, that the question is not 
what I can prove ;  but whether, in my way by ideas, I 
oannot without the help of  these principles know that 
I am a man;  and be certain of the truth of  that, and 
several other propositions : I say, of  several other pro- 
positions ;  for I do not think you,  in your way af cer- 
tainty by reason,  pretend  to be  certain  of  all  truths ; 
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or to be  able to prove  (to those who  doubt) all  pro- 
positions, or so  much as be able to convince every one 
of  every proposition,  that you yourself are certain of. 
There be many propositions ill Mr. Newton's  excellent 
book, which there are thousands of people, and those a 
little more rational than such as should deny themselves 
to be men,  whom  Mr. Newton  himself  would  not  be 
able, with or without the use of maxims used in mathe- 
matics, to convince of the truth of: and yet this would 
be no argument against his method of certainty, where- 
by he came to the knowledge that they are true.  What 
therefore you can conclude, as to my way of certainty, 
from a supposition of  my not being able, in my way by 
ideas, to convince those who doubt of it, that they are 
men, I do not see.  But your lordship is resolved  to 
prove that I cannot, and so you go on. 
Your lordship says,  that " I suppose that we must 
have a clear and distinct idea of that we are certain of ;" 
and this you prove out of my chapter of maxims, where 
I say,  'c  that every one knows the ideas that he has, and 
that distinctly  and  unconfusedly  one  from  another." 
Answ.  I suspected all along, that you mistook what I 
meant by'confused  ideas.  If your lordship pleases to 
turn to my chapter of distinct and confused ideas, you 
will there find, that an idea which is distinguished in the 
mind from all others, may yet be confused* : the con- 
fusion being made by a careless application of distinct 
names to ideas, that are not sufficiently distinct.  Which 
having explained at large, in that chapter, I shall not 
need here again to repeat.  Only permit me to set down 
an instance :  he that has the idea of the liquor that, cir- 
culating through the heart of a sheep, keeps that animal 
alive, and he that has the idea of the liquor that circu- 
lates through the heart of a lobster, has two different 
ideas;  as distinct  as an idea of  an  aqueous,  pellucid, 
cold liquor, is from the idea of a red, opake, hot liquor: 
but yet these two may be confounded,  by giving the 
name blood to this vital circulating liquor of a lobster. 
This being  considered, will  show  how what I have 
said there may consist with my saying, that to certainty 
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ideas are not required, that are in all  theis pnrts per- 
fectly clear and distinct :  because certainty being spoken 
there of the knowledge of  the truth of  any proposition, 
and propositions being made in words, it may be true, 
that notwithstanding all the ideas we have in our minds 
are, as far as we have them there, clear and distinct ;  yet 
those which we would suppose the terms in the proposi- 
tion to stand for, may not be clear and distinct :  either, 
1.  By making the term stand for an uncertain idea, 
which  we  have  not  yet precisely  determined  in  our 
minds, whereby it comes  to stand sometimes for  one 
idea, sometimes for another.  Which though, when we 
reflect on them, they are distihct in our minds,  yet by 
this use  of  a  name undetermined in  its signification, 
come to be confounded.  Or, 
2. By supposing the name  to stand for  something 
more than  really is in the idea in our minds, which we 
make it a sign of, v. g. let us suppose, that a man many 
years since, when he was young, eat a fruit, whose shape, 
size, consistency, and colour,  he has a perfect remem- 
brance of; but the particular taste he has forgot, and 
only remembers that it very much delighted him.  This 
complex idea, as far as it is in his mind,  it is evident, 
is there ;  and as far as he perceives it, when he reflects 
on  it, is in all parts clear  and distinct:  but when he 
calls it a pine-apple, and will suppose, that name stands 
for the same precise  complex idea, for which another 
man (who newly eat of  that fruit,  and has the idaa of 
the taste of  it also fresh in his mind)  uses it,  or for 
which he himself  used  it, when he had the taste fresh 
in his  memory;  it is  plain  his complex  idea in that 
part, which consists in the taste, is very obacure. 
To apply this to what your lordship here makes me 
suppose, I answer, 
1. I do not suppose, that to certainty it is requisite, 
that an idea should be in all its parts clear and distinct. 
I can be certain, that a pine-apple is not an artichoke, 
though my idea, which I suppose that name to  stand for, 
be in me obscure and confused, in regard of its taste. 
a.  I do not deny, but on the contrary I affirm, that 
I can have a clear and distinct idea of a man (i. e. the 
idea I give the name man to, may be clear and distinct) 
though it should be true, that men are not yet  agreed 
on the determined idea that the name man shall stand 
for.  Whatever confusion  there may be  in the idea, to 
which that name is indeterminately applied ;  I do allow 
and affirm, that every one,  if  he  pleases,  nlay have a 
clear and distinct idea of a man to himself,  i. e.  which 
he makes the word  man stand for:  which, if he makes 
known to others in his discourse with them about man, 
all verbal dispute will cease, and he cannot be mistaken 
when  he  uses  the term  man.  And  if  this were  but 
done with most of the  glittering  terms brandished in 
disputes, it would  often  be  seen  how  little some men 
have to say, who with equivocal  words and expressions 
make no small noise in controversy. 
Your lordship concludes this part by saying,  thus 
you have showed how inconsistent my way of  ideas is 
with  true  certainty,  and  of  what  use  and  necessity 
these  general principles  of  reason  are."  Answ.  By 
the laws of disputation, which in another place you ex- 
press such a regard to, one is bound  not to change the 
terms of the  question.  This I crave  leave humbly to 
offer to your lordship, because, as far as I have looked 
into controversy, I do not  remember to have met with 
any one so apt, shall I say, to forget or change the ques- 
tion as your lordship.  This,  my lord, I should not ven- 
ture to say, but upon very good grounds, which 1 shall 
be ready to give you an account of,  whenever you shall 
demand it of me.  One example of it we have here :  you 
say,  rr you  have  showed  how inconsistent  my way of 
ideas is with true certainty, and of what use and neces- 
sity these general principles of reason  are."  My lord. 
if you please to look back to the 10t5th page, you will 
see what  you  there  pron~ised  was  io show  the dif- 
ference of  my methorl  of  certainty  by  ideas,  and  the 
method  of  certainty  by  reason :"  and particularly in 
the pages between that and this, the certainty of prin- 
ciples,  which  you  say  is  one  of  those  two  things, 
wherein the way of  certainty by reason  lies.  Instead 
of  that, your  lordship  concludes here,  that  you  have 
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1. How inconsistent my way of  ideas is with true 
certainty."  Whereas  it should  be "  to show the in- 
consistency or  difference  of  my  method  of  certainty 
by  ideas,  and  the  method  of  eertainty by  reason 3" 
which are two very different propositions.  And before 
you undertake to  show,  that my method of  certainty 
is inconsistent with true certainty,  it will be necessary 
for you  to define,  and tell us wherein true certainty 
consists, which your lordship has  shown  no great for- 
wardness to do. 
2.  Another thing which  you  say you  have done is, 
'. that you have shown of what use and necessity these 
general principles of  reason  are."  Answ.  Whether by 
these general principles  you  mean  those propositions 
which you set down, page 108, and call there maxims, 
or any other propositions which you have not any where 
set down, I cannot tell.  But whatsoever they are, that 
you mean here by 'I  these,"  I know not how the useful- 
ness of these your general principles, be they what they 
will, came to be a question between your lordship and 
me here.  If you have a mind to show any mistakes of 
mine  in my chapter of  maxims, which,  you  say,  you 
think extraordinary for the design of it, I shall not be 
unwilling to be rectified;  but that the usefulness  of 
principles is not what is here under debate between us 
I, with submission,  affirm.  That which your lordship 
is  here  to prove  is,  that the certainty of  principles, 
which  is  the way  of  certainty by  reason,  is  different 
from my way of  certainty by ideas.  Upon the whole, I 
crave leave to say in your words,  that, 66 thus I hare," 
I humbly conceive, made  it appear, that you have not 
showed any difference, much less any inconsistency of my 
method  of  certainty by ideas,  and the  method  of  cer- 
tainty by reason," in that first part, which you assign of 
certainty by reason, via. certainty of principles. 
I come now to the second part, which you  assign of 
certainty by reason, viz. eertainty of deductions.  1 ally 
crave leave first to set down these words in the latter 
end of your discourse, which we have been consideriog, 
where your lordship  says, "  you  begin  to  think  J. S. 
was  in  the right, when he made me say,  That I had 
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discoursed with very  rational men  who  denied  them- 
selves to be men."  Answ.  I do not know what may be 
done by those who have such a command over the pro- 
nouns "  they" and "them:'  as to  put "  they themselves" 
for "they."  I shall therefore desire my reader to turn to 
that passage of my book, and see whether he too can be 
so lucky as  your lordship,  and  can with  you begin to 
think, that by these words, "  who have actually denied, 
that they,  i. e. infants  and  changelings,  are men;  I 
meant, who actually denied that they themselves were 
men *." 
Your lordship,  to prove  my method of certainty by 
ideas to be different from, and inconsistent with,  your 
second part of the certainty by reason,  which, you say, 
lies in the certainty of deductions,  begins thus : "  that 
you come now  to the certainty of  reason,  in making 
deductions ;  and  here you  shall briefly lay down the 
grounds of  certainty, which  the  ancient philosophers 
went  upon,  and then  compare my way of  ideas with 
them."  To which give me leave, my lord, to reply: 
(1.)  That I humbly conceive,  it should  have  been 
grtxunds of certainty [in  making deductions] which the 
ancient philosophers went  upon;  or else  they will be 
nothing to the proposition, which your lordship has un- 
dertaken here to prove.  Now of the certainty in making 
deductions, I see none of the ancients produced by your 
lordship,  who  say any thing to show,  wherein it con- 
sists, but Aristotle; who, as you say, "  in his method of 
inferring one thing from another, went upon this com- 
mon principle of  reason,  that what things  agree in a 
third, agree among themselves."  And it so falls out, that 
so far as he goes towards the showing wherein the  cer- 
tainty of deductions consists, he and I agree, as is evi- 
dent by what I say in my Essay j-.  And if Aristotle had 
gone any farther to show, how we are certain, that those 
two things agree with a  third, he would  have  placed 
that certainty in the perception of that agreement, as I 
have done,  and then  he and I should  have perlitetly 
agreed.  I presume to say, if Aristotle had gone farther 
in this matter, he would have placed our knowledgeor 
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certainty of the agreement of  any two things in the per- 
ception of their agreement.  And let not any one from 
hence think I attribute too  much to myself in saying, 
that  that acute and  judicious  philosopher, if he had gone 
farther in that matter, would have done as I have done. 
For if he omitted  it, I imagine  it was not that he did 
not see it, but that it wag  so obvious and evident, that 
it appeared superfluous to name it.  For who can doubt 
that the knowledge,  or  being  certain,  that any  two 
things agree, consists in the perception of  their agree- 
ment ?  What else can it possibly consist in ?  It  is so ob- 
vious, that it would  be a little extraordinary to think, 
that he that went so far could  miss  it.  And I should 
wonder, if any one should allow the certainty of deduc- 
tion to consist in the agreement of two things in a third, 
and yet should deny that the knowledge or certainty of 
that agreement consisted in the perception of it. 
(2.)  In the next place, my lord, supposing my method 
of certainty, in making deductions, were different from 
those of the ancients ; this, at best, would be only that 
which  I  call  argumenturn  ad  verecundiam";  which 
proves  not on which  side reason is,  though I, in mo- 
desty, should answer nothing to their authorities. 
(3.)  The ancients, as it seems by your lordship, not 
aereeing one among another about thc grounds of cer- 
tainty,  what can their authorities signify in the case ? 
or how will it appear, that I differ from reason, in dif- 
fering from  any of  them,  more  than that they  differ 
from reason, in differing one from another?  And there- 
fore, afher all the different  authorities produced by you 
out of your great measure of reading, the matter will at 
last reduce itself to this point, that your lordship should 
tell us wherein the certainty of reason, in making de- 
ductions, consists ;  and then show wherein my method 
of making deductions differs from it: which, whether 
you have done or no, we shall see in what follows. 
Your lordship closes yourvery learned, and to other 
purposes very  useful,  account  of  the  opinions  of  the 
ancients,  concerning  certainty,  with  these  words : 
"  that thus you have, in as few words as you could, laid 
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together  those old methods of  certainty, which  have 
obtained  greatest  reputation  in the world."  Where- 
upon I must crave  leave to mind  you  again, that the 
proposition  you are here upon, and hil~e  undertaken to 
prove  in this place,  is concerning the certainty of  de- 
ductions, and not concerning  certainty in  general.  I 
say ~iot  this, that 1 am willing to decline the examina- 
tion  of  my method  of  certainty in  general,  any way, 
or in  any place:  but I  say it to observe,  that  ill dis- 
courses  of  this  nature,  the laws  of  disputation  have 
wisely  ordered  the  proposition  under  debate  to  be 
kept to, and that in the same terms,  to avoid wander- 
ing, obscurity, and confusion. 
I therefore proceed  now to consider what use  your 
lordsl~ip  makes of the ancients, against my way of  cer- 
tainty in general;  since you think fit to make no use 
of  them,  as to the certainty of  reason in  making de- 
ductions : though it is under this your second  branch 
of certainty by reason, that you bring them in. 
Your first objection  here is that old  one again, that 
my  way of certainty by ideas is new.  Answer.  Your 
calling of it new does not prove it to be different from 
that of reason:  but your lordship proves it to be new. 
"  I. Because  here  [i.  e. in  my  way]  we  have  no 
general principles."  Answer.  I do, as your lordship 
knows,  own  the truth and  certainty of  the received 
general maxims ;  and I contend for the usefulness and 
necessity  of  self-evident  propositions  in  all certainty, 
whether of institution or demonstration.  What there- 
fore those general principles  are, which  you  have not 
in  my  way  of  certainty  by  ideas,  which  your  lord- 
ship has in your way of  certainty by reason, I beseech 
you  to tell me,  and  thereby  to  make  good  this  as- 
sertion against me. 
2. Your lordship says, "  that here [i. e.  in my way] 
we  have  no  antecedents  and  consequents,  no  syllo- 
gistical methods of demonstration."  Answer.  If your 
lordship here means, that there be no antecedents and 
consequents in my book,  or that I speak  not or allow 
not of  syllogism as a form of  argumentation, that has 
its use, I humbly conceive the contrary is plain.  But 
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if  by "  here we have no antecedents and consequents, 
no syllogistical methods of demonstration,"  you mean, 
that I do not  place  certainty in  having  antecedents 
and consequents, or in making of syllogisms, I grant I 
do not ; I have said  syllogisms, instead of your words, 
syllogistical  methods  of  demonstration ;  which  ex- 
amined, amount here to no more than syllogisms ; for 
syllogistical methods are nothing but mode and figure, 
i.  e.  syllogisms; and the rules  of  syllogisms  are the 
same,  whether  the syllogisms  be  used  in  demonstra- 
tion or in probability.  But it was  convenient for you 
to say, "  syllogistical  methods  of  demonstration,"  if 
you would  have it thought, that certainty is placed in 
it: for  to have  named  bare  syllogism,  without  an- 
nexing  demonstration  to it,  would  have  spoiled  all, 
since every one, who  knows what  syllogism is,  knows 
it may as well  be used  in topical  or  fallacious  argu- 
ments, as in demonstratioh. 
Your lordship charges me  then, that in my way of 
ideas  T  do not  place  certainty in  having  antecedents 
and consequents.  And pray,  my lord, do you in your 
way by reason  do so? If you  do,  this is certain,  that 
every body has,  or  may have  certainty in  every thing 
he discourses  about: for every  one,  in  any discourse 
he makes,  has, or may, if he pleases, have antecedents 
and consequents. 
Again, your lordship Charges me, that 1 do not place 
certainty in syllogism ;  I crave leave to ask again, and 
does your lordship? And is this the difference between 
your way of certainty by reason, and my way of certainty 
by ideas ?  Why else is it objected to me, that I do not, 
if your lordship does not place certainty in syllogism ? 
And if you do, 1 know nothing so requisite, as that you 
should advise all people, women and all, to betake them- 
selves immediately to the universities, and to the learn- 
ingof logic, to put themselves out of the dangerous state 
of  scepticism:  for there young lads,  by being taught 
syllogism, arrive at certainty ;  whereas, without mode 
and figure, the world  is ill perfect  ignorance and un- 
certainty, and is sure sfnothing.  The merchant cannot 
be certa'in that his account is right cast up, nor the lady 
that her  coach  is not a wheelbarrow,  nor her dairy- 
maid that one and one pound of butter are two pounds 
of  butter,  and two and two four; and all for want of 
mode and figure.:  nay, according to this rule, whoever 
lived before Aristotle, or him, whoever it was, that first 
introduced syllogism, could not be certain of any thing; 
no, not that there was a God, which will be the present 
state of  the far greatest part of  mankind (to pass by 
whole nations of the East, as China and Indostan, &c.) 
even in the Christian world, who  to this day have not 
the syllogistica1 methods of demonstration, and so can- 
not be certain of any thing. 
3. Your lordship farther says, that "  in  my way of 
certainty by ideas we have no criterion."  Answer.  To 
perceive the agreement or disagreement of  two ideas, 
and not to perceive the agreement or disagreement of 
two ideas, is, I think, a criterion  to distinguish what a 
man is certain of, from what he is not certain of.  Has 
your lordship any other or better criterion to distinguish 
certainty from uncertainty? If you have, I repeat again 
my earnest request,  that you would  be pleased to do 
that right to your way of certainty by reason, as not to 
conceal it.  If your lordship has not, why is the want of 
a criterion, when I have so plain a one, objected to my 
way of certainty, and my way so often accused of a tend- 
ency  to scepticism  and infidelity, when you yourself 
have not a better? And I think I may take the liberty 
to say, if yours be not the same, you have not so good. 
Perhaps  your  lordship  will  censure  me  here,  and 
think it is more than becomes me, to press you so hart1 
concerning your own way ; and to ask, whether your 
way of certainty lies in having antecedents and conse- 
quents, and syllogisms ; and whether it has  any other 
or better criterion than what I have given:  your lord- 
ship  will  possibly  think  it enough,  that "  you  have 
laid down the grounds of certainty which the ancient 
Grecians went upon."  My lord, if you think so, I must 
be satisfied with it: though perhaps others will think it 
strange, that in a dispute about a method of certainty, 
which,  for its supposed coming short of certainty, you 
charge with a tenhcy  to scepticism and infidelity, you 
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sho111d produce only the different opinions of other men 
concerning certainty, to make good this charge, with- 
out declaring any of those different opinions or grounds 
of certainty to be true or false:  and some may be apt 
to  suspect that you yourself are not yet resolvecl wherein 
to place it. 
But, my lord,  I  know too well  what your  distance 
above me requires of me, to say any such thing to your 
lordship.  Your own opinions are to yourself, and your 
not discovering them must pass for a  sufficient reason 
for your not d~scovering  them: and if  you think fit to 
overlay  a  poor  infant  modern  notion with  the great 
and  weighty  names  of  Yythagoras,  Plato,  Aristotle, 
Plutarch,  and the like; and heaps of  quotations  out 
of the ancients ; who is not presently to think it dead, 
and that there is an end of it? Especially when it will 
have too much envy for any one to open his mouth in 
defence of a notion, which is declared by your lordship 
to be different frorn what those great men said, whose 
words are to be taken without any more ado, and who 
are not  to be  thought ignorant or  mistaken  in  any 
thing.  Though I crave leave to say, that however in- 
fallible oracles they were,  to take things barely upon 
their, or any man's  authority, is barely to believe, but 
not to know or be certain. 
Thus your lordship has sufficiently proved my way 
of  certainty by  ideas to be  inconsistent with the way 
of certainty by reason, by proving  it new ; which you 
prove only by saying, that ''  it is  so wholly new,  that 
here we  have no general  principles ; no criterion ; no 
antecedents and consequents ;  no syllogistical methods 
of demonstration : and yet we are told of a better way 
of  certainty to be attained merely by the help of ideas ;" 
add, if your lordship pleases, signified by words: which 
put into propositions,  whereof some are general prin- 
ciples, some are or may be antecedents, and some cow 
sequents, and some put together in i~iodc  and figure, 
syllogistical methods of demonstration.  For pray, my 
lord, may not words,  that stand  for ideas, be put into 
propositions, as well as any other ?  And may not those 
propositions, wherein  the terms stand for ideas,  be a3 
well  put into antecedents and consequents,  or syllo- 
gisms, and make maxims, as well as any other proposi- 
tions, whose terms stand not for ideas, if your lordship 
can find  any such? And if  thus ideas can be brought 
into maxims,  antecedents and consequents,  and syllo- 
gistical methods of  demonstration, what inconsistency 
has  the way of  certainty by ideas, with those ways of 
certainty by reason, if at  last your lordship will say, that 
certainty coilsists in propositions put together as ante- 
cedents and consequents, and in mode and figure ?  For 
as for principles or maxims, we shall know whether your 
principles  and maxims are a  way  to certainty,  when 
you shall please to tell us what it is, that to your lord- 
ship makes a maxim or principle,  and distinguishes it 
from other propositions ; and whether it be any thing 
but an immediate perception of  the agreement or dis- 
agreement of the ideas, as expressed in that proposition. 
To  conclude, by all that your lordship has alleged out 
of the ancients, you have  not,  as I humbly conceive, 
proved that my  way of  certainty is new, or that they 
had any way of  certainty different from  mine:  much 
less have you proved that my way of certainty by ideas 
is  inconsistent  with  the way  of  certainty  by  reason, 
which was the proposition to be proved. 
Your lordship having thought it enough against my 
way of certainty by ideas, thus to prove its newness, 
you betake yourself  presently to your old topic of ob- 
. scure and confused  ideas;  and ask, "  but how comes 
there to be such a way of  certainty by ideas,  and yet 
the ideas themselves  are so uncertain  and obscure?" 
Answer.  No idea, as it is in the mind,  is uncertain ; 
though to those who use names uncertainly it may be 
uncertain what idea that name stands for.  Arld  as to 
obscure and confused ideas, no idea is so obscure in ail 
its parts, or so confounded with all other ideas, but that 
one, who, in a proposition, joins it  with another in that 
part which is clear and distinct, may perceive its agree- 
ment or disagreement, as expressed in that propositiou : 
though wher names are  used for ideas, which are in some 
part obscure or confounded with other ideas, there can 
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concerning that, wherein  the idea is obscure and con- 
fused.  And therefore to your lordship's question, cc how 
is it possible  for us to have  a clear perception of  the 
agrcement  of  ideas,  if  the ideas  themselves  be  not 
clear and distinct  ?"  I answer, very well ; because  an 
obscure or confused idea, i. e.  that is not perfectly clear 
and distinct in all i13 parts, may be compared with an- 
other in  that part of  it which  is  clear  and  distinct: 
which will,  I humbly  conceive,  remove all those  dif- 
ficulties,  inconsistencies,  and  contradictions,  which 
your  lordship  seems  to be  troubled  with,  from  my 
words quoted in those pages. 
Your lordship having,  as it seems, quite forgot that 
you were to show wherein the certainty of deductions, 
in the way of ideas, was inconsistent with the certainty 
of deductions, in the way of reason, brings here a new 
charge upon my way of certainty, viz. "  that I have no 
criterion to distinguish false  and doubtful ideas from 
true and certain."  Your lordship says, the academics 
went upon ideas,  or representations of  things to their 
minds ; and pray, my lord, does not your lordship do so 
too ?  Or has Mr. J. S. so won upon your lordship, by his 
solid philosophy  against the fancies of  the ideists, that 
you begin to think him in the right in this too ;  where 
he says, " that notions are the materials of  our know- 
ledge ; and that a notion is the very thing itself exist- 
ing in the understanding*?"  For since I make no doubt 
but that, in all  your  lordship's  knowledge,  you  will 
allow that you  have some immediate objects  of  your 
thoughts, which  are the materials of  that knowledge, 
about which  it is employed,  those  immediate objects, 
if they are not, as Mr. J. S. says, the very things them- 
selves, must be ideas.  Not thinking your lordship there- 
fore yet so perfect a convert of Mr. J. S.'s,  that you are 
persuaded, that as often as you think of your cathedral 
church,  or of  Des Cartes's  vortices,  that the very ca- 
thedral church  at Worcester,  or the motion  of  those 
vortices, itself exists in your understanding ;  when one 
of  them never existed but in that one place  at Wor- 
cester, and the other never existed any where in rerum 
* Solid Philosophy, p. 24, and 27. 
natut.a.  I  conclude,  your  lordship  has  immediate 
objects  of  yaur  mind, which are not the very things 
themselves existing  in your  understanding ; which if, 
with the academics, you will please to call representa- 
tions, as I suppose you will, rather than with me ideas, 
it will make no difference. 
This being so, I must then make the same objection 
against your way of  certainty by reason, that your lord- 
ship does against my way of certainty by ideas (for upon 
the comparison  of  these  two we  now are) and then I 
return your words here  again, viz.  "that you have  no 
criterion to distinguish  false and doubtful representa- 
tions  fram true and certain;  how then can any man 
Be  secure, that he  is not imposed  upon  in your lord- 
ship's  way of representations ?" 
Your lordship says, "  I tell you of a way of certainty 
by ideas, and never offer any such method for examin- 
ing them,  as  the  academics  required  for  their  pro- 
bability."  Answ.  I  was  not,  I  confess,  so  well  ac- 
quainted with what  the academics went upon for  the 
criterion of  a  greater probability as your lordship is ; 
or if I had, I writing, as your  lordship  knows,  out of 
my own thoughts, could not well transcribe out of them. 
But that you should tell me, I never offer any criterion 
to distinguish false from true ideas, I cannot but won- 
der; and therefore crave leave to beg your lordship to 
look again into b. ii. c. 32. of  my Essay ; and there, I 
persuade myself, you will find a criterion, whereby true 
and false ideas may be distinguished. 
Your lordship brings for instance the  idea of solidity; 
but what  it is an instance of, I confess T do not see : 
" Your lordship charges on my way of certainty, that 
I have no criterion to distinguish  false  and doubtful 
ideas from  true  and  certain;  which  is  followed  by 
an account  you  give,  how  the academics examined 
their  ideas  or  representations,  before  they  allowed 
them to prevail  on  them  to give an assent,  as  to a 
greater  probability."  And  then  you  tell  me,  that 
" I never offer  any such method  for examining them, 
as the academics  required  for  their  probability:"  to 
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instance, my  first  idea, wllich I go upon, of  solidity.'' 
Would not one now expect, that this should be an in- 
stance to make good your lordship's charge, that I have 
no criterion to distinguish whether my idea of solidity 
wcrc false and doubtful, or true and certain? 
'1'0 show that I have no such criterion, your lordship 
asks me two questio~ls  : the first is, '(  how my idea of 
solidity  comes  to be  clear and distinct?" I will  sup- 
pose for once, that I know not how it comes to be clear 
and distinct: how will this prove,  that I have no crite- 
rion to know whether it be true or false? For the ques- 
tion here is not about knowing how an idea comes to be 
clear and distinct ;  but how I shall know whether it  be 
true or false.  But  your lordship's following words seem 
to aim at a farther objection ;  your words all together 
are,  "how this idea"  [i.  e.  my idea  of solidity, which 
consists in repletion  of space, with  an exclusion of all 
other solid substances] "  comes to be clear and distinct 
to me, when  others, who go on  in the same way of 
ideas,  have  quite  another  idea  of  it?"  My  lord,  I 
desire your lordship to name who those "  others"  are, 
who go in  the same way of ideas with  me,  who have 
quite another idea of this my idea than I have ; for to 
this idea I could be sure that "  it,"  in any other writer 
but your lordship, must here refer : but, my lord, it is 
one of your privileged particles, and 1 have nothing to 
say to it.  But let it be so, that others have quite an- 
other idea  of  it than I; how does  that prove,  that I 
have no criterion to distinguish whether my  idea of so- 
lidity be true or no ? 
Your lordship farther adds, "  that those others think 
that they have as plain  and distinct an idea, that ex- 
tension  and body are the same :" and then your lord- 
ship asks, "  now what criterion  is  there to come to a 
certainty in this matter ?"  Answ. In  what matter, 1 be- 
seech your lordship  ?  If it be whether my idea of soli- 
dity be a true idea, which is the matter here in question, 
in  this matter I have given a  criterion to know, in my 
Essay*:  if  it be  to decide the question, whether the 
word  "body"  more  properly  stands for  the simple 
* B.  ii. c.  32. 
idea  of  space, or for  the complex  idea  of  space  and 
solidity  together,  that is  not  the question  here;  nor 
can there  be  any other criterion  to decide  it by, but 
the propriety of our language. 
But your lordship adds, "  ideas can have no way of 
certainty in themselves,  if  it be possible for even phi- 
losophical  and  rational  men  to  fall  into  such con- 
trary ideas about the same thing ;  and both sides think 
their ideas to be clear  and  distinct."  If this were so, 
I do not see how this would any way prove, that I had 
no criterion  whereby  it might  be  discerned whether 
my ideas of solidity were true or no ;  which was to be 
proved. 
But at last, this which your lordship calls "contrary 
ideas about the same thing,"  is nothing but  a  differ- 
ence about a name.  For I think nobody will say, that 
the idea of extension  and the idea of solidity are the 
same ideas :  all the difference then between those philo- 
sophical and rational men, which  your  lordship men- 
tions here, is no more but this, whether the simple idea 
of pure extension shall be called body, or whether the 
complex ideas of extension and solidity joined together 
shall be called body; which will be no more than a bare 
verbal dispute to any one, who does not take sounds for 
things, and make the word body something more than 
a sign of what the speaker would  signify by it.  But 
what the speaker makes the term body stand for, cannot 
.  be precisely known till he has determined it in his own 
mind, and made it known to another; and then there 
can between them be no longer a dispute about the sig- 
nification  of the word :  u. g. if  one  of  those  philoso- 
phical  rational men tells your lordship, that he makes 
the term body to stand precisely for the simple idea of 
pure extension, your lordship or he can be in no doubt 
or uncertainty concerning this thing ;  but whenever he 
uses the word body, your lordship must suppose in his 
mind the siinple idea af extension, as the thing he means 
by body.  If, on the other side, another of those philo- 
sophical rational men shall tell your lordship, that he 
makes the term body to stand precisely for a complex 
idea inaile up of  the simple ideas of extension and so- 
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doubt or uncertainty concerning this thing :  but when- 
ever he uses the word  body, your  lordship must think 
on, and allow the idea belong~ng  to it, to be that com- 
plex one. 
As your lordship can allow this different use  of the 
term body in these different men, without changing any 
idea, or any thing in your  own  mind, but the applica- 
tion of the same term to different ideas, which changes 
neither the truth nor certainty of any of  your lordship's 
ideas, from what it was before: so those two philosophi- 
cal rational men  may, in  discourse  one with another, 
agree to use  that term  body  for  either  of  those  two 
ideas, which  they please, without  at all  making  their 
ideas, on  either  side, false  or  uncertain.  But if they 
will contest which of these ideas the sound body ought 
to stand for, it is visible their difference is not about any 
reality of things, but the propriety of speech; and their 
dispute and doubt is  only about the signification  of a 
word. 
Your lordship's  second question is, "  whether by this 
idea  of  solidity we  may come  to know  what  it  is." 
Answ. I must  ask you  here  again, what you mean by 
it ?  If your lordship by it means  solidity,  then  your 
question runs thus :  whether by this  [i. e. my] "  idea of 
solidity,  we  may  come to know  what  solidity  i8?" 
Answ.  Without doubt, if your  lordship  means by the 
term solidity what I mean by the term solidity; for then 
I have told you what  it is, in the  chapter above-cited 
by your lordship* : if you mean any thing else by the 
term solidity, when  your  lordship will  please  to tell 
me what you mean by it, I will tell your lordship what 
solidity  is.  This,  I humbly  conceive,  you  will  find 
yourself obliged to do,  if what I have  sald  of solidity 
does not satisfy you what it is.  For you will not think 
it reasouable I should  tell your lordship what a thing 
is when  expressed  by you  in  a  term, which I do not 
know  what  your  lordship  means  by,  nor  what  you 
make it stand for. 
But your lordship asks, "  wherein it consists;"  if you 
mean wherein the idea of it consists, that I have already 
told your lordship, in the chapter of my Essay above- 
* Eas~,  B,  ii. c.  4. 
mentioned.  Ifyour lordship  means what  is  the real 
internal constitution, that physically makes solidity in 
things ;  if I answer I do not  know, that will  no more 
make my idea of  solidity not  to be  true or certain (if 
your lordship thinks certainty may be attributed to single 
ideas) than the not knowing the physical constitution, 
whereby the parts of bodies are so framed as to  cohere, 
makes my idea of cohesion not true or certain. 
To my sayihg in my Essay *, "  that if any one asks 
me what this solidity is, I send him to his senses to in- 
form  him;"  your  lordship  replies, "  you  thought the 
design ofmy book would have sent him to his ideas for 
certainty : and are we,  says  your  lordship, sent back 
again from our  ideas  to our senses ?"  Answ. I cannot 
help  it,  if  your  lordship  mistakes  the design  of  my 
book :  for what concerns certainty, i. e. the knowledge 
of the truth of propositions, my book  sends every one 
to his  ideas ;  but  for  the getting  of  simple ideas of 
sensation, my book sends him only to his  senses.  But 
your lordship  uses  certainty here  in  a  sense I never 
used  it,  nor  do  understand  it in ; for what the cer- 
tainty of any simple  idea is, I confess I do  not know, 
and shall be glad if you would tell me what you mean 
by it. 
However, in this sense you ask me, and that as if your 
question carried a demonstration  of  my contradicting 
myself: "  and are we  sent back  again, from our ideas 
to our  senses ?"  Answ.  My lord,  every one is sent to 
his senses to get the simple ideas of sensation, because 
they are no  other way to be got. 
YOUP  lordship presses on with this  farther question, 
"  what do these ideas  signify then?" i.  e. if a  man be 
sent to his senses for the idea of solidity.  I answer, to 
show  him  the certainty  of  propositions,  wherein  the 
agreement or disagreement of ideas is perceived ;  which 
is the certainty I speak of,  and no other: but what the 
certainty is which your  lordship  speaks of in this and 
the following page, I confess I do not understand.  For 
Your lordship adds, that I say farther, "  that if this 
be  not  a  sufficient  explication of  solidity, I  promise 
to tell  any  one  what  it is,  when  he  tells  me  what 
* n.  ii. c. 4.  § 6. 3(3G  Mr. Locke's  second Rep& 
thinking  is;  or explains  to  me,  what  extension  and 
motion  are."  "  Are we  not  now in  the true way  to 
certainty, when such things  as  these  are given over, 
of which  we  have  the clearest  evidence  by  sensation 
and reflection  ?  For  here I  make  it as  impossible  to 
come  to  certain, clear,  and  distinct  notions  of  these 
things, as to discourse  into a  blind  man  the ideas  of 
light and colours.  Is not this a rare way of certainty?" 
Answ.  What things, my lord, I beseech you, are those 
which  you  here  tell  me  are given  over,  of  which  we 
have the clearest cvidence  by  sensation  or reflection ? 
It  is likely you will tell me, they are extension and mo- 
tion.  But,  my lord, I  crave  the liberty to say,  that 
when you have considered again, you will be satisfied, 
there are no things given over in the case, but only the 
names extension and motion ; and concerning them too, 
nothing is  given  over, but a  power  of defining them. 
TVhen you will be pleased to lay by  a little the warmth 
of those questions of triumph, which I meet with in this 
passage, and tell me what  things your lordship makes 
these names  extension  and  motion  to stand for; you 
perhaps will not find, that I make it impossible for those, 
who have their senses, to get the simple ideas, signified 
by these names, very clear and distinct by their senses : 
though I do say, that these, as well as all other names 
of simple ideas, cannot be defined; nor any simple ideas 
be brought into our minds by words, any more than the 
ideas of light and colours can be discoursed in to a blind 
man :  which is all I do say in those words of mine, which 
your lordship quotes, as such wherein I have given over 
things, whereof we  have the  clearest  evidence.  And 
so from my being of opinion, that the names of  simple 
ideas cannot be defined, nor thoseideas got by any words 
whatsoever, which is all that I there say ;  your lordship 
very pathetically expresses yourself, as if in my way all 
were gone, certainty were lost; and if my method should 
be allowed,  there is an  end of  all  knowledge  in  the 
world. 
The reason your  lordship  gives  against my way of 
certainty  is, "  that I  here  make  it  as  impossible  to 
come  to  certain,  clear, and  distinct  notions  of  these 
things,  [i.  e.  extension  and  motion!  as  to  discourse 
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into  a  blind  man  the  idea  of  light  and  colours." 
Answ.  What olear and distinct notions or ideas are, I 
do  understand:  but what  your  lordship  means  by 
certain  notions,  speaking here,  as  you  do,  of  simple 
ideas, I must own I do not  understand.  That for the 
attaining those simple ideas I send men to their senses, 
I shall think I am in  the right, till I hear from  your 
lordship  better  arguments  to convince me of my mis- 
take than these: "Are we not  now in the true way to 
certainty?  Is  not  this  a  rare  way  of  certainty  ?" 
And if your lordship has a better way to get clear and 
distinct simple ideas than by the senses, you will oblige 
me,  and  I  think  the world  too,  by a  discovery of  it. 
Till then, I shall continue in the same mind 1 was of, 
when  I  writ  that passage,  viz.  That words  can  do 
nothing towards  it*,  and that for the reason which I 
there promised,  and i.  to be found,  Essay, b.  iii. c.  6. 
$7,  &c.  And therefore to your lordship's sayiug, "that 
thus you have showed, that I have  no security against 
false and uncertain  ideas,  no  criterion to judge them 
by;"  I think I may securely reply, that with submission 
thus showivg it, is not showing at  all ;  nor will ever show, 
that J have no such criterion, even when we shall add 
your lordship's  farther inference,  now here again our 
idens ,deceive us."  Which supposing it a good infereuce 
from these words of  mine,  ci  that most  of  our simple 
ideas are not the likenesses of things without us;"  yet 
if wems to me to come in  here a little,  owt  of  season. 
because the proposition to be  proved  is,  as I humbly 
conceive, not that our ideas deceive us, but that  '<  I have 
not, a criterion to distinguish true from false ideas." 
If it be  brought to prove that I have ,no criterian, I 
hqve this to say, that I neither well understand whi~tiit 
is f~r  our ideas to deceive us in the way of certainty.; 
*or9  in the best sense that I can give it, do I see haw it 
pxayeg that I have no criterion ; nor, lastly, how lt tol- 
I~wq  from my saying that most of our simple ideas are 
not resemblances. 
, YO,I.IL  lordship seems by the following words to mean, 
that iv this way by  ideas which are confessed not t~ be 
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resemblances,  men  are hindered, and cannot go far in 
the knowledge of what they desire to know of the nature 
of  those  ob~ects,  of  which  we  have  the ideas  in  our 
minds.  If this  should  be  so,  what is  this, I beseech 
your lordship, to your showing that I have no criterion ? 
but that this is a fault in the way by ideas, I shall be 
convinced, when your lordship shall be pleased to show 
me,  how  in  your  way  of  certainty by reason we can 
know more of the nature of things without us, or of that 
which causes these  ideas or perceptions in us.  But, I 
humbly conceive, it is no objection tw  the way of ideas, 
if any one will deceive himself, and expect certainty by 
ideas, in things where certainty is not to be had ;  because 
he is told how knowledge or certainty is got by ideas, 
as far as men attain to it.  And since your lordship is 
here comparing the ways of certainty by ideas and  by 
reason, as two different and inconsistent ways, I humbly 
crave leave to add, that when you can show me any one 
proposition, which you have attained to a certainty of, 
in your way of certainty by reason, which I cannot at- 
tain to  & certainty of in my way of  certainty by ideas ;  1 
will acknowledge my Essay to be guilty of wllatever your 
lordship pleases. 
Your  lordship  concludes,  "so  that these  ideas are 
really  nothing  but names,  if  they be  not  reyresentn- 
tions."  Answ.  This does  not  yet show,  that  I have 
no  criterion  to distinguish true from false ideas;  the 
thing that your  lordship is thus showing.  For I may 
have  a  criterion to distinguish  true from  false  ideas, 
though that criterion concern  not names  at all.  For 
your  lordship, in this proposition,  allowing none to be 
ideas, but what  are representations ; the other, which 
you say are nothing  but names,  are not concerned in 
the criterion, that is to distinguish true fromfalse ideas : 
because  it relates to nothing but ideas, and the distin- 
guishing  of  them  one frclm  another; unless  true and 
false ideas can be any thing but ideas, i.  e.  ideas and not 
ideas at the same time. 
But farther, I crave leave to answer, that your lord- 
ship's  proposition, viz. "  thd  these ideas are really no- 
thing but  names,  if  they  be not  the  representations 
of  things,"  seems  to  me  no  consequence  from  my 
words, to which it is subjoined, though it is introduced 
with  "so  that :" for,  methinks,  it carries  something 
like a contradiction in it.  I say, "  most of  our  simple 
ideas of  sensation  are not  the likeness  of  something 
without  us :" your lordship infers,  "if  so,  these ideas 
are really nothing but names;" which,  as it seems to 
me, is as much as to say, these ideas, that Are  ideas, are 
not ideas,  but names only.  Methinlrs they might be 
allowed to be ideas, and that is all they pretend to be, 
though they do not resemble that which produces them. 
I cannot help thinking a son something really more than 
a bare name, though he has not the luck to resemble his 
father, who begot him:  and the black and blue which 
I see I cannot conclude but to be something besides the 
words black  and blue  (wherever  your lordship  shall 
place that something, either in my perception only, or 
in my skin) though it resemble not at all the stone, that 
with a knock produced it. 
Should your lordship  put your  two hands, whereof 
one is hot and the other cold, into lukewarm water; it 
would be hard to think that the idea of heat produced 
in you by one of your hands, and the idea of cold by the 
other,  were  the  likenesses  and very  resemblances of 
something in the same water, since the same water could 
not be capable of having at  the same time such real con- 
trarieties.  Wherefore since, as it is evident, they can- 
not  be  representations  of  any thing  in  the water, it 
follows  by  your lordship's  doctrine here,  that if you 
should declare what you feel, viz. that you feel heat and 
cold  in that water, viz. heat by one  hand, and cold by 
the other; you  mean  nothing by heat  and cold : heat 
and cold in the case are nothing but names ;  and your 
lordship, in  truth, feels nothing but these two names. 
Your lordship, in the next place, proceeds to examine 
my way  of  demonstration.  Whether  you  do  this  to 
show that I have  no  criterion, whereby to distinguisll 
true from false  ideas; or  to show,  "that  my  way  of 
certainty by ideas is inconsistent with the certainty of 
deductions  by  reason;"  (for  these  were  the  things 
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therefore to be upon in this place) does not appear ;  but 
this appears by the words wherewith you introduce this 
examen, that it is to avoid doiilg me wrong. 
Your lordship, as if you had been sensible that your 
former discourse hsd led you towards doing me wrong, 
breaks it off of a sudden,  and begins  this new one of 
demonstration,  by  telling  me,  "you  will  do  me  no 
wrong."  Can  it  be  thought  now,  that  you  forget 
this promise, before you get half through your examen ? 
or is  a misciting  my words,  and misrepresenting  my 
sense, no wrong ?  Your lordship, in this very examen, 
sets down a long quotation out of my Essay, and in the 
close you tell me :  "these are my own words which your 
lordship  hae  set  down  at large,  that I may not com- 
plain  that  you  misrepresent  my  sense:"  this  one 
would think guaranty enough in a less man than your 
lordship :  and yet, my lord, I must crave leave to com- 
plain, that not only my sense, but my very words, are 
in that quotation misrepresented. 
To show that my complaint is  not groundless, give 
me  leave,  my lord,  to set down my words, as I read 
them  in  that place  of  my  book  which  yoiir  lordship 
quotes for them *,  and as I find them here in your second 
letter. 
'  If we add all the self-evident pro- 
positions  may  be  made  about  all 
our  distinct  ideas,  principles  will 
be  almost  infinite, at least innume- 
rable,  which  men  arrive  to  the 
knowledge of at different ages ;  arid 
a great many of these innate princi- 
ples  they  never  come  to know all 
their lives.  Cut  whether they come 
in view of the mind earlier or later, 
this  is  true of  them, that they are 
a11  known by their native evidence, 
are wholly independent, receive  no 
light, nor are capable of any proof, 
one from another,'  &c. 
* Essay, b. iv. c.  7. $  10. 
That  it is true 
of  our  particu- 
lar distinct ideas, 
that  they  are 
all  known  by 
their  native  evi- 
dence, are wliol- 
ly  independent, 
receive  no  light, 
nor  are capable 
of  any  proof, 
one  from  an- 
other,'  kc. 
By their standing thus together, the reader will with- 
out any pains  see whether those your lordship has set 
down in your letter are my own words;  and whether in 
that place,  which  speaks only of  self-evident proposi- 
tions or principles, I have any thing in words or in sense 
like this, "that our particular distinct ideas are known 
by  their  native evidence,"  &c.  Though your  lord- 
ship closes the quotation with  that soleinn declaration 
above-mentioned,  'c  that they are my  own words, which 
you have  set down at large, that I may not complain 
you  misrepresent  my  sense."  And  yet  nothing  can 
more misrepresent my sense than they do, applying all 
that to particular  ideas,  which I speak there only of 
self-evident  propositions  or  principles ; and  that  so 
plainly, that I think I may venture any one's  mistaking 
it in my own words : and  upon this misrepresentation 
of my sense your lordship raises  a  discourse,  and ma- 
nages a dispute  for, J  think, a  dozen  pages following, 
against my placing demonstration on self-evident ideas ; 
though self-evident ideas are  things wholly unknown to 
me; and  are nowhere  in my  book,  nor  were  in  my 
thoughts. 
But let us come to your exceptions against my way 
of demonstration, which your lordship is pleased to call 
demonstration without principles.  Answ.  If you mean 
by principles  self-evident  propositions,  thkn you know 
my  demonstration is  not  without principles,  in 'that 
sense of  the term principles :  for your lordship in the 
next page blames my way, because I suppose every in- 
termediate idea in demonstration to have a self-evident 
connexion with  the other idea; for two such ideas as 
have a self-evident connexion,joined together in a pro- 
position,make a self-evident proposition.  If  your lordship 
means by principles those which in the  place there quoted 
by  your lordship I mean, viz. "  whatever is, is ;  and it is 
impossible for the  same thing to be, and not to be * ;" 
and such other general propositions,  as are re2eived 
under the name of maxims ;  I grant, that I do say, that 
they are not absolutely requisite in every demonstration; 
and I think I have shown, that there be demonstrations 
* Essay, b. iv. c. 2. f 8. 
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which may be  made without  them: though I do not, 
that  I remember, say, that they are excluded, and cannot 
be made use of in demonstration. 
Your  lordship's  first  argument  against  my way of 
demonstration is,  Ir that it must  suppose self-evidence 
must be in the ideas of  my mind;  and that  every in- 
termediate  idea,  which  I take  to  demonstrate  any 
thing by,  must have  a self-evident connexion with the 
others."  Answ.  Taking self-evidence  in the ideas of 
the mind to mean  in  the perceived  agreement or dis- 
agreement of ideas in the mind ; I grant, I do not only 
suppose, but say so. 
To prove it not to be so in demonstration, your lord- 
ship says, '(  that it is such a way of  demonstration as 
the old  philosophers never  thought  of."  Answ.  No- 
body, I think, will question, that your lordship is very 
well read in thc old philosophers : lout he that will an- 
swer for what the old philosophers ever did, or did not 
think of, must not only understand their extant writiogs 
better than any man ever did ; but must have ways to 
know their thoughts, that other men have not.  For all 
of them thought  more than they writ; some of them 
writ not at all, and others writ a great deal more than 
ever came to us.  But if it should happen, that any of 
them placed the proof of any proposition in the agree- 
ment of two things in a third, as I think some of them 
did; then it will, I humbly conceive, appear, that they 
did think of  my demonstration ; unless  your lordship 
can show, that they could see that two things agreed in 
a third, without  perceiving  their agreement with that 
third: and if they did in every syllogism of a demon- 
stration  perceive that agreement, then there was a self- 
evident connexion ;  which  is that which your lordship 
says they never thought of. 
But supposing they never thought of it, must we put 
out oureyes, and not see whatever they overlooked? Are 
all the discoveries made by Galileo, my lord Bacon, Mr. 
Boyle,  and Mr. Newton,  &c. to be  rejected  as false, 
because they teach us what the old philosophers never 
thought of? Mistake me not, my lord, in thinking that 
I have the vanity here to rank myself, on this occasion, 
with these great discoverers of truth, and advancers of 
knowledge.  On the contrary, I contend, that my way 
of certainty, my way of demonstration, which your lord- 
ship so often condemns for its newness, is not new ;  but 
is the very same that has always been used, both by an- 
cients and moderns.  I am only considering here your 
lordship's  argument,  of  never having been thought of 
by the old philosophers; which is an argument that will 
make nothing for or against the truth of any proposition 
advanced  by a  modern writer,  till  your lordship  has 
proved, that those old philosophers (let the happy age 
of  old  philosophers  determine  where  your  lordship 
pleases)  did discover all truth, or that they had the sole 
privilege to search  after it, and besides  them nobody 
was to study nature, nobody was to think or reason for 
himself;  but every one was to be barely a reading phi- 
losopher, with an implicit faith. 
Your objection  in  the next words,  that then  every 
demonstration carries its own  light with it, shows that 
your way by reason is what I do not understand.  For 
this I thought heretofore was the property of demon- 
stration, and not a   roof that it was not a demonstra- 
tion, that it carried its own light with it: but yet thoogh 
in every demonstration there is a self-evident connexion 
of the ideas, by which it is made;  yet that it does not 
follow from thence,  as your lordship here objects, that 
then every demonstration would be as clear and unques- 
tionable as that two and two make four, your lordship 
may see in the same chapter, and the reason of it ". 
You seem in the following words to  allow, that there 
is such a connexion of the intermediate ideas in mathe- 
matical demonstration ; but say, "  you should be glad 
to see any demonstration (not about figures and num- 
bers) of  this kind."  And  if  that be a good argument 
against it,  I  crave  leave  to use  it too on my  side; 
and to say,  c6 that I would  be  glad to see any demon- 
stration  (not  about figures and numbers)  not of  this 
kind;"  i.  e.  wherein  there is  not  a  self-evident  con- 
nexion  of all the intermediate  ideas.  If you have any 
such, I earnestly beg your lordship to favour me with 
*  Essay, b. iv. C. 2. § 4, 5,6. 
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it ;  foi. I crave liberty to say, that the reason, and form, 
and way of evidence in demonstration,  wherever there 
is demonstration, is always the same. 
But you  say, '' THIS is  a  quite  different  case from 
mine;"  I suppose your  lordship  means  by THIS,  ma- 
thematical demonstration,  the thing mentioned  in  the 
preceding period ; and then your sense will run thus : 
mathematical demonstrations,  wherein  certainty is  to 
be had by the intuition of the self-evident connexion of 
all the intermediate ideas,  are different  from that de- 
monstration which I am there treating of.  If you mean 
not so,  I must  own,  I know not what  you  mean  by 
saying,  "THIS  is  a  quite different  case  from  mine." 
And if your lordship does mean so, I do not see how it 
can be so as you say: your words taken all together run 
thus :  "  my principal ground is from mathematical de- 
monstrations,  and  my  examples  are  brought  from 
them.  But this is quite  a different case from mine :" 
i.  e. I am speaking in  that chapter of  my Essay con- 
cerning demonstration in general, and the certainty we 
have by it.  The examples I use are brought from ma- 
thematics, and yet you say, "  mathematical demonstra- 
tions  are  quite  a  different  case  from  mine."  If I 
here  misunderstand  your lordship's  THIS,  I must beg 
your pardon  for it; it is  one  of  your privileged  par- 
ticles,  and T am not master of  it.  Misrepresent your 
sense I cannot;  for  your  very  words  are  set  down, 
and let the reader judge. 
But your lordship gives  a  reason  for what you had 
said in these words subjoined, where you say, "  I grant 
that those  ideas,  on  which  mathematical  demonstra- 
tions  proceed,  are wholly  in  the  mind,  and  do not 
relate to the existence of things ;  but our debate goes 
upon  a  certainty  of  knowledge  of  things as  really 
existing."  In  which  words  there  are  these  things 
remarkable : 
1. That your lordship's  exce~tion  here,  is against 
what I have said concerning demonstration in my Essay, 
and not against any thing I have said in  either of my 
letters to  your lordship.  If therefore your lordship and 
I have since, in our letters,  had any debate about the 
certainty of the knowledge of things as really existing ; 
that which was writ beforel that debate could have no 
relation to it,  nor be limited  by it.  If therefore your 
lordship makes any exception (as you do) to my way of 
demonstration, as proposed  in my Essay, you must, as 
I humbly conceive, take it as delivered there, compre- 
hending mathematical demonstrations ;  which  cannot 
be excluded,  because  your lordship says, "  our debate 
now goes upon a certainty of  the knowledge of things 
as really existing,  supposing mathematical demonstra- 
tions did not afford a certainty of knowledge of things 
as really existing." 
2. But in the next place,  mathematical demonstra- 
tions do afford a certainty of the knowledge of things as 
really existing,  as  inuch  as  any other demonstrations 
whatsoever ;  and therefore they afford your lordship no 
ground upon that account to separate them, as you do 
here, from demonstrations in other subjects. 
Your lordship indeed thinks I have given you suffi- 
cient grounds to charge me with the contrary: for you 
say, "  I grant that those ideas, on which mathematical 
demonstrations proceed, are wholly in the mind;" this 
indeed I grant : '' and do not relate to the existence of 
things ;"  but these latter words I do not remember that 
I any where say.  And I wish you had quoted the place 
where I grant any such  thing; I am sure it is not in 
that place, where  it is likeliest to be found :  I mean, 
w.here Iexamine, whether the knowledge we have of ma- 
thematical truths be the knowledge of things as really 
existing*:  there I say (and I think I have proved) that 
it is, though it consists in the perception of the agree- 
ment  or disagreement  of  ideas  that are only  in the 
mind ;  because it takes in all those things, really exist- 
ing, which  answer those  ideas.  Upon which grounds 
it was,  that I there  affirmed  moral  knowledge  also 
capable of certainty t.  And pray, my lord, what other 
way can your lordship  proceed,  in  any demonstration 
you would make about any other thing but figures and 
numbers, but the same that you do in demonstrations 
* Essay, b. iv. c.  4.  $ 6.  t Ibid.  $  7. 406  Mr. Loch's second Reply 
about figures and numbers ?  If you would demonstrate 
any thing concerning man or murder, must you not first 
settle in your mind the idea or notion you have of that 
animal or that action, and  then show what you would 
demonstrate necessarily to belong to that idea in your 
mind, and to those  things existing only as they corre- 
spond with, and answer that idea in your mind ?  How 
else you can make any general proposition, that shall 
contain  the knowledge  of  things  as  really  existing, 
I that am ignorant should be glad to learn, when your 
lordship shall do me the favour to show me any such. 
In  the mean time there is no reason why you  should 
except demonstrations about figures and numbers,from 
demonstrations about other subjects, upon the account 
that I grant, "  that those ideas on which mathematical 
demonstrations  proceed,  are  wholly  in  the  mind," 
when I say the same of all other demonstrations.  For 
the ideas  that other demonstrations  proceed  on  are 
wholly in the mind.  And no demonstration whatsoever 
concerns things as really existing,  any farther than as 
they correspond with,  and answer those  ideas in  the 
mind,  which  the  demonstration  proceeds  on.  This 
distinction therefore  here of  your lordship's,  between 
mathematical  and  other  demonstrations,  having  no 
foundation, your inference founded  on it falls with it ; 
viz.  "  So that although we should grant all that I say 
about the intuition  of  ideas  in  mathematical demon- 
strations,  yet  it comes not at all to my business,  un- 
less I can prove,  that we  have  as clear  and distinct 
ideas  of beings  as we  have  of  numbers and figures." 
Though  how beings here and numbers and figures come 
to be opposed against one another, I shall not be able 
to conceive, till I am better instructed  than hitherto I 
am, that numbers and figures are no beings ;  and that 
the mathematicians and philosophers, old ones and all, 
have, in all the pains taken about them, employed their 
thoughts about nothing.  And I would be glad to know 
what those things are, which your lordship  says  our 
debate goes upon here as really existing, that are beings 
more than numbers and figures." 
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Your  lordship's  next exception against my way of 
demonstration  is,  that "in  it I am inconsistent  with 
myself."  For  proof  of  it,  you  say,  "I  design  to 
prove  demonstrations  without  general  principles; 
and yet every one  knows that general principles  are 
supposed  in  mathematics."  Answ.  Every  one  may 
know that general principles are supposed in mathema- 
tics,  without  knowing,  or  ever  being  able to know, 
that I, who  say  also  that  mathematicians  do  often 
make use of them, am inconsistent with myself; though 
I also  say,  that a demonstration  about numbers  and 
figures may be made without them. 
To prove  me  inconsistent  with myself,  you  add: 
"and  that person  would  be  thought  ridiculous,  who 
should  go about to prove, that general principles are 
of  little  use,  or  of  dangerous  use  in  mathematical 
demonstrations."  A man  may make other ridiculous 
faults in writing,  besides inconsistency, and there are 
instances enough of it: but by good luck I am in this 
place clear of what would be thought ridiculous, which 
yet is  no proof of  inconsistency.  *For  I never "went 
about  to prove,  that general  principles  are  of  little 
or dangerous use in mathematical demonstrations." 
To  prove me inconsistent with myself, your lordship 
uses  one  argument more,  and that is, "that I confess 
that the way  of  demonstration  in  morality  is  from 
principles,  as those of  mathematics  by necessary  con- 
sequences."  Answ.  With  submission,  my  lord,  I do 
not say in the place quoted by your lordship, "that the 
way of demonstration in morality is from principles,  as 
those of the mathematics by necessary consequences.*" 
But this is that which I  say, "that I doubt  not but 
in morality from  principles,  as incontestable as those 
of  the  mathematics,  by  necessary  consequences,  the 
measures  of  right  and wrong  might  be  made  out." 
Which words, I humbly conceive, have no inconsistency 
with my saying, there may be demonstrations without 
the help of maxims ;  whatever inconsistency the words 
which you here set down for mine may have with it. 
My lord, the words you bring out of my book  are so 
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often  different from  those I read in the places which 
you  refer to, that I am sometimes ready to think you 
have  got some  strange copy  of  it,  whereof  I  know 
nothing,  since  it so  seldom  agrees  with  mine.  Par- 
don  me,  my lord, if with some care I examine the ob- 
jection  of inconsistency with myself; that if I find any, 
I may retract the one part or the other of it.  Human 
frailty,  I  grant,  and variety  of  thought in long dis- 
courses,  may make a man  unwittingly advance  incon- 
sistencies.  This may consist with  ingenuity,  and de- 
serve to be  excused :  but for  any one to persist in it, 
when  it is  showed  him,  is  to give  himself  the  lie; 
which cannot but stick closer to him in the sense of all 
rational men, than if he received it from another. 
I own T  have said,  in  my Essay, that 'there  be  de- 
monstrations, which may be made without those gene- 
ral maxims, that I there treated of.  But I cannot re- 
collect,  that I  ever  said,  that  those  general maxims 
could not be  made  use  of  in  demonstration: for they 
are no  more  shut out of  my  way  of  demonstration 
than  any other self-evident  propositions.  And there- 
fore there is no inconsistency in those two propositions, 
which  are mine,  viz.  "Some  demonstrations may  be 
made  without  the  help  of  those  general  maxims," 
and  "morality,  I  doubt  not,  may  be  demonstrated 
from  principles ;" whatever  inconsistency  may  be in 
these two following propositions,  which  are your lord- 
ship's,  and not  mine,  viz. "the way of  demonstration 
in  morality  is  from  principles,  and  geseral maxims 
are not  the way to proceed  011  in  demonstration,  as 
to other parts of  knowledge."  For to admit self-evi- 
dent propositions,  which is what I mean by principles, 
in the place of my Essay *,  which your lordship quotes 
for the first of my inconsistent propositions, and to say 
(as I do in the other  place quoted  by your  lordship) 
"that those  magnified  maxims  are not the principlev 
and foundations of  all our other knowledge,+"  has no 
manner of inconsistency.  For though I think them not 
necessary to every demonstration,  so neither do I ex- 
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clude them any more than other self-evident propositions 
out of  any  demonstration, wherein  any  one  should 
make use of them. 
The next objection against my way of demonstration, 
from my placing demonstration on the self-evidence  of 
ideas, having been already answered, I shall need to say 
nothing in defence of it ;  or in answer to any thing raised 
against it, in your twelve or thirteen following pages 
upon that topic.  But that your lordship may not think 
I do not pay a due respect to a11  that you say, I shall 
not wholly pass those pages over in silence. 
1.  Your lordship says,  that  '6  I confess that some of 
the most  obvious  ideas  are far from  being  self-evi- 
dent."  Answ.  Supposing I  did say so,  how,  I  be- 
seech your  lordship, does it prove, that "it is impossi- 
ble to come  to a demonstration  about real  beings,  in 
this  way  of  intuition  by  ideas?"  which  is  the pro- 
position  you  promise to make appear, and you bring 
this as the first reason to make it appear.  For should 
I  confess  a  thousand  times over,  "that  some  of  the 
most  obvious ideas are far fram being  self-evident ;" 
and  should I, which I do not, make self-evident ideas 
necessary to demonstration :  how will it thence follow, 
that it is impossible to come  to a demonstration, &c.? 
since though I should confess some of the most obviaus 
ideas not to be self-evident;  yet my confession  being 
but of some, it will not, follow from my confession, but 
that there may be  also some self-evident:  and so still 
it might be  possible to come to demonstration by in- 
tuition, because ''  some" in  my use of the word  never 
signifies 'c  all." 
In the next place,  give  me leave to ask, where it is 
that I confess, that "  some ideas are not self-evident ;" 
Nay, where  it is, that I once  mention any such thing 
as a self-evident  idea ?  For  self-evident is an epithet, 
that I do not remember I ever gave to any idea,  or 
thought belonged at all to ideas.  In all the places you 
have  produced  out of  my Essay,  concerning matter, 
motion,  time,  duration,  and  light;  which  are  those 
ideas your lordship is pleased to instance in,  to prove, 
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bly to offer it to your  lordship,  that there is not any 
such confession.  However, you go on to prove it.  The 
proposition  then  to  be  proved  is,  that  "I confess 
that these  are far from  being  self-evident  ideas."  It 
is necessary to set it down, and carry it in our minds ; 
for the proposition to be proved  is, I find, a very slip- 
pery thing, and apt to slide out of  the way. 
Your lordship's  proof  is, that according to me, "we 
can  have  no intuition  of  these  things  which  are  so 
obvious  to us,  and consequently we can have no self- 
evident  ideas  of  them."  The force  of  which  proof, 
I confess, I do not understand.  "We have no intuition 
of the  obvious  thing matter,  and  the obvious  thing 
motion ;  ergo, we have no  self-evident ideas of them." 
Granting that they are obvious things, and that obvious 
as they are, we have, as you express it, no intuition of 
them ;  it will not follow from thence, that we have no 
intuition  of  the ideas we signify by the names matter 
and motion, and so have no self-evident ideas of them. 
For whoever has in his mind an idea, which  he makes 
the name matter or motion stand for, has no doubt that 
idea there, and sees,  or has,  in your  phrase, an intui- 
tion of  it there ; and so has a self-evident idea of it, if 
intuition, according to your lordship, makes a self-evi- 
dent idea (for of self-evident ideas, as I have before re- 
marked, I have  said  nothing,  nor  made  any such di- 
stinction as self-evident  and not self-evident  ideas) and 
if intuition of an idea does not make a self-evident idea, 
the want of it is in vain brought here to prove the idea 
of matter or motion not self-evident. 
But your  lordship proceeds to instances,  and your 
first instance is in matter :  and here, for fear of mistak- 
ing, let us remember what the proposition to be proved 
is, viz.  that,  "according to me, we have  no intuition, 
as you call it, of  the idea of matter."  Your lordship 
begins and tells me, that I give this account of the idea 
of  matter, that "it consists in a solid  substance, every 
where the  same."  Whereupon  you  tell  me,  "you 
would  be  glad to come  to a  certain  knowledge  of 
these two things;  first,  the  manner  of  the cohesion 
of  the parts of  matter, and the demonstration of the 
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divisibility  of  it in  the way  of  ideas."  Answer.  It 
happened just as I feared, the proposition to be proved 
is slipt already quite out of sight:  you own that I say 
matter is a solid substance, every where the same.  This 
idea, which is the idea signified by the word matter, I 
have  in  my mind,  and have  an intuition  of  it there: 
how then does this prove, that according to me, ''  there 
can be no intuition of  the idea of  matter  ?"  Leaving 
therefore this proposition, which was to be proved, you 
bring places  out of  my book to show,  that we do not 
know wherein the union  and cohesion  of  the parts of 
matter consist;  and that the divisibility of  matter in- 
volves us in difficulties : neither of  which  either is,  or 
proves, that cc according to me, we cannot have an in- 
tuition of the idea of matter ;"  which was the proposition 
to be proved, and seems quite forgotten during the three 
following pages, wholly employed upon this instance of 
matter.  You ask indeed, "  whether I can imagine, that 
we have intuition into the idea of matter ?"  But those 
words seem to me to signify quite another thing than 
having an intuition of  the idea of  matter, as appears 
by your explication of them in these words subjoined : 
or that it is possible to come to a demonstration about 
it, by the help of  any intervening ideas :"  whereby it 
seems to me plain, that by intuition into it, your lord- 
ship means '(  demonstration about it,"  i.  e.  some know- 
ledge  concerning matter,  and not a  bare view or in- 
tuition of the idea you have of it.  And that your lord- 
ship speaks of knowledge concerning some affection of 
matter, in this and the following question,  and not of 
the bare  intuition  of  the  idea  of  matter,  is  farther 
evident  from the introduction  of  your two questions, 
wherein  you  say, '' there  are two things  concerning 
matter, that you would  be glad to come to a certain 
knowledge of:"  So that all that can follow, or in your 
sense of them  does  follow, from my words quoted  by 
you, is, that I own, that the cohesion of  its parts is an 
affection of  matter that is hard to be explained ; but 
from them  it can neither  be inferred,  nor does  your 
lordship attempt to infer, that any one cannot view or 
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which he signifies to others by the word  matter: and 
that you did not make any such inference from them is 
farther plain by your asking, in the place above quoted, 
not only "whether I can imagine, that it is possible to 
come to a demonstration about it ;" but your lordship 
also adds, 66 by the help of any intervening ideas."  For 
I do not think you  demand  a  demonstration by  the 
help of  intervening ideas,  to make you  see, i. e. have 
an intuition of your own idea of matter.  It would mis- 
become me to understand your lordship in so strange a 
sense ;  for then you might have just occasion to ask me 
again, "  whether I could think you a man of  so little 
sense ?"  I therefore  suppose,  as pour  words  import, 
that you demand  a demonstration  by the help of  in- 
tervening  ideas to show  you,  how  the parts of  that 
thing, which you represent to yourself by that idea, to 
which  you  give  the name  matter,  cohere  to~ether; 
which is nothing  to the question  of  the intuition  of 
the idea :  though, to cover the change of the question 
as dexterously as might be, "  intuition of the idea"  is 
changed  into '' intuition  into the idea;"  as if  there 
were no difference between looking upon a watch, and 
looking into a watch, i. e. between the idea that, taken 
from  an obvious  view,  I sigrtify  by  the name  watch, 
and have in my mind when I use the word watch ;  and 
the being able to resolve any question that may be pro- 
posed  to me,  concerning  the inward make  and con- 
trivance of  a watch.  The idea which  taken from the 
outward visible  parts  I  give  the name  watch  to,  I 
perceive  or have an intuition  of,  in  my mind equally, 
whether or no I know any thing more of a watch than 
what is represented in that idea. 
Upon this change of the question, all that follows to 
the bottom of the next page being to show, that from 
what I say it follows  that there  be  many difficulties 
concerning  matter  which  I  cannot  resolve;  many 
questions  concerning it which  I think  cannot be de- 
monstratively decided ;  and not to show, that any one 
cannot perceive,  or have an intuition, as you call it, of 
his  own idea of  matter: I think I  need  not trouble 
your lordship with an answer to it. 
In  this one instance of matter, you have been pleased 
to ask me two hard questions.  To  shorten your trouble 
concerning this business of intuition of ideas, will you, 
my lord, give me leave to ask you this one easy question 
concerning  all  your  four  instances,  matter,  motion, 
duration, and light, viz. what  you  mean  by  these four 
words ?  That your lordship may not  suspect it to be 
either captious  or impertinent, I will  tell you  the use 
I shall make of  it: if  your  lordship tell me what you 
mean by these names, I shall presently reply, that there 
then are the ideas that you have of them in your mind ; 
and it is plain you see or have an intuition of  them, as 
they are in your  mind, or,  as I should have expressed 
it, perceive them as they are there, because you can tell 
them to another.  And so it is with every one, who can 
tell what he means by those words ; and therefore to 
all such (amongst which I crave leave to be one) there 
can be no doubt of the intuition of those ideas.  But if 
your lordship will not tell me what you mean by these 
terms,  I fear  you  will  be  thought  to use  very  hard 
measure  in  disputing,  by  demanding  to  be  satisfied 
concerning questions put in terms, which you yourself 
cannot tell the meaning of. 
This considered, will perhaps serve to show, that all 
that you  say  in the  following  paragraphs,  to n.  2, 
p.  141,  contains  nothing  against  intuition  of  ideas, 
which  is what  you are upon,  though it be  no notion 
of  mine ; much less does it contain any thing against 
my way of demonstration  by ideas, which is the point 
under proof.  For, 
1.  What your lordship has  said  about the idea  of 
matter hath been considered already. 
2.  From motion, which is your second instance, your 
argument stands thus: that because I say, the definitions 
I meet with of  motion are insignificant,  therefore the 
idea fails us.  This seems to me a strange consequence ; 
and all one as to say, that a deaf and dumb man, be- 
cause he could  not understand  the words  used  in the 
definitions that are given of motion, therefore he could 
not have the idea of motion, or the idea of motion failed 
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that antecedent, is forced from it to no purpose:  the 
proposition  to be  inferred  being this,  that then "we 
can have no intuition of the idea of motion." 
3. As  to time,  though the intuition of  the idea of 
time be not my way of  speaking, yet what your lord- 
ship here infers from my words, granting it to be a right 
inference, with submission, proves nothing against the 
intuition of  that idea.  The proposition  to be  proved 
is, "  that we can have no intuition of the idea of time;" 
and the proposition  which  from  my words  you  infer 
is,  that we have not the knowledge of the idea of time 
by intuition, but by rational deduction."  What can be 
more remote than these two propositions ?  The one of 
them signifying (if it signifies  any thing) the view the 
mind has of it ; the other, as I guess,  the original and 
rise  of  it.  For "  what  it is  to have  the knowledge 
of  an idea,  not by intuition,  but by deduction of  rea- 
son,"  I confess I do not well understand;  only I am 
sure, in terms it is not the same with having  the in- 
tuition of  an idea : but if  changing of  terms were not 
some  men's  privilege,  perhaps  so  much  controversy 
would not be written.  The meaning of  either of these 
propositions I concern not myself about, for neither of 
them is mine.  I only here show, that you do not prove 
the proposition  that you yourself  framed, and under- 
took to prove. 
Since, my lord,  you are so favourable to me,  as to 
seem willing to correct whatever you can find any way 
amiss  in  my  Essay : therefore  I  shall  endeavour  to 
satisfy you concerning the rise of our idea of duration, 
from  the succession of  ideas  in  our minds.  Against 
this, though it be  nothing to the matter in hand, you 
object, "  that some people reckoned  succession of  t~me 
right by knots, and notches, and figures, without ever 
thinking of  ideas."  Answer.  It is certain  that men, 
who wanted better ways,  might, by knots or notches, 
keep accounts of the numbers of certain stated lengths 
of  time,  as well  as  of  the  numbers  of  men  in  their 
country, or of any other numbers ;  and that too with- 
out ever  considering  the immediate  objects  of  their 
thoughts under the name of ideas: but that they should 
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count time, without ever thinking of something, is very 
hard to me to conceive;  and the things they thought 
on, or were present in their minds when they thought, 
are what I call ideas: thus much in answer to what 
your lordship says.  But to any one that shall put the 
objection stronger, and say, Many have had the idea of 
time, who never reflected on the constant train of ideas, 
succeeding one another in  their minds, whilst waking, 
1 grant it; but add, that want of  reflection makes not 
any thing cease  to be : if it did,  many men's  actions 
would  have no cause,  nor rise,  nor  manncr; because 
many men never reflect so far on their otvii slctions, as 
to consider what they are bottomed on, or how they are 
performed.  A man  may measure duration I)y motion, 
of which he has no other idea,  but of  a constant suc- 
cession of ideas in train ; and yet never reflect on tlrat 
succession of  ideas in his mind.  A man may guess at 
the length of  his  stay by himself  in the dark:  :  here is 
no  succession  to  measure  by,  but  that  of  his  own 
thoughts ;  and without some succession,  1 think there 
is no measure of  duration.  But though in this case he 
measures the length of the duration by the train of his 
ideas, yet he may never  reflect on that,  bui coriclude 
he does it he knows not how. 
You add, ''  but besides  such arbitrary measures of 
time, what need any recourse to ideas, when the returns 
of  days,  and months, and years, by the planetary mo- 
tions, are so easy and  so universal ?"  Such, here, as I 
suppose, refers to the knots,  and notchcs,  and figures 
before-mentioned:  if it does not,  I know not what it 
refers  to; and if  it does,  it makes  thosc  knots  and 
notches  measures  of  time,  which  I humbly  conceive 
they were  not,  but only arbitrary ways  of  recording 
(as all other ways of recording are) certain numbers of 
known lengths of time : for though any one sets down 
by arbitrary marks, as notches on a stick, or strokes of 
chalk on a trenchard,  or figures on paper, the number 
of yards of cloth, or pints of milk that are delivered to 
a  customer;  yet I  suppose  nobody  thinks  that  the 
cloth or milk  were measured by those notches, strokes 
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arbitrary measures of  those things.  But what this is 
against, I confess I io  not see :  this, I am sure, it is not 
against any thing I have said.  For, as I remember, I 
have said (though not the planetary motions, yet) that 
the motions of the sun and the moon are the best mea- 
sures of time.  But if you mean, that the idea of dura- 
tion is rather taken from the planetary motions,  than 
from the succession of ideas in our minds, I crave leave 
to  doubt of that ;  because motion no other way discovers 
itself to us, but by  a succession of  ideas. 
Your next argument against my thinking the idea of 
time to be derived from the train of  ideas, succeeding 
one another in our minds, is, that your lordship thinks 
the contrary.  This,  I must own, is an argument by 
way of authority, and I humbly submit to it ;  though I 
think  such arguments produce no certainty, either in 
my way of  certainty by ideas,  or in your way of  cer- 
tainty by reason. 
4.  As to your fourth instance,  you having set down 
my  exceptions  to the  peripatetic  and  Cartesian  de- 
finitions of  light, you  subjoin  this question : "  And  is 
this a self-evident idea of light ?"  I beg leave to answer 
in the same way by  a question,  and whoever  said  or 
thought that it was,  or meant  that it should  be? He 
must  have  a strange notion  of  self-evident  ideas,  let 
them be what they will  (for I know them not) who can 
think, that the showing others' definitions of  light to 
be unintelligible  is a  self-evident idea  of  light.  But 
farther, my lord, what, I beseech you, has a self-evident 
idea of light to do here ? I thought, in this your instance 
of light, you were making good what you undertook to 
prove from myself, that we have no intuition of  light. 
But because  that perhaps would  have sounded pretty 
oddly,  you  thought  fit  (which  I  with all  submission 
crave leave sometimes to take notice of) to change the 
question:  but the misfortune  is, that put as it is,  not 
concerning- our intuition,  but the self-evidence  of  the 
idea of light, the one is no better proved than the other: 
and yet your lordship concludes this your first head ac- 
cording to your usual form : "  thus we have seen what 
account the author of  the Essay himself  has given  of 
these  self-evident  ideas,  which  are the  ground-work 
of  demonstration."  With  submission,  my  lord,  he 
must have good eyes, who has seen an account I have 
given in my Essay of self-evident ideas, when neither in 
all that your  lordship has  quoted out of  it, no  nor in 
my whole Essay, self-evident ideas are so much as once 
mentioned.  And where the account I have given of a 
thing,  which  I  never  thought upon, is  to be seen,  I 
cannot imagine.  What your lordship farther tells me 
concerning them, viz. "  that self-evident ideas are the 
ground-work  of demonstration,"  I also assure you  is 
perfect news to me, which I never met with any where 
but in your lordship : though if I had  made them the 
ground-work  of  demonstration,  as you  say,  I  think 
they might remain so, notwithstanding any thing your 
lordship has produced to the contrary. 
We are now come to your second head, where I ex- 
pected to have found this consequence made good, "that 
there  may  be  contradictory  opinions  about  ideas 
which I account  most  clear  and distinct;  ergo,  it is 
impossible  to  come  to  a  demonstration  about  real 
beings  in the way  of  intuition  of  ideas."  For  this 
you told me was your second reason to prove this pro- 
position.  This  consequence  your  lordship, it seems, 
looks upon as so clear, that it needs no proof; I can find 
none here where you take it up again.  To  prove some- 
thing, you say, "  suppose an idea happen to be thought 
by some to be  clear  and  distinct,  and  others should 
think the contrary  to be  so:?'  in  obedience  to your 
lordship, I do suppose it.  But, when it  is supposed, will 
that make good  the  above-mentioned  consequence ? 
You, yourself, my lord, do not  so much as pretend it; 
but in this question subjoined, "What hopes of demon- 
stration by clear and distinct ideas then ?"  infer a quite 
different proposition.  For  cc it is  impossible  to come 
to a  demonstration  about real  beings  in the way  of 
intuition of ideas ;"  and there is "  no hopes of demon- 
stration by  clear  and distinct  ideas ;" appear to me 
two very different propositions. 
There  appears  something  to  meyetmoreincomprehen- 
sible in your way of managing this argument  here. Yout 
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reason is, as we have seen, in these words, "  there may 
be  contradictory  opinions  about  some  ideas,  that I 
account most  clear  and distinct:"  and your  instance 
of it in  these words,  "suppose  an idea happen  to be 
thought by some  to be  clear and  distinct, and others 
should think  the contrary to be so."  Answ.  So they 
may, without having any contradictory opinions about 
any idea,  that I account  most  clear  and distinct.  A 
man may think his idea of heat to be clear and distinct, 
and another may think his idea of cold (which I  take to 
be the contrary idea to that of heat) to be clear and di- 
stinct, and be both  in the right, without the least ap- 
pearance  of any contradictory opinion.  All therefore 
that your lordshb says, in  the remaining part of this 
paragraph, having  nothing  in  it of contradictory opi- 
nions about ideas that I think most clear, serves not at 
all to make good your second reason.  The truth is, all 
that you say here concerning Des Cartes's idea of space, 
and another man's idea of space, amounts to no more but 
this, that different men  may signify different ideas by 
the same name, and will  never  fix  on  me what your 
lordship would  persuade  the world I say,  "that both 
parts of  a contradiction may be  true."  Though I do 
say, that in such a loose use of the terms body and va- 
cuum, it may be demonstrated, both that there is, and 
is not  a vacuum :  which  is  a  contradiction in words, 
and is apt to impose, as if it were so in sense, on those 
who mistake words for things ;  who are a kind of rea- 
soners, whereof I perceive  there is  a  gre3ter number 
than I thought  there had been.  All that I have  said 
in that place quoted by your lordship*,  is nothing but 
to show the danger of relying upon  maxims, without 
a careful guard upon the use  of words, without which 
they will serve to make  demonstrations on both sides. 
That this  is  so, I dare appeal  to any reader,  should 
your lordship press me again, as you do here,  with all 
the force of these words, "  Say you so? What !  demon- 
strations on both  sides ?  And in the way of ideas too ? 
This is extraordinary indeed !" 
* Essay, b. iv. c. 7. $  12. 
That  all the opposition between Des Cartes and those 
others, is only about the naming of ideas, I think may 
be made appear from  these words  of your lordship in 
the next paragraph : 'i  in the ideas of space and body, 
the question  supposed is,  whether  they be the same 
or  no."  That this is  a  question  only about names, 
and not about ideas themselves, is evident from hence, 
that nobody can doubt whether the single idea of pure 
distance, and the two ideas of distance and solidity, are 
one and the same idea or different ideas, any more than 
he can doubt whether one and two are different.  The 
question then in the case, is not whether extension con- 
sidered separately by itself, or extension and solidity to- 
gether, be the same idea or ;lo ;  but whether the simple 
idea of extension alone shall be called body, or the com- 
plex  idea  of  solidity and extension  together shall be 
called body.  For that these ideas themselves  are dif- 
ferent, I think I need not go about to prove to any one, 
who ever thought of emptiness or fulness :  for whether 
in fact the bottle in a  man's  hand be  empty or no, or 
can by him be  emptied  or no;  this,  I think, is plain, 
that his idea of fulness, and his  idea of emptiness, are 
not the same.  This the very dispute concerning a va- 
cuum supposes: for if men's idea of pure space were not 
different from their idea of solidity and space together, 
they could never so far separate them in their thoughts 
as to make a question, whether  they did always exist 
together,  any more than they could question whether 
the same thing existed with itself.  Motion cannot be 
separated in existence from space ;  and yet nobody ever 
took the idea of space and the idea of motion to be the 
same.  Solidity likewise  cannot  exist without space ; 
but will any one  from thence  say, the idea of solidity 
and the idea of space are one and the same ? 
Your lordship's third reason, to prove that "it is im- 
possible to come to a demonstration about real beings 
in this way of  intuition  of ideas, is, that granting the 
ideas to be  true, there  is  no  self-evidence  of the con- 
nexion of them, which  is  necessary to make a demon- 
stration."  This,  I  must  own,  is  to  me  as  inconl- 
prebensible a consequence as the former; as also is that 
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which your lordship says to make it out, which I shall 
set down in your own words, that its force may be left 
entire to the reader: "But granting  the ideas to be true, 
yet when their connexion is  not  self-evident,  then an 
intermediate idea  must  complete the  demonstration. 
But how doth it appear, that this middle idea is self- 
evidently connected with  them ?  For it is said, if that 
intermediate idea be not known by intuition, that must 
need a proof; and so  there  can be  no demonstration : 
which your lordship is very apt to believe  in this way 
of ideas ;  unless these  ideas get more light  by  being 
put between two others."  Whatever there be in these 
words to prove the proposition in question, I leave the 
reader  to find out; but that he may not  be led into 
mistake,  that there is any thing in my words that may 
be serviceable to it, I must crave leave to acquaint him, 
that these words set down  by your lordship, as out of 
my Essay, are not to be  found in that place,  nor any 
where in my book, or any thing to this purpose, "  that 
the intermediate  idea is  to be known  by  intuition;" 
but this, that there must be an intuitive knowledge or 
perception of the agreement or disagreement of the in- 
termediate idea with  those, whose  agreement or dis- 
agreement by its intervention it demonstrates *. 
Leaving therefore all that your lordship brings out of 
Gassendus, the  Cartesians, Morinus, andBernier, in their 
argument from motion, for or against a vacuum, as not 
being at all concerned in it ;  I shall only crave leave to 
observe, that  you seem to make use here of the same way 
of argumentation, which I think I may call your main, 
if not only one, it occurs so often, via. that when I have 
said any thing to show wherein certainty or demonstra- 
tion, &c. consists, you think it sufficiently overthrown, 
if you can produce any instance out of my book, of any 
thing advanced by me, which comes short of certainty 
or demonstration :  whereas, my lord, 1  humbly conceive, 
it is no proof against my notion of certainty, or my way 
of demonstration, that I cannot attain to them in  all 
cases.  I only tell wherein they consist, wherever they 
are ;  but if I miss of either of them, either by reason of 
* B. iv. c. ii, $  7. 
the nature of the subject, or by inadvertency in my way 
of proof, that is no objection to the truth of my notions 
of  them :  for I never  undertook  that my way of  cer- 
tainty or demonstration, ifit ought to be called my way, 
should make me or any one omniscient or infallible. 
That which makes it necessary for me here again to 
take notice of this your way of  reasoning, is the ques- 
tion wherewith you wind up the account you have given 
of the dispute of  the parties above-named  about a va- 
cuum :  'c  and is it possible to imagine, that there should 
be  a  self-evident  connexion in the case ?"  Answ.  It 
concerns not me to examine, whether, or on which side, 
in that dispute, such a  self-evident  connexion  is, or is 
not possible.  But this I take the liberty to say, that 
wherever it  is not,  there is no demonstration, whether 
it be the Cartesians or the Gassendists that failed in this 
point.  And I humbly conceive, that to conclude from 
any one's  failing in  this,  or any other case, of a  self- 
evident oonnexion in each step of his proof, that there- 
fore it is not necessary in demonstration; is a conclu- 
sion without grounds, and a way of arguing that proves 
nothing. 
In  tGe neat paragraph you come to  wind up the argu- 
ment, which you have been so long upon, viz. to make 
good  what  you  under too!^;  i.  e.  "  to show  the  dif- 
ference  of  my method  of  certainty by ideas,  and  the 
method  of  certainty by  reason;"  in answer  to  my 
saying, I can find no opposition between them :  which 
opposition,  according  to the  account you  give  of it, 
after forty pages spent in it, amounts at last to this : 
(I.)  That I affirm, that  general principles and maxims 
of reason  are of  little or  no use; and  your  lordship 
says, "  they are of very great use, and the only proper 
foundation of  certainty."  To which I crave  leave to 
say,  that if  by principles  and maxims  your  lordship 
means all self-evident  propositions,  our ways are even 
in this part the same;  for  as you  know,  my  lord, I 
make  self-evident  propositions  necessary to certainty, 
and found all certainty only in them.  If by principles 
and maxims you  mean a select r,umber  of self-evident 
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maxims,  which  is  the sense in which  I use  the term 
maxims in  my Essay; then to bring it to a  decision 
which of  us  two,  in  this point, is in  the right, it will 
be  necessary for  your  lordship to give  a  list of those 
maxims ;  and then to show, that a man can be  certain 
of no truth without the help of those maxims.  For to 
affirm maxims to be the only foundations of certainty, 
and yet not to tell which are those maxims, or how they 
may be known ;  is, I humbly conceive, so far from lay- 
ing any sure grounds of certainty, that it  leaves even the 
very foundations of it uncertain.  When your lordship 
has thus settled the grounds  of your way of certainty 
by reason,  one may be  able  to examine, whether it be 
truly the way of  reason,  and how far my way of cer- 
tainty by ideas differs from it. 
(9.) The second difference that you assign, between 
my way of certainty by ideas, and yours by reason,-is, 
that "  I say,  that demonstration is by way of intuition 
of ideas, and that reason  is only the faculty employed 
in  discovering and comparing  ideas with  themselves, 
or with others intervening;  and that this is  the only 
way of  certainty."  Whereas your  lordship "  affirms, 
and, as you  say,  have  proved, that there  can  be  no 
demonstration  by intuition  of  ideas; but that all the 
certainty we can attain to, is from  general principles 
of reason, and necessary deductions made from them." 
Answ. I have  said, that demonstration consists in  the 
perception of the agreement or +agreement  of the in- 
termediate idea, with those whose  agreement or dis- 
agreement it is to show, in each step of the demonstra- 
tion :  and if you will say this is differeht from the way 
of demonstration by reason, it will then be to the point 
above-mentioned, which you  have been  so long upon. 
If this be your meaning here,it seems pretty strangely 
expressed, and remains to be proved : but if any thing 
else be your meaning, that meaning not being the pro- 
position to be proved, it matters not whether you have 
proved it or no. 
Your lordship  farther  says here, "  that all the cer- 
tainty we can attain  to,  is from  general principles of 
reason,  and  necessary  ded~rctiolls  made from  them." 
This,  you say, "  you  have  proved."  What has  been 
proved, is to be seen  in what  has been  already consi- 
dered.  But if your proof,  that all  the certainty we 
can attaiil to is from  general principles of reason, and 
necessary deductions  made from them,"  were as clear 
and cogent as it seems  to me  the contrary;  this will 
not reach to the point in debate, till your lordship has 
proved,  that this is opposite to my way of certainty by 
ideas.  It  is strange (and perhaps to some maybe matter 
of thought)  that in  an  argument wherein  you  lay so 
much stress  on  maxims,  general  principles  of  reason, 
and necessary deductions from them, you should never 
once tell us, what, in your account, a maxim or general 
principle of reason is,  nor the marks it is to be known 
by;  nor offer  to show what a necessary deduction  is, 
nor how it is to be made, or may be known.  For I have 
seen  men  please  themselves  with  deductions  upon 
deductions,  and spin  consequences,  it  mattered  not 
whether  out of  their  own  or other men's  thoughts; 
which, when looked into, were visibly nothing but mere 
ropes of sand. 
It is  true, your  lordship  says, "  you  now  come to 
certainty  of  reason  by  deductions."  But when  all 
that truly learned discourse which follows is read over 
and over again, I would  be glad to be told, what it is 
your lordship calls a necessary deduction ;  and by what 
criterion you distinguish it from suchdeductions as  come 
short of certainty, or even  of  truth itself.  I confess I 
have read over those pages more than once, and can find 
no such criterion laid down in them by your lordship, 
though acriterion be there much talked of.  Butwhether 
it be my want of  capacity for your way of  writing, that 
makes  me  not  find  any  light given by your lordship 
into this  matter; or  whether  in  truth you  have  not 
showed  wherein what you  call  a  necessary deduction 
consists,  and how it may be known from what is not so, 
the reader must judge,  This I crave leave to say, that 
when you have shown what general principles of reason 
aud necessary deductions are, the world will  then see, 
and not till then, whether this your way of certainty by 
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tions made from  them,  be opposite to,  or so much as 
different from, my way of certainty by ideas ;  which was 
the thing to be shown. 
In the  paragraph under consideration, you blame me, 
that in my chapter concerning reason I have treated it 
only as a faculty,  and not in the other senses which I 
there give of  that word.  This exception  to my book 
is, I suppose, only from your lordship's  general care of 
letting nothing pass in my Essay, which you think needs 
an amendment.  For any particular reason, that brings 
it in here, or  ties it on  to this part of your discourse, 
I confess I do not see.  However, to this I answer, 
1. The understanding, as a faculty, being the subject 
of my Essay, it carried me to treat directly of reason no 
otherwise than as a faculty.  But yet reason, as standing 
for true and clear  principles,  and also as standing for 
clear and fair deductions from those principles, I have 
not wholly omitted ;  as is manifest  from what I have 
said  of  self-evident  propositions,  intuitive knowledge, 
and demonstration, in other parts of my Essay.  So that 
your question,  'c  why in a chapter of reason are the two 
other senses of the word neglected ?"  blaming me for 
no other fault that I am really guilty of,  but want of 
order, and not putting every thing in its proper place ; 
does not appear to be of so mighty weight, hut that I 
should have thought it  might have been left to the little 
nibblers in controversy, without  being made use of by 
so great a man as your lordship.  But the putting things 
out of their proper place, being  that which  your lord- 
ship thinks fit to except against  in  my writings, it so 
falls out, that to this too I plead not guilty.  For in that 
very chapter of reason *,  I have not omitted to treat of 
principles and  deductions ;  and what I  have said there, 
I presume, is enough tc let others see, that I have not 
neglected to declare  my poor sense about self-evident 
propositions,  and the cogency and evidence of demon- 
strative or probable deductions of reason :  though what 
I have said there, not being backed with authorities, nor 
warranted with the names of ancient philosophers, was 
;not worth your lordship's  taking notice of. 
* $4 2, 3,  4. 14,  15,  16,  17,  18, 
1  have, I confess, been so unwary to write out of my 
own thoughts, which your lordship has, more than once, 
with some sort of reprimand taken notice of.  I own it, 
your lordship is  much in  the right ; the safer wily is, 
never to declare one's  own sense in any material point. 
If I had filled my book with quotations and collections 
of  other  men's  opinions,  it  had  shown  much  more 
learning, and  had  much  more  security in  it; and I 
myself had  been  safe  from  the attacks of the men of 
arms, in the commonwealth of  letters : but in writing 
my book, I had no thoughts of  war; my eye was fixed 
only on truth, and that with  so sincere and  unbiassed 
an endeavour, that I thought I should not have incurred 
much blame, even where I had missed  it.  This I per- 
ceive, too late, was the wrong way: I should have kept 
myself still safe  upon  the reserve.  Had I learnt  this 
wisdom of Thraso in Terence, and resolved with myself, 
Hic ergo ero postprincipia ;  perhaps I might have pre- 
served the commendation was given him, illuc estsnpere 
ut  hos instruxit ipszu si6i cavit loco.  But I  deserved to 
be soundly corrected, for not having profited by reading 
so much as this comes to. 
But  to return to your  accusation  here,  which  all 
together stands thus : "  why in a chapter of reason are 
the other two senses neglected ?  We might have ex- 
pected  here full  satisfaction  as  to  the  principles  of 
reason, as distinct from the faculty;  but the author of 
the Essay wholly avoids it."  What I guess these words 
accuse me to have avoided, I think I have shown already 
that I did not avoid. 
a  Before you conclude, you say you must observe that 
Iprove,that demonstration must be by intuition inan ex- 
traordinary manner from the sense of the  word."  He  that 
will be at the pains to read that paragraph which you 
quote for it*, will see that I do not prove that it must be 
by intuition,  because  it is  called  demonstration; but 
that it is  called demonstration because  it is by intui- 
tion.  And as to the propriety of it, what your lordship 
says in the following words, "  it would be most proper 
for  ocular  demonstration or  by the finger,"  will not 
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hinder it from being proper also in mental demonstra- 
tion, as long as the perception of the mind is properly 
expressed by seeing. 
Against my observing, that the notation of  the word 
imported  showing  or  making  to  see,  your  lordship 
farther says, "  demonstration among some philosophers 
signified only the conclusion of  an argument, whereby 
we  are brought from  something we  did perceive  to 
something we did not ;" which  seems  to me to agree 
with what I say in the case, viz.  that by the agreement 
of ideas which we do perceive, we  are brought to per- 
ceive the agreement of  ideas which before we did riot 
perceive.  To which no doubt will  be answered, as in 
a like case, "  not by a way of  intuition, but by a de- 
duction  of  reason,"  i.  e.  we  perceive  not  in  a  way 
that affords us intuition or a sight, but by deductions 
of reason, wherein we see nothing.  Whereas, my lord, 
I  humbly conceive, that the force of s deduction of rea- 
son consists in this, that in each step of it we see what 
a connexion it  has,  i.  e.  have an intuition of  the certain 
agreement or disagreement of  the ideas, as in demon- 
stration ;  or an intuition or perception, that they have 
a probable, or not so much as a probable connexion, as in 
other deductions of reason. 
You farther overthrow the necessity of intuitive know- 
ledge, in every step of a  demonstration, by the autho- 
rity ofAristotle ;  who says,  things that are self-evident 
cannot be demonstrated."  And so say I too, in several 
places of  my Essay*.  When  your lordship can show 
any inconsistency between these two propositions, viz. 
"  that intuitive knowledge  is  necessary in  each step 
of  a  demonstration,  and  things  that are self-evident 
cannot  be  demonstrated t ;"  then  I shall  own  you 
have  overthrown  the  necessity  of  intuition  in every 
step of  a demonstration  by reason,  as well  as by Ari- 
stotle's  authority. 
In the remainder of  this  paragraph, I met with no- 
thing but your lordship finding  fault with some, who, 
in this age, have made use of mathematical demonstra- 
tions in natural philosophy.  Your lordship's  two rea- 
* J3. iv, c. 7.  10, 19, and elsewhere.  U.  iv, c. 2. 
sons against this way of advancing knowledge upon the 
sure grounds of mathematical demonstration, are these: 
(1.) "  That Des  Cartes,  a  mathematical  man,  has 
been guilty of  mistakes  in his system."  Answ.  When 
mntliematical men will build  systems  upon fancy, and 
not upon demonstration, they are as liable to mistakes 
as others.  And  that Des Cartes was  not led into his 
mistakes by mathematical demonstrations, but for want 
of them, I think  has  been  demonstrated by * some of 
those mathematicians who seem to be meant here. 
(2.) Your second argument against accommodating 
mathematics to the nature of material things is, "  that 
mathematicians cannot be certain of  the manner  and 
degrees of  force given  to bodies  so far distant as the 
fixed  stars ; nor  of  the laws  of  motion in  other sy- 
stems."  A very  good argument why they should not 
proceed demonstratively in this  our system upon laws 
of  motion,  observed  to be established  here : a reason 
that may persuade us to put out our eyes, for fear they 
should mislead us in what we do see, because there be 
things out of our sight. 
It  is great pity Aristotle had not understood mathe- 
matics as well  as Mr. Newton,  and made use  of  it in 
natural philosophy with as good success :  his example 
had then authorized the accommodating of  it to mate- 
rial things.  But it is not to be ventured, by a man of 
this age, to go out of  the method which Aristotle has 
prescribed,  and which  your lordship,  out of  him, has 
set down in the following pages,  as that which should 
be kept to :  for it is a dangerous presumption to go out 
of a track chalked out by that supposed dictator in the 
comnlonwealth of letters, though it led him to the eter- 
nity of  the world.  I say not this, that I do not think 
him  a very  great man:  he  made  himself  so,  by  not 
keeping precisely to beaten tracks : which servile sub- 
*jection of  the mind,  if we  may take my lord Bacon's 
word for it,  kept  the little knowledge the world had 
from growing greater, for more than a few ages.  That 
the breaking loose from it in  this age is a fault, is not 
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directly said ;  but there is  enough said, to show there 
is no great approbation of such a liberty.  Mathematics 
in gross,  it is plain,  are a  grievance  in  natural philo- 
sophy, and with reason : for mathematical proofs,  like 
diamonds,  are  hard  as  well  as  clear,  and  will  be 
touched with nothing but strict reasoning.  Mathema- 
tical proofs are out of  the reach of  topical arguments, 
and are  not  to be  attacked by the  equivocal  use  of 
words or declamation, that make so great a part of other 
discourses ;  nay, even of controversies.  How well you 
have proved my way of ideas guilty of  any tendency to 
scepticism, the reader will  see ; but  this I will  crave 
leave to say, that the secluding mathematical reasoning 
from philosophy,  and instead  thereof  reducing  it to 
Aristotelian rules and  sayings, will  not be thought to 
be much in favour of knowledge against scepticism. 
Your lordship indeed says,  you did not by any means 
take off from  the  laudable  endeavours  of  those,  who 
have  gone  about  to reduce  natural  speculations  to 
mathematical  certainty."  What can  we  understand 
by this,  but your  lordship's  great  complaisance  and 
moderation ?  who,  notwithstanding  you  spend  four 
pages to '(  show that  the endeavours  of mathematical 
men, to accommodate the principles  of that science to 
the nature of  material things, havc been  the occasion 
of great mistakes in the philosophy of  this age ;" and 
that therefore Aristotle's method is to be followed:  yet 
you make this compliment to the mathematicians, that 
you leave them to their liberty to go on, if they please, 
in their laudable endeavours to reduce  natural specu- 
lations to mathematical certainty. 
And thus we are come to the end of your lordship's 
clearing this passage : "  that you grant that by sensa- 
tion and reflection  we  come  to know the powers  and 
properties of  things; but our reason  [i. e.  the  prin- 
ciples  of  reason  agreed  on  by mankind]  is satisfied, 
that there must be  something beyond these ;  because 
it is impossible they should subsist  by themselves : so 
that the nature of  things properly belongs to reason 
[i.  e. the principles of  reason  agreed on by mankind] 
and  not  to  mere  ideas."  Which if  any one  be  so 
lucky as  to understand  by these  your  lordship's  fifty 
pages  spent upon it, better than my friend did, when 
he confessed  himself  gravelled by it, as it stands  here 
recited, he ought to enjoy the advantage of  his happy 
genius, whilst I miss that satisfaction by the dulness of 
mine ;  which hinders me also from  seeing how the op- 
position of  the way of certainty by ideas, and the way 
of  certainty by reason,  comes  in, in the explication of 
this passage : or  at least, if it does belong to it, yet I 
must own, what is a greater misfortune, that I do not 
see  what  the opposition  or  difference is,  which your 
lordship  has  so much  talked  of,  between the way of 
certainty by ideas, and the method of certainty by rea- 
son.  For my excuse, I think others will be as much in 
the dark as I, since you nowhere tell wherein yourself, 
my lord,  place  certainty.  So that to talk of a differ- 
ence  between certainty by  ideas, and certainty that is 
not by ideas, without declaring in what that other cer- 
tainty consists ; is  like to have no better success, than 
might be  expected from one who would  compare two 
things together, the one whereof is not known. 
You now return to your discourse of nature and per- 
son,  and tell me,  that to what  you  said  about the 
general nature in distinct individuals,  I object  these 
three things ; 
(1)  That I cannot  put together one and the same 
and  distinct."  This  I  own  to  be  my  objection; 
cc and consequently there  is po foundation for the di- 
stinction  of  nature  and  person."  This,  with  sub- 
mission, I deny to be any objection  of  mine,  either in 
the place quoted by your lordship, or any where else. 
There may be foundation enough for distinction, as there 
is of these two, and yet they may be treated of in a way 
so obscure, so confused, or perhaps so sublime, that an 
ordinary  capacity  may  not from  thence get, as your 
lordship expresses it, "  clear and distinct apprehensions 
of  them."  This  was  that  which  my  friend  and I 
complained of in that place, want of clearness in your 
lordship's  discourse,  not  of  want of  distinction in the 
things themselves. 430  Mr. Lockc's  secorzd Reply 
(2.)  "That what  your  lordship said about common 
nature,  and particular  substance in  individuals,  was 
wholly  unintelligible  to  me  and  my  friends."  To 
which, my lord,  you  may add if  you  please,  that it is 
still so to me. 
(3.) That I said, "that to speak truly and precisely 
of  this matter as in reality it is, there is no such thing 
as  one  and the same conlrnon  nature in  several indi- 
viduals;  for  all that in  truth is  in  them,  is  particu- 
lar,  and  nothing  but  particular,"  kc.  Ipnsw.  This 
was  said,  to show how unapt these  expressions, "the 
same common nature in several individuals,  and seve- 
ral  individuals  being  in  the same  coinmon  nature, 
were to give true and clear  notions  of  nature."  To 
this  your  lordship answers, that other, and those very 
rational men, have spoken so: to which I shall: say no 
more, but that it is an argument, with which any thing 
may be defended, and all the jargon of  the schools be 
justified ; but, I presume,  not  strong enough to bring 
it back again, let men ever so rational make use of it. 
Your  lordship  adds, "but now, it seems, nothing is 
intelligible but what suits with the new way of  ideas." 
My lord,  the new way  of  ideas,  and  the  old  way of 
speaking intelligibly, was always, and ever will be the 
same.  And  if I may  take the liberty to declare my 
sense of  it, herein it consists : (1.)  That a man use no 
words but such as he makes the signs of certain deter- 
mined  objects  of  his  mind  in  thinking, which he can 
make known  to  another.  (2.) Next, that he use the 
same word steadily for the sign of the same immediate 
object  of  his  mind  in thinking.  (3.)  That  he  join 
those words together in  propositions, according to the 
grammatical rules of that language he speaks in.  (4.) 
That he unite those sentences in a coherent discourse. 
Thus, and thus only, I humbly conceive, any one  may 
preserve  himself  from  the confines  and  suspicion of 
jargon, whether he pleases to call those  immediate ob- 
jects of  his  mind, which  his words do or should stand 
for, ideas or no. 
You  again accuse the way of ideas, to make a com- 
mon nature no more than a common name.  That, my 
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lord,  is not my  way  by  ideas.  When your  lordship 
shows  me where I have  said so, I promise  your  lord- 
ship to strike it out: and the like I promise, when you 
show me where "I  presume that we are not to judge of 
things  by  the  general  principles  of  reason,"  which 
you call my fundamental mistake.  ''  These principles 
of  reason,  you  say,  must  be  the  standard to  man- 
kind."  If  they  are  of  such  consequence,  would  it 
not have been convenient we should have been instructed 
something more particularly about them, than by barely 
being told their name ;  that we might be able to know 
what are, and what are not principles of reason ? 
But be they what they will, because they must be the 
standard to mankind, your lordship says, "you  shall in 
this  debate proceed  upon the following  principles, to 
make it appear that the difference between nature and 
person  is  not  imaginary and fictitious,  but  grounded 
upon  the  real  nature  of  things."  With  submission, 
my lord, you need not be at  the pains to draw up your 
great art~llery  of so many maxims, where you meet with 
no opposition.  The thing in debate, whether  in this 
debate or no, I know not, but what led into this debate, 
was  about  the expressions,  "one  common  nature in 
several  individuals,  and  several  individuals  in  one 
common  nature :" and the question,  I thought,  was, 
whether  a  general  or  common  nature  could  be  in 
particulars, i.  e. exist  in individuals ?  But since  your 
lordship turns your artillery against those who deny that 
there is  any foundation of  distinction between nature 
and person, I am out of gun-shot ;  for I am  none of 
those, who ever said or thought there was no foundation 
of distinction between nature and person. 
The  maxims youlay down in the  following paragraph, 
are to make me understand how one and the same and 
distinct  may consist; I confess, I do not see how your 
lordship's words there at  all make it  out.  This, indeed, 
I do understand, that several particular beings inay have 
a conformity in them to one general abstract idea, which 
may, if  you please,  be called their general or common 
nature :  but how that idea or general nature can be the 
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To  my saying, that your  lordship  had  not told me 
what  nature is, I am told,  that "if  I had a mind  to 
understand  you, I could  not  but see,  that by nature 
you  meant  the  subject of  essential  properties."  A 
lady asking a learned  physician what  the spleen mas, 
received this  answer, that it was the receptacle of  the 
melancholy humour.  She had  a mind  to understand 
what the spleen was, but by this definition of it found 
herself not much enlightened ;  and therefore went on to 
ask,  what  the melancholy  humour  was:  and by  the 
doctor's answer found that the spleen and the melancholy 
humour had a relation one to the other; but what the 
spleen was, she knew not one jot  better  than she did 
before  he told  her any thing about it.  My lord, rela- 
tive definitions of terms that are not relative, usually do 
no more than lead us in a circuit to the same place from 
whence we set out, and there leave us in the same igno- 
rance we were  in  at first,  So I fear it would fall out 
with me here, if I, willing as T am to understand what 
your  lordship means by nature, should go to ask what 
you mean by essential properties. 
The three or four next pages, I hope, your lordship 
does not think contain any serious answer to what my 
friend said concerning Peter, James, and John ;  and as 
for the pleasantry of your countryman, I shall not pre- 
tend  to meddle  with  that,  since  your  lordship,  who 
knows  better  than any body his way  of  chopping  of 
logic, was fain to give it off,  because  it was  growing 
too rough.  What work  such a dangerous chopper of 
logic would make, with an argument that supposed the 
names  Peter, James, and John, to stand for ~nen  ;  and 
then without  scruple affirmed, that the nature of man 
was  in them;  if  he were  let loose  upon  it: who can 
tell ?  Especially if he might have the  liberty strenuously 
to use the phrase "  for  his life," and to observe what a 
turn the chiming  of  words,  without  determined ideas 
annexed  to them,  gives  to the understanding,  when 
they are gone deep into a man's  head, and pass there 
for things, 
To  show that the common or general nature of man 
could not be  in  Peter or  James, I alleged, that what- 
ever existed (as whatever was  in Peter or James did) 
was particular; and that it confounded my understand- 
ing, to make a general a particular.  In answer, your 
lordship  tells  me,  that,  to make me understand  this, 
you had told me in your answer to my first letter, ('that 
we are to consider beings as God had ordered them in 
their several sorts and ranks,"  &c.  And thereupon you 
ask me, "  why it was not answered in the proper place 
for it ?"  Answer.  I own I was not always so fortunate, 
as to say things in that, which your lordship thinks the 
proper place ;  but having been rebuked for repetitions, 
I thought your lordship could not be ignorant that "  I 
had considered beings as God had ordered them in their 
several sorts and ranks,"  &c. since you could not but 
have read  these  words  of  mine :  I  would not here 
be thought to forget,  much  less to deny,  that nature 
in  the  production  of  things  makes  several  of  them 
alike.  There is  nothing  more  obvious,  especially  in 
the  races  of  animals,  and a11  things  propagated  by 
seed*,"  &c.  And I have  expressed  my sense in  this 
point  so  fully here,  and in  other places,  particularly 
b.  iii. c. 6,  that I dare leave it to my reader, without 
any farther explication. 
Your  lordship  farther  asks,  "  Is not  that  a  real 
nature, which  is  the subject of  real properties ?  And 
is not the nature really in those who have the essential 
properties? I  answer  to both  those  questions,  Yes; 
such as is the reality of the subject, such is the reality 
of its properties :  the abstract general idea is really in 
the mind of  him that has it, and the properties that it 
has are really and inseparably annexed  to it ;  let this 
reality be whatever your lordship pleases : but this will 
never prove, that this gneral  nature exists in Peter or 
James.  Those properties, with  submission, do not, as 
your lordship supposes, exist in Peter and James :  those 
qualities indeed may exist in them, which your lordship 
calls properties ;  but they are not properties in either 
of  them,  but are properties only of  that specific abs- 
tract nature,  which  Peter and James,  for  their  sup- 
posed  conformity to it,  are ranked  under.  For ex- 
* Essay, b. iii.  c. 3. $ 13. 
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ample,  rationality,  as much  a  property  as it is  of  a 
man, is no propcrty of Petcr.  He  was rational a good 
part of his life, could writc and read,  and was a sharp 
f'ellow  at a  bargain;  but  about  thirty,  a  knock  so 
altered him, that for these  twenty years past he has 
been able to do nolie of  these things : there is to this 
clay  not so  much  appearance of  reason in  bin1  as in 
his horse or monkey, and yet he is Peter still. 
Your lordship asks, "  Is not that a real nature, that 
is the subject of  real properties? And  is not that na- 
ture really in those who have the same essential yro- 
perties ?"  Give me leave, I beseech you, to ask, are not 
those distinct real natures, that are the subjects of di- 
stinct essential properties ?  For example, that the na- 
tiwe of an animal is the subject of  essential properties 
of an animal, with the exclusion of those of a man or a 
horse ;  for else the nature of an animal, and the nature 
of a man, and the nature of a horse, would be the same : 
and so, wherever the subject of the essential properties 
of' an animal is,  there also would  be the subject of the 
essential properties of  a man, and of  a horse : and so, 
in effect, whatever is an animal, would be a man : the 
real nature of an animal, and the real nature of a man, 
being the same.  To avoid this, there is no other way 
(if thls reality your lordship builds  so much on be any 
thing beymd the reality of two abstract distinct ideas 
in the mind) but that there be one  real nature of  an 
animal,  tbe subject  of  the essential properties  of  an 
animal ;  ~nd  mother real nature of a man, the subject 
cf  the ~sqentisl  properti~s  of  a man: both which  real 
nzti~res  must  be  in Peter,  to make  him a man.  So 
that every individual man or beast must, according to 
this account, have  two real natures in  him,  to make 
him what he is:  nay,  if this, be  so, two will  not serve 
the turn.  Bucephdus must  have the real  nature of 
ens or being, and the real nature of body, and the real 
nature of vivens, and the real nature of animal, and the 
real  nature of  a horse ; i. e.  five distinct real natures 
in  him,  to make him  Bucephalus:  for  these  are all 
really  distinct  common  natures,  whereof  one  is not 
the subject of  precisely the same essential properties 
as the other.  This,  though very  hard  to my under- 
standing, must be really so,  if every distinct, common, 
or general nature,  be  a real being,  that really exists 
any where,  but in the understanding : "  common  na- 
ture,  taken in  my  way  of  ideas,  your  lordship  truly 
says,  will  not make  me  understand  such  a  common 
nature, as you  speak of, which  subsists in several  in- 
dividuals,  because  I  can  have  no  ideas  of  real  sub- 
stances, but such as are particular;  all others are only 
abstract ideas, and made only by the act of the mind." 
But what your lordship farther promises there, I find, 
to my  sorrow,  does  not hold, viz.  that in  your  lord- 
ship's way (as far as you have discovered it) which you 
call "  the way of reason, I may come to a better under- 
standing of this matter." 
Your lordship in the next paragraph declares your- 
self really ashamed to be  put to explain these things, 
that which you had said being so very plain and easy: 
and yet I am not ashamed to own, "that for my life" I 
cannot understand them, as they are now farther ex- 
plained.  Your lordship thinks it proved,  that every 
common nature is a real being :  let it be so, that it is 
the subject  of  real properties, and that thereby it is 
demonstrated to be a real being ; this makes it harder 
for me to conceive, that this common nature of a man, 
which is a real being, and but one, should yet be really 
in Peter,  in  James,  and  in  John.  Had Amphitruo 
been  able to conceive  this,  he had  not  been  so much 
puzzled,  or thought Sosia to talk idly, when  he told 
him, domi ego sum inguam et apud te adsum Sosia idem. 
For the common nature of man is a real being, as your 
lordship says,  and Sosia is no more : and he that can 
conceive  any one  and  the same real  being  to  be  in 
divers  places  at once,  can  have  no difficulty to con- 
ceive  it of  another real being.  And so  Sosia may at 
the same time be at  home, and with his master abroad: 
and Amphitruo might have been  ashamed to demand 
the explication of  so plain a matter;  or at least, if he 
had stuck a little at here and there too, ought he not 
to have been satisfied, as soon as Sosia had told him, I 
am another distinct I, here, from the same I, that I am 
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there ?  Which, no doubt,  Sosia could have  made out : 
let your  lordship's  countryman  chop  logic with  him, 
and try whether  he cannot.  Countryman.  But how 
is it possible,  Sosia,  that thou the real same,  as thou 
sayest, should be at home and here too?  Sosia.  Very 
easily, because I am really the same, and yet distinct. 
Countryman. How can this be ?  Sosia.  By a trick that 
I have.  Countryinan.  Canst thou teach me the trick? 
Sosia.  Yes : it is but for thee to get a particular sub- 
sistence proper to thy real self  at home,  and another 
particular  subsistence  proper  to  thy  same  real  self 
abroad, and the business is done :  thou wilt then easily 
be the same real thing, and distinct from thyself;  and 
thou mayest  be in as many places  together,  as thou 
canst get particular subsistences, and be still the same 
one real being.  Countryman.  But what is  that par- 
ticular subsistence ?  Sosia.  Hold ye,  hold ye,  friend, 
that's  the secret!  I thought once it was  a. particular 
existence,  but that I find is an ineffectual drug,  and 
will  not do: every one sees it will not make the same 
real  being  distinct from  itself,  nor bring it into two 
different places at once, and therefore it is laid aside, 
and subsistence is taken to do the feat.  Countryman. 
Existence my boy's  schoolmaster made me underatand, 
the other day,  when  my  gray mare foaled.  For he 
told me that a horse, that never was befoxe, began then 
to exist;  and when the poor foal died, he told me the 
same horse ceased to exist.  Sosia.  But did he tell thee 
what  became of  the real common  nature of  a horse, 
that was ib it, when the foal died ?  Countryman.  No : 
but  this I know, that  my real horse was redly  destroyed. 
Sosia. There's now thy ignorance! So much of thy horse 
as had a  real existence was redly destroyed, that  b true: 
but there was something in thy horse, which, having a 
real particular subsistence, was not destroyed: nay, and 
the best  part of  thy horse too;  for it was that, which 
had in  it  all  those  properties  that made  thy horse 
better than a broomstick.  Countryman.  Thou tell'st 
me wonders of this same subsistence;  what, I pray thee, 
is it  ?  Sosia.  I beg your pardon for that ;  it is the very 
philosopher's  stone:  thaw who are adepti, and can do 
strange things with it, are wiser than to tell what it is. 
Countryman.  Where may it be bought then ?  Sosia. 
That I know not :  but I will tell thee where tho11 mayest 
meet with it.  Countryman.  Where  ?  Sosia.  In some 
of the shady thickets of the schoolmen ;  and it is worth 
the looking  after.  For  if  particular  subsistence  has 
such a  power over a real being,  as to make one  and 
the same real being to be distinet, and ill divers places 
at  once, it  may perhaps be able to give thee an account 
what becomes of that real nature of thy horse after thy 
horse is dead ;  and if  thou canst but find whither that 
retires,  who  knows  but thou  mayest get as  useful  a 
thing as thy horse again? since to that real nature of 
thy horse  inseparably  adhere the shape  and motion, 
and other properties of thy horse. 
I hope,  my lord,  your  countryman will  not  be  dis- 
pleased  to have  met  with  Sosia  to chop  logic  with, 
who, I think, has made it as intelligible,  how his real 
self  might be the same and distinct, and be really in 
distinct places at once, by the help of a particular sub- 
sistence proper to him in each place ;  as it is intelligible 
how any real being under the name of  a common  na- 
ture, or under any other name bestowed upon it, may 
be the same and distinct, and really be in divers places 
at once, by the help of a particular subsistence proper 
to kach  of  those distinct  sames.  At least,  if  I  may 
answer for  myself,  I  understand  one  as  well  as  the 
other : and if my head be turned from common  sense 
(as I find your lordship very apt to think) so that it is 
great news to you that I understand any thing; if  in 
my way of ideas I cannot understand worrls,  that ap- 
pear to me either to stand for  no ideas,  or to be  so 
joined,  that they  put inconsistent  ideas together;  T 
think your  lordship uses me right,  to turn me off  for 
desperate, and a leave me,  as you do,  to the reader's 
understanding." 
To  your lordship's  many questions  coricerning  men 
and drilb, in the ~aragraph  where you begin to explain 
what my friend and I found difficult in your discourse 
concerning person;  I  answer,  that these two names, 
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on real distinct properties or no :  so perfectly arbitrary 
that,  if  men  had  pleased, drill rnight  have  stood  for 
what man now does, and vice versa.  I answer farther, 
that these two  names  stand for  two  abstract ideas, 
which  are (to  those  who  know  what  they  mean  by 
these two names) the distinct essences  of  two distinct 
kinds ;  and as particular existences, or things existing 
are  found  by  men  (who  know  what  they  mean  by 
these names)  to agree to either of  those  ideas,  whkh 
these names stand  for;  these names  respectively  ore 
applied to those particular things, and the things said 
to be of  that kind.  This I have so fully and at large 
explained in  my  Essay, that I should have thought it 
needless to have said any thing again of it here, had it 
not been to show my readiness to answer any questions 
you shall be pleased to ask concerning any thing I have 
writ, which  your lordship either finds difficult,  or has 
forgot. 
In the next place, your lordship comes to clear what 
you  had  said  in answer to this  question put by your- 
self, "  what  is  this  distinction  of  Peter,  James,  and 
John founded upon ?"  To which  you answered, "  that 
they  may  be  distinguished  from  each  other  by  our 
senses,  as to difference of  features, distance of  place, 
&c.  But that is not all; for  supposing there was no 
external difference,  yet  there is  a difference  between 
them,  as several  individuals in the same common na- 
ture."  These words  when  my friend  and I came to 
consider, we owned, as your lordship here takes notice, 
that we could  understand no more  by them  but this, 
6c  that the ground  of  distinction  between  several  in- 
dividuals  in  the  same  common  nature is,  that they 
are several  individuals  in  the same common  nature." 
Hereupon  your lordship tells me, "  the question  now 
is, what this distinction is founded upon? whether on 
our observing  the difference  of  features, distance  of 
place, &c. or on some antecedent ground." 
Pursuant  hereunto,  as  if  this  were  the  question, 
you ih the next paragraph (as far as I can understand 
it) make the ground  of  the distinction between these 
individuals:  or  the  principium  individuntionis,  to  be 
the union of the soul and body.  But with submission, 
my lord, the question is, whether I and my friend were 
to blame,  because when  your  lordship,  in  the words 
above-cited,  having  removed  all other grounds of  di- 
stinction,  said,  "  there was yet  a  difference  between 
Peter and James, as several  individuals  in  the same 
common  nature ;" we  could  understand  no more  by 
it but "  this, that the ground of  distinction  between 
several individuals in the same coinrnon nature is, that 
they are several individuals in the same common nature." 
Let the ground that your lordsliip now assigns of the 
distinction  of  individuals  be what it will, or  let what 
you say be as clear as you  please, viz, that the ground 
of their distinction is in the union of soul and body; it 
will, I humbly conceive, be nevertheless true, that what 
you  said  before  might amount to no more  but this, 
"that the ground of the distinction between several in- 
dividuals  in the same common  natur.e  is,  that they 
are several individuals in the same common  nature :  ' 
and therefore we might not be to blame for so under- 
standing it.  For the words which  our understandings 
were then employed about, were those which yon had 
there  said,  and  not  those which  you  would say five 
months  after:  though I must  own, that those  which 
your lordship here says  concerning the distinction  of 
individuals, leave it as much in the dark to me as what 
you said before.  But perhaps I do not understand your 
lordship's  words  right,  because  I  conceive  that  the 
princ+ium  ir2dividuationis  is  the  same  in  1111  the 
several species of creatures, men as well as others; and 
therefore if the union of soul and body be that which 
distinguishes two individuals in the human species one 
from another,  I know  not  how two cherries,  or  two 
atoms of matter,  can be  distinct  individuals;  since I 
think there is  in them no union  of a  soul  and body. 
And upon this ground it will be very hard to tell what 
made the soul and the body individuals  (as certainly 
they were) before their union. 
But I shall leave what your lordship says concerning 
this matter to the examination  of those, whose health aiid leisure allow them more time than I have for this 
weighty question, wherein the distinction of two men or 
two cherries consists: for fear I should make your lord- 
ship's countryman a little wonder again, to find a grave 
pliilosopher make a serious question of' it. 
To your nest paragraph, I answer, that if the true 
idea of a person,  or  the true signification of the word 
person lies in this, that supposing  there was no  other 
difference in the several  individuals of the same kind, 
yet there is a difference between them as several indivi- 
duals in the same common nature; it will follow from 
hence, that the name person will agree to Bucephalus 
and Podargus,  as well  as  to Alexander  and Hector. 
But whether  this  consequence will  agree with what 
your lordship says concerning person in another place, 
I am not concerned ;  I am only answerable for thihis  @on- 
sequence. 
Your lordship is pleased here  to call my endeavour 
to find out the meaning of your words,  as you had put 
them  together, " trifling  exceptions."  To which  I 
must say, that I am heartily sorry, that either my un- 
derstanding, or your lordship's  way of writing, oMges 
me so often to such trifling.  I cannot, as I ham said, 
answer to what I do not understand ;  and I hope here 
my trifling, in searching out your lordship's meaning, 
was  not  much out of the way,  because I think  every 
one will see by the steps I took, that the sense I found 
out by  it was  that which  your  words  implied;  and 
your lordship does not disown it, but only replies, that 
I should not  have  drawn that which was  the natural 
consequence from it,  because  that consequence would 
not  well  consist  with  what  you  had  said  in  another 
place. 
What your lordship adds farther to clear your say- 
ing, "  that an individual intelligent substance is rather 
supposed to the making  of a  person  than the proper 
definition  of  it;"  though  in  your  definition  of  per- 
son you put a complete intelligent substance :  may have 
its effect upon others' understandings; but I must suffer 
under  the short-sightedness  of my  own, who  neither 
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understood it as it stood in your first angwer, nor do I 
now as it is explained in your second. 
Your lordship being  here,  as you  say, come to the 
end of this debate, I should here have ended too ; and 
it was time, my letter being grown already to too great 
a  bulk : but I being  engaged  by  promise  to  answer 
some things in your first letter, rvhich in my reply to it 
I had omitted, I come  now to  them, and shall endea- 
vour to give your lordship satisfaction in those points; 
though to make room for them I leave out a great deal 
that I had writ  in  answer  to this  your lordship's  se- 
cond letter.  And if after all my answer seems too long, 
I must beg your lordship and  my reader to excuse it, 
and  impute  it to those  occasior~s  of  length, which  I 
have mentioned  in more places than one, as they have 
occurred. 
The original and main question between your  lord- 
ship and me being, "  whether  there  were  any thing 
in my Essay repugnant to the docrine of the Trinity ?" 
I endeavoured,  by examining the grounds  and  man- 
ner of your lordship's  bringing my book into that con- 
troversy, to bring that  question  to a  decision.  And 
therefore  in my answer to your lordship's  first letter, 
I insisted particularly on what had a  relation to that 
point.  This method your lordship in your second let- 
ter censured, as if  it contained only personal matters, 
which were fit to be  laid aside.  And by mixing new 
matter and charging my book with new accusations be- 
fore the first was  made  out, avoided  the decision  of 
what was in debate between us; a strong presumption 
to me that your  lordship had little to say to support 
what began the controversy, which you were so willing 
to have me let fall; whilst on the other side, my silence 
to  other points which I had promised an answer to, was 
often reflected on, and I rebuked for not answering in 
the proper place. 
Your lordship's calling upon me on this occasion shall 
not be lost; it is fit your expectation should be satisfied, 
and your objections considered ;  which, for the reasons 
above-mentioned,  were  not  examined  in  my  former 
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conceive, make nothing  for or  against the doctrine of 
the Trinity.  I shall therefore consider them barely as 
so many philosophical questions, and endeavour to show 
your  lordship where  and  upon  what  grounds it is  I 
stick ; and  what  it is that hinders me  from the satis- 
faction it would be to me to be in every one of them of 
your mind. 
Your lordship tells me, p..  7, "  whether I do own sub- 
stance or not, is not the point  before us ; but whether 
by virtue  of  these  principles I can  come  to any cer- 
tainty of reason about it.  And your lordship says, the 
very places I produce  do prove  the contrary; which 
you shall therefore  set  down  in  my own words, both 
as to corporeal and spiritual substances." 
Here again, my lord, I must beg your pardon, that 
I do not distinctly comprehend your meaning in these 
words, viz. "  that by virtue of these principles one can- 
not come to certainty of  reason about eubstance :" for 
it is not very clear to me, whether your lordship means, 
that we cannot come to certainty, that there is such a 
thing in the world as substance ;  or whether we cannot 
make any other proposition about substance, of which 
we can be certain ;  or whether we cannot by my prin- 
ciples establish any idea  of substance of which we can 
be certain.  For to come to certainty of reason about 
substance  may  signify either  of  these, which  are far 
different propositions:  and  I  shall  waste  your  lord- 
ship's time, my reader's,  and my own, (neither of which 
would I willingly do) by  taking it in one sense, when 
you mean it in another, lest it should meet with  some 
such reproof as this :  that "  I misrepresent your mean- 
ing,  or  might  have  understood  it,  if I  had  a  mind 
to it,"  &c.  And therefore  cannot  but wish  that you 
had so far condescended to the slowness of my appre- 
hension as to give me your sense so determined, that I 
might not trouble you with  answers  to what was  not 
your precise meaning. 
To avoid it in the present case,  and to find in what 
sense I was here to take these words, "  come to  no cer- 
tainty of reason  about substance,"  I looked into what 
followed,  and when I came to the 13th page, I fhouglit 
I had there got a  clear  explication of your lordship's 
meaning;  and that by no  certainty  of  reason  about 
substance your lordship here meant no certain idea of 
substance.  Your lordship's words are, "  I do not charge 
them" (i. e.  me, as one  of  the gentlemen  of  the new 
way of reasoning) "  with discarding the notion of sub- 
stance because they have  but an imperfect idea of it; 
but  because  upon  those  principles  there  can  be  no 
certain  idea  at  all  of  it."  Here I  thought myself 
sure, and that these words plainly interpreted the mean- 
ing of  your  proposition,  p. 7,  to be,  "  that upon my 
principles there can  be  no  certain  idea at all of sub- 
stance."  But before I carne  to  the end of that para- 
graph I found myself at a loss again; for that paragraph 
goes on in these words : "  whereas your lordship asserts 
it to be one  of  the most  natural  and certain ideas in 
our minds, because it is a repugnance to our first con- 
ceptions  of  things,  that  modes  or  accidents  should 
subsist  by  themselves;  and  therefore  you  said,  the 
rational idea  of substance is  one  of the first ideas in 
our minds : and  however  imperfect  and  obscure our 
notion be,  yet we  are as certain  that substances  are 
and must  be,  as  that there  are many  beings  in  the 
world."  Here the certainty,  which  your words  seem 
to mean, is certainty of the being of substance. 
In this sense therefore I shall take it, till your lord- 
ship shall determine it otherwise.  And  the reason why 
I take it so is,  because what your  lordship goes on to 
say,  seems  to me to look  most  that way.  The pro- 
position then that your lordship undertakes to prove is 
this, "  that by virtue of  my  principles we cannot come 
to any certainty of reason, that there is any such thing 
as  substance."  And  your  lordship  tells  me,  "  that 
the very  places  I  produce  do  prove  the  contrary, 
which you therefore will  set  down  in my own words, 
both as to corporeal and spiritual substances." 
The first your  lordship  brings,  are these words  of 
mine:  a  When we talk or think of any particular sort 
of  corporeal  substances,  as horse,  stone,  &c.  though 
the idea we have of either  of them  be but the compli- 
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sensible qualities, which we  use  to And  united in  the 
thing called  horse  or  stone; 7et because  we  cannot 
conceive how they sliould subs~st  alone, nor one in an- 
other, we suppose them  existing in, and supported by 
some  common  subject; which  support we  denote  by 
the name substance :  though it be certain, we have no 
clear and distinct idea of that thing we suppose a sup- 
port."  And again, 
"  The same  happens  concerning  the operations  of 
the mind, viz.  thinking,  reasoning,  fearing, &c. which 
we  considering  not  to subsist  of  themselves, nor  ap- 
prehending how they can  belong  to body,  or be pro- 
duced by it, we are apt to think  these the actions  of 
some other substance, which we  call spirit ;  whereby 
yet it is  evident, that having  no  other idea  or notion 
of matter, but something wherein those  many sensible 
qualities, which affect our  senses, do subsist; but snp- 
posing a substance, wherein thinking, knowing, doubt- 
ing, and a power  of moving,  &c. do  subsist: we have 
as clear a notion  of the nature  or substance of spirit, 
as we  have  of  body; the  one  being supposed  to be 
(without knowing what it is) the substratum  to those 
simple  ideas  we  have  from  without;  and  the  other 
supposed  (with  a  like ignorance of what it is)  to be 
the substratum to those  operations which we  experi- 
ment in ourselves." 
But; how  these words  prove,  that  "upon  my prin- 
ciples we cannot come to any certainty of reason, that 
there is any such thing as  substance in the world ;" I 
confess I do not see, nor  has your lordship, as I hum- 
bly conceive, shown.  And I think it would be a hard 
matter from these words of mine to make a syllogism, 
whose conclusion should be,  e~go,  '(  from my principles 
we cannot come to any certainty of reason, that there 
is any su.bstance in the world." 
Your lordship indeed tells  me,  that I say, "that in 
these and the like fashions  of speaking, that the sub- 
stance is always supposed something ;" and grant that 
I say over and over,  that substance is supposed : but 
that, your  lordship says, is not what you  looked  for, 
but something in the way of certainty by reason. 
What your lordship looks for is not, I find, always 
easy for me  to guess.  But what I brought that,  and 
some other passages to the same purposes for, out of my 
Essay is,  that I think they prove,  viz.  that '' I did not 
discard,  nor almost  discard  substance out of  the rea- 
sonable world."  For he that supposes  in  every spe- 
cies of  material  beings,  substance to be always some- 
thing, doth not discard or almost discard it out of the 
world,  or deny any such  thing  to be.  The passages 
alleged, I think, prove  this; which  was  all I brought 
them for.  And  if  they  should  happen  to  prove  no 
more, I think you can hardly infer from thence, "  that 
therefore upon  my principles we  can come  to no cer- 
tainty, that there is any such thing as substance in the 
world." 
Your lordship  goes  on to insist  mightily  upon  my 
supposing; and to these words  of  mine, "  we cannot 
conceive  how  these  sensible  qualities  should  subsist 
alone,  and  therefore we  suppose  a  substance to sup- 
port  them,"  your  lordship  replies,  '(  it  is  but  sup- 
posing  still;  because  we  cannot  conceive  it  other- 
wise : but what certainty follows  from  not being able 
to conceive ?"  Answ.  The same  certainty that  fol- 
lows from  the repugnancy to our first conceptions  of 
things upon which your lordship grounds  the relative 
idea of substance.  Your words are, "it is a rnere effect 
of reason, because  it is il repugnancy to our first con- 
ceptions  of  things,  that  modes  or  accidents should 
subsist  by themselves."  Your  lordship  then,  if I un- 
derstand your reasoning  here,  concludes  that there is 
hubstance, "because  it 1s  a  repugnancy to our concep- 
tions  of  things"  (for  whether  that repugnancy be to 
our  first  or  second  conceptions,  I  think  that is  all 
one) "that modes or accidents should subsist by them- 
selves ;" and I conclude  the same  thing,  because we 
cannot conceive how sensible qualities should subsist by 
themselves.  Now  what  the difference of  certainty is 
frm  a  repugnancy to our conceptions,  and from our 
not being able to conceive ; T confess,  my lord, I am 
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me,  that I have  laid  down the same certainty of  the 
being of substance, that your lordship has done. 
Your lordship  adds,  are there not  multitudes  of 
things which we  are not able to conceive? and yet it 
would  not be  allowed  us  to suppose  what we  think 
fit  upon  that  account."  Answer.  Your lordship's  is 
certainly a very just  rule ; it is  pity it does not reach 
the case.  "  But because it is not allowed us to suppose 
what we think fit in  things, which we are not able to 
conceive;"  it does not  therefore  follow,  that we may 
not with certainty suppose or infer that which is a na- 
tural and undeniable consequence of  such an inability 
to conceive,  as I call it, or repugnancy to our concep- 
tions, as you call it.  We cannot conceive the founda- 
tion of Harlem church to stand upon nothing; but be- 
cause it is not allowed us to suppose what we think fit, 
viz.  that it is  laid  upon  a  rock  of  diamond,  or  sup- 
ported by fairies ;  yet I think  all the world will allow 
the infallible certainty of this supposition from thence, 
that it rests  upon  something.  This I take to be the 
present case ;  and therefore  your next words, I think, 
do less concern Mr. L.  than my lord B. of W.  I shall 
set them down,  that the  reader  may  apply them  to 
which of the two he thinks they most belong.  They 
are, "  I could hardly conceive that Mr. L. would have 
brought such evidence  as this  against himself;  but I 
must suppose some unknown substrat~im  in this case." 
For these words,  that your lordship has last quoted of 
mine, do not only not prove, "  that upon my principles 
we cannot come to any certainty that there is any such 
thing as substance in the world ;" but prove  the con- 
trary,  that there must  certainly be  substance in the 
world, and upon the  very same grounds that your lord- 
ship takes it to be certain 
Your next paragraph, which  is to the same purpose, 
I have read more than once,  and can never forbear, as 
often as I read it, to wish myself young again ;  or that a 
liveliness of fancy, suitable to that age, would teach me 
to sport  with  words  for the diversion  of  my readers. 
This I find  your lordship thinks so  necessary  to the 
quickening of controversy,  that you will  not trust the 
debate to the greatness of your learning, nor the gravity 
of your subject without it, whatever authority the dig- 
nity of your character might give to what your lordship 
says :  for you having quoted these words of mine :  c6  as 
long as  there  is  any  simple  idea,  or sensible quality 
left,  according to my way of  arguing,  substance can- 
not be discarded:  because  all simple  ideas,  all sensi- 
ble qualities carry with them  a  supposition of  a sub- 
stratum to  exist  in,  and  a  substance  wherein they 
inhere :" you add, "  what  is  the meaning of carrying 
with them a  supposition  of  a substratum and  a  sub- 
stance ?  Have these  simple ideas the notion of a sub- 
stance  in  them ?  No,  but  they  carry it with them : 
How so?  Do sensible qualities carry a corporeal sub- 
stance along with them ?  Then a corporeal substance 
must be intromitted by the senses together with them. 
No,  but they carry the supposition  with  them;  and 
truly  that  is  burden  enough  for  them.  But  which 
way do they carry it?  It  seems it is only because we 
cannot  conceive  it  otherwise.  What  is  this  con- 
ceiving ?  It may be said it is  an act of the mind,  not 
built  on  simple ideas,  but lies  in  the comparing  the 
ideas  of  accident  and  substance  together;  and from 
thence finding that an accident must carry substance 
along with  it:  but  this  will  not  clear  it;  for  the 
ideas of accidents are simple ideas,  and carry nothing 
along with  them, but  the impression  made  by sensi- 
ble ohjects." 
In this passage,  I conclude,  your lordship had some 
regard to the entertainment of that part of your readers, 
who would Le thought men as well by being risible as 
rational creatures.  For I  cannot imagine you  meant 
this for  an argument:  if  you  did,  1 have  this  plain 
simple  answer,  that, "  by carrying with them  a  sup- 
position,"  I mean, aecording to the ordinary import of 
the phrase, that sensible qualities imply a substratum to 
exist in.  And if your lordship please to change one of 
these equivalent expressions into the other, 311  the argu- 
ment here, I think, will  be  at an end: what will  be- 
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Ilitherto, I do not see any thing in my words brought 
by your lorc!sliip that provcs, "  that upon my pril~ciples 
we can comc to no certainty of reason, that there is sub- 
stance in tlie world ;" but the coritrary. 
Your lordship's  next  words  are to tell  the world, 
illat  my  sin~ile  about the elephant  and  tortoise "  is 
to ridicule the notion  of  substance, and  thc European 
philosopliers  for  asserting it."  But  if  your  lordship 
picase  to turn again to my Essay ",  yon will find those 
passages  wcre  not  intended  to  ridicule  the notioil 
of  substance, or tliosc  who  asserted it, whatever that 
c6  it"  signifies : but  to show,  that though  substance 
did  support  accidents,  yet  philosophers,  who  had 
found  such  a  support  necessary,  had  no  more  a 
clear idea of  what that support was,  than the Indian 
had of that which  suy7ported his  tortoise, though sure 
he was it was something.  Had your pen, which quoted 
so  muclz  of  the  nineteenth  section  of  tlic  thirteenth 
chapter  of  my  second  book,  but  set down  the re- 
maining Jine and a  hnEf  of that paragraph, you would 
by these words tvhicll  follow  there, " so that of  sub- 
stance vre have no idea of what it is,  but only a con- 
fused  ob6cur.c one of what it rices ;"  have put it past 
doubt what I meal~t.  But  your lordship was pleased to 
take only those, wllich you thought would serve best to 
your  Furpose;  and  T crave leave  to add now  these 
remaining ones, to s'Eiow my reader what was mine. 
It is to the saine purpose I use the same illustration 
again in that other place, which you are pleased to cite 
liketvise t;  which your lordship says you did, "only to 
show that it was a deliberate and (as I thought) lucky 
similit~idc." It was upon  serious consideration, I own, 
that I entertained the opinion, that we had no clear and 
distinct idea of substance.  But  as  to  that similitude, Jdo 
not remember that it was much deliberated on; such 
inaccurate  writers as I am, who aim at  nothing but plain- 
ness, do not much  study similes ;  and, for the fault of 
repetition,  you have been  pleased  to pardon it.  But 
supposing you had proved  that simile was  to ridicule 
the notion  of substance,  published  in  the writings of 
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some European philosophers ; it will by no means fol- 
low from thence, "  that upon my principles we  cannot 
come to any certainty of reason, that there is any such 
thing as substance i11  the world."  Men's  notions of  a 
thing may  be laughed  at by those  whose  principles 
establish the certainty of the thing itself; and one may 
laugh at Aristotle's notion of  an orb of  fire under the 
sphere of  the moon, without principles that will make 
him uncertain whether there be any such thing as fire. 
My simile did perhaps serve to show, that there were 
philosophers,  whose knowledge was  not  so clear nor 
so great  as  they pretended.  If  your  lorilehip  there- 
upon thought, that the vanity of sbch z pretension 11;1d 
something  ridiculous  in  it, I  shall  not  contest  your 
judgment in the case :  for, as human nature is framed, 
it is not impossible  that whoever is  discovered  to pre- 
tend to know more thzu really he does, will be in danger 
to be laughed at. 
In the next paragraph, your lordship bestows tlie 
epithet of  dull on Burgersdicius  and Sanderson,  and 
the tribe of  logicians.  I will  not cluestion your  right 
to  call any body dull, whom you please :  but if your lord- 
ship does it to insinuate that I did so, 1 hope I may be 
allowed to  say thus much in my own defence, that I am 
neither so stupid or ill-natured to discredit those whom 
I quote, for being of  the same opinion with me.  And 
he that will look into the eleventh and twelfth pages of 
my reply, which your lordship refers to, will  find that 
I am very far from calling them dull, or speaking dimi- 
nishingly of  them.  But if  I had  been  so  ill-bred  or 
foolish as to have called then1 dall,  I  do  not see how 
that does at all  serve  to prove this proposition, "  that 
upon  my principles we  can  come  to no certainty of 
reason, that there is any such thing as substance ;"  any 
more than what follows in the next paragraph. 
Your lordship in it  asks me, as if it were of some great 
importance to the proposition to be proved,  "  whether 
there be no difference between the bare being of a thing, 
and its subsistence by itself ?"  Answ.  Yes ; there is a 
difference, as I understand tliose terms :  and then I be- 
seech your lordship to make use of it, to prove the pro- 
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position before us.  But because you seem by this ques- 
tion to conclude,  I'  that the idea of a thing that subsists 
by itself is a clear and distinct idea of substance ;" I beg 
leave to ask, is the ides of  the manner  of  subsistence 
of  a thing the idea of  the thing itself? If it be not, 
we may have  a clear and distinct idea of  the manner, 
and yet have  none  but  a  very obscure and confused 
one of  the thing.  For example, I tell your lordship, 
that I know a thing that cannot subsist without a sup- 
port, and I know  another that does subsist without a 
support, and say no more of them ;  can you, by having 
the clear and distinct ideas of  having a  support,  and 
not  having a support,  say,  that you  have  a clear and 
distinct idea of the thing, that T know, which has,  and 
of  the thing, that I know, which has not a  support? 
If your lordship can, I beseech you to give me the clear 
and distinct ideas of  these,  which  I only  call by  the 
general name of things, that have or have not supports: 
for such there are, and such I shall give your lordship 
clear and distinct ideas of,  when you shall please to  call 
upon me for them ; though I think your lordship will 
scarce find  them by the general and confused idea of 
thing, nor in the clearer and more distinct idea of hav- 
ing or not having a support. 
To  show a blind man that he has no clear and distinct 
idea of  scarlet, 1 tell him, that his notion of  it, that it 
is a thing or being, does not prove he has any clear or 
distinct idea of  it; but barely that he takes it to be 
something  he  knows  not what.  He replies,  that he 
knows more than that ; v. g.  he knows that it subsists 
or inheres in another thing :  Ec and is there no difference, 
says he, in your lordship's words, between thebare being 
of  a thing, and its subsistence in  another ?'  Yes, say 
I to him,  a great deal; &hey are very different  ideas. 
But for all that, you have no clear and distinct idea of 
scarlet, nor such an one as I have, who see and know it, 
and have another kind of idea of  it besides that of in- 
herenoe. 
Your  lordship  has  the idea of  subsisting by  itself, 
and  therefore you  conclude you have a dear  and dib 
stinct idea  of  the thing that subsists by  itself; which, 
methinks, is all one, as if your countryman should say, 
he hath an idea of a cedar of  Lebanon,  that it is a tree 
of a nature to need no prop to lean on for its support, 
therefore he hath a clear and distinct idea of a cedar of 
Lebanon :  which clear and distinct idea, when he comes 
to examine, is nothing but a general one of a tree, with 
which his indetermined idea of a cedar  is confounded. 
Just so is the idea of  substance, which, however called 
clear and distinct, is confounded with the general inde- 
termined idea of something.  But suppose that the man- 
ner of subsisting by itself gives us a clear and distinct 
idea of  substance, how does that prove,  cc that upon my 
principles we can come to no certainty of reason, that 
there is any such thing as substance  in the world?" 
which is the proposition to be proved. 
In what  follows, your  lordship  says,  "  you  do not 
charge any one with discarding the notion of substance, 
because he has but an imperfect idea of it; but because 
upon those principles there can be no certain idea at 
ail of it."  - 
- 
Your  lordship says here  those principles,"  and in 
other places  these principles,"  without particularly 
settincr them  down, that I know.  I  am sure, without 
D 
laying down propositions that are mine, and proving 
that those granted,  c'  we cannot come to any certainty 
that there  is  any such thing  as substance,"  which  is 
the thing to be proved ; your lordship proves  nothing 
in the case against me.  What,  therefore, the certain 
idea, which I do not understand, or idea of  substance, 
has to do here, is not easy to see.  For that which I 
am charged with  is  the discarding  substance.  But 
the discarding substance is not the discarding the no- 
tion of  substance.  Mr. Newton  has  discarded  Des 
Cartes's vortices, i. e. laid down principles  from which 
he proves there is no such thing ;  but he has not there- 
by discarded the notion  or idea of  those vortices,  for 
that he had when he confuted their being,  and every 
one  who  now reads  and understands  him  will  have. 
But as I have already observed, your lordship here, 1 
know not u  on what ground, nor with what intention. 
confounds t  e idea of  substance and substance itself:  K 
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for to the words  above  set  down your  lordship sub- 
joins, "  that you assert it to be one of the most natural 
and certain  ideas in our minds,  because it is  a repug- 
nance to our first conception of  things,  that modes or 
accidents should subsist by themselves ; and therefore 
your lordship said, the rational idea of  substance is one 
of the first ideas in our minds, and, however imperfect 
and obscure our notion be, yet we  are as certain that 
substances are and must be,  as that there are any be- 
ings in the world."  Herein I tell your lordship that I 
agree with you, and therefore I hope  this is no objec- 
tion  against  the  Trinity.  Your  lordship  says,  you 
"  never thought it was:  but to lay all foundations of 
certainty, as to matters of faith, upon clear and distinct 
ideas,  which  was the opinion you opposed,  does  cer- 
tainly overthrow  all mysteries of  faith,  and  excludes 
the notion  of  substance  out  of  rational  discourse;" 
which your lordship affirms to have been your meaning. 
How these  words, "  as  to matters of  faith,"  came 
in, or  what they had  to do against me in an answer 
only to me, I do not see:  neither will  I here examine 
what it is to be "  one of  the most natural  and certain 
ideas in our  minds."  But be  it what it will,  this I 
am sure,  that  neither  that,  nor  any thing  else  con- 
tained in this paragraph,  any way proves, "  that upon 
my principles  we  cannot  come to  any certainty that 
there is  any  such  thing as substance  in the world :" 
which was the proposition to be proved. 
In  the next place,  then,  I  crave leave to consider 
how that is proved, which,  though nothing to the pro- 
position  to be ,proved, is  yet  wha,t you  here  assert ; 
viz. "  that the idea of  substance is one of  the most na- 
tural and certain ideas in our minds :"  your  proof  of 
it is  this, " because  it  is  a  repugriancy  to our  first 
conceptions of things, that modes and accidents should 
subsist by themselves,  and therefore  the rational idea 
of substance is one of the first ideas in our minds." 
From whence I grant it to be a good  consequence, 
that to those who  find  this  repugnance the idea of  a 
support is very necessary ;  or,  if  you please to call it 
so, very rational.  But a clear ancl distinct idea of  the 
thing itself, which is the support, will not  therice  he 
proved to be one of the first ideas in our minds ;  or that 
any such idea is ever there at all.  He  that is satisfied 
that Pendennis-castle, if  it were not supported, would 
fall into the sea, must think of  a support that sustains 
it :  but whether the thing that it rests on be timber, or 
brick, or stone, lie has, by his  bare idea of  the neces- 
sity of some support that props it up, no clear and di- 
stinct idea at all. 
In this paragraph you farther say, "  that the laying 
all foundation of certainty as to  matters of faith on clear 
and distinct ideas, does certainly exclude the notion of 
substance out of rational discourse."  Answer.  This is 
a  propositiori  that will  need  a  proof;  because  every 
body at first sight will think it hard to be proved.  For 
it is obvious,  that let certainty in  matters of  faith,  or 
any matters whatsoever, be laid on what it will, it ex- 
cludes not the notion of  substance certainly out of  ra- 
tional discourse; unless it  be certainly true, that we can 
rationally discourse of  nothing but what we certainly 
know.  But whether it  be a proposition easy or not easy 
to  be proved, this is certain, that it  concerns not me ;  for 
I lay not "  all foundation of certainty, as to matters of 
faith,  upon clear  and distinct  ideas;"  and therefore if 
it does discard substance out of  the reasonable part of 
the world,  as your  lordship  phrases  it above,  or ex- 
cludes the notion of substance out of rational discourse; 
whatever havoc  it makes of  substance, or its idea,  no 
one jot of the mischief is to be laid at my door, because 
that is no principle of mine. 
Your lordship ends this paragraph with telling me, 
that "  I at  length apprehend your lordship's  meaning." 
I wish heartily that I did, because it would be much 
more for your ease, as well  as  my own.  For  in this 
case of substance, I find it not easy to know your mean- 
ing, or what it is J  am blamed for.  For in the begin- 
ing of this  dispute, it is the being  of  substance ; and 
here again it is  substance itse!f  is discarded.  And in 
this very paragraph, writ as it  seeins to explain yourself, 
so that in the close of it you tell me that "  at length I 
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stance is excluded out of rational discourse ;"  the expli- 
cation is such, that it renders your lordship's meaning 
to be more obscure  and  uncertain  than it was before. 
For  in the same paragraph your  lordship says, that  "upon 
my principles there can be no certain idea at all of sub- 
stance ;'' and also, that "  however imperfect and obscure 
our notions be, yet we  are as certain that substances 
are and must be, as  that there  are  any beings  in  the 
world."  So that supposing I did know (as I do not) 
what your lordship means by certain idea of substance, 
yet I must own still, that what your meaning is by dis- 
carding of substance, whether it  be the idea of substance 
or the being of substance, I do not  know.  But that, I 
think, need not much trouble me, since your  lordship 
does not, that I see, show how any position or principle 
of mine overthrows either substance itself, or the idea of 
it, or excludes either of them out of rational discourse. 
In your next paragraph, you  say," I declare, p.  35, 
that if  any one assert that we  can have  no ideas  but 
from sensation  and reflection,  it is  not  my opinion." 
My  lord, I have looked  over that 35th page, and find 
no such words of  mine  there; but refer my reader to 
that and the following pages, for my opinion concerning 
ideas from sensation and reflection, how far they are the 
foundation and  materials of  all our knowledge.  And 
this I do, because to those words which your lordship 
has set down as mine, out of the 35th page, but are not 
there, you subjoin,  c6 that you are very glad  of  it, and 
will do me all the right you can in this matter ;"  which 
seems to imply, that it is a matter of great consequence, 
and therefore I desire my meaning may be taken in my 
own words, as they are set down at large. 
The promise your lordship makes me, "  of doing me 
all the right you can,"  I return you my humble thanks 
for, because it is a piece of  justice so  seldom  done  in 
controversy; and because I suppose you have here made 
me this promise, to authorise me to mind you of  it, if 
at any time your haste should make you  mistake my 
words or meaning :  to have one's words exactly quoted, 
and their meaning interpreted by the plain and visible 
design of  the author in his whole  discourse,  being a 
right which every writer has a just claim to, and such 
as a lover of truth will be very wary of violating.  An 
instance of some sort of intrenchment on this, I humbly 
conceive, there is in the next page but one, where yola 
interpret my words,  as if  I excused  s  mistake I had 
made, by calling it a slip of my pen ;  whereas, my lord, 
I do not own any slip of my pen in that place, but say 
that the meaning of  my expression  there is  to be in- 
terpreted  by other  places,  and particularly  by  those 
where I treat professedly of  that subject:  and that in 
such cases, where an expression is only incidept to the 
matter in hand, and may seern not exactly to  quadrate 
with the author's  sense, where he  designedly treats of 
that subject ;  it ought rather to be interpreted as a slip 
of his pen, than as his meaning.  I should not have taken 
so particular a notice of  this, but that you,  by having 
up these words, with an air that makes me sensible how 
wary I ought to be,  show what use would  be made of 
it, if ever I had pleaded the slip of  my pen. 
In the following pages I  find a  discourse drawn 11p 
under several  ranks of  numbers, to prove, as I guess, 
this proposition, "  that in my way of  ideas we  cannot 
come to any certainty as to the nature of  substance." 
I shall be in a condition  to answer to this accusation, 
when I shall be told what particular proposition,  as to 
tlie nature of substance, it is, which in my way of  ideas 
we cannot come to any certainty of.  Because probably 
it may be such a proposition concerning  the nature of 
substance, as I shall readily own,  that in my  way of 
ideas we can come to no certainty of; and yet I think 
the way of ideas not at all to be blamed, till there can 
be  shown  another way,  different  from  that of  ideas, 
whereby we may come to a certainty of it.  For it was 
never pretended, that by ideas we  could come to cer- 
tainty concerning every proposition that could be made 
concerning substance or any thing else. 
Besides the doubtfulness visible  in the phrase itself, 
there is another reasonthat  hinders me from understand- 
ing precisely what is meant by these words,  to "  come 
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cause your  lordship makes  nature and substance to be 
the same :  so that to come to a certainty as to the nature 
of substance,  is,  in your lordship's  sense of  nature, to 
come to a certainty as to the substance of  substance ; 
which, I own, I do not clearly understand. 
Another thing that hinders me from giving particular 
answers to the arguments that may be supposed to be 
contained  in  so  many pages is,  that I do not see how 
what is discoursed in  those thirteen or fourteen pages 
is brought to prove this proposition, '' that in my way 
of ideas we cannot come to any certainty as to the na- 
ture of  substance ;"  and it would  require  too  many 
words to examine every one of  those  heads, period by 
period, to see what they prove ; when you yourself  do 
not apply them to the direct probation of  any proposi- 
tion that I understand. 
Indeed, you wind up this discourse with these words, 
*'  that you leave the reader to judge whether this be a 
tolerable account of the idea of substance by sensation 
and reflection."  Answ. That which your lordship has 
given in  the preceding  pages, "  I think  is  not a very 
tolerable account of  my idea of  substance ;"  since  the 
account you  give over  and  over  again  of  my idea of 
substance is,  that '' it is nothing but a complex idea of 
accidents."  This is your account  of  my idea  of  sub- 
stance, which you insist so much on, and which you say 
you took out of  those $aces  I myself  produced in my 
first letter.  But jf  you had been  pleased  to have set 
down this one, which is to be found there amongst the 
rest produced  by  me  out of  B.  ii.  c.  12. $ 6, of  my 
Essay, viz. "  that the ideas of  substances are such com- 
binations  of  simple  ideas,  as  are taken to represent 
distinct particular things subsisting by themselves ; in 
which  the supposed  or  confused idea of  substance  is 
always the first and chief."  This would  have been a 
full answer  to all that I think you  have  under  that 
variety of heads objected against my idea of substance. 
But your lordship, in your representation of my idea of 
substance, thought fit to leave this passage out; though 
you  are pleased  to set  clown several  others produced 
both before  and after  it in  my  first  letter:  which,  I 
think, gives me a right humbly to return your lordship 
your own  words:  "and  now  I freely leave the reader 
to judge whether this, which your lordship has given, 
be a tolerable account of my idea of  substance." 
The next point to be  considered is concerning  the 
immateriality  of  the soul;  ~vhereof  there is  a  great 
deal said.  The original of  this controversy  T shall set 
down in your lordship's own words: you say, "the only 
reason you had to engage in this matter was the bold 
assertion, that the ideas we have by sensation or reflec- 
tion are the sole matter and foundation  of all our rea- 
soning,  and  that our certainty  lies in perceiving  the 
agreement and disagreement  of  ideas, as expressed in 
any proposition: which last, you say, are my own words." 
To overthrow  this bold  assertion,  you  urge my ac- 
knowledgment,  "  that  upon  my  principles  it cannot 
be demonstratively proved,  that the soul is immaterial, 
though it be in the highest degree probable :" and then 
ask, "is  not this the giving up the cause of certainty?" 
Answ.  Just as much  the giving up the cause  of  cer- 
tainty  on  my  side,  as it is on  your lordship's:  who, 
though you  will not please to tell wherein  you place 
certsinty, yet it is  to be supposed you  clo  place cer- 
tainty in something or other.  Now let it be whatyou 
will that you  place  certainty in, I  take the liberty to 
say, that you cannot certainly prove, i. e.  demonstrate, 
that the soul of man is immaterial :  I am sure you have 
not so much as offered at any such proof, and therefore 
you give up the cause of certainty upon your principles. 
Because if  the not being able to clemonstrate,  that the 
soul is  immaterial, upon  his  principles,  who  declares 
wherein he thinks certainty consists, be the giving up 
of the cause of certainty; the not being able to demon- 
strate the immateriality of the soul, upon his principles, 
who does not tell wherein certainty consists, is no less 
a giving up of the cause of  certainty.  The only odds 
between these two is  more art and reserve in the one 
than the other.  And therefore, my lord, you must either 
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soul is immaterial, or you must allow  me to say, that 
you too give up the cause of  certainty, and your prin- 
ciples tend to scepticism as much as mine.  Which of 
these two your lordship shall please  to do, will be to 
me advantageous ;  for by the one I shall get a demon- 
stration of the soul's immateriality, (of  which I should 
be very glad) and that upon principles which, reaching 
farther than mine, I shall embrace, as better than mine, 
and  become  your lordship's  professed  convert.  Till 
then, I shall rest satisfied that my principles, be they as 
weak and fallible as your lordship pleases, are no more 
guilty of  any such tendency than theirs, who,  talking 
more of certainty, cannot attain to it in cases where they 
condemn the way of ideas for coming short of it. 
You a little lower in the same page set down these as 
my words, "that I never offered it as a way of certainty, 
where we cannot reach certainty."  I have already told 
you,  that I  have  been  sometimes in doubt what copy 
you had got of  my Essay ;  because I often found your 
quotations out of  it did not agree with what I read in 
mine: but by this instance here, and some others, I know 
not  what to think;  since  in  my  letter,  which I did 
myself the honour to send your lordship, I am sure the 
words are not as they are here set down.  For I say not 
that I offered the way  of  certainty  there spoken  of; 
which looks as if it were a new way of  certainty, that 
I pretended to teach the world.  Perhaps the difference 
in  these,  from  my  words,  is not  so great, that upon 
another occasion I should take notice of it.  But it be- 
ing to lead people into an opinion, that I spoke of  the 
way of  certainty by ideas  as something new,  which I 
pretended to teach the world, I think it worth while to 
set down my words themselves ;  which I think are so 
penned, as to show a great caution in me to avoid such 
an opinion.  My words  are,  "I think it is  a  way to 
bring us to a  certainty in those things, which I have 
offered as certain; but I never thought it a way to cer- 
tainty, where we cannot reach certainty." 
What use your lordship makes of the term "offered," 
applied to what I applied it not, is to be seen in  your 
next words, which you subjoin to those which you wt 
down for  mine:  "but did you not offer to put us inb 
a way of certainty?  And what is that but to attain cer- 
tainty in such th~ngs  where we could not otherwise do 
it?"  Answ.  If this your way of reasoning here carries 
certainty in it, I humbly conceive, in your way of cer- 
tainty by  reason,  certainty may be  attained,  where it 
could not otherwise be had.  I only beg you, my lord, 
to show me the place, where I offer to put you in a way 
of  certainty different from what had formerly been the 
way  of  certainty, that men by it might attain to cer- 
tainty in things which they could not before  my book 
was writ.  Nobody,  who reads my Essay with that in- 
differency, which is proper to a lover of truth, can avoid 
seeing, that what I say of certainty was not to teach the 
world a new way of eertainty (though that be one great 
objection of yours against my book), but to endeavour to 
show wherein the old and only way of certainty consists. 
What was the occasion and design of my book, may be 
seen plainly enough in the epistle to the reader, without 
any need that any thing more should be said of it.  And 
I am too sensible of my own weakness, not to profess, 
as I do, "that I pretend not to teach, but to inquire*." 
I cannot but wonder what service you, my lord,  who 
are a teacher of  authority, mean to truth or certainty, 
by condemning the way of certainty by ideas; because 
E own, by  it I cannot demonstrate that the soul is im- 
materi81.  May it  not be worth your considering, what 
advantage  this  will  be to scepticism,  when  upon the 
same grounds your words here  shall be turned  upon 
you; and it shall be asked, "what a strange way of cer- 
tainty is this, [your  lordship's  way by reason]  if it fails 
us in some of the first foundations of the real knowledge 
of ourselves ?" 
To avoid this,  you undertake to prove from my own 
principles, that we may be certain, "that the first eter- 
nal thinking Being, or omnipotent Spirit, cannot, if he 
would, give to certain systems of created sensible mat- 
ter, put together as he sees fit, some degrees of  sense, 
perception,  and thought."  For  this,  my lord, is my 
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proposition, and this the utmost that I have said con- 
cerning the power of thinking in matters. 
Your first argument I take to be this, that, according 
to me, the knowledge we have being by our ideas, and 
our idea of matter in general being a solid  substance, 
and our idea of body a solid extended figured substance; 
if I admit matter to be capable of thinking, I confound 
the idea of matter with the idea of a spirit: to which I 
answer, No; no rnore than I confound the idea of matter 
with the idea of a horse, when I say that matter in ge- 
neral is a solid extended substance ; and that a horse 
is a  material  animal, or  an extended  solid  substance 
with sense and spontaneous motion. 
The idea of  matter is an extended  solid  substance; 
wherever there is such a substance, there is matter, and 
the essence of matter, whatever other qualities, not con- 
tained in that essence, it shall please God to superadd to 
it.  For example, God creates an extended solid sub- 
stance, without the superadding any thing else to it, and 
so we may consider  it at rest:  to some parts of  it he 
superadds motion, but it has still the essence of matter: 
other parts of it he frames into plants, with all the ex- 
cellencies of vegetation, life, and beauty, which are to be 
found in a rose or a peach-tree,  &c. above the essence 
of  matter in general, but it is still but matter: to other 
parts he adds sense and spontaneous motion, and those 
other properties  that are to be  found in an elephant. 
Hitherto it is not doubted but the power  of  God may 
go,  and that the properties  of  a rose, a peach,  or  an 
elephant, superadded to matter, change not the proper- 
ties of matter; but matter is in these things matter still. 
But if  one venture to go on one step further, and say, 
God may give to matter thought, reason, and volition, 
as well as sense and spontaneous motion, there are men 
ready presently to limit the power  of  the omnipotent 
Creator, and tell us he cannot do it; because it destroys 
the essence, "  changes the essential properties of  mat- 
ter."  To make good  which  assertion,  they  have  no 
more to say, but that thought and reason are not in- 
cluded in the essence of matter.  I grant it; but what- 
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ever excellency,  not contained in its essence, be super- 
added to matter, it does not destroy the essence of  mat- 
ter, if it leaves it an extended solid substance ;  wherever 
that is, there is the essence of matter: and if every thing 
of  greater perfection, superadded to such a,  substance, 
destroys the essence of matter, what will become of  the 
essence of  matter in a plant, or  an animal, whose pro- 
perties far exceed those of  a mere extended solid sub- 
stance ? 
But it is farther urged, that we cannot conceive how 
matter can think.  I grant it; but to argue from thence, 
that God therefore  cannot give to matter a faculty of 
thinking, is to say God's  omnipotency is  limited  to a 
narrow  compass,  because  man's  understanding  is  so; 
and brings down God's infinite power to the size of  our 
capacities.  If  God can give no power to any parts of 
matter, but what men can account for from the essence 
of matter in general; if all such qualities and properties 
must destroy the essence, or change the essential pro- 
perties  of  matter, which  are to our conceptions above 
it, and  we  cannot  conceive  to be  the natural conse- 
quence of  that essence:  it is plain, that the essence of 
matter is destroyed, and its essential properties changed 
in most of the sensible parts of this our system.  For it 
is visible,  that all the planets  have  revolutions  about 
certain remote centres, which I would have any one ex- 
plain, or make conceivable by the bare essence or natu- 
ral powers depending on the essence of matter in gene- 
ral, without something added to th;?t essence, which we 
cannot conceive: for the moving of matter in a crooked 
line, or the attraction of  matter  by matter, is all that 
can be said in the case; either of which it is above our 
reach to derive from the essence of  matter, or body in 
general; though one of these two must unavoidably be 
allowed to be superadded in this instance to the essence 
of matter in general.  The omnipotent Creator advised 
not with us in the making  of  the world,  and his  ways 
are not  the less  excellent,  because  they are past  our 
finding out. 
In the next place, the vegetable part of the creation 
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will look  into it, will observe  excellencies and opera. 
tioils in this part of matter, which he will not find con- 
tained in the essence of  matter in general, nor be able 
to conceive how they can be produced by it.  And will 
he therefore say, that the essence of matter is destroyed 
E.  Ions  in them, because  they have properties and oper  t' 
not  contained in the essential properties  of  matter as 
matter, nor  explicable by the essence of  matter in ge 
noral ? 
Let us advance one step farther, and we shall, in the 
animal world, meet  with  yet  greater perfections and 
properties, no ways explicable by the essence of matter 
in general.  If the omnipotent Creator had not super- 
added to the earth, which produced the irrational ani- 
mals,  qualities far surpassing those  of the dull dead 
earth,  out of  which  they were made,  life, sense,  and 
spontaneous motion,  nobler qualities than were before 
in it, it had still remained rude senseless matter;  and if 
to  the individuals of each species he  had not superadded 
a power of  propagation, the species had perished  with 
those individuals:  but by these essences or properties of 
each species, superadded to the matter which they were 
made of,  the essence or properties of matter in general 
were  not  destroyed  or  changed,  any  more  than any 
thing that was in the individuals before was destroyed 
or changed by $he power of generation, superadded to 
them by the first benediction of the Almighty. 
In  all such cases, the superinducement of greater per- 
fections  and nobler  qualities destroys nothing  of  the 
essence  or perfections that were there before,unless there 
can be  showed a manifest repugnancy between  them ; 
but all the proof offered for that, is only, that we can- 
not conceive how matter, without such superadded per- 
fections,  can produce such effects;  which is,  in truth, 
no more than to say, matter in general, or every part 
of matter, as matter, has them not; but is no reason to 
prove that God, if he pleases, cannot superadd them to 
some parts of  matter:  unless it can be proved to be a 
contradiction, that God should give to some parts of 
matter qualities and perfections,  which matter in gene- 
ral has not;  though we cannot conceive how matter is 
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invested with them, or how it  operates by virtue nfthose 
new  endowments.  Nor is it to be wondered that we 
cannot, whilst we limit all its operations to thosequali- 
ties it  had before, and would explain them by the known 
properties of matter in general, without any such super- 
induced perfections.  For if this be a right rule of rea- 
soning to deny a thing to be, because we cannot con- 
ceive  the manner  how  it comes  to be; I shall desire 
them who  use  it to stick  to this  rule, ar-d see what 
work it will make both in divinity as well as philoso- 
phy;  and whether they can advance any thing more in 
favour of scepticism. 
For to keep within the present subject of the power 
of  thinking and self-motion,  bestowed by  omnipotent 
Power on some parts of matter: the objection to this is, 
I cannot conceive how  matter should think.  What is 
the consequence? ergo, God cannot give it a power to 
think.  Let this stand for a good reason, and then pro- 
ceed in other cases by the same.  You cannot conceive 
how  matter can attract matter at any distance,  much 
less at the distance of 1,000,000 miles;  ergo, God can- 
not give it such a power.  You  cannot conceive  how 
matter should feel or move itself, or affect an immaterial 
being, or  be  moved  by  it; ergo, God  cannot give it 
such powers :  which is in effect to deny gravity and the 
revolution of the planets about the sun; to make brutes 
mere machines, without sense or  spontaneous motion ; 
and to allow man neither sense nor voluntary motion. 
Let us apply this rule one degree farther.  You can- 
not conceive how  an extended solid substance should 
think,  therefore  God  cannot  make it think:  can you 
conceive how your own soul,  or any substance thinks ? 
Yau find indeed,  that you do think, and so do I ;  but 
1 want to be  told  how  the action of  thinking  is per- 
formed :  this, I confess, is beyond my conception ;  and 
I would be  glad any one, who conceives it, would .ex- 
plain it to me.  God, I find, has given me this faculty; 
and since I ~annot  but be convinced of his power in this 
instance, which though I every moment experiment in 
myself,  yet I  cannot conceive  the manner  of;  what 
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power in other like cases only for this reason, because 
I cannot conceive the manner how ? 
To explaln this matter a little farther :  God has cre- 
ated a substance; let it be, for example, a solid extended 
substance:  is  God bound  to give it,  besides  being,  s 
power of  action? that, I think, nobody  will  say.  He 
therefore may leave it in a state of inactivity, and it will 
be nevertheless a substance; for action is not necessary to 
the being of  any substance, that God does create.  God 
has likewise created and made to exist, de novo, an im- 
material  substance, which will  not lose its being of  a 
substance,  though  God  should  bestow  on  it nothing 
more but this bare being, without giving it any activity 
at all.  Here are now two distinct substances, the one 
material, the other immaterial, both in a state of perfect 
inactivity.  Now I ask what power God can give to one 
of these substances (supposing them to retain the same 
distinct natures,  that they had  as substances in  their 
state of  inactivity) which he cannot give to the other ? 
I11  that state,  it is plain, neither of  them  thinks;  for 
thinking being an action, it cannot be denied that God 
can put an end to any action of any created substance, 
without annihilating of  the substance whereof  it is a,n 
action:  and if it be so, he can also create or give exist- 
ence to such a substance, without giving that substance 
any action at  all.  Now I would ask, why Omnipotency 
cannot 5ive to either  of  these  substances,  which  are 
equally in a state of perfect inactivity, the same power 
that it can  give to the other ?  Let it be, for example, 
that of  spontaneous or self-motion,  which is a power 
that it is supposed God can give to an unsolid substance, 
but denied that he can give to a solid substance. 
If it be  asked,  why they limit the omnipotency of 
God, in reference to the one rather than the other  of 
these substances; all that can be said to it is, that they 
cannot conceive how the solid substance should ever be 
able to move itself.  And as little, say I, are they able 
to  conceive how a created unsolid substance should move 
itself;  but there may  be  something in an immaterial 
substance,  that you do not know.  I grant it; and in 
a material one too:  for example, gravitation of matter 
towards matter, and in the several proportions observ- 
able, inevitably shows, that there is something in mat- 
ter that we do not uaderstand, unless we can conceive 
self-motion  in  matter;  or an inexplicable and incon- 
ceivable attraction in matter, at immense and almost in- 
comprehensible distances :  it must therefore  be confessed, 
that there is something in solid, as well as unsolid sub- 
stances, that we do not understand.  But this we know, 
that they may each of them have their distinct beings, 
without  any  actiqity  superadded to them, unless  you 
will  deny, that God can take from any being its power 
of acting, which it is probable will be thought too pre- 
sumptuous for any one to do ; and, I say, it is as hard 
to conceive self-motion in a created immaterial, as in a 
material being, consider it how you will :  and therefore 
this is no reason to deny Omnipotency to be abIe to give 
rt power  of  self-motion  to a  material  substance,  if he 
pleases, as  well  as  to an immaterial; since neither of 
them can have it from themselves, nor can we conceive 
how it can be in either of them. 
The same is visible in the other operation of  think- 
ing; both these substances may be made, and exist with- 
out thought ;  neither of them has, or can have the power 
of  thinking from  itself:  God may give it to either of 
them,  according to the good  pleasure of  his  omnipo- 
tency ;  and  in  whichever  of  them it is,  it  is  equally 
beyond  our capacity to conceive  how  either of  those 
substances thinks.  But for  that reason  to deny that 
God, who had power enough to give them both a being 
out of  nothing,  can,  by  the  same  omnipotency,  give 
them what other powers and perfections he pleases, has 
no better a foundation than to deny his power of crea- 
tion, because we cannot conceive how it is performed ; 
and there at last this way of reasoning must terminate. 
That Omnipotency  cannot make a substance to be 
solid and not solid at the same time, I think, with due 
reverence, we may say; but that a solid substance may 
not have qualities, perfections, and powers, which have 
no natural or visibly necessary connexion with solidity 
and extension, is too much for us (who are but of  yes- 
terday, and know  nothing) to be  positive  in.  If God 
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cannot join things together by connexions inconceivable 
to us,  we must deny even the consistency and being of 
matter itself;  since  every  particle  of  it having  some 
bulk, has its parts connected by ways inconceivable to 
us.  So that all the difficulties that are raised against 
the thinking of matter, from our ignorance or narrow 
concevtions, stand not at all in the way of the power of 
God, if he pleases to ordain it so ;  nor prove any thing 
against his having actually endued some parcels of mat- 
ter, so disposed as he thinks fit, with a faculty of think- 
ing, till it can be shown that it contains a contradiction 
to suppose it. 
Though to  me sensation  be  comprehended  under 
thinking in  general, yet in the  foregoing discourse I 
have spoken of  sense in brutes, as distinct from think- 
ing : because  your lordship, as I remember, speaks of 
sense in  brutes.  But here I  take liberty to observe, 
that if your lordship allows brutes to have sensation, it 
will follow, either that God can and doth give to sorne 
parcels of matter a power of perception and thinking ; 
or thst all animals have immaterial and consequently, 
according to your lordship, immortal souls, as well as 
men: and to say that fleas and mites, &c. have immortal 
souls as well as men will possibly be looked on as going 
a great way to serve an hypothesis, and it would  not 
very well agree with what your lordship says, Answ. 2. 
p.  64, to the words of  Solomon, quoted out of  Eccles. 
c. iii. 
I have been pretty large in making this matter plain, 
that they who are so forward to bestow hard censures or 
names  on the opinions of  those  who differ from them, 
may consider whether sometimes they are not more due 
to their ow11 :  and that they may be persuaded a little to 
temper that heat, which  supposing the truth in their 
current opiflions, gives them (as they think) a right to 
lay what imputations  they please on thase who  would 
fairly examine the grounds they stand upon.  For talk- 
ing with a supposition and insinuations, that truth and 
knowledge, nay, and religion too, stands and falls with 
their systems, is at best but an imperious way of beggi~g 
the question, and assuming  to themselves, under  the 
pretence of zeal for the cause of  God, a title to infalli- 
bility.  It is very becoming that men's  zeal for truth 
should go as far as their proofs,  but not go for proofs 
themselves.  He that attacks received opinions,  with 
any thing  but fair arguments, may,  I own,  be justly 
suspected not to mean  well, nor to be led by the love 
of truth; but the same may be said of  him too who so 
defends  them.  An  error  is  not the better for  being 
common, nor truth the worse for having lain neglected: 
and if it were put to the vote any where in the world, I 
doubt, as things are managed, whether truth would have 
the majority; at least, whilst the authority of men, and 
not the examination of things, must be its measure.  The 
imputation of  scepticism, and those broad insinuations 
to render what I have writ suspected, so frequent as if 
that were the great business of'all this pains you have 
been at  about me, has made me say thus much, my lord, 
rather as my sense of the way to establish truth in its full 
force and beauty, than that I think the world will need 
to have any thing said to it,,to make it distinguish be- 
tween your lordship's  and my design in writing;  which 
therefore I securely leave to the judgment of the reader, 
and return to the argument in hand. 
What I have above said I take to be a full answer to 
ail that your lordship would infer from my idea of mat- 
ter, of  liberty, and of  identity, and from the power of 
abstracting.  You  ask,  "how  can my way  of  liberty 
agree with the idea that bodies  can operate only by 
motion and impulse?"  Answ.  By the omnipotency of 
God, who can make all things agree, that involve not 
a contradiction.  It  is true, I say, '(that bodies operate 
by impulse,  and nothing else *."  And  so I  thought 
when I writ it, and can yet conceive, no  other way of 
their  operation.  But  I  am since  convinced  by  the 
judicious Mr. Newton's incomparable book,that it is too 
bold a preslimption to limit God's power, in this point, 
by my narrow conceptions.  The gravitation of matter 
towards matter, by ways inconceivable to me, is not only 
a demnstration that God can, if  he pleases, put into 
bodies  powers  and ways of  operation above what  can 
Essay, b. ii. c. 8.  $  l I. 
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be derived from our idea of body, or can be explained by 
what we know of matter, but also an unquestionable and 
every where visible instance, that he has done so.  And 
therefore  in  the next edition of  my book  I shall take 
care to have that passage rectified. 
As to self-consciousness,  your lordship asks,  "what 
is there like self-consciousness in mat,ter ?"  Nothing at 
all in matter as matter.  But that God cannot bestow 
on some parcels of matter a pourer of thinking, and with 
it self-consciousness,  will  never be proved  by  asking, 
"  how is it possible to apprehend that mere body .should 
perceive  that it doth perceive ?"  The weakness of  our 
apprehension I grant in the case : I confess as much as 
you please, that we cannot conceive how  a solid, no nor 
how an unsolid created substance thinks; but this weak- 
ness of our apprehensions reaches not the power of God, 
whose weakness is stronger than any thing in man. 
Your argument from abstraction we have in this ques- 
tion, "if  it may be in the power of matter to think, how 
comes it to be so impossible for such organized bodies 
as the brutes have to  enlarge their ideas by abstraction?" 
Answ. This seems to  suppose, that I place thinking with- 
in the natural power of matter.  If that be your mean- 
ing, my lord, T neither say, nor suppose, that all matter 
has naturally in it a faculty of thinking, but the direct 
contrary.  But if you mean that certain parcels of mat- 
ter, ordered by the divine Power, as seems fit  to him, 
may be made capable of receiving from his omnipotency 
the faculty of thinking ;  that indeed I say, and that being 
granted, the answer to your  question is  easy, since if 
Omnipotency can give thought to any solid substance, it 
is not hard to conceive, that God may give that faculty 
in an higher or  lower  degree, as  it pleases  him,  who 
knows what disposition of  the subject is suited to such 
a particular way or degree of thinking. 
Another argument to prove,  that God cannot endue 
any parcel of  matter with  the Faculty  of  thinking, is 
taken from those words of mine, where I show by what 
connexion of  ideas we may come to know, that God is 
an immaterial substance.  They are these :  "the idea of 
an eternal, actual knowing Being, with the idea of im- 
materiality, by the intervention of  the idea of  matter, 
and of its actual division, divisibility, and want of  per- 
ception," &c.  From whence your lordship thus argues : 
d6 here the want of perception is owned to be so essential 
to matter, that God is therefore concluded to be imma- 
terial."  Answ. Perception and knowledge in that one 
eternal Being, where it has its source, it is visible, must 
be essentially inseparable from it ;  therefore the actual 
want of  perception in so great part of  the particular 
parcels  of  matter,  is  a  demonstration,  that  the first 
Being, fkom  whom perception and knowledge is inse- 
parable,  is not matter.  How far this makes the want 
of perception  an essential property of matter, I will not 
dispute; it suffices that it shows, that perception is not 
an essential property of  matter ; and therefore matter 
cannot be that eternal original Being, to which percep- 
tion and knowledge is  essential.  Matter, I say, natu- 
rally is without perception;  ergo, says your  lordship, 
"want  of perception is an essential property of matter, 
and God doth not change the essential properties  of 
things,  their  nature  remaining."  From  whence  you 
infer, that God cannot bestow on any parcel of  matter 
(the nature of matter remaining) a faculty of thinking. 
If the rules of  logic, since my days, be not changed, I 
may safely deny this consequence.  For an argument 
that runs thus, "God does not, ergo, he cannot;" I was 
taught, when I came first to the university, would not 
hold.  For I never  said God did; but "that I see no 
contradiction in it, that he should, if he pleased, give 
to some systems of senseless matter a faculty of think- 
ing*:"  and I know nobody, before Des Cartes, that ever 
prctended to show that there was any contradiction in 
it.  So that, at worst, my not being able to see in mat- 
ter any such incapacity as makes it impossible for Om- 
nipotency to bestow on it a faculty of thinking, makes 
me opposite only to the Cartesians.  For,  as far as I 
have seen or heard, the fathers of  the Christian church 
never pretended to demonstrate that matter was incapa- 
ble  to  receive  a  power  of  sensation, .perception,  and 
8hinking,  froin  the hand  of  the omn~potent  Creator. 
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Let us therefore, if yw  please, suppose the form of your 
argumentation  right,  and that  your  lordship  means, 
God  cannot:  and then if  your  argument be  good,  it 
proves, that God could not give to Balaam's ass a power 
to  speak to his master as he did; for the want of rational 
discourse being natural to that species, it is but for your 
lordship to call it an essential property, and then God 
cannot  change the essential properties of  things, their 
nature remaining: whereby it is proved, that God can- 
not, with all his omnipotency, give to an ass a power to 
speak as Balaam's  did. 
You say, my lord, "  you do not set bounds to God's 
omnipotency :  for he may, if he pleases, change a body 
into an immaterial  substance;"  i.  e.  take away from 
a substance the solidity which it had before, and which 
made it matter, and then give it a faculty of thinking, 
which  it had not before, and which makes it a spirit, 
the same substance remaining.  For if the same sub- 
stance remains not, body is not changed into an imma- 
terial substance, but the solid  substance,  and  all be- 
longing to it,  is annihilated, and an immaterial sub- 
stance created ;  which is not a change of one thing into 
another, but the destroying of one, and making another 
"  de novo."  In this change therefore of  a body,  or 
material substsfice, into an immaterial, let us observe 
these distinct considerations. 
First, you say, "God  may, if he pleases,"  take away 
from  a  solid  substance  solidity,  which  is  that which 
makes it a material substance or body; and may make 
it an immaterial  substance, i.  e. il  substance without 
solidity.  But this privation of one quality gives it not 
another : the bare taking away a lower  or less noble 
quality, does not give it an higher or nobler ;  that must 
be the gift of God.  For the bare privation of one, and 
a meaner quality, cannot be the position  of  an higher 
and better :  unless any one will say, that cogitation, or 
the power of  thinking, results from the nature of  sub- 
stance itself; which if it do, then wherever there is sub- 
stance, there must be cogitation or a power of thinking. 
Here then, upon your lordship's  own principles,  is an 
immaterial substance without the faculty of thinking. 
In the next place, you will  not  deny, but God may 
give to this  substance, thus deprived  of solidity,  a fa- 
culty of thinking; for you suppose it made capable of 
that, by being  made immaterial : whereby you  allow, 
that the same numerical substance may be sometimes 
wholly incogitative, or without a power of thinking, and 
at other times perfectly cogitative,  or endued with a 
power of thinking. 
Further, you  will not deny, but God can give it so- 
lidity, and make it material again.  For I conclude it 
will not be denied, that God can make it agam what it 
was before.  Now I crave  leave  to ask your lordship, 
why God, having given to this substance the faculty of 
thinking after solidity was taken from it, cannot restore 
to it solidity again, without taking away the faculty of 
thinking? When you have  resolved this,  my lord, you 
will have proved it impossible for God's omnipotence to 
give to a solid substance a faculty of thinking; but till 
then, not having proved it impossible, and yet dexlying 
that God can do it, is to deny that he can do what is 
in itself possible : which,  as I humbly conceive, is visi- 
bly to set bounds to God's  omnipotency ;  though you 
say here, "you  do not  set bounds  to God's  omnipo- 
tency." 
If I should imitate your lordship's  way of writing, I 
should not omit to bring in Epicurus here,  and take 
notice that this was his way, &'Deum  verbis ponere, re 
tollere ;"  and then add,  that I am certain you do not 
think he promoted the great ends of morality and reli- 
gion."  For it ia  with such candid and kind insinuations 
as these, that you  bring in both Hobbes and Spinosa 
into your discourse here about God's being able, if he 
pleases, to give to some parcels of  matter,  ordered as 
he  thinks  fit, a faculty of  thinking ; neither of  those 
authors having, as appears by any passages you bring 
out of them, said any thing to this question, nor having, 
as it seems, any other business here, but by their names 
skilfully to give that character to my book, with which 
you would recommend it to the world. 
I pretend not to inquire what measure of  zeal, nor 
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writing, as yours has all  along been with me : only I 
cannot but consider what reputation it would  give to 
the writings of the fathers of the church, if they should 
think truth required, or religion allowed  them to imi- 
tate  such patterns.  But, God be thanked, there be those 
amorigst them who do not admire such ways of manag- 
ing the cause of truth or religion: they being sensible, 
that if  every one, who  believes or can pretend he has 
truth on his  side, is thereby authorised without proof 
to insinuate  whatever  may serve  to prejudice  men's 
minds against the other side ;  there will be great ravage 
made on charity and practice, without any gain to  truth 
or knowledge.  And that the liberties frequently taken 
by disputants to do so, may have  been the cause that 
the world, in all ages, has received so much harm, and 
so little advantage, from controversies in religion. 
These are the arguments which your  lordship has 
brought to confute  one  saying in  my book,  by other 
passages  in  it; which  therefore being  all but "  argu- 
menta ad  hominem,"  if  they did  prove  what  they do 
not, are of no other use, than to  gain a victory over me; 
a thing, methinks, so much beneath your lordship, that 
it does not deserve one of your pages.  The question is, 
whether God can, if he pleases, bestow on any parcel of 
matter, ordered as he thinks fit, a faculty of perception 
and  thinking.  You  say,  '(you  look  upon a mistake 
herein to be of dangerous conseqlience,  as to the great 
ends of religion and morality."  If this be so, my lord, 
I think one may well wonder why your  lordship  has 
brought  no  arguments  to  establish  the truth itself, 
which you look on to be of such dangerous consequence 
to be mistaken in ;  but have spent so many pages only 
in a personal  matter, in endeavouring  to show, that I 
had  inconsistencies  in  my  book : which,  if  any  such 
thing had been showed, the question would be still as 
far from being  decided,  and  the danger of  mistaking 
about it as little prevented, as if nothing of all this had 
been said.  If therefore your lordship's  care of the great 
ends of religion  and morality have  made you  think  it 
necessary to clear this question, the world has reason to 
conclude there is little to be said against that proposi- 
tion,  which is to be found in  my book concerning the 
possibility, that some parcels of matter might be so or- 
dered by Omnipotence, as to be endued with a faculty of 
thinking, if God so pleased ; since your lordship's con- 
cern for the promoting the great ends of  religion and 
morality has not enabled you to produce one argument 
against n proposition, that you  think of  so dangerous 
consequence to them. 
And  here I crave  leave to observe,  that though in 
your title-page you promise to prove, that my notion of 
ideas is inconsistent with itself (which if it were,it could 
hardly be proved to be inconsistent with any thing else) 
and with  the articles  of the Christian faith; yet your 
attempts all along have been to prove me in some pass- 
ages of my book inconsistent with myself, without hav- 
ing shown any proposition in my book inconsistent with 
any article of the Christian faith. 
I think your lordship has indeed made use of one argu- 
ment of your own: but it is such an one, that I confess 
I do not see how  it is apt much to promote  religion, 
especially the Christian religion, founded on revelation. 
I shall set down your lordship's  words, that they may 
be considered.  You say, "that you are of opinion, that 
the great ends of religion and morality are best secured 
by the proofs of  the immortality of  the soul from its 
nature and properties; and which,  you think,  proves 
it immaterial.  Your lordship does not question, whe- 
ther  God  can  give  immortality  to  a  material  sub- 
stance ;  but you  say,  it takes off very much from the 
evideuce  of  immortality,  if  it  depend  wholly  upon 
God's  giving  that, which  of  its own nature  it is uot 
capable  of,"  &c.  So  likewise  you  say,  "if  a  man 
cannot  be  certain,  but  that matter may  think (as  I 
affirm) then what  becomes of  the soul's  immateriality 
(and consequently immortality) from its operations  ?" 
But for all this, say I, his assurance of faith remains on 
its own  basis.  Now  you appeal to any man of sense, 
"  whether the finding the uncertainty of  his own prin- 
ciples  which  he went  upon  in  point  of  reason,  doth 
not weaken  the credibility of  these fundamental arti- 
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faith? for  before,  there  was  a  natural  credibility  in 
them  on  the  account  of  reason;  but  by  going  on 
wrong grounds of  certainty,  all that is lost;  and in- 
stead  of  being  certain, he is more doubtful than ever. 
And if the evidence of faith falls so much short of that 
of  teason,  it must  needs  have  less  effect upon men's 
minds, when the subserviency of reason is taken away I 
as it must be when the grounds of certainty by reason 
are panished.  Is it at all probable, that he who finds his 
reason deceive him in such fundamental points, should 
have  his faith stand firm  and unmoveable  on the ac- 
count  of  revelation?  For in  matters of  revelation, 
there must  be  some  antecedent  principle  supposed, 
before we can believe any thing on the account of it." 
More to the same  purpose we have some pages far- 
ther, where from some of my words your lordship says, 
"  You cannot  but observe,  that we have  no  certainty 
upon  my  grounds,  that  self-consciousness  depends 
upon  an individual  immaterial  substance,  and conse- 
quently that a material substance may,  according to 
my principles,  have  self-consciousness  in it ;  at least, 
that I am not  certain  of  the contrary.  .Whereupon 
your  lordship  bids  me consider,  whether  this  doth 
not a  little  affect  the whole  article of  the  resurrec- 
tion ?"  What does  all this tend to  ?  but to make the 
world believe, that I have lessened the credibility of  the 
immortality of the soul and the resurrection, by saying, 
that though it be most highly probable, that the soul is 
immatkrial, yet upbn my principles it cannot be demon- 
strated ; because it is not impossible to God's omnipo- 
tency,  if he pleases,  to bestow  upon  some  parcels of 
matter, disposed as he sees fit, a faculty of thinking. 
This your accusation of my lessening the credibility 
of  these articles of faith is founded on  this,  that the 
article of the immortality of the soul abates of its ctedi- 
bility, if it be allowed, that its immateriality (which is 
the supposed  proof from  reason and philosophy of its 
immortality) cannot be demonstrated from natural rea- 
son.  Which  argument of  your lordship's  bottoms,  as 
I humbly conceive, on this, that divine revelation abates 
of its credibility in all those articles it proposes, propor- 
tionably as human reason fails to support the testimony 
of God.  And  all that your lordship in those passages 
has said, when examined, will I suppose be found to 
import thus much, viz. Does God propose any thing to 
mankind to be believed? It  is very fit and oredible to 
be  believed,  if  reason  can  demonstrate it to be true. 
But, if human reason comes short, in the case, and can- 
not  make  it out,  its  credibility  is  thereby  lessened: 
which is in  effect to say,  that the veracity  of  God is 
not a  firm and sure foundation of  faith to rely upon, 
without the concurrent testimony of reason;  i. e.  with 
reverence be it spoken,  God is not to be believed  on 
his own word, unless what he reveals be in itself credi- 
ble, and might be believed  without him. 
If this be a way to promote  religion, the Christian 
religion in all its articles, I am not sorry that it is not a 
way to be found in any of  my writings;  for I imagine 
any thing like this would (and I should think deserved) 
to have other titles than bare scepticism bestowed upon 
it, and would  have raised  no small outcry against any 
one, who is not to be supposed to be in the right in all 
that he says, and so may securely say what he pleases. 
Such as I, the "  profanum vulgus,"  who take too much 
bpon us, if we would examine, have nothing to do but 
to hearken and believe, though what be said should sub- 
vert the very foundations of the Christian faith. 
What I have above observed,  is so visibly contained 
in your lordship's  argument,  that when I met with it 
in your answer to my first letter, it seemed so strange 
for a man of your lordship's  character, and in o dispute 
in defence of  the doctrine of  the Trinity, that I could 
hardly persuade myself,  but it was a slip of your pen: 
but when I found it in your second letter made use of 
again, and seriously enlarged as an argument of weight 
to be insisted upon, I was convinced, that it was a prin- 
ciple that you heartily embraced, how little favoursble 
soever it  was to the articles of the Christian religion,and 
particularly those which you undertook to defend. 
I desire  my  reader to peruse the passages  as they 
stand in your letters themselves, and see whether what 
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from God is more or less credible, according as it has a 
stronger or weaker  confirmation  from  human  reason. 
For, 
1. Your  lordship  says,  "you  do  not question  whe- 
ther God can give immortality to a material substance; 
but you say it takes off  very much  from the evidence 
of immortality, if it depends wholly upon  God's  giving 
that which of its own nature it is not capable of." 
To which I reply, any one's  not  being  able  to de- 
monstrate the soul to be  immaterial takes off not very 
much, nor at all of  the evidence  of  its immortality, if 
God has revealed that it shall be immortal ;  because the 
veracity of God is a demonstration of  the truth of what 
he has revealed, and the want of  another demonstration 
of a proposition that is demonstratively true, takes not 
off from the evidence of it.  For where there is a clear 
demonstration,  there is as much evidence as any truth 
can have,  that is  not  self-evident.  God has revealed 
that the souls of men shall live for ever: but, says your 
lordship, "  from this evidence  it takes off  very much, 
if it depends wholly upon God's  giving that, which of 
its own nature it is not capable of;" i. e.  the revelation 
and testimony of God loses much of its evidence, if this 
depends wholly upon  the good pleasure  of God, and 
cannot be demonstratively made out by natural reason, 
that the soul is immaterial, and consequently in its own 
nature immortal.  For that is a11 that here is or can be 
meant  by these words, "  which of  its own nature it is 
not  capable  of,"  to make  them  to the purpose.  For 
the whole of your lordship's  discourse here is to prove, 
that the soul cannot be material, because then the evi- 
dence of its being immortal would be very much lessen- 
ed.  Which is  to say, that it is  not as credible upon 
divine revelation, that a  material  substance should be 
immortal,  as  an immaterial;  or which is all one, that 
God is not equally to be believed, when he declares that 
a material substance shall be immortal, as when he de- 
clares that an immaterial shall be so; because the im- 
mortality  of  a  material  substance  cannot  be demon- 
strated from natural reason. 
Let us try this rule of your lordship's  a little farther. 
God hath revealed, that the bodies men shall have after 
the resurrection, as well as their souls, shall live to eter- 
nity:  does your lordship believe the eternal life of  the 
one of these more than the other, because you think you 
can prove it of  one of  them by natural reason, and of 
the other  not? Or can any one, who  admits of  divine 
revelation in the case, doubt of one of them more than 
the other ?  Or think this proposition less credible, the 
bodies of men, after the resurrection,  shall live for ever, 
than this, that the souls of men shall, after the resurrec- 
tion, live  for ever? For  that he must do, if  he thinks 
either of  them is less credible than the other.  If this 
be so, reason is  to be consulted, how  far God is to be 
believed, and the credit of divine testimony must receive 
its force from the evidence of reason; which is evidently 
to take away the credibility of  divine revelation, in all 
supernatural  truths, wherein the evidence of reason fails. 
And  how much  such a principle  as this  tends  to the 
support of the doctrine of the Trinity, or the promoting 
the Christian religion, I shall leave it to your lordship 
to consider.  This I think I may be confident in, that 
few Christians have founded their belief of  the immor- 
tality of the soul upon any thing but revelation:  since 
if they had entertained it upon natural and philosophi- 
cal reasons, they could not  have avoided the believing 
its pre-existence before its union  to the body, as well 
as its future existence after its separation from it.  This 
is justified by that observation  of Dr.  Cudworth,  B. i. 
c. 1, $31, where he affirms, "  that there was never any 
of the ancients, before Christianity, that held the soul's 
future permanency after  death, who did not likewise 
assert its pre-existeuce." 
I am not so well read in Hobbes or Spinosa as to be 
able to say what were  their  opinions  in this matter. 
But possibly there be those, who will think your lord- 
ship's  authority of  more use to them in  the case than 
those justly decried names ;  and be glad  to find your 
lordship a patron of the oracles of reason, so little to the 
advantage of the oracles of divine revelation.  This at 
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bottom of  the next page,  that those  who  have  gone 
about to lessen the credibility of  the articles of  faith, 
which evidently they do, who say they are less credible, 
because  they cannot  be made  out demonstratively by 
natural reason; have not been thought to secure several 
of the articles of the Christian faith ;  especially those of 
the Trinity, Incarnation, and Resurrection of the body, 
which  are  those  upon  the  account  of  which  T am 
brought by your lordship into this dispute. 
I  shall  not  trouble the reader with your lordship's 
endeavours in the following words to prove,, that if the 
soul be not an immaterial substance, it can be nothing 
but life; your very first words visibly confuting all that 
you allege to that purpose.  They are, "if  the soul be 
a  material  substance,  it is  really nothing  but life ;" 
which is to say, that if  the soul be really  a substance, 
it is not really a substance, but really nothing else but 
an affection of  a substance;  for  the life, whether of  a 
material or immaterial substance, is not the substance 
itself, but an affection of it. 
2. You say, cc although we think the separate state of 
the soul after death is sufficiently revealed in the Scrip- 
ture ; yet it creates a great difficulty in understandipg 
it, if  the soul be  nothing  but life,  or  a material  sub-  -  stance, which  must  be  dissolved when  life  is  ended. 
For if the soul be a material substance, it must be ma& 
up, as others are, of the cohesion of  solid and separate 
parts, how minute  and  invisible soever they be.  And 
what is it which  should keep them together, when tife 
is gone ?  So that it is no easy matter to  give an account, 
how the soul should be capable of  immortality, unless 
it be an immaterial substance ; and then we know the 
solution  and texture  of  bodies cannot reach the soul, 
being of a different nature." 
Let it be  as hard a  matter as  it will, "to give an 
account  what  it is,  that  should  keep the parts of  a 
material soul together,"  after it is separated from  the 
body ;  yet it will be always as easy to give an account 
of it, as to give an account what it is which should keep 
together a material and immaterial substance.  And yet 
the difficulty that there is to give an account of that, I 
hope, does not, with your lordship, weaken the credibi- 
lity of  the inseparable union of  soul and body to eter- 
nity ;  and I persuade myself  that the men of  sense, to 
whom your  lordship  appeals  in  the case, do not find 
their belief of  this fundamental point much weakened 
by that difficulty.  I thought  therefore (and by your 
lordship's permission would think so still) that the union 
of parts of matter, one with another, is as much in the 
hands of  God, as the union of  a material and immate- 
rial substance ;  and that it does not take off very much, 
or at all, from  the evidence of  immortality, which de- 
pends on that union,  that it is no easy matter to give 
an account what it is that should keep them together: 
though its depending wholly upon the gift and good 
pleasure of God, where the manner creates great diffi- 
culty in the understanding, and our reason cannot dis- 
cover in the nature of  things how  it is, be  that which 
your lordship so positively says, "  lessens the credibility 
of the fundamental articles of the resurrection and im- 
mortality." 
But, my lord,  to remove this objection a little, and 
to show of how small force it  is even with yourself; give 
me  leave to presume,  that your lordship as firmly be- 
lieves the immortality of the body after the resurrection 
as any other article of faith :  if so, then it being no easy 
matter to give an account what it is that shall keep to- 
gether the parts of a material soul, to one that believes 
it  is  material, can no  more weaken  the credibility of 
its immortality, than the like difficulty weakens the cre- 
dibility of the inlmortality of the body.  For when your 
lordship shall find it an easy matter to give an account, 
what it is besides the good pleasure of God, which shall 
keep together the parts of our material bodies to eter- 
nity, or even soul and body ; I doubt not but any one, 
who shall think the soul material,  will  also find it as 
easy to give an account, what it is that shall keep those 
parts of matter also together to eternity. 
Were it not that the warmth of controversy is apt to 
make men so far forget, as to take up those principles 
themselves (when they will serve their turn) which they 480  Mr.  Locke's second Reply 
have highly condemned in others, I should wonder to 
find your lordship to argue, that because "  it is a diffi- 
culty to  understand  what  should  keep  together  the 
minute parts of a material soul, when life is gone; and 
because  it is not  an easy matter to give  an  account 
how the soul should be capable of  immortality, unless 
it be an immaterial  substance :" therefore it is not so 
credible, as if it were easy to give an account, by natu- 
ral reason, how it could be.  For to this  it is, that all 
this your discourse tends,  as is  evident by what is al- 
ready set down out of page 55, and will be more fully 
made out by what your lordship says in other places, 
though there need no such proofs, since it would all be 
nothing against me in any other sense. 
I thought your lordship had in other places asse~ted, 
and insisted on this truth, that no part of divine revela- 
tion was the less to be believed, because the thing itself 
created great difficulties in the understanding, and the 
manner of  it was hard to be explained,  and it was no 
easy matter to  give an account how it was,  This, as I 
take it, your lordship condemned in others, as a very 
unreasonable principle,  and such as would  subvert all 
the articles of the Christian religion that were mere mat- 
ters of  faith, as I think it will:  and is it possible, that 
you should  make use  of  it here yourself,  against the 
article of life and immortality, that Christ hath brought 
to  light through the Gospel ;  and neither was, nor could 
be made out by natural reason without revelation ? But 
you will say, you speak only of the soul; and your words 
are, that "it is no easy matter to give an account, how 
the soul should be capable of  immortality, unless it be 
an immaterial substance."  I grant it ;  but crave leave, 
to  say, that  there is not any one of those difficulties that 
are, or can be raised, about the manner how a material 
soul can be immortal, which  do not as well reach  the 
immortality of the body. 
But if it were not so, I am sure this principle of your 
lordship's would reach other articles of faith, wherein our 
natural reason finds it not easy to give an account how 
those mysteries are; and which therefore, according to 
your principles, must be less credible than other articles, 
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that create less  difficulty to the understanding.  For 
your lordship says, that you appeal to any man of sense 
whether to a man who  thought by  his principles he 
could from natural grounds demonstrate the immor- 
tality of the soul,  the finding the uncertainty of those 
principles  he went upon  in point of  reason,  i.  e.  the 
finding  he  conld  not  certainly  prove  it  by  natural 
reason, doth not weaken the credibility of  that funda- 
mental article, when it is,considered purely as a matter 
of faith.  Which in effect, I humbly conceive, amounts 
to this, that a proposition divinely revealed, that cannot 
be proved  by natural reason, is less credible than one 
that can :  which seems to me to come very little short 
of this,  with due reverence  be it spoken,  that God is 
less to be believed  when he affirms  a proposition  that 
cannot be proved by natural reason, than when he pro- 
poses what can be proved by it.  The direct contrary 
to  which is my opinion ;  though you endeavour to make 
it good by  these  following words: " if  the evidence 
of  faith falls so much short of that of  reason,  it must 
needs have less effect upon men's minds, when the sub- 
serviency of reason is taken away; as it must be, when 
the grounds of  certainty by  reason are vanished.  Is 
it at all probable, that he who finds his reason deceive 
him in such fundamental points, should have his faith 
stand firm and unmoveable on the account  of revela- 
tion ?"  Than which, I think, there are hardly plainer 
words to be found out, to declare, that the credibility 
of God's  testimony depends on the natural evidence or 
probability of  the things we  receive  from revelation, 
and rises and falls with it; and that the truths of God, 
or the articles of mere faith, lose so much of their cre- 
dibility, as they want proof from reason :  which if true, 
revelation may come to have no credibility at all.  For 
if in  this present  case, the credibility of this proposi- 
tion, the souls of men shall live  for  ever, revealed in 
the Scripture, be lessened  by  confessing it cannot be 
demonstratively proved  from reason, though it be as- 
serted to be most  highly probable; must not, by  the 
same rule,  its credibility dwindle  away to nothing, if 
natural reason should not be able to make it out to be 
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so much as probable,  or  should place the probability 
from natural principles on the other side?  For if mere 
want of demonstration lessens the credibility of any pro- 
position divinely revealed, must not want of probability, 
or contrary probability from natural reason, quite take 
away its credibility?  Here at last it must end, if in any 
one case the veracity of  God, and the credibility of the 
truths we rzceive from him by revelation, be subjected 
to the verdicts  of  human  reason,  and be  allowed  to 
receive any accession or diminution from other proofs, or 
want of other proofs of its certainty or probability. 
If this be  your lordship's  way to promote  religion, 
or defend its articles, I know  not what argument the 
greatest enemies of it could use, more effectual for the 
subversion  of  those you  have undertaken to defend ; 
this being to resolve all revelation perfectly and purely 
into natural reason, to bound its credibility by that, and 
leave no room for faith in other things, than what can 
be accounted for by natural reason without revelation. 
Your lordship insists much upon it, as if I had con- 
tradicted what I had said in my Essay, by saying, that 
upon my principles it cannot be demonstratively proved 
that it is an immaterial substance in  us that thinks, 
however probable it be.  He that will be at the pains 
to read that chapter of mine, and consider it, will find, 
that my business  there was  to show,  that it was no 
harder to conceive an immaterial than a material sub- 
stance;  and that from the ideas of thought, and a power 
of moving of matter, which we experienced in ourselves 
(ideas  originally not belonging  to matter as matter) 
there was no more difficulty to conclude there was an 
immaterial substance in us, than that we had material 
parts.  These ideas of thinking, and power of moving 
of  matter, I in another place showed, did demonstra- 
tively lead us to the certain knowledge of the existence 
of an immaterial thinking being, in whom we have the 
idea of spirit in the strictest sense ;  in which sense I also 
applied it to the soul, in that 23d chapter of my Essay: 
the easily conceivable possibility, nay, great probability, 
that that thinking substance in us is immaterial, giving 
me  sufficient  ground  for  it.  In which  sense  I shall 
think I may safely attribute it to the thinking sub- 
stance in us, till your lordship shall have better proved 
from my  words,  that it is impossible it should be im- 
material.  For I only say,  that it is possible,  i.  e.  in- 
volves no contradiction, that God, the omnipotent iin- 
material spirit, should, if he pleases, give to some parcels 
of matter, disposed as he thinks fit, a power of thinking 
and moving ; which parcels of matter, so endued wit11 
a  power  of  thinking  and motion,  might properly be 
called spirits, in contradistinction to unthinking matter. 
In all which,  I  presume,  there  is  no manner of  con- 
tradiction. 
I justified  my use of  the word  spirit in that sense, 
from the authorities of Cicero and Virgil, applying tlie 
Latin word  spiritus, from whence spirit is derived, to 
a soul as a thinking thing, without excluding materi- 
ality out of it.  To which your lordship replies," that 
Cicero, in his  Tusculan  Questions,  supposes  the soul 
not to be a finer sort of body, but of a different nature 
from the body.-That  he calls the body the prison of 
the soul.-And  says that a wise  man's  business  is  to 
draw off his soul from his body."  And then your lord- 
ship concludes, as is usual, with a question, "  is it possi- 
ble  now  to think  so great a man looked on the soul 
but as a modification of the body, which must be at  an 
end with life?" Answ. No; it is impossible that a marl 
of so good sense as Tully, when he uses the word corpus 
or body, for the gross and visible parts of a man, which 
he acknowledges to be mortal; should look on the soul 
to be a modification of that body, in a discourse wherein 
he was endeavouring to persuade  another, that it was 
immortal.  It  is to be acknowledged that truly great 
men, such as he was, are not wont so manifestly to con- 
tradict themselves.  He  had therefore no thought con- 
cerning the modification of the body of man in the case; 
he was not such a trifler  as to examine, whether the 
modification of the body of a man was immortal, when 
that  body itself was mortal: and therefore that which he 
reports as Dic~archus's  opinion, he dismisses in the be- 
ginning without any more ado, c. ll. But Cicero's mas 
a  direct,  plain,  and  sensible  inquiry,  viz.  What the 
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soul was; to see whether from thence he could discover 
its immortality.  But in all that discourse  in his first 
book of Tusculan Questions, where he lays out so much 
of his reading and reason, there is not one syllable show- 
ing the leaat thought, that the soul was an immaterial 
substance; but many things directly to the contrary. 
Indeed (I.) he shuts out the body, taken in the sense 
he uses  corpus all along*,  for the sensible  organical 
parts of  a man, and is positive that is not the soul: 
and body in this sense, taken for the human body, he 
calls the prison of the soult; and says a wise man, in- 
stancing Socrates and Cato, is glad of  a fair opportu- 
nity to get out of  it.  But he nowhere says any such 
thing of  matter: he calls  not  matter in  general the 
prison of the soul, nor talks a word  of  being  separate 
from it. 
(2.) He  concludes, that the soul is not like other things 
here below, made up of a composition of the elements, 
c.  27. 
(3.) He excludes the two gross elements, earth and 
water, from being the soul, c.  26. 
So far he is clear and positive;  but beyond this he is 
uncertain; beyond this he could not get.  For in some 
places he speaks doubtfully, whether the soul be not air 
or fire: cc  anima sit animus ignisve nescio,"  c. 25.  And 
therefore he agrees with Panaetius, that, if  it be at all 
elementary, it is, as he calls it, "  inflammata anima, in- 
flamed air;"  and for this he gives several reasons,  c. 
18, 19.  And though he thinks it to be of a peculiar 
nature of its own, yet he is so far from thinking it im- 
material, that he says, c. 19, that the admitting it to be 
of an aerial or igneous nature would not be inconsistent 
with any thing he had said. 
That which he seems most to incline to is, that the 
soul was not at  all elementary, but was of the same sub- 
stance with the heavens; which Aristotle, to distinguish 
from the four elements and the changeable bodies here 
below,  which  he sup  osed  made up of  them,  called 
'. quinta essentia."  &at  this was  Tully's opinion, is 
*  Chap  19,22,30,31, &c. 
-1-  So speaks Ennius :  "Terra corpus est, at mens ignis est." 
plain from these words :  "  ergo, animus, qui, ut  ego dico, 
ditinns est, ut Euripides audet dicere Deus; et  qmidem 
si Deus,  aut ani~na  aut ignis est, idem est animus ho- 
minis.  Warn  ut ills natura ccelestis et terra vacat et 
humore;  sic utriusque harum rerum humanns animus 
est expeTs.  Sir, autem est quilita quaedam natara ab 
Aristotele inducta ;  primum haec et Deorum est et ani- 
rnorum.  Hanc nos seritentiain secuti,  his ipsis verbis 
in  consolatione haec  expressimus," c. 26.  And then he 
goes on,  c.  27,  to repeat  those his own words, which 
your lordship has quoted out of  him, wherein  he had 
affirmed, in his treatise, "  De Consolatione," the soul not 
to have its original from the earth, or to be mixed or 
made of  any thing earthly; but had said, " Singularis 
est igitur quaedam natura et vis animi sejuncta ab his 
usitatis  notisque  naturis."  Whereby,  he tells us,  he 
meant nothing but Aristotle's "  quinta essentia ;" which 
being unmixed, being that of which the gods and souls 
consisted,he  calls it  cc divinum, celeste," and concludes 
it eternal; it being,  as he  speaks, "  sejuncta ab omni 
mortali concretione."'  From which it is clear, that in all 
his inquiry about the substance of the soul, his thoughts 
went  not  beyond  the  four  elements,  or  Aristotle's 
"  quinta essentia," to look for it.  In all which there is 
nothing of irnrnateriality, but quite the contrary. 
He was willing to believe (as vood and wise men have 
always been) that the soul was immortal; but for that, 
it is plain,  he never  thought of  its immateriality,  but 
as the eastern people do, who believe the soul to be im- 
mortal, but  have nevertheless no thought, no conception 
of its  immateriality.  It is remarkable, what a very con- 
siderable  and judicious  author says in the case:  "No 
opinion*,"  says he, "  has been so universally received as 
that of  the inlmortality  of  the soul;  but its imma- 
teriality  is a  truth,  the knowledge  whereof  has  not 
spread so far.  And indeed it is extremely difficult to 
let into the mind of a Siamite the idea of a pure spirit. 
This the missionaries,  who have been longest among 
them, are positive in: all the pagans ofthe East do truly 
believe,  that there remains something of  a man after 
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his death, which subsists independently and separately 
from his body.  But they give extension and figure to 
that which remains,  and attribute  to it all  the same 
members, all the same substances, both solid and liquid, 
which our bodies are composed of.  They only suppose 
that the souls are of a matter subtile enough to escape 
being seen or handled.-Such  were the shades and the 
manes of  the  Greeks and the Romans.  And it is by 
these figures of  the souls, answerable to those of  the 
bodies,  that Virgil supposed  Bneas knew  Palinurus, 
Dido, and Anchises, in the other world." 
This gentleman was  not a man that travelled  into 
those parts for his pleasure, and to have the opportunity 
to tell strange stories, collected by chance, when he re- 
turned; but one chosen on purpose (and it seems well 
chosen for the purpose) to inquire into the singularities 
of Siam.  And he has so well acquitted himself of  the 
commission, which his epistle dedicatory tells us he had, 
to inform himself exactly of what was most remarkable 
there, that had we but such an account of  other coun- 
tries of  the East, as he has given us of  this kingdom, 
which he was an envoy to, we should be much better 
acquainted than we are, with the manners, notions, and 
religions of  that part of the world, inhabited by  civi- 
lized nations, who want neither good sense nor acute- 
ness of  reason,  though not cast into the mould of  the 
logic and philosophy of our schools. 
But to return to Cicero:  it is  plain, that in his in- 
quiries about the soul, his thoughts went not at all be- 
yond matter.  This the expressions, that drop from him 
in several places of  this book, evidently show:  for ex- 
ample,  that  the  souls  of  excellent  men  and women 
ascended into heaven;  of  others, that they  remained 
here on earth, c. 12: that the soul is hot, and warms the 
body:  that at its leaving  the body, it penetrates and 
divides,  and breaks  through our thick, cloudy,  rnoist 
air:  that it stops in  the region of fire, and ascends no 
farther, the equality of warmth and weight making that 
its proper place,  where it is nourished  and sustained 
with the same things, wherewith the stars are nourished 
and sustained; and that by the convenience of its neigh- 
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bourhood, it shall there have a clearer view  and fuller 
knowledge of the heavenly bodies, c.  19 :  that the soul 
also from this height shall have a  pleasant  and fairer 
prospect of  the  globe of  the earth, the disposition of 
whose parts will  then lie before  it in one view, c. 20: 
that it is hard to  determine what  conformation,  size, 
and place the soul has in the body:  that it is too subtile 
to be seen:  that it is in a human body as in a house, or 
a  vessel, or a receptacle, c. 22 : all which  are expres- 
sions that sufficiently evidence, that he who used them 
had not in his mind separated materiality from the idea  - 
of the soul. 
It may perhaps be replied, that a great part of this, 
which  we  find in c. 19, is said upon the principles  of 
those who would have the soul  to be "  anima inflam- 
mata, inflamed air:'  I grant it: but it is also to be ob- 
served, that in this lgth, and the two following chap- 
ters, he does not only not  deny, but even  admits, that 
so material a thing as inflamed air may think. 
The truth of  the case in short is this:  Cicero was 
willing  to believe  the soul  immortal; but when  he 
sought in the nature of the soul itself something to esta- 
- blish this his belief into a certainty of it, he found him- 
self at a loss.  He confessed he knew not what the soul 
was'; but the not knowing what it was, he argues, c. 2, 
was no reason to conclude it was not.  And thereupon 
he proceeds to the repetition of what he had said in his 
6th book De Repub. concerning the soul.  The argu- 
ment, which, borrowed from Plato, he there makes use 
of, if it  have any force in it, not only proves the soul to 
be immortal, but more than, I think, your lordship will 
allow to be  true:  for it proves it to be  eternal,  and 
without  beginning,  as well  as without  end; "  neque 
nata certe est, et aeterna est,"  says he. 
Indeed, from the faculties of  the soul he concludes 
right,  that it is of  divine original:  but as  to the sub- 
stance of the soul, he at the end of  this discourse con- 
cerning its faculties, c. 25, as well as at the beginning 
of it, c. 22, is not ashamed to own his ignorance of  what 
it is :  anima sit animus, ignisve nescio ; nec me pudet, 
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de re obscura affirmare  possum, sive anima, sive ignis 
sit animus, eum jurarem  esse divinum,"  c. 25.  So that 
all the certainty he could attain to about the soul, was, 
that he was  confident  there was  something  divine  in 
it; i.  e.  there were faculties in the soul that could not 
result from the nature of  matter, but must have their 
original from a divine power :  but yet those qualities, 
as  divine  as  they  were,  he acknowledged  might  be 
placed  in breath or fire,  which  I think your lordship 
will not deny to be material substances.  So that all 
those divine qualities,  which he so much and so justly 
extols in the soul, led him not, as appears, so much as to 
any the least thought of immateriality.  This is demon- 
stration, that he built  them  not upon an exclusion of 
materiality out of the soul; for he avowedly professes, 
he does not know but breath or fire might be this think- 
ing thing in us :  and in all his considerations about the 
substance of the soul itself, he stuck in air or fire,or Ari- 
stotleys  "quinta essentia;" for beyond those, it  is evident, 
he went not  But with all his proofs out of Plato, to 
whose authority he defers so much, with all the argu- 
ments his vast  reading and  great parts codd furnish 
him with for the immortality of the soul, he was so little 
satisfied,  so  far from  being  certain,  so  far from any 
thought that he had, or could prove it, that he over and 
over again professes his ignorance and doubt of it.  In 
the beginning he enumerates  the  several  opinions of 
the philosophers,  which he had well  studied about it; 
and then, full of certainty, says, "  harum sententiarum 
quae  Vera  sit, Deus aliquis  videret, quae  veri simillima 
magna quaestio,"  c.  11.  And towards the latter end, 
having gone them all  over again,  and one  after ano- 
ther examined them, he professes himself still at a loss, 
not  knowing  on  which  to pitch, nor  what  to deter- 
mine : "  Mentis acies;  says he, "  seipsam intuens non- 
nunquam  hebescit,  ob eamque  causam  contemplandi 
diligentiam omittimus.  Itaque dubitans, circumspec- 
tans, hasitans, multa adversa revertens, tunquam in rate 
in mari immenso, nostra vehitur oratio,"  c.  30.  And 
to conclude this  argument, when  the person he intro- 
duces as discoursing with him, tells him he is resolved 
to  keep firm to the belief of immortality, Tully answers, 
c. 82, "  Laudo id quidem, etsi nihil animis oportet con- 
fidere;  movemur  enim  saepe  aliquo  acute  concluso, 
labamus, mutamusque sententiam clarioribus etiam in 
rebus ;  in his est enim aliqua obscuritas." 
So unmoveable is that truth delivered by the Spirit of 
truth,  that  though  the  light  of  nature  gave  some 
obscure glimmering, some uncertain hopes of  a future 
state ;  yethuman reason could attain to no clearness,no 
certainty about it, but that it  was "Jesus  Christ* alone 
who had brought life and immortality to light through 
the Gospel."  Though we  are now told, that to own 
the inability of  natural reason to bring immortality to 
light, or, which passes for the same, to own principles 
upon which the immateriality of  the soul (and,  as it is 
urged, consequently its immortality) cannot be demon- 
stratively proved,  does lessen  the belief of  this article 
of revelation, which Jesus Christ alone has brought to 
light, and which consequently the Scripture assures us 
is established and made certain only by revelation.  This 
would  not  perhaps  have  seemed  strange from those 
who are justly complained of, for slighting the revela- 
. tion  of  the Gospel, and therefore would not be much 
regarded,  if  they should contradict so plain a text of 
Scripture in favour  of  their  all-sufficient reason :  but 
what use the promoters of scepticism and infidelity, in 
an age so much suspected by your lordship, may make 
of what comes from  one of your great authority  and 
learning, may deserve your consideration. 
And thus, my lord, I hope I have satisfied you con- 
cerning Cicero's opinion about the soul, in his first book 
of Tusculan Questions ;  which though I easily believe, 
as your lordship says, you are no stranger to, yet I hum- 
bly conceive you  have not shown (and upon a careful 
perusal of that treatise again, I think I may boldly say 
you cannot  show) one  wor2.  in it,  that expresses any 
thing like a notion in Tully of the soul's immateriality, 
or its being an immaterial substance. 
From what  you bring  out of Virgil,  your lordship 
concludes, "that  he no niore than Cicero does me any 
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kindness  in this  matter,  being  both  assertors  of  the 
soul's immortality."  My lord, were not the question of 
the soul's immateriality, according to custom, changed 
here into that of  its immortality,  which I am no less 
an assertor  of  than either of  them, Cicero and Virgil 
do me all the kindness I desired of them in this matter; 
and that was  to show, that they attributed the word 
4'spiritus" to the soul of  man, without any thought of 
its immateriality :  and this the verses you yourself bring 
out of Virgil, Bneid. 4. 585, 
Et cum frigida mors ani~nae  seduxerit artus 
Omnibus umbra locis adero, dabis improbe pcenas," 
confirm, as well as those I quoted out of his 6th book : 
and for this Monsieur de la Loubere shall be my wit- 
ness, in the words above set down out df  him;  where 
he shows, that there be those amongst the heathens of 
our days, as well as Virgil andothers amongst the an- 
cient  Greeks and Romans, who  thought the souls or 
ghosts of men departed did not die with the body, with- 
out thinking them to be perfectly immaterial; the lat- 
ter being much  more incomprehensible to them than 
the former.  And what Virgil's notion of the soul is, and 
that ''  corpus," when put in contradistinction  to  the soul, 
signifies nothing  but the gross tenement of  flesh and 
bones,  is  evident  from this  verse  of  his  Xneid.  6, 
where he calls the souls which yet were visible, 
"Tenues sine corpore vitae." 
Your lordship's  answer concerning what is said, Ec- 
cles. xiii. turns wholly upon Solomon's taking the soul 
to be immortal,  which was not what I questioned :  all 
that I quoted that place for was to show,  that spirit 
in English might properly be applied to the soul, with- 
out any notion of its immateriality :  as my was by Solo- 
mon ;  which whether he thought the souls of men to be 
immaterial, does little  appear in that passage, where 
he speaks of  the souls of  men and beasts  together, as 
he does.  But farther, what I contended for, is evident 
from that place, in that the word spirit is there applied, 
to the Bishop cf  Worcester.  49 1 
by our translators, to the souls of  beasts, which your 
lordship,  1  think, does  not  rank  amongst  the imma- 
terial, and consequently inimortal spirits, though they 
have sense and spcmtaneous motion. 
But you say, "if  the soul be not of itself a free think- 
ing substance, you  do not see what foundation there 
is in nature for a day of judgment."  Ans. Though the 
heathen world did not of old, nor do to this day, see a 
foundation in nature for a day of judgment ;  yet in re- 
velation,  if  that will  satisfy  your lordship,  every one 
may see a  foundation for  a day of judgment, because 
God has positively declared it ;  though God has not by 
that revelation taught us,  what  the substance of  the 
~oul  is; nor has anywhere said, that the soul of itself is 
a free agent.  Whatsoever any created substance is, it 
is not of  itself, but is by the good pleasure of  its Cre- 
ator :  whatever degrees of perfection it has, it has from 
the bountiful hand of its Maker.  For it is true, in a na- 
tural as well as a spiritual sense, what St. Paul says*, 
"not  that we  are sufficient  of  ourselves to think any 
thing as of ourselves, but our sufficiency is of God." 
But your  lordship,  as I guess by  your following 
.  ~vords,  would argue, that a material substance cannot 
be  a free agent; whereby I suppose you  only mean, 
that you cannot see or conceive how a solid substance 
should  begin,  stop,  or  change its own  motion.  To 
which give me leave to answer, that when you can make 
it conceivable, how any created, finite, dependent sub- 
stance, can move itself, or alter or stop its own motion, 
which it must, to be a free agent; I suppose you  will 
find  it no harder for  God to bestow  this power on a 
solid, than  an unsolid  created substance.  Tully t, in 
the place above-quoted,  could not conceive this power 
to be in any thing, but what was from eternity ;  ''cum 
pateat igitur aternum id  esse  quod seipsum  moveat, 
quis est qui hanc naturam animis esse tributam neget?" 
But though you cannot see how any created substance, 
solid or not solid, can be a free agent (pardon me, my 
lord. if I put in both till your lordship please to  explain 
it of  either, and show  the manner how either of them 
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can, of  itself, move  itself  or any thing else), yet I do 
nob think you will so far deny men to be free agents, 
from  the difficulty  there is  to see  how they are free 
agents, as to  doubt whether there be foundation enough 
for a day of judgment. 
It  is not for me to judge how far your lordship's spe- 
culations reach:  but finding in myself  nothing to be 
truer than what the wise Solomon* tells me :  "as thou 
knowest not what is the way of the spirit, nor how the 
bones do grow in the womb of  her that is with child ; 
even so thou knowest not the works of God who msketh 
all things ;" I gratefully receive and rejoice in the light 
of revelation, which sets me at  rest in many things, the 
manner whereof my poor reason can by no means make 
out to me :  omnipotency, T know, can do any thing that 
contains in it  no contradiction ;  so that I readily believe 
whatever God 11as declared, though my reason find dif- 
ficulties in it, which it cannot master.  As in the pre- 
sent case,  God having revealed  that there shall  be a 
day of judgment,  I think that foundation enough, to 
conclude men  are free enough to be made answerable 
for their actions, and to  receive according to what they 
have done ;  though how man is a free agent, surpass my 
explication or comprehension. 
In answer to the place I brought out of  St. Luke t, 
your lordship asks, "whether  from these words of  our 
Saviour, it follows that a spirit is only an appearance?" 
I answer, No ;  nor do I know who drew such an infer- 
ence from them :  but it  follows, that  in apparitions there 
is something that  appears,and that  that  which appears is 
not wE~olly  immaterial; and yet this was properly called 
~YE~JU~,  and was often looked upon by those, who celled 
it ?~VE;~FL~  in Greek, and now  call it spirit in English, to 
be the ghost or soul of one departed :  which, I humbly 
conceive, justifies my use of the word spirit, for a think- 
ing voluntary agent, whether material or immaterial. 
Your lordship says, that I grant, that it  cannot, upon 
these principles, be demonstrated, that the spiritual sub- 
stsnce in us is immaterial : from whence 70"  conclude, 
"that  then my  grounds  of  certainty  from ideas  are 
* Eccl. xi. 5.  -/-  Chap. xxiv. ver. 31). 
plainly given up."  This being a way of arguing that 
you often make use of,  I  have often had  occasion  to 
consider it, and cannot  after all see the force of  this 
argument.  I acknowledge, that this or that proposition 
cannot upon my principles  be  demonstrated ; ergo, I 
grant  this proposition to be false, that certainty consists 
in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of 
ideas: for that is my ground of certainty, and till that 
be given up, my grounds of certainty are not given up. 
You farther tell me,  that I say, the soul's  immate- 
riality may be proved  probable  to the highest  degree, 
to which your lordship replies, "that  is not the point: 
for it is not probability, bnt certainty, that you are pro- 
mised in this  way of ideas, and that the foundation of 
our knowledge and real certainty lies in them ; and is 
it dwindled  into a probability at last?"  This is  also 
what your lordship has been  pleased to object to me 
more than once,  that I promised  certainty.  I would 
be glad to know in what words this promise is made, 
and where it  stands, for I love to be a man of my word. 
I have indeed told wherein I think certainty, real cer- 
tainty, does consist, as far as any one  attains it ;  and 
-1 do not yet, from any thing your  lordship has said 
agair~st  it, find any reason to change my opinion therein : 
but I do not remember that 1 promised certainty in this 
question, concerning the soul's immateriality, or in any 
of those propositions, wherein you, thinking I come short 
of certainty, infer from thence, that my way of certainty 
by ideas is given up.  And I am so far from promisirlg 
certainty in all things, that 1 am accnsed by your lord- 
ship of scepticism, for setting too narrow bounds to our 
knowledge and certainty.  Why therefore your lordship 
asks me, "  and is the certainty"  [of  the soul's being im- 
material]  '<  dwindled into a  probability at last ?"  will 
be hard to  see a reason for, till you can show that I pro- 
mised  to demonstrate that it is  immaterial;  or that 
others, upon their principles  without ideas, being able 
to demonstrate it immaterial, it comes to dwindle into 
bare probability,  upon my principles by ideas. 
One thing more I am obliged to take notice of.  I 
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of  all religion and genuine morality, I thought no ar- 
guments, that are made use of  to work the persuasion 
of a God into men's minds, should be invalidated, which, 
I grant,  is  of  ill consequence."  To which  words  of 
mine T find, according to your particular favour to me, 
this reply : "that here I must give your lordship leave 
to ask me, what I think of the universal consent of man- 
kind,  as  to the being  of  God? Hath not  this  been 
made use of  as an argument, not only by  Christians, 
but by the wisest  and greatest  men  among the hea- 
thens ?  And what then would I think of one who should 
go about to invalidate  this  argument? And  that by 
proving,  that it hath been  discovered  in these latter 
ages by  navigation,  that there  are whole  nations  at 
the bay of  Soldania,  in  Brasil, in the Caribbee-islands 
and Paraquaria, among whom  t,here was found no no- 
tion  of  a  God:  and even  the author of  the Essay of 
Human Understanding hath done this." 
To this  your  question,  my  lord,  I  answer,  that I 
think that the universal consent of  mankind, as to the 
being of a God, amounts to thus much, that the vastly 
greater  majority  of  mankind  have,  in  all ages of  the 
world,  actually  believed  a God;  that the majority of 
the remaining part have not actually disbelieved it, and 
consequently those who have actually opposed the belief 
of  a  God,  have  truly been  very  few.  So that com- 
paring those that have actually disbelieved with those 
who have actually believed  a  God, their  number  is so 
inconsiderable,  that  in respect  of  this  incomparably 
greater majority  of  those  who  have  owned the belief 
of a God, it may be said to be the universal consent of 
mankind. 
This is all the universal consent which truth of mat- 
ter of  fact will allow, and therefore all that can be made 
use of  to prove a God.  But if  any one would extend 
it farther, and speak deceitfully for God; if this univer- 
sality should be  urged in a  strict sense, not for much 
the majority, but  for  a general consent of  every one, 
even t,o  a man,  in all  ages and countries :  this would 
make it either no argument, or a perfectly useless and 
unnccessary one.  For if  any one  deny n God, such a 
perfect universality  of consent is destroyed ;  and if no- 
body does deny a God, what need of  arguments to con- 
vince atheists ? 
I would crave leave to ask your lordship, were there 
ever in the world any atheist or no? If  there were not, 
what need is there of raising a question about the being 
of  a  God, when  nobody  questions it? What need  of 
provisional arguments against a fault, from which man- 
kind  are so  wholly  free;  and which,  by  an universal 
consent, they may be  presumed  to be secure from? If 
you say (as I doubt not but you  will) that there have 
been atheists in the world, then your lordship's universal 
consent reduces itself to only a great majority; and then 
make  that majority as great as  you will, what I have 
said in the place quoted by your lordship, leaves ,it  in its 
full force, and I have not said one word that does in the 
least invalidate this argument for  a  God.  The argu- 
ment I was upon  there, was  to show,  that the idea of 
God was not innate ;  and to my purpose it was sufficient 
if there were but a less number found in the world, who 
had no idea of God, than your lordship will allow there 
have been of  professed  atheists :  for whatsoever is in- 
-  nate, must be  universal in the strictest sense ; one ex- 
ception is a  sufficient  proof  against it.  So that all I 
said, and which was  quite to another purpose, did not 
at all tend, nor  can  be  made use of, to invalidate the 
argument for  a Deity, grounded on such an universal 
consent as your lordship, and all that build on it, must 
own,  which  is  only a  very disproportioned  majority: 
such an universal  consent my  argument there neither 
affirms nor requires to be less, than you will be pleased 
to allow  it.  Your  lordship therefore might,  without 
any prejudice to those declarations of  good-will and fa- 
vour  you have  for  the author of  the Essay of  Human 
Understanding, have spared the mentioning his quoting 
authors that are in print, for  matters of  fact, to quite 
another purpose, "as going about to invalidate the argu- 
ment for a Deity from the universal consent of mankind;" 
since he leaves that universal consent as entire and as 
large as  you  yourself  do,  or can own,  or suppose it. 
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ship has given me this occasion  for  the vindication  of 
this passage  of  my  book,  if  there  should be  any one 
besides  your lordship who  should so far mistake it, as 
to think it in the least invalidates the argument for a 
God, from the universal consent of mankind. 
But because  you  question  the credibility of  those 
authors I have  quoted,  which, you say in the next pa- 
ragraph, were very ill chosen ;  I will crave leave to say, 
that he whom I relied  on for his testimony concerning 
the Hottentots of Soldania, was no less a man than an 
ambassador  from  the king of  England  to the great 
Mogul : of  whose relation,  Monsieur  Thevenot, no  ill 
judge in the case, had so great an esteem, that he was 
at  the pains to translate it into French, and publish it 
in his (which is  counted no  unjudicious) collection  of 
travels.  But to intercede  with  your  lordship  for  a 
little more favourable allowance of credit to sir Thomas 
Roe's relation, Coore, an inhabitant of the country, who 
could speak English, assured Mr. Terry*, that they of 
Soldania had no God.  But if  he too have the ill luck 
to find no credit  with  you, I hope  you  will be a little 
more favourable to a divine of  the church of  England 
now living, and admit of his testimony in confirmation 
of  sir  Thomas Roe's.  This worthy gentleman, in the 
relation of  his voyage to Surat, printed but two years 
since, speaking of  the same people, has these words t : 
"they  are sunk  even  below  idolatry, are destitute of 
both priest and tcmple, and, saving a little show of re- 
joicing,  which is made at the full and new  moon, have 
lost all kind of religious devotion.  Nature has so richly 
provided  for  their  convenience  in  this  life, that they 
have drowned all sense of  the God of it, and are grown 
quite careless of  the next." 
But to provide against the clearest evidence of atheism 
in these  people,  you  say, "that  the account  given  of 
them makes them not fit to be a standard for the sense 
of  mankind."  This,  I  think,  may  pass  for  nothing, 
till somebody be found, that makes them to be a stand- 
ard for tl~e  sense of  mankind :  all the use I made of then1 
* Tercy's Voyage, p. 17 and 23.  1-  Mr. Ovington, p. 489. 
was to show, that there were men  in  the world  that 
had no innate idea of a God.  But to keep something 
like an argument going (for  what will  not  that do?) 
you  go near  denying those Cafers  to be men:  what 
else do  these words  signify ?  "a people  so  strangely 
bereft  of  common  sense,  that they  can  hardly  be 
reckoned among mankind ; as appears by the best ac- 
counts of the Cafers of  Soldania,"  &c.  I hope if any 
of them were  called Peter, James,  or  John,  it would 
be past  scruple that  they were men ;  however Cour- 
vee,  Wewena,  and  Cousheda,  and those  others  who 
had names,  that had  no  place in  your Nomenclator, 
would hardly pass muster with your lordship. 
My lord, I should not  mention this,  but that what 
you yourself say here  may be a motive  to you to con- 
sider, that what you have laid sucli stress on concern- 
ing the general nature  of man, as  a  real  being,  and 
the subject  of  properties, amounts to nothing for the 
distinguishing of species ;  since  you yourself own that 
there may be  individuals wherein  there is  a  common 
nature with a particular  subsistence proper to each of 
them :  whereby you are so little able to know of which 
of  the ranks  or sorts  they  are into  which  you  say, 
"  God has  ordered  beings,  and which  he  hath distin- 
guished by essential properties, that you  are in doubt 
whether they ought  to be  reckoned  among mankind 
or no." 
Give  me leave  now to think,  my lord, that I have 
given  an answer  to  all  that is  any way  material  in 
either of the letters you  have  honoured  me with.  If 
there be any argument, which you think of weight, that 
you find omitted, upon the least intimation from your 
lordship  where  it  is,  I  promise  to  consider  it,  and 
to endeavour  to give  you  satisfaction  concerning  it, 
either by owning my  conviction, or showing what hin- 
ders it.  This  respect I shall think  due from  me  to 
your  lordship : though I  know better  to  employ the 
little time my business  and health  afford me, than  to 
trouble myself with the little cavillers who may either 
be set on, or be forward (in hope to recommend them- 
selves) to meddle in this controversy. 
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Before I conclude, it is fit I take notice of the obli- 
gation I have to you  for  the pains you  have  been at 
about my Essay, which I conclude could not have been 
any way so effectually recomme~lded  to the world  as 
by  your  manner  of  writing  against  it.  And  since 
your lordship's  sharp sight, so  carefully employed for 
its  correction,  has,  as  I  humbly conceive,  found  no 
faults  in  it,  which  your lordship's  great endeavours 
this way have  made  out to be  really there; I hope 1 
may presume it will pass the better in the world, and 
the judgment of all  considering  men, and make it for 
the future stand better even in your lordship's opinion. 
I  beg  your  lordship's  pardon for this  long trouble, 
and am, 
My Lord, 
Your lordship's  most humble 
And most obedient servant, 
JOHN LOCKE. 
Oates, May  4,  1698. 
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